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Abstract
Mission education in South Africa became increasingly untenable in the 1940s 
because mission churches lacked the finances to be able to maintain a national 
system of educational provision and because Africans were questioning mission 
education which they increasingly considered institutionally racist. This crisis led 
the Nationalist Government to appoint an education commission to make 
recommendations leading to the reform o f ‘native education7. This commission 
argued that mission education was incompatible with the ordering of society 
envisaged by the government. It suggested that the state should wrestle control of 
‘native education5 from missionaries, enabling it to fashion a policy more in 
sympathy with apartheid.
In 1953 the Bantu Education Act was passed which withdrew state aid from 
mission schools and made their continued registration dependent on the approval 
of the Minister for Native Affairs. The Catholic Church, able to raise the necessary 
finance, decided to continue running all their schools privately. This decision was 
based purely on religious doctrine and meant that the Church taught Bantu 
Education in all of its schools. Of the remaining denominations only the American 
Board had the resources to maintain a single privately funded school.
Aside from a few politicised figures in the Church of the Province of South Africa 
who refused to lease their schools, claiming that to do so was to compromise with 
apartheid, church leaders leased their schools to the government. This decision was 
made because Church leaders considered that Bantu Education, despite their 
abhorrence to its ultimate aims, provided better opportunities to children than an 
‘education5 picked up on the streets.
This decision was made with little, if any, consultation with Africans (parents, 
teachers or students) because church governing structures were undemocratic and 
racially exclusive, denying Africans any meaningful representation. Ironically, the 
decision to lease was in accord with the wishes of most Africans who reluctantly 
accepted the fact that Bantu Education, in the absence of any realistic alternative, 
was better than no education.
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I.
Introduction
The dramatic student uprising in Soweto in 1976, which stimulated all facets of the 
liberation movement and refocused world attention on South Africa, was an expression of 
the anger which Africans felt for the Bantu Education system.1 This explosion of resentment 
which ‘altered the history of the country irrevocably52 demonstrated the centrality of the 
Bantu Education policy to the wider plans of the government. According to the Anglican 
priest, Father Huddleston, of all the legislation passed in the early 1950s, the Bantu 
Education Act was cby far the most important and by far the most deadly.53 This Act 
guaranteed that missionaries would no longer be directly in control of African schools, 
ensuring that the education of Africans would be, for the first time, under the direct control 
of the apartheid architects.
Given its importance to apartheid it is unsurprising that historians and educationalists have 
been much exercised by the policy. As Bram Fleisch has shown, early work suggested that 
‘Bantu Education5 was the creation of a particular Afrikaner mentality which was ‘the 
outgrowth of some misunderstood anthropological concepts, German racial theory 
(attributed to Eiselen), and a peculiar insular Afrikaner “ethnic identity55.54 For such authors 
the Bantu Education Act was the injurious action of a government intent, for ideological 
reasons, on denying Africans the chance to ‘assimilate5 themselves into European society. 
They argued that a benevolent mission education system was destroyed because it offered 
an education equal to that offered to whites, threatening white supremacy through the 
creation of an increasingly articulate African elite.5
1 Throughout the course of this thesis I will describe black South Africans as Africans. This is 
because the terminology ‘black5 also refers to ‘coloureds’ and ‘Asians’. As a consequence of this white 
South Africans will not be tenned Africans, but simply whites.
2B. Hirson, YearofFire. Year of Ash; The Soweto Revolt: Roots of a Revolution?. (London, 1979), 
foreword p. 1.
3 T. Huddleston, Naught for Your Comfort. (London, 1956), p. 160.
4 B. Fleisch, ‘American Education and the Eiselen Commission Report’, paper presented to the 
History of South African Education Conference, Salt Rock, Kwa-Zulu Natal, 26-28 Oct. 1999.
5 In particular see E. Brookes, A South African Pilgrimage. (Johannesburg, 1977).
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This analysis is problematic on at least two levels. Firstly, as will be seen, mission education 
was not the vehicle of racial harmony and equal opportunity that liberal interpretation 
assumed. Secondly, it is over descriptive and lacks analysis. It views educational change in 
isolation, divorced from wider political and economic factors which shape policy, seeing the 
Act simply as the product of an irrational and insular form of Afrikaner nationalism.
In 1984, Kallaway's collection, Apartheid and Education6, endeavoured to move away from 
this dominant ‘liberal tradition5 by demonstrating how the tools of Marxist political economy 
could provide fuller explanations of educational change. The book's contributors argued 
that changes in education policy could only be explained with reference to the needs of the 
political and productive system in South Africa, and as the product of conflict between 
political, economic and social forces in general. The articles by Pam Christie and Colin 
Collins, and Frank Molteno in particular, quickly established a new paradigm in the study 
of educational change.7 They asserted that the interaction between the emerging industrial 
economy and education was of crucial importance. Changes in twentieth century educational 
policy were thus conceived to provide Africans with the skills required by capital, to mould 
them into the new social relations of production brought about by changes in the economy. 
For the capitalist state to survive, they argue, it had to produce suitable workers, in both 
number and quality. In this interpretation Bantu Education was intended to increase the 
number of Africans passing through lower levels of education, in response to the need for 
ever-increasing numbers of semi-skilled workers with basic numeracy and literacy.
Although this paradigm created a welcome new perspective on Bantu Education, it was 
economically reductionist, representing education in an overtly functionalist fashion, and the 
state too monolithically. Schools and the state are both areas of contestation where struggles 
occur both between and within them amongst a multitude of actors with divergent attitudes 
and opinions. Education clearly has a crucial role to play in ensuring the reproduction of the
6 P. Kallaway (ed.) Apartheid and Education: The Education of Black South 
Africans (Johannesburg, 1984).
7 P. Christie, & C. Collins, ‘Bantu Education: Apartheid Ideology and Labour Reproduction’ and 
F. Molteno, ‘The Historical Foundations of the Schooling of Black South Africans’, in Kallaway, (ed.), 
Apartheid and Education.
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labour force, but schools are only one element in a capitalist society and many other 
political, cultural and social forces help, or hinder, the creation and development of 
appropriate capitalist relations of production. Moreover, if schools were successfully 
reproducing, in such a functionalist fashion, the ‘ideal’ African worker, explaining how these 
very schools became the centre of social conflict from the 1970s becomes difficult.
More recent scholarship on the Bantu Education Act has accepted the basic premise of the 
early revisionist interpretation, that the needs of the economy shaped legislation. However, 
it has done so in a less reductionist fashion by indicating other influences that also informed 
policy in 1953. In a thesis and several articles Jonathan Hyslop, in particular, has shown that 
the Bantu Education Act was, in its urban context, designed to act as a form of social 
control.8 He argues that ‘the conditions which prevailed in education in the 1940s 
constituted a major obstacle to social stability.’9 He suggests that there were too few 
mission schools, and those that existed were woefully underfunded and overstretched, so 
that the majority of African youths were uneducated and unskilled, posing a political as well 
as economic danger. Sue Krige, Cynthia Cross and Bram Fleisch have extended the debate, 
and an examination of their contributions can be found in chapter three.
There is no secondary literature dealing specifically with the reaction of the mission schools 
and their communities to Bantu Education. The material that exists can be found within 
general church and mission histories, which are generally poor and lacking in analysis; the 
Act is dealt with briefly, if at all, with little consideration of its effect on church/state 
relations or mission churches’ relations with the wider community. In his major work on the 
church and apartheid John de Gruchy, for example, notes that, ‘The first major crunch in 
church-state relations came in 1957 with the proclamation of Clause 29 (C) of the Native
8 J. Hyslop,1 Social Conflicts over African Education in South Africa from the 1940s to 1976'. PhD 
thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, 1990, ‘The Concepts of Reproduction and Resistance in the 
Sociology of Education: The Case of the Transition From ‘Missionary’ to ‘Bantu’ Education, 1940-1955', 
Perspectives in Education. Vol. 9, No. 2, Sept. 1987. “‘A Destruction Coming In”: Bantu Education as 
Response to Social Crisis’, in P. Bonner (et al) Apartheid's Genesis. 1935-1962. (Johannesburg, 1993). 
‘ State Education Policy and the Social Reproduction of the Urban Working-Class: The Case of the Southern 
Transvaal, 1955-1976’, Journal of Southern African Studies. Vol. 14, No. 3, 1988.
9 Hyslop, ‘ A Destruction... ’, p. 3 94.
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Laws Amendment Act.’10 While the proclamation of 1957 certainly had serious implications 
for church-state relations,11 this statement clearly demonstrates the absence of analysis of 
the Bantu Education Act’s impact on the mission churches in South Africa.
To find any substantial account of mission responses to the Act it is necessary to examine 
mission church histories denominationally.12 While these texts do consider the Act, they too 
suffer from weaknesses. Firstly, and obviously, they only appraise the Act on a 
denominational basis. Consequently there is no comparative analysis of how decisions were 
reached, whether they were made collectively or in isolation, or how the decisions of one 
mission church affected those of another. In general, these works are written by academics 
connected to organised religion in some way, either through links with religious studies 
departments, or through their present or previous employment.13 They are often, perhaps 
understandably, more concerned with providing a better guide to Christian action in the 
future, than to gaining a better understanding of the past. Mostly they have not made any 
significant use of primary sources, undermining their accuracy and analysis. While they are 
concerned with the decisions of Bishops and other church leaders, they rarely examine the 
basis of those decisions. None seek to scrutinize, for example, the opinions and aspirations 
of those who ran the schools at local levels, or those who taught and studied in them.
This lacuna is unfortunate, for the Bantu Education Act presented the English-speaking 
churches with the ideal opportunity to unite in the face of apartheid legislators, as they all 
confronted a serious challenge to their hegemony in the educational sphere. By examining 
the churches’ reactions, both individually and collectively, I hope to address a number of
10 J. de Gruchy, The Church Struggle in South Africa. (Cape Town, 1979), p. 60.
11 It made it very difficult for Africans to attend church services in ‘white’ areas.
12 G. Abraham. The Catholic Church and Apartheid: The Response of the Catholic Church in South 
Africa to the First Decade of National Party Rule. 1948-57. (Johannesburg, 1989). F. England & T. 
Paterson, Bounty in Bondage: The Anglican Church in Southern Africa. (Johannesburg, 1989). A. Prior, 
Catholics, in Apartheid Society, (Cape Town, 1982) C. Villa-Vicencio. Trapped in Apartheid: A Socio- 
Theological History ofTfre: English-Speaking Churches. (Cape Town, 1988). M. Worship, Between Two 
Fires: The Anglican Cmirch and Apartheid 1948-1957. (Pietermaritzburg, 1991).
13 See N. Etherington. ‘Recent Trends in the Historiography of Christianity in Southern Africa’, 
Journal of Southern African Studies. Vol. 22, No. 2, June 1996.
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important issues, such as the nature of ecumenical relations; the priorities of the churches; 
the nature of church and state relations; the ideology of mission education, and the 
importance of public opinion within South Africa and abroad.
It is my intention to move beyond an examination of the origins and long-term policy 
objectives of Bantu Education and examine the immediate effects of the Act on mission 
education. Little research has occurred exploring the impact of the Act on schools and 
institutions, and upon those intimately involved in mission education; the teachers, pupils 
and parents. An important part of this thesis will thus be its emphasis on case studies of 
particular‘flagship’ mission institutions. This will entail a comprehensive evaluation of the 
attitudes and priorities of those most active in African education - local administrators, 
teachers and students. Although there has been limited work on African teachers’ 
organisations, none has looked specifically at Bantu Education.14 Throughout the 1940s the 
relationship between organisations representing African teachers and the provincial 
education departments had been steadily deteriorating due to the failure of provincial 
authorities to address and remedy teacher grievances. The Bantu Education Act promised 
the expansion of African education, the ‘Africanisation’ of all levels of teaching and the 
lower reaches of the schools inspectorate, and the complete professionalisation of African 
teachers who would finally be recognised as civil servants. Given these proposed 
developments it is not safe to assume - as has most of the existing literature - that African 
teachers instantly rejected Bantu Education; some may have welcomed the break with 
missionary paternalism and the promised opportunities.
The response of students and parents is also unclear. Lodge, Hyslop and Feit have argued 
that the failure of the ANC’s boycott campaign indicates that African parents were, at best, 
ambivalent towards Bantu Education. But, as they admitted, the failure of the ANC’s 
campaign had as much to do with mismanagement as anything else.15 In fact, the evidence
14 R. Feteni. Towards Tomorrow: The Story of the African Teachers' Associations of South Africa. 
(Michigan, 1979). Hyslop, ‘Teacher Resistance in African Education from the 1940s to the 1980s5, in M. 
Nkomo (ed.), Pedagogy of Domination. (Trenton, 1990).
15 T. Lodge, ‘The Parents’ Schools Boycott: Eastern Cape and East Rand Townships, 1955', in 
Kallaway (ed.), Apartheid and Education. Hyslop, “‘Let Us Cry for our Children”: Lessons of the 1955-6
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from the Schools5 Boycott does not indicate any consensus amongst African parents and 
pupils. Like teachers, African parents could gain status through School Committees 
established by the Act, which also promised more schooling than provided by the missions, 
so that once again it is incorrect to assume that Africans rejected Bantu Education in the 
1950s as they did in the 1970s. An examination of the reactions of the African communities 
around the larger missionary institutions also highlights how a particular part of the 
apartheid programme affected the daily lives of Africans, and will explore the means by 
which they contested or accepted the policies forced upon them.
I also hope the thesis sheds more light on the churches’ attitudes towards apartheid and 
increases our understanding of missions and churches, the meaning of ‘mission education’ 
and the concerns of those being ‘educated’ in twentieth century South Africa.
Thus, this thesis attempts to examine a moment in the bringing of modernity to Africa. The 
arrival of western education in Africa (with all its manifest limitations and contradictions) 
is a key period in the history of Africa and the rest of the world. Throughout the continent 
missionaries attempted to bring Africans into ‘the family of civil nations’ via the adoption 
of European patterns of behaviour, thus as the Comar offs' argue, colonialism ‘was as much 
a cultural as a political encounter.516 Missionary education must be seen as one of a number 
of modernising forces, such as capitalism, industrialisation and urbanisation, which 
transformed African societies. In South Africa, as in other parts of Africa where there has 
been a long history of missionary activity, educational endeavours were part of a wider 
process to ‘revolutionize African being-in-the-world.517 By the mid-twentieth century 
hundreds of mission schools exited throughout South Africa, all of which were driven by a 
faith in the universal human capacity for improvement; as the Comaroffs’ declare ‘the
School Boycotts’, Transformations. No. 4, 1987. E. Feit, African Opposition in South Africa: The Failure 
of Passive Resistence. (Stanford, 1967).
16 John Comaroff and Jean Comaroff, Of Revelation and Revolution; The Dialectics of Modernity 
on a South African Frontier Vol. 2, (Chicago, 1997), p. 16.
17 ibid. p. 17.
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civilising mission was above all a pedagogic crusade.’18 As a mission statement from the 
American Board declared: education was to create ‘responsible citizens’ who would adopt 
the ‘accepted standards of European civilization.’19 Missionaries saw education as a means 
by which to ‘modernise’ the ‘pre-modem’; to impart to them the ‘benefits’ of white 
civilisation. Such a task was, however, riven with ambiguities and ironies and this thesis 
illustrates the contradictions inherent in missionary endeavour, and how Africans responded 
to these contradictions.
Sources
I made extensive use of mission archives both in Great Britain and South Africa. Such 
archival material was generally well housed and easy available20 and the archival research 
proved very fruitful and stimulating, and led to a number of possible generalisations. Despite 
rhetoric to the contrary, the ‘home’ churches (such as the Church of England) had very little 
influence over decisions taken by the resident churches (such as the Church of the Province 
of South Africa). This indicates the somewhat contradictory nature of the relationship 
between home and resident churches. Home churches certainly encouraged resident 
churches to establish themselves as independently as possible, but were then reluctant to 
give free rein to resident churches when faced with Bantu Education. The records also 
indicate the lack of ecumenical contacts between the churches, as there seems to have been 
little correspondence between them. On the other hand the amount of contact that the 
churches maintained with government officials is somewhat surprising and suggests that the 
churches believed they could influence policy by persuasion. The archives also reveal the 
very deliberate attempts by the churches to foster a public image of consensus. The 
numerous criticisms of Reeves for ‘breaking rank’ clearly illustrate the Anglicans'
18 John Comaroff and Jean Comaroff, Of Revelation and Revolution, p. 412. They argue that 
‘Modernity is to be understood as an ideological constellation, one which gave rise to material practices and 
to concrete institutions erected in its name’, in J. Comaroff & J. Comaroff, ‘Revelations Upon Revelation: 
After Shocks, Afterthoughts’, interventions. Vo. 3, No. 1, 2001, p. 112 (original emphasis).
19 William Cullen Library (henceforth WCL) AC623 Christian Council of South Africa ‘American 
Board Mission: Policy and Aims for the Education of Africans’, Jan. 1954, p. 1.
20 See bibliography.
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determination to present a united front, a determination shared by the other denominations. 
Given the sensitivity of Bantu Education in a racially charged South Africa it appears that 
the white church leadership wished to foster accord to justify their actions to all church 
members.
I completed fourteen oral interviews which I found stimulating, providing as they did a 
valuable break from the daily study of documents. Not only did I meet some wonderfully 
interesting people but I found they provided the context for my archival research, and made 
it easier for me to understand and evaluate the fears and hopes of those involved in mission 
and Bantu education. Nevertheless it is noteworthy that the majority of teachers knew little 
of the passage of the Act in the 1950s and only associated the ‘evils’ of Bantu Education 
with the 1970s.
During the course of my research I had a major car accident in which I broke my back. This 
injury precipitated my return to England and two six month periods of suspension from my 
studies. Inevitably the accident somewhat hindered the development of this Ph.D. As far as 
my research was concerned I feel that I would have managed to complete more oral 
interviews in South Africa if had not been for my accident. I had arranged a number of 
interviews in Grahamstown and Durban which had to be cancelled. However, I did return 
to South Africa and managed to interview some of those whom I had previously contacted. 
A return trip to Gauteng to undertake further interviews and research in the state archives 
in Pretoria had to be cancelled due to both time and financial constraints. Financial 
difficulties also meant that I was unable to consult the American Board archives in Boston.
While I found the archives easily accessible I did encounter a few problems. Primarily, I was 
disappointed at the small quantity of Methodist material available. I had hoped to offer a 
more complete examination of Methodist responses to Bantu Education, including a case 
study of Healdtown school. Although I did find material at the Cory Library relating to the 
Methodists and Bantu Education it was rather limited and, although a small quantity was 
surveyed in the SOAS library, it remains the case that a more thorough examination of local 
and provincial archives in South Africa (for which I neither had the time or the resources)
would be necessary to assess the Methodist reaction to Bantu Education more fully. Despite
Wbeing unable to complete a chapter on Methodist responses, I have referred, were 
appropriate, to their experience of Bantu Education within the chapter which deals with the 
Anglican Church’s reaction, because of the similarities in their responses to the legislation. 
There is a thesis by Margaret Rundle21 which looks purely at Methodist reactions to the 
Eiselen Report and Bantu Education which can compliment this work to offer a better 
explanation of Methodist policy. However, as Rundle herself remarks, ‘few reports survived 
of the discussions on the future of mission education.,22
Also disappointing was the sparse material at the University of South Africa. I had come to 
understand that there was a large amount of archival material relating to teaching 
organisations at UNISA. Whilst this was true, there was very little for the period which I 
looked at. I was also unable, despite repeated investigation, to track down archival material 
that related to St. Peter’s Anglican school in Johannesburg which I had hoped to examine 
in detail. I was surprised at the lack of material relating to Father Huddleston and other 
members of the Community of the Resurrection. The Community itself in Mirfield indicated 
to me that they had no archives relating to their mission in South Africa. Huddleston’s 
papers, which are currently being catalogued at Oxford, may prove more rewarding to 
future researchers. In general school year books and church monthlies also proved 
unsatisfactory, with very little, if any, mention of Bantu Education.
Perhaps the greatest frustration with this research was its narrow focus on elite institutions. 
The vast majority of those involved in mission education, teachers and pupils, were at 
primary schools. However, records simply do not exist for these schools. This in itself is 
interesting and, as this thesis will show, was the product of missionary indifference towards 
primary schools. All recent studies of African education policy in South Africa, including
21M. Rundle, ‘Accommodation or Confrontation? Some Responses to the Eiselen Commission and 
Bantu Education with Special Reference to the Methodist Church of South Africa’, unpublished MA thesis, 
University of Cape Town, 1991.
22 M, Rundle, ‘Compliance or Confrontation? Contrasting Responses to the Bantu Education Act 
1953', paper presented to the History of South African Education Conference, Salt Rock, Kwa-Zulu Natal, 
26-28 Oct. 1999, p. 9.
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Hyslop’s important work, have been limited by this; while they have discussed missionary 
education in a general sense, they have been based upon the archival records of only a small 
number of elite missionary institutions.23
Nevertheless, despite these difficulties I consulted a wide range of archival material which 
has proven richly rewarding for this thesis and has suggested a number of other avenues for 
future research. An examination of the initial years of state control would be fruitful, to see 
how students and teachers reacted to the changes induced by Bantu Education. There is 
evidence to suggest that many students, particularly those in the larger secondary schools, 
reacted with hostility to the new dispensation, continuing the long tradition of disturbances 
and ‘riots’ in schools. An examination of private Catholic schools from the transition to the 
1970s, when it began to give up its schools due to a lack of resources, could perhaps 
illustrate that the purpose of Bantu Education could be successfully subverted through 
imaginative teaching techniques. Additionally, this thesis has revealed that an examination 
of the responses of churches in Britain to Bantu Education could be broadened out to 
encompass a study of British churches1 attitude to apartheid in general.
23 The concerted use of oral history would be of great benefit here.
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'Idealism like Patriotism, is not Enough’1 The Churches Face Apartheid
In 1963 Peter Walshe wrote
For the first sixty years o f the twentieth century, the white-controlled churches o f  
South Africa were very largely absorbed into the country's economic, cultural and 
legal patterns o f racial discrimination.. .the churches drifted with the economic and 
political currents o f  South African history.2
According to Anthony Giddens, Marxist analysis of religion as a form of ideology argues 
that it is ‘[T]he transmuted representation of values which are in fact created by man in 
society" from which the church acts to provide 'principled support for an existing social and 
political order. ’3 There are limitations to this Marxist view, especially its failure to ascribe 
any agency to individuals within any given religion.4 Nevertheless, in South Africa it is clear 
that before 1948 the English-speaking churches, in general, frequently echoed the ideology 
of the dominant white class, and reflected the views of the state. The English-speaking 
churches can in many respects be seen as a microcosm of English-speaking white society in 
the inter-war period. Although they raised dissenting voices against aspects of segregation 
they were themselves too entrenched within the apparatus of white domination to imagine 
a reorganisation of society, let alone lead a crusade for its implementation.
British rule at the Cape and the influx of English-speaking settlers was accompanied by the 
establishment of Anglican, Methodist, Congregational and Presbyterian churches to serve 
their needs, and to establish missionary enterprises amongst the African population of the 
colony. By the end of the nineteenth century they had substantial numbers of white and 
African members.
1 Huddleston, Naught for Your Comfort (Collins, London, 1956), p. 79.
2 P. Walshe, Church Versus State in South Africa: The Case of the Christian Institute (London, 
1983), p. 6.
3 A. Giddens, Capitalism and Modem Social Theory: An Analysis of the Writings of Marx. 
Durkheim and Max Weber (Cambridge, 1971), p. 205.
4 Opposition from church members such as Trevor Huddleston proved that the dominant view of 
the churches could be challenged by individual agency.
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Denomination Nominal Membership African
Methodist 203,067 179,878
Anglican 89,650 41,739
Cong./LMS 41,409 38,539
Presbyterian 30,679 13,5265
Greg Cuthbertson has remarked that these Protestant denominations ‘hardly protested’ 
against the South African War, but rather welcomed it because they believed that civilisation 
accompanied British rule, and the spread of Empire meant the spread of Christianity.6 Thus, 
a British victory would allow them to increase their missionary endeavour and undermine 
the power of the Dutch Reformed Churches. Such faith in the intentions of the British 
Empire stemmed from the churches’ location within the colonising structure. For example, 
most Anglican church leaders were drawn from the upper echelons of British society and 
shared a similar world view with those in government, such as governor generals, - they 
were liberals who believed in imperial trusteeship and the civilising mission of the churches 
in Africa.7
This position led to extensive contact between religious and political leaders from the end 
of the South African War to the victory of the Nationalists in 1948, especially during the 
dominance of the South African Party (1910s and 1920s) when English-speaking South 
Africa was at its zenith. Up to 1948 the majority of English-speaking South Africans with 
access to political power belonged to the Church of the Province of South Africa
5 Figure from 1898 see R, Davenport, ‘Settlement, Conquest, and Theological Controversy: The 
Churches of Nineteenth-century European Immigrants’ in R. Elphick & R. Davenport (eds.)f Christianity 
in South Africa: A Political, Social and Cultural History (Oxford, 1997), p. 55. The category African 
probably included so called ‘coloured5 people.
6 G. Cuthbertson, ‘Pricking the “Nonconformist Conscience55: Religion Against the South African 
War’, inD, Lowry (ed.) The South African War Reappraised (Manchester, 2000), p. 179.
7 Andrew Porter has identified a ‘ shift in outlook5 among British missionaries in the late-nineteenth 
century who increasingly looked to governments for assistance. He argues this was due to a number of 
factors: 1 [the] increased respectability and middle-class nature of the missionary movement, the willingness 
of officials (especially private) to endorse missionary goals either because of a common evangelical faith 
or growing mutual familiarity, and the increased political weight in Britain itself of evangelical and non­
conformist opinion.5 This growing relationship did not mean, however, that there was not ‘frequent tension 
and conflict5 between mission societies and governments throughout this period.. Porter, ‘Religion and 
Empire: British Expansion in the Long 19th Century, 1780-1914*. Inaugural lecture. King’s College. 20 Nov. 
1991, p. 14 & 18.
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(henceforth CPS A) and the synods of all Protestant churches sent annual messages of loyalty 
to the Governor-General. This interaction gave the churches the impression that they could 
influence opinion and policy-making in the Union. While it is impossible to evaluate the 
number and effect of private meetings between church and political leaders, the number of 
deputations, letters, and statements sent to the Government8 are testament to this belief.9 As 
Richard Elphick has argued, The mission Christians relied on the goodwill of those whites 
in administration, politics and business who interpreted administration of Africans as 
trusteeship’.10
The shared appreciation between church and government leaders that trusteeship was the 
most suitable means for successful colonisation and the development of African peoples was 
premised on the assumption that white culture was vastly superior to that of Africans. This 
belief lay at the heart of the churches’ paternalistic view that only through the gradual 
assimilation of European religious and cultural practises could ‘Africans’ become ‘fit’ for 
entry into European civilization. This unhurried development was a constituent part of their 
propagation of British values, which were, in turn, grounded in the liberal belief in 
‘progress’. In this period, Protestant Churches extolled the participation of the educated in 
progressive government, the rule of law and the conviction that ideas, rather than political 
action, brought about change in society. They believed in the gradualism of change and the 
power of the moral will to effect change in the individual and in society, ‘to let God 
transfigure society through the slow gestation of Christ's kingdom in its midst.’11 The 
importance of this creed in shaping church history in this period cannot be overestimated.12
8 From 1912 until the formation of the Christian Council of South Africa in 1936 every General 
Missionary Conference issued resolutions to the government on social issues affecting Africans,
9 Gf particular importance to the churches in this period was J. H. Hofmeyr, a committed Christian 
who was twice a cabinet minister between 1933 and 1948.
10 R. Elphick, ‘Mission Christianity and Interwar Liberalism’, in J. Butler, R. Elphick & D. Welsh 
(eds.), Democratic Liberalism in South Africa: It's History and Prospect (Cape Town, 1987), p. 71.
11 de Gruchy, ‘Grappling...’, p. 368.
12 The gradualist approach to the assimilation of Africans into European society was also 
encouraged because the churches felt the need to protect them from the subversive evils of western 
civilisation, such as gambling, prostitution and alcohol.
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Given their belief in the inferiority of Africans it is unsurprising that by 1900 all Protestant 
churches, congregations and dioceses were segregated. Such segregation was justified on 
the grounds of cultural incongruity (Africans were not yet ‘civilized'), linguistic difficulties 
and natural patterns of racial separation.13 In addition to this, the church was part of a civil 
society which was itself inherently racist, which assumed the superiority of whites and which 
relegated Africans to the most menial roles in society. The Protestant Churches’ adoption 
of this segregationist position greatly affected its relationship with all parts of South African 
civil society and the state.
The relationship between the Protestant Churches and the state in this period was premised 
on the idea that they operated in separate spheres and that it was the churches' duty to 
‘render unto Caesar that which was Caesar’s. ’ Both the churches and the state were part of 
the ‘civilizing mission’, and it was the state’s duty to be part of the structure of authority 
over all citizens. Its role was to provide justice, order and security for its citizens so that 
they could fulfil their destiny as God’s children. The churches’ duty was to teach and 
proclaim principles by which people should live according to God. These spheres of 
authority were, however, separate, and it was not the churches'duty to enter the secular 
political world to pressure governments and individuals. According to Geoffrey Clayton, the 
Anglican Archbishop of Cape Town, it was the churches'duty to ‘state clearly the moral 
problem and leave men to form their own personal decisions.’14 Thus, while the churches 
could, and did, enter into the political sphere, in that they commented on legislation, they 
tended not to do so as corporate bodies as it was not for them to undermine ‘legitimately 
elected’ governments.15
It is not self-evident, therefore, that the Protestant Churches should engage in secular 
political debates or actions. It also cannot be assumed that church leaders considered
53 Davenport, ‘ Settlement, Conquest... p. 65. He remarks ‘in the nineteenth century relationships 
developed which would later provoke a world-wide denunciation of religious apartheid’, p. 65.
14 Quoted in M. Worsnip, Between Two Fires: The Anglican Church and Apartheid 1948-57 
(Pietermaritzburg, 1991), p. 32. For a more detailed examination of Clayton’s position see chapter 8.
15 For instance they may criticise a piece of legislation, such as the 1913 Natives Land Act, but 
would never encourage citizens to disobey it requirements.
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apartheid immoral. At this time many church leaders would not have recognised apartheid 
as the great evil it was later acknowledged to be. As we will see, this position is what 
frustrated a number of radical churchmen in the Anglican Church. These factors did not 
mean, however, that Protestant churches did not condemn government policy; they 
recognised that they had a duty to speak out against policies which they felt subverted the 
creation of God’s kingdom on earth. When Protestant Churches engaged in criticism of 
government policy, however, it was always in terms of their continued belief in the validity 
of ‘trusteeship’. This can be seen in their approach towards the 1913 Natives Land Act 
which limited African title to land to a mere 13 per cent of South Africa.36 In general, the 
churches condemned the Act, claiming that it thwarted the economic aspirations of Africans. 
Nevertheless, they focussed their criticism on its intention to exclude Africans from land and 
agricultural resources rather than on the overall place of the legislation in the national 
system of exploitation and control.17 What the churches failed to do was contextualise the 
Act within the white supremacist framework of the state in South Africa. This was because
the nature o f  the conflict was essentially related to the way in which the government 
imposed and executed its policy, which persons were included within the privileged 
class, and which persons were fit to discharge the responsibility o f  citizenship18
The Protestant missionary enterprise was essentially concerned with the transformation of 
the individual, rather than with society as a whole (individuals would change society 
themselves, from within). The churches’ concern with the Natives Land Act, and much 
subsequent legislation, was not how it impinged upon the rights of Africans in society 
generally, but how it operated to hinder individual Africans from becoming ‘civilised’.
The Protestant Churches'continued belief in trusteeship greatly affected their relationship 
with Africans in this period. Despite the fact that between 1884 and 1911 the number of
16 A figure gradually reached after the 1936 Native Trust and Land Act.
17 J. R. Cochrane, Servants of Power : The Role of the English-speaking Churches in South Africa 
1903-1930 (Johannesburg, 1987), p. 105,
18 Villa-Vicencio, Trapped in Apartheid, p. 78.
15
African Christian communicants rose from 60,154 to 322,67319, their representation within 
the Protestant churches’ governing structures remained inadequate until well into the 
apartheid era. Protestant churches were reluctant to ordain Africans, and it was only after 
the dramatic Ethiopian secessions in the 1880s and 1890s, that pressure from home churches 
in Britain saw their ordination. Attempting to prevent further fractures the churches adopted 
various strategies during the inter-war period to satisfy African opinion. In 1923 the 
Presbyterian Church established the Bantu Presbyterian Church, whilst the American Board 
created the Bantu Congregational Church. Both were created to offer African leadership, 
but maintain close ties with governing missions.20 The CPSA attempted integration within 
the diocesan structure giving Africans a say, albeit limited, in the Provincial Missionary 
Council.21 However, Christopher Gell, writing in 1957, demonstrated how the CPSA rigged 
its synodical voting system so that it could never come under African control.22 The fear of 
African control meant that by the 1950s
in none o f  these forums...had African Christians gained the level o f  autonomy or 
participation necessary to project a strong African role.. .the leadership was still 
overwhelmingly in the hands o f  whites, and church actions and statements reflected, 
for the most part, the concerns o f Africans as perceived by liberal Whites.23
Despite inadequate leadership opportunities within the Protestant Churches some Africans 
saw advantage in their programme which offered education and social mobility into 
professions such as teaching, the ministry and nursing for a small elite. For these Africans
19 Elphick, ‘The Benevolent Empire and the Social Gospel: Missionaries and South African 
Christians in the Age of Segregation5, in Elphick & Davenport (eds.), Christianity in South Africa p. 347.
20 The creation of such churches highlights the acceptance of segregation within the missionary 
hierarchy. Africans would not be allowed positions of authority and influence within the missions 
themselves, so they were separated into their own institutions where they were given the space to express 
opinions contrary to those acceptable to Presbyterian and American Board leaders.
21 Elphick, ‘The Benevolent...’, p. 350.
22 C.W.M. Gell, ‘Colour and South African Church’, Africa South. Vol. 1, No. 2, January-March, 
1957, p. 65. Gell also argues that a favoured tactic of the CPSA was to have its synod meetings in white 
areas. Africa South was a monthly journal, edited by Ronald Segal, expressing the views of white radicals 
who were closely aligned to the ANC.
23 E. Regehr, Perceptions of Apartheid: The Churches and Political Change in South Africa ( 
Scottdale, 1979), pp. 178-9.
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it was advantageous to remain within the Protestant churches.
The under-representation of Africans within the ruling structures of churches should also 
be understood within the context of the racism of white congregations. The significance for 
the churches of racism amongst their congregations was paramount as it limited their ability 
and willingness to fight against injustice. Archbishop Clayton graphically explained the 
difficulties church leaders faced.
The real weakness o f  the Church ’ s position is that we do not carry our laity with us.
Synods will pass liberal resolutions, but for instance in some o f  the country parishes 
in my Diocese the situation is very bad. In one parish a lady ... proposed at the 
Vestry meeting that as there was a certain service which only coloured people 
attended and as the white people paid forthe flowers at the Altar, the flowers should 
be taken o ff the Altar at that service! And I myself have been told by a prominent 
laymen in one parish that i f  coloured people attended the service he would steal the 
key and lock the church ... the pronouncements o f  the English-speaking Churches 
are really the expressions o f opinion ofthe leaders rather than the expressions o f the 
mind o f the Church people as a whole. This is a matter which we have to fight 
ourselves24
Gell also remarked on the fear of the church for cif it acts vigorously against the colour bar 
within and outside the Church, it will lose the allegiance of its white members.’25 Such 
allegiance was a serious matter because white congregations inevitably contributed most to 
church finances.
The Catholic Church in Inter-War South Africa
Although the history of Catholic worship in South Afr ica stretches back into the late 
eighteenth century, it was only in the latter part of the nineteenth century that the Catholic 
Church established itself as a major Christian denomination in the region. By 1898 it
24 Lambeth Palace Library (hereafter LPL), London, Corr. of G. Fisher (Archbishop of Canterbury) 
V. 109 f6 Clayton to Fisher 21 July 1952. Clayton continued ‘Probably one of the most necessary qualities 
for them [the clergy] and for us is a sense of humour. Without that they would go mad or at least have a 
nervous breakdown.5
25 Gell, ‘Colour...’, p. 64.
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counted 17,508 members in the Cape Colony, of whom 14,965 were white.26 Its mission 
among Africans was relatively undeveloped until the start of the twentieth century, for the 
Church found it difficult to ignore the claims of white Catholics. While a number of 
significant mission stations were established among Africans before the South African War, 
most notably in Natal, by 1903 the number of Africans baptized in Natal, Zululand and the 
Transkei, the areas of heaviest Catholic penetration, was only in the region of 10,000.27 
However, despite the internment of German priests during World War One Catholicism 
grew rapidly in the twentieth century, and in 1922 Pope Pius XI issued a decree establishing 
the Apostolic Delegate in South Africa.28 This was followed by a strong missionary drive 
in the 1930s in response to an undertaking in the 1920s ‘to encourage closer involvement 
of the Catholic laity in the Church's life’.29
Like its Protestant counterparts, the Catholic Church was segregated throughout the inter­
war period, not so much by law as by custom. As Dennis Hurley, the Archbishop of Durban 
remarked, ‘Segregation was the rule, and you know those of us born in this country just 
couldn't see any other way, we accepted it...we were very much part of the system.’30 
African and white congregations were separated racially and the church hierarchy remained 
under the control of white Bishops. Again, in common with other English-speaking churches 
the Catholic Church assumed the inferiority of Africans and adopted the idea of trusteeship.
According to Elphick, in the inter-war period the Catholic Church was ‘a minority church 
in a country still marked by considerable anti-Catholicism,’ Unable to gain access to 
influential figures within decision-making circles, it considered itself vulnerable and was
26 Davenport, ‘Settlement...5, p. 55. The first Roman Catholic Bishop was appointed in 1837.
27 ibid, p. 200.
28 The Apostolic Delegate is appointed when the Church has reached a certain level of development. 
Apostolic Delegates represent the Pope and while they take precedence over all local church hierarchies, 
the office is almost entirely advisory. Abraham, The Catholic Church, p. 17.
29 Brain, ‘Moving p. 202.
30 Interview with the author, Durban 19 June 1998.
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reluctant to confront the state.31 Like the Protestant Churches, it also believed in the 
separate spheres of state and church responsibility but, unlike them, it refused to make any 
comment on society as a whole. It tended to adopt a passive role, accepting society as it 
was, and it was not until 1952 that the South African bishops made an official statement on 
race relations.
Afrikaner and African Nationalism
de Gruchy has recently argued that the apparent inability of the English-speaking churches 
in South Africa to offer effective opposition to apartheid was because they were ‘caught 
between Afrikaner and African nationalism’.32 He suggests that the failure of the churches 
was because they were trying to be all things to all people; they were trying to reflect the 
concerns of African and white members, as well as trying to deal with an unsympathetic 
government whose religious creed contrasted sharply with their own.
The slender victory of the National Party in 1948 ended a period of some 150 years of 
relative stability for the English-speaking churches of South Africa. The victory of the 
Nationalists completely changed the landscape of church and state relations as the traditional 
bond between the Protestant churches, the CPS A in particular, and the state was severed 
and with it the churches’ access to the corridors of power.33
This severing was due, at its most fundamental level, to a difference in theology. As has 
been shown, the English-speaking churches in South Africa believed in the gradual 
assimilation of all humans into an inclusive society. Such a society would not materialise 
overnight but would come through the nurturing of the Christian spirit among all citizens 
as individuals who would spread the message of the universalism of the Gospel. Thus as 
‘civilization’ and Christianity spread hand in hand, so South Africa would develop in the
31 Elpliick, ‘The Benevolent...\ p. 348.
32 de Gruchy. ‘Grappling...\ p. 157.
33 In effect, the Dutch Reformed Church became the ‘established’ church in South Africa, allowing 
it to influence policy, rather than the Protestant churches.
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fliture into a completely racially integrated society.34 Such a vision was anathema to the 
leaders of the National Party and contrary to the teachings of their neo-Calvinist theology.
Afrikaner nationalists rejected the universalism of the English-speaking churches, as being 
opposed to the will of God. Biblical justification was used to demonstrate the false goal of 
integration. Afrikaner theologians and politicians argued that the story of the Tower of 
Babel, where God divided the nations and confused tongues, established the divine sanctity 
of nations and people. For the Afrikaners nationhood became a divine concept, with each 
nation having a unique mission and course under God's will; the nation became the central 
form of human existence, and the volk of each nation an expression of their organic unity.35 
Within each nation there were separate spheres of power (the church, state, culture, science) 
each autonomous and yet mutually dependent. Each was sovereign in its own sphere and 
yet they were all ‘characterised by their universal interaction and their harmonious 
supplementation of each other5.36 Within this the state (as part of the structure) was to 
promote and protect God's will, as opposed to the perceived confusion of church and state 
relations under liberalism. Within the Calvinist state, authority came only from God. By 
making the human individual the centre and measurement of all things, the nationalists 
argued, liberals and humanists undermined the authority of God.
Calvinism was theocentric in contrast to the absolutism o f the rational individual 
in liberalism...[AJuthority unequivocally came from God, and could not be based 
upon individual rights.37
Thus in Afrikaner theology the individual5 s needs were subservient to the needs of the volk
34 In this section I will include the Catholic Church as its creed was in line with English-speaking 
churches, and was diametrically different to that of the Dutch Reformed Churches.
35 C. Bloomberg, Christian Nationalism and the Rise of the Afrikaner Broederbond in South Africa. 
(London, 1990), p. 17.
36 A. Norval, Deconstructing Apartheid Discourse. (London, 1996), p. 71.
37 ibid. p72. The liberal and humanist emphasis on the rights of the individual was clearly a 
democratising force. Such a force undermined the pre-ordained image of the ordering and hierarchy of 
society.
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as God required with his emphasis on the group rather than the individual.38 These ideas 
granted the Afrikaners a justification for apartheid where all nations could live out their 
divine destiny as separate entities, in direct opposition to the contemporary moves towards 
the integration of humanity. Nationhood was to be celebrated, with language playing a key 
role in national identity.39 Such a theology did not, however, assume the inferiority of any 
one volk; rather nations were at different stages of development, and at the end of time all 
nations would be at the same stage. This notion obliged Afrikaners to assist others to reach 
their highest state of nationhood, thus Afrikaner Churches had, as a moral duty, to act as 
guardians over Africans.40
After 1948, English-speaking protestant churches could not look on the government of 
South Africa as a natural ally. It was now Afrikaans-speaking, no longer in sympathy with 
British aims, and intent on reducing the influence of English-speakers within the civil 
service. If anything, the English-speaking churches had now become ‘foreign churches’, 
their ability to influence the government greatly weakened.41 This decline in the position of 
the English-speaking churches coincided with the growing politicization of Africans both 
within and outside of these churches.
From the early 1940s, and especially after the Second World War, African nationalism 
became more militant and attempted to engage the African public in ways that it had not 
done before. South Africa’s entry into the war in 1939 against the forces of fascism 
generated new hope amongst Africans that change would take place domestically, and lead
38 The English-speaking churches rejection of Afrikaner theology was based upon the essential fact 
that it represented 'a shift from a universalist to an exclusivist Christian tradition.5 T. Moodie, The Rise of 
Afrikanerdom: Power. Apartheid, and the Afrikaner Civil Religion. (Berkely, 1975), p. 271. In 1955 
Archbishop Clayton argued, ‘we must stand for the right of a man to be treated not as a member of a group 
but as a man.' Quoted from Worsnip, Between Two Fires, p. 18.
39 The promotion of Afrikaans further distanced the English-speaking churches from the 
Nationalists, not only psychologically but also practically.
40 An example of this would be the NGK’s creation, in 1951, of the Bantu Church of South Africa 
which had an all white moderature. See J. Kinghom, ‘Modernization and Apartheid: The Afrikaner 
Churches5, in R. Elphick & R. Davenport (eds.), Christianity in South Africa, p. 145.
4! This is not to imply, however, that the churches had ever had any more than a nominal influence 
on the government.
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to the eventual erosion of segregation. In 1942 Smuts42 dramatically declared that 
‘segregation had fallen on evil days’, and in 1945 promised ‘larger freedoms’.43 During the 
war years the African National Congress (ANC), under the leadership of Dr. A. B. Xuma, 
began to transform itself into a more centrally organised national body attempting to attract 
more members from the educated elite. The 1941 Atlantic Charter, that reaffirmed 
democratic ideals, was adopted by the ANC in its 1943 document, African Claims, which, 
for the first time, set out the aims of the ANC and committed it to the goal of unqualified 
universal suffrage in South Africa. A year after African Claims was produced Xuma 
welcomed the creation of the ANC Youth League (ANCYL) which hoped to generate 
amongst the ANC and the African masses a sense of urgency, by espousing a new spirit of 
militant nationalism and self-reliance.
The 1940s also witnessed rapidly increasing African urbanisation. In 1936 some 1 million 
Africans were living in urban areas; by 1951 there were 2.3 million,44 the increase being 
most obvious on the Rand, This growth had been fuelled by the collapse of the Reserves and 
the rapid expansion of secondary industry which saw many Africans leaving for the cities 
in the hope of finding work. Most came with very little money, and work and housing 
conditions for the majority were abysmal, with many Africans living in poverty and fear 
because of the high level of crime. Urban social policy was totally inadequate in dealing with 
these problems and by the 1940s South African cities, and Johannesburg in particular, were 
facing a multi-dimensional crisis. Mass discontent erupted around community and work 
issues. There were rent boycotts, extensive bus boycotts in Alexandra in 1943-4, and a 
partly successful Anti-Pass Campaign from 1944-6. African workers had shown a degree 
of militancy during the war, especially during 1942, and in 1946 70,000 African 
mineworkers went on strike. They were brutally suppressed by the police and army. The 
period also witnessed the demise of the Natives’ Representative Council (NRC), which had 
been established in 1936 supposedly to offer Africans a political voice. The NRC effectively
42 Prime Minister, 1919-24 and 1939-48.
43 Quoted in T. Davenport South Africa: A Modem History. (London, 1991), p. 306.
44 T. Karis & G. Carter (eds.), From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of African 
Politics in South Africa 1882-1964. Vol. 2 ‘Hope and Despair 1935-52' (Stanford, 1973), p. 79.
22
ceased to function from 1946 as its members realised that they were treated with disdain by 
the government, and could not hope to achieve any substantive change in South Africa.45 
Even its more conservative members had become hopelessly frustrated and were moving 
towards the idea of more militant action.46
The combined effects of these events led the ANC, and African nationalists more generally, 
into a more combative mood towards the end of the 1940s, The victory of the National 
Party with its apartheid platform in 1948 challenged all politically-minded Africans.
The promises that Smuts had made during the war, and his failure to honour them 
afterwards, led to a turning point in African political history. It is from this period that a 
concerted rejection not only of Afrikaner racism but also of white liberalism and trusteeship 
began. The failure of the government to create a new non-racial South Africa after the war, 
the brutal suppression of African mine workers, and the failure of the NRC, led many 
Africans to question the wisdom of aligning themselves with white liberals. Africans had 
seen no erosion of discrimination and began to express their impatience with all shades of 
white opinion. With the ANCYL pushing for a more aggressive and proactive role for the 
ANC, 1949 saw the organisation adopting a 'Programme of Action’ which promised 
endeavours of a confrontational nature with the state and for the first time the ANC 
committed itself to a programme of strikes, boycotts and civil disobedience 47
Albert Luthuli, a leading churchman who served on the Adams College Council, represented 
the American Board Mission on its tour of America in 1948, and later became president of 
the ANC, expressed the views of many African Christians when he remarked:
45 Interestingly ZK Matthews blames the Government’s refusal to appoint a commission to look into 
the causes of the disturbances in schools as one of the reasons why the NRC was suspended. See ZK 
Matthews, ‘Reasons Why the Native Representative Council in the Union of South Africa Adjourned’, Nov. 
1946. In Karis & Carter (eds.), From Protest to Challenge Vol. 2, Document 31, pp. 224-233. The 
government did, however, appoint a committee in 1947 to examine the causes of the disturbances, see 
chapter two.
46 ibid, p.72.
47 For a detailed examination of this period see, T. Lodge, Black Politics In South Africa Since 1945 
(London, 1983) and P. Rich, State Power and Black Politics in South Africa. 1912-51 (London, 1996).
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White paternalistic Christianity - as though whites have invented the Christian faith 
- estranges my people from Christ ... have not many of the churches simply 
submitted to a secular state which opposes expressions of fellowship and our 
membership one of another?48
The disillusionment that many Africans felt did not yet mean the end of the deputation and 
formal letters of complaint, but now they fought for their rights on two different fronts.
Protestant Churches 1948-1953
The English-speaking churches in South Africa entered the apartheid era with their belief 
in the gradual transformation of society by ideas rather than actions unaltered, as a pastoral 
letter from the Bishops of the CPSA to all their congregations in 1952 suggests:
It is not our purpose.. .to put before you a plan of political action or social change.
Such changes are bound to come in this land as elsewhere.. .It is for us to show by 
example that men of different races can work together with mutual respect for the 
building in this land of a social order more in accordance with the mind of Christ49
Despite their opposition to Afrikaner ideology, the churches still viewed the state as 
fundamentally legitimate after 1948.50 According to Charles Villa-Vicencio the English- 
speaking churches were still ‘able to depend on the theological and cultural resources of 
their denominational links in Britain and elsewhere, [so that] their identity has never really 
been hammered out in relation to the ‘hard realities’ of the South African context.’51 
However, these churches were part of the ‘hard reality’ of South Africa. By 1948 a good 
many of their leaders were South-African bom, their institutional ties with British Churches 
were more ceremonial than practical, and they had absorbed and replicated South African 
segregationist structures. Given their experiences in South Africa, their cordial relationship 
and respect for government and their institutional racism, as well as the racism of the vast
48 A. Luthuli, Let Mv People Go (London, 1962), p. 119,
49 Quoted from Worsnip, Between Two Fires, p. 12.
50 ibid, p. 36.
51 Villa-Vicencio, Trapped In Apartheid, p. 14.
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majority of their white members, it seems unlikely that they could have offered a more active 
opposition to apartheid. Worsnip goes so far as to say that ‘The CPS A entered the apartheid 
era severely hampered by the fact that it had within its practices and structures elements of 
the selfsame policy which the Nationalists wanted to enforce. ’52
The unwillingness of the Protestant Churches to disapprove openly of government policy 
is illustrated by their reaction to the 1949 Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act. When this 
Act was passed there was little critical comment, the churches fearful perhaps of the 
withdrawal of marriage licenses. But as Ambrose Reeves53 remarked in 1961:
Today, I believe that the cmcial point for the Church in South Africa came with the 
passing of the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act ... at that moment all the 
churches missed the opportunity of taking their stand on an issue of major 
theological and moral significance54
This lack of opposition to a fundamental piece of legislation as far as Christian witness was 
concerned showed not only their fear of the new government, but also the degree of 
complicity in their racial thinking.
In 1952, one year before the passing of the Bantu Education Act, the ANC, working with 
the South African Indian Congress, launched a programme of mass resistance in the form 
ofthe Defiance Campaign. This campaign against apartheid legislation was to be non-violent 
in nature and was intended to clog up prisons and courts as thousands of Africans and 
Indians deliberately courted arrest by disobeying minor regulations. Once again the English- 
speaking churches were found wanting. The Anglican Church, for example, officially refused 
to support the campaign, publically arguing against it, fearful of its destabilising effects. In 
1955 Clayton remarked more generally about organised resistance to the government, ‘For 
myself I do not think it is reasonable to complain that a government should attempt to put
52 Worsnip, Between Two Fires, p. 59. Racism within the churches also chronically undermined 
their anti-apartheid stand for it not only weakened African support, but gave the Nationalist Party 
ammunition to use against them.
53 Anglican Bishop of Johannesburg.
54 Quoted Abraham, The Catholic Church, p. 29.
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down a resistance campaign. Those who take part in it are breaking the law, and clearly if 
you do that you must expect to be punished.’55
The Churches were unable to deal with the ethical questions raised by the employment of 
illegal action as a means of protest, even when it was premised upon Gandhian principles 
of non-violence and non-confrontation.56 The campaign saw the ANC's membership grow 
from some 5,000 to over 100,000, despite the churches’ failure to support it.57 The Defiance 
Campaign showed the churches’ contradictory position. They recognised the unjust nature 
of apartheid laws, but failed to support the Campaign because of their own deeply held 
views that the church and state should be separate, and the fear and conservatism of white 
members.
The Catholic Church 1948-53
As we have seen, the Catholic Church entered the apartheid era still perceiving itself as a 
vulnerable institution, existing as it did within a strongly Protestant state. Its sense of frailty 
was exacerbated by the words and actions of the Nationalist Government and the Dutch 
Reformed Churches after 1948. D.F. Malan58 told parliament in 1949 that his government 
would not recognise the rights of people or organisations who ‘undermine the principles of 
apartheid, who preach equality and who propagate foreign ideologies.’59
One of the first acts of the new government was to terminate Smuts's immigration schemes 
and in 1949 the Federated Dutch Reformed Churches invited the Hervormde Kerk in a 
deputation to Malan to protest against ‘increasing Roman Catholic influences in South
55 LPL, G. Fisher V. 131 Clayton to Fisher 9 March 1955.
56 B. Clarke, ‘Confronting the Crisis: Church-State Relations’, in England, Frank, Paterson & 
Torquil (eds.), Bounty in Bondage: The Anglican Church in South Africa, pp. 142-7.
57 W. Beinart, Twentieth-Century South Africa. (Oxford, 1994), p. 149.
58 Prime Minster 1948-54.
59 quoted in Abraham, The Catholic Church, p. 24,
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Africa which are threatening to become a danger to the Protestant cause. ,6° In the same year 
a provincial congress of the National Party proposed, unsuccessfully, to exclude Catholics 
from the right to hold office in the party, and a committee was established to investigate the 
position of Catholicism in South Africa. Its findings were published in Die Kerkbode61 in 
1953 and proposed that all Catholic schools, hospitals and other institutions should come 
under direct government control, while the further entry of Catholic religious teachers and 
immigrants into South Africa should be prevented. In addition, priests, teachers or lay 
persons of the Catholic Church who spoke out against the Protestant faith or apartheid 
should be banned. While such recommendations were never implemented they clearly 
demonstrated the depth of hostility to the Catholic Church after 1948. Not surprisingly 
Archbishop Hurley recently remarked of this period:
the Catholic Church still considered itself a kind of alien minority in South Africa,
barely tolerated in some ways and looked upon as the roomse gevacir by the Dutch
Reformed Church, we weren't a very positive, confident church.62
The Catholic Church was desperate to avoid accusations of disloyalty and consequently 
adopted a conciliatory approach to the government. Thus, Archbishop H.M. Lucas, the 
apostolic delegate to South Africa, assured Malan in 1954,4 we [the Catholic Church] would 
always act first by memoranda and consultation’, and would not act in an ‘underhand 
manner’.63
The deep conservatism of the Catholic Church is also demonstrated in its reaction to the 
Mixed Marriages Act and Defiance Campaign, and its first Statement on Race Relations 
made in 1952. The reaction of the Catholic Church to the Mixed Marriages Act followed 
that of the other churches in its timidity; the Bishops Conference discussed it privately but
60 Abrahams, The Catholic Church p. 25.
61 The official organ of the Dutch Reformed Church.
62 Interview with author, Durban 19 June 1998. Roomse gevaar is literally translated as Roman (i.e. 
Catholic) Danger.
63 quoted in Abrahams, The Catholic Church, p. 26.
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made no official statement . Fr Louis Stubbs, the editor of Southern Cross64, commenting on 
the Bishops’ position, reminded his readers that ‘the Church preaches good citizenship, and 
so strives to avoid open defiance of authority even when it considers that authority is 
overstepping its boundaries’.65
After a meeting of the Joint Council of Catholic Africans and Europeans in late 1952, a 
statement was released in early 1953 from the Council, condemning the Defiance 
Campaign, despite African opposition.66 Only African organisation under white, and 
preferably Catholic, ‘supervision’ was acceptable to the church hierarchy. Its statement on 
race relations, issued by the Bishops Conference in 1952, was cautious and paternalistic. 
While it called for an end to discrimination based on colour, the responsibility was placed 
on ‘non-Europeans’ to earn this as a right:
Justice demands that non-Europeans be permitted to evolve gradually towards full 
participation in the political, economic and cultural life of the country. This 
evolution cannot come about without earnest endeavours on the part of non- 
Europeans to prepare themselves for the duties connected with the rights they hope 
to gain.
The Catholic Church did not call for action, other than in peoples hearts, and continued to 
express notions of trusteeship: ‘Though the majority of non-Europeans are still 
underdeveloped, there are many of them well qualified to participate fully in the social, 
political and economic life of the country.’67
The term ‘qualified’ again implied that equality in South Africa was only for Christian, 
western-educated Africans. Segregation or apartheid was only wrong where it impinged
64 Southern Cross was founded in Cape Town in 1920 and was financed by the Catholic Publishing
Group.
65 quoted in Abrahams, The Catholic Church, p. 29.
66 See Southern Cross 31 Dec. 1952, p. 1 and 18 Feb 1953, p. 1.
67 Statement reproduced in Prior (ed.), Catholics in Apartheid Society. Appendix: Bishops' 
Statements. The Statement concluded with the remark that ‘what has been said remains in the realm of 
principle’.
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upon the rights of ‘civilised7 Africans.
The conservatism of the Catholic Church was also promoted by the racism of its white 
church members. Fr. Stubbs noted in 1950 that no matter how ‘many bitterly reproached 
the church for its ‘silence” even more would ‘howl to high heaven if the church did give 
voice.'68 Such was the depth of white opposition to the Catholic Church's making critical 
statements on race relations that in the Transvaal the South African Catholic Defence 
League was established to voice lay Catholic opposition to the supposed disloyalty of the 
South African Catholic Bishops Conference (henceforth SACBC).69 As with the Protestant 
Churches the day-to-day opinions and attitudes of its lay members limited the church's 
ability to maintain a public witness against apartheid.
Ecumenical Links
The failure of the churches to offer an effective, practical and meaningful form of resistance 
to apartheid was replicated in their attempts at ecumenical organisation. The first attempt 
by the churches in South Africa to work together was the creation of a General Missionary 
Conference in 1936 which aimed primarily at eliminating missionary competition. This was 
replaced in 1954 by the Christian Council of South Africa, in an attempt to create a more 
united and inclusive Christian movement. Its early years were characterised by its 
conservatism as it tried to cement relations with the Dutch Reformed Churches. At the 
outset the Council included the Cape and Transvaal synods of the DRC but both withdrew 
in 1941, claiming that the Council favoured the English language and that it differed from 
them in its opinions on the ‘native question'.70 The Catholic Church had also been invited 
to join the Council but, given its international hostility to ecumenical action it declined.71 As
68 quoted in Abrahams, The Catholic Church. p33.
69 This organisation was based on the National Catholic Welfare Conference of the United States 
of America that had successfully coordinated the activities of the Church there.
70 de Gruchy, ‘Grappling...5, pl58.
71 Archbishop Hurley commented on this matter ‘We weren't a very ecumenical church in those 
days... We were unskilled in ecumenical approaches...not motivated enough in the matter of going to other 
churches and working with them’, Interview with author, 19 June 1998.
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the leadership of the Council was drawn from that of its member churches it tended to be 
dominated by white opinion and gave no more concrete or effective resistance to apartheid 
than the churches individually. On 11-13 July 1949 the Council held a Conference at 
Rosettenville on the subject of ‘The Christian in a Multi-Racial Society’. Its findings once 
again stressed the benefits of trusteeship and the dangers of denying individual rights to 
‘mature’ Africans
At this stage in the affairs of our country we accept the principle of trusteeship. But 
we are emphatic that the policy should mean the preparation of the ward for the 
taking of his fiill share in the life of the community. When this maturity has been 
reached by any individual the privileges and responsibilities of full citizenship 
should be granted.72
The similarity of this document to the Catholic statement of race relations of 1952 
is marked, despite ■ the absence of Catholics from the Council.
Churches to 1953
In 1953 the churches were internally divided over the question of apartheid. Weakened73 
both by the victory of the Nationalists and the gradual loss of African support they did little 
more than flounder in the face of apartheid.
As most white church leaders in this period felt that the state in South Africa was legitimate, 
their creed determined that they could not challenge its authority and power, for it was not 
for the church to govern. This led to a situation where the churches could proclaim their 
opposition to unjust laws, but were unwilling to call Christians to act against them, even if 
such action were peaceful. The churches' reluctance to involve itself in secular political 
affairs was not, however, simply the result of religious doctrine. Had the churches been
72 School of Oriental and African Studies Library CBMS A/T.9/1 Southern Africa. Christian 
Council of South Africa, Minutes 1942-60, CMBS Papers,. The similarity of this document to the Catholic 
Statement on Race Relations of 1952 is marked.
73 Alan Paton remarking on the position of the CPS A in the 1950s had argued that ‘Clayton did 
not wish to anger the Government; it was not that he was personally afraid, but he was anxious not to expose 
the Church of the Province and its manifold works to any danger. ’ Paton, Apartheid and the Archbishop: 
The Life and Times of Geoffrey Clayton Archbishop of Cape Town. (Cape Town, 1973). pp. 248-9.
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more democratically organised, with proportional African representation in their hierarchy, 
they may have supported action such as the ANC's Defiance Campaign, and refused to obey 
legislation like the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act of 1949. Unable and, more 
importantly, unwilling, to imagine a transformed society in South Africa, the churches could 
do little more than trust in the power of the individual conscience gradually to change 
society for the better. Given such internal contradictions and conservatism, it is no surprise 
that the Nationalist Government could dismiss church condemnation with ease, for the 
churches themselves, aside from a few ostracised members, practised racial discrimination 
in most spheres of their daily lives.
The tensions and contradictions inherent in the churches themselves were played out within 
their schools. The next chapter seeks to examine the nature and viability of missionary 
education in South Africa at the beginning of the apartheid era.
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3‘Mealie Pap and Hope’1: Mission Schools Before Bantu Education
In 1977 Edgar Brookes remarked that the introduction of Bantu Education in 1953 saw 
mission education ‘butchered to make an ideologist’s holiday.’2 This comment is 
representative of what Jon Hyslop has called the ‘prevalent myth’ of mission education 
which argues that a benevolent and successful education system was destroyed by the 
Nationalists in the 1950s for ideological reasons.3 This ‘prevalent myth’ fails to appreciate 
the chronic state that mission education was in in the 1940s and early 1950s. Mission 
education was in a state of near collapse in the years before Bantu Education. It was 
financially starved, over burdened with students, and internally fragmenting due to growing 
student and teacher opposition to its nature and practice. By the end of the Second World 
War, mission education was, quite simply, ripe for reform.
This was not, however, true of mission schooling before this turbulent period. As we have 
seen, the arrival of western education was a significant moment in the bringing of modernity 
to Africa. South Africa has a long history of mission schooling and for many years mission 
schools self-confidently promoted ‘civilizing values’ to Africans. Many families made great 
financial sacrifices to send then children to these schools believing them to be essential for 
the future development of their children. In 1952 ZK Matthews wrote of the feelings 
instilled in him by attending Lovedale as a boy in 1916.
It is not easy now to try and convey what it meant to a young African boy... to find 
himself at Lovedale Missionary Institution. Elsewhere one could go from the sixth 
standard to a limited kind of industrial or vocational training, or into teacher- 
training school... only at Lovedale could an African begin to study the literature, 
language, history, mathematics, and science which Europeans studied on their way 
to university. Through Lovedale’s gates one passed into the wonderland of
1 Killie Campbell Africana Library (henceforth KC) MS 1279 Douglas Buchanan Mudie, File 1. 
‘Plea For Higher Salaries For African Teachers in the Province of the Transvaal’, memorandum submitted 
to D. Reitz, Minister for Native Affairs. The document is not dated but its content indicates that it was 
written during the latter part of the Second World War.
2 Brookes, A South African Pilgrimage, p. 56. Quoted from Hyslop, ‘A Destruction...’, p. 398. 
Brookes had been closely associated with mission education having been Head of Adams College in the late 
1930s.
3 See Hyslop, ‘Food Authority and Politics...’, and ‘A Destruction...5
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education ... here was the school from which some of the teachers whom I had 
regarded with awe had come ... here I was amongst boys and young men who had 
come from all parts of the country in search of the same treasure, an education that 
would move us ahead in the world.4
“Lovedale5 he concluded, “preformed a great service for Africans. * People such as Steve 
Biko, Albert Luthuli, Jordan Ngubane, ZK Matthews, Joshua Nkomo, Nelson Mandela, 
Ellen Kuzwayo and Phyllis Ntantlala, to name but a few, attended mission schools and 
became significant political and community leaders.5 Mandela, too, has described the 
Methodist institution of Healdtown, which he attended in 1937, as a “privileged academic 
oasis ... [where] we were taught - and believed - that the best ideas were English ideas, the 
best government was English government and the best men were Englishmen ... the 
educated Englishman was our model. ’6
Jelico Njokweni, who taught at Healdtown in the 1920s and 1930s, remarked
they [the missionaries] brought the word of God to us ... we trusted the missionaries 
like anything, they brought education to us... we also accepted their plans and their 
advices to us. That is why I said those days were good days.7
These schools were only available to a relatively privileged class of Africans but this does 
not undermine the fact that for 150 years they successfully captured the hearts and minds 
of this class who saw them as the only means by which to create better opportunities for 
themselves in later life. As we shall see, the fact that missionary education was in a state of 
near collapse in the 1940s, was due in part to churches over stretching themselves financially 
in the face of every increasing African demands for education.
4 ZK Matthews & M, Wilson, Freedom for My People: The Autobiography of ZK Matthews: 
Southern Africa 1901-1968 (Cape Town, 1981), p. 33. He remembers how his family was ‘exultant5 about 
his going to Lovedale.
5 Ellen Kuzwayo notes that ‘the long list of graduates [from Lovedale] bears witness to the high 
standard and quality of education achieved by blacks. ’ Kuzwayo, Call me Women (London, 1985), p. 91.
6 N. Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom (London, 1994), pp. 43-44.
7 Jelico Njokweni, interview with author, Headtown, 18 Jan. 2000.
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The Financial Crisis
Despite changes in the nature of funding, and a considerable increase in expenditure after 
World War Two, African education was grossly underfunded at the very time that African 
demands for education were growing. Spending on African education remained insignificant 
compared to white schooling. For example, in 1945 the state spent about £38 p.a. on each 
white student compared to £3.17.10 for each African.8 This was despite an increase in 
African enrolment which rose from 284,250 in 1930 to 587,586 in 1945.9 The combined 
effects of increased demand and inadequate funding were particularly felt by mission schools 
and institutions. Although mission schools were subsidised by the central government this 
did not include building costs, medical expenses, wages for non-teaching staff, compulsory 
cost of living allowances10 for all staff and the costs of books for students.
In 1946 the Union Advisory Board for Native Education highlighted the urgent need for 
more central funds for African education
the demands for educational facilities for the Africans are increasing so rapidly that 
the increase of 15% provided for on the estimates of the year 1946/7 is quite 
inadequate to meet these demands....it is the urgent request of the Board that 
increases in future be calculated not on a percentage basis but on survey of the 
actual requirements in each Province.11
In desperation the Financial Committee of the Board called on the government to, at the 
very least, make loan funds available to mission schools ‘to ensure that these bodies should
8 Christie & Collins, ‘Bantu Education...5 in Kallaway (ed.) Apartheid and Education, p. 165.
9 M. Horrell, Bantu Education to 1968 (Johannesburg, 1968), p. 51.
10 Imposed by all provincial administrators, and were payable to all teaching staff at mission 
institutions as they were to all teachers in all schools,
11 State Archives Pretoria (hereafter SAB) BNE Box 1. Minutes of the Union Advisory Board on 
Native Education 1946-51. Minutes 11-12 March 1946, p. 2. It continued ‘the amount allocated to the 
Transvaal was in no way based on the actual requirements of that province. ’
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carry on their good work’.12 The situation was so grave that Dr. Kerr13 told the Board that 
‘unless immediate assistance from the Government was forthcoming a large number [of 
mission schools] would either have to provide fewer schooling facilities or close down’ .14 
Similar concerns were voiced by a Union-wide conference of the heads of mission 
institutions in 1949:
The financial problems of Institutions were felt to concern both capital development 
and normal maintenance....Information was exchanged regarding the annual 
shortfall and capital indebtedness of the Institutions represented.... Conference was 
convinced that any lengthy continuance of present circumstances must result in the 
closing of institutions.15
Mission finances were so fragile that they were not only unable to extend their educational 
reach, they were in danger of being unable to maintain their current level of provision. This 
can be seen across a range of mission institutions. The Church of Scotland institution of 
Lovedale in the Eastern Cape, seen by many at the time as the premier educational 
institution for Africans, was £12,000 in debt in 1947.16 Blythswood institution, also under 
the control of the Church of Scotland, experienced a similar crisis; its overdraft with the 
Standard Bank amounted to £11,992 in 1949 (in 1949 it also owed the Bantu Presbyterian 
Church £2250) and by 1952 the overdraft had risen to £14,713.17 In the same year, St. 
Matthews, a Methodist institution also in the Eastern Cape was £11,617 in debt, having 
borrowed £800 over two years simply to ‘carry on.’ The foremost Methodist institution, 
Healdtown, received a letter in 1949 from the Standard Bank requesting a copy of its
12 SAB BNE ‘Minutes...’, p. 4.
13 See chapter 5.
14 SAB BNE ‘Minutes...’, p.. 4,
15 William Cullen Library (henceforth WC) University of the Witwatersrand AB2089 St. Peter’s 
School. File 13 Union Wide Conference of the Heads of Native Institutions, Bloemfontein, 1-2 June 1949, 
pp. 2-3.
16 National Library of Scotland (henceforth NLS) Edinburgh Church of Scotland Foreign Mission 
ACC7548 South Africa B381 Lovedale General Dec. 1938 - June 1956. Standard Bank to J. Beatie (Africa 
Secretary of the Church of Scotland) 6 Aug. 1947. The bank agreed to extend the institutions overdraft from 
£10,000 to £12,000.
17 NLS ACC7548 B372 Blythswood Governing Council Minutes 1949-55. Minutes 31 Dec. 1949 
and Statement of Accounts for 1952.
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income and expenditure accounts, and expressing concern at its overdraft with the bank of 
£11,838.18 A Methodist report into indebtedness at its schools noted that its institutions 
were ‘carrying Trust Debts on buildings amounting to approximately £60,000, while in most 
Institutions there is a considerable shortfall on current accounts.’19 It concluded
It is clear that our efforts to meet the growing demands of African higher education 
must of necessity be hampered if the task is left to the Institutions with no greater 
provision of financial help than is the case at present20
In 1951 the Khaiso institution in Pretoria, under the control of the CPS A, suggested the 
appointment of a bursar to control its financial affairs and to ‘check expenditure’. This 
measure was rejected by the school’s Governing Council, however, because it lacked 
funds!21
The financial starvation was exacerbated during and after the war as the cost of many 
essential commodities rose. In 1950 the Governing Council at Khaiso noted that ‘costs have 
increased in catering and accommodation’22, while in 1951 its principal lamented the 
continued rise in the prices of mealies, milk, sugar, soap, bread and meat.23 In 1951 Ida 
Grant wrote from Adams to her friends and family ‘rising costs have meant that we have not 
been able to make ends meet.’24
18 Cory Library (henceforth CL) Rhodes University MS 16598 Healdtown Institution Papers. File 
5 Administrative Records 1923-76. Standard Bank to Rev. Grant (Headmaster), 16 July 1949.
19 CL MS 153 88 Methodist Conferences 1946-58. ‘Report on the Missionary Institutions Under the 
Control of the Methodist Church of South Africa’, no date, p. 4.
20 CL MS15388 ‘Report on the Missionary Institutions...’ p. 6.
21WC AB2365 Diocese of Pretoria, Box 14 Khaiso School 14.3 Minute Books 1934-56. Governing 
Council Minutes 17 Nov. 1951. The minutes of 5 June 1950 show that the school arranged a fair to raise 
funds.
22 WC AB2365 Khaiso School 14.3 Governing Council Minutes, 3 Nov. 1950.
23 ibid. Principal’s Report 1951.
24 End of school year letter from Ida Grant (the wife of the headmaster, Jack Grant), Nov 1951. 
Letter (and all subsequent letters from Ida Grant) shown to me by Shula Marks who was given they by Ida 
Grant. The financial difficulties that Adams College experienced in this period were exacerbated by a 
number of expensive capital projects that were undertaken at the school. In 1950, for example, the college 
was fully electrified for the first time at a cost of £8000, of which the Native Affairs Department contributed 
only £3890. Iso Lomuzi; The Adams College Magazine. Vol. 17, No. 29, Nov. 1950, p. 5.
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The strained finances of mission institutions resulted in numerous difficulties for those within 
their walls. As the headmasters of institutions had made clear in 1949, the day-to-day 
maintenance and upkeep of institutions, let alone their expansion, became increasingly 
difficult. In 1951 the principal of Khaiso noted, for example, that there was ‘never any 
money over for improvements to buildings which, although they are constantly being 
patched, become more slum-like.’25
Desperate to make ends meet, many institutions attempted to cut costs. For example, at St. 
Matthew’s staff were made redundant to save £1200 per annum.26 In 1951 at Khaiso, staff 
were forced to pay for their food and laundry for the first time, and by 1952 they were 
paying rent for lodgings and the use of electric fires and cookers.27 At Healdtown the daily 
bread ration was lOoz per student before the war; rising prices halved this to 5oz during the 
war, and it remained at 5oz until at least 1953.28 Missionary attempts to cut costs were 
matched by attempts to raise income, but the only effective way of doing so was to raise 
school fees, a measure they realised would be unpopular with Africans. Many parents were 
already making considerable sacrifices in order to educate their children.29 As the 
headmaster of Lovedale remarked in 1953, ‘It seems impossible in these days to run such 
a place as this without loss, unless we raise fees beyond a figure which many Africans might 
find difficult to pay.’30 Similarly, in 1951 Ida Grant noted that at Adams
in the new year we shall have to raise our fees from £20 per annum to £24. This
will make it harder than ever for many parents to send their children to us, and we
are hoping to find the wherewithal to help a number by awarding £4 bursaries31
25 WC AB2365 Khaiso School 14.3 Principal’s Report, 1951.
26 CL MS14831 St. Matthew’s College. Minutes of Council 22 June 1950.
27 WC AB2365 Khaiso School 14.3 Governing Council Minutes 7 June 1952.
28 CL MS 16598 File 5 ? to Garret, 30 April 1953. Healdtown and other Eastern Cape schools were 
particularly hit by a drought which ravaged the area after the end of the Second World War, raising the price 
of food.
29 See, for example, ZK Matthews Freedom for Mv People, p. 29.
30 NLS ACC7548 B379 Lovedale Principal 1947-56. R. Shepherd to J. Watt 23 Nov. 1953.
31 Ida Grant, end of school year letter, Nov. 1951.
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Despite these concerns, fees were raised. In 1951 the fee per student at Khaiso was £15 a 
year; only two years later, after two increases, it was £25 per annum.32 By 1953 the parents 
of pupils at Healdtown were protesting, 'the institution has ceased to exercise patience with 
regard to school fees. Only the rich can send their children to Healdtown nowadays.’33
The weak economic position of mission institutions was exacerbated by the continued 
growth in demand for education. Committed to the expansion of their schools and eager to 
satisfy African desire, mission schools increased the intake of students, putting additional 
strain on their overstretched finances. As early as 1939 J.D. Reinhallt Jones’34 remarked 
'....the increased demands which have to be faced are fast exhausting the resources of the 
missions... .they will soon meet the limits of their service.,35 The Commission of Inquiry into 
the 1946 Lovedale disturbances36 argued that \ .. .the number of students is too large for the 
Institution to handle effectively.,37 At the start of the school year at Adams College in 1952 
the institution admitted 500 students, over 50 more than it had ever admitted before.38
Into the 1950s mission schools were, at best, surviving by raising fees and cutting services
32 WC AB2365 Khaiso School 14.3 Minutes 25 Feb. 1953. The increase to £25 was necessary to 
cover a shortfall in the first six months of 1952 of £200. The minutes of 3 Nov. 1950 noted that the 
‘financial position was throughly unsatisfactory and the only solution was to increase fees substantially.5
33 CL MS16598 File 5 Healdtown Institution Papers, Administrative Records. Memorandum 
Submitted to the Chairman of the Healdtown Governing Council by the Port Elizabeth Parents, 2 Nov. 195 3.
34 Rheinallt Jones was a leading ‘liberal’ and had been founding president of the South African 
Institute of Race Relations which was a liberal research body concerned with improving race relations.
35 J.D. Reinallt Jones, ‘The Crisis in Native Education in South Africa’, International Review of 
Mission. April 1939, Vol. 18. No. 110, p. 197. Note the title of the article which recognises a ‘crisis’ in 
mission education as early as 1939. R. Shepherd, the principal of Lovedale, argued that the ‘chief cause 
of student unrest was that the numbers attending institutions were too great ‘for effective control in the 
present temper of African youth. ’ Star. 4 Dec. 1953.
36 The schools disturbances or ‘riots’ will be discussed in detail in this chapter.
37 CL MS16453 Report of the Inquiry into the Causes of the Disturbances at Lovedale on 7' Aug. 
1946, (30 Nov. 1946).
38 Ida Grant, end of school year letter, Oct. 1952. In 1954 Healdtown received over 2000 applicants 
for the 300 available places. S. Pitts, ‘Headtown Disturbance’ in Umthunvwa. March 13 1954, p. 1. 
Umthunywa was first published in 1937, by the 1950s it was under the control of the Bantu Press and 
presented a liberal outlook.
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and privileges to students and staff.39 However, the budgetary problems they faced were 
only one aspect of the crisis confronting mission education.
The Hegemonic Crisis
The second crisis revolved around what Hyslop has called the ‘....breakdown of previously 
existing trust relations between students and missionaries.540 This ‘breakdown" manifested 
itself throughout the 1940s and early 1950s in an unprecedented degree of student militancy 
directed specifically at missionary authority. Student action ranged from the stoning and 
burning of buildings (described at the time as student ‘riots’ or ‘strikes’) to the refusal to eat 
institutional food and attend church services.
The first recorded mission school disturbance took place at Lovedale in 1876 when students 
refused to eat the food offered to them,41 and continued sporadically at different times and 
places thereafter.42 After the end of the Second World War, however, the number of 
incidents at mission institutions increased rapidly. In 1947 the South African Institute of 
Race Relations (SAIRR.) reported that there had been twenty disturbances in mission 
schools between 1945 and 1947,43 whilst Hyslop has found evidence of a further eleven 
episodes of student unrest up to 1954,44 and I have evidence of a further three disturbances
39 It should also be remembered that these ‘riots’ also drained mission finances because any repairs 
that were needed after trouble had to come directly from mission funds as insurance companies refused to 
pay for damage caused by ‘riot’. The Lovedale Riot of 1946, for example, caused over £220 worth of 
damage.
40 Hyslop, ‘The Concepts of Reproduction...’ p. 19.
41F. Molteno, ‘The Historical Foundations of the Schooling of Black South Africans’, in Kallaway 
(ed.) Apartheid and Education, p. 78.
42 At Kilnerton Training Institution students went on a hunger strike in 1920 demanding more food, 
whilst in the same year between £3000 and £5000 worth of damage was done to Lovedale by students 
protesting against ‘bad bread’. Hirson, Year of Fire. Year of Ash, p. 30.
43 Race Relations Survey 1947 (Johannesburg, 1947), p. 27. Referenced from Hyslop, ‘Food, 
Authority’, p. 10.
44 Hyslop, ‘Food, Authority’, p. 10.
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during this period.45
Hyslop argues that students adopted a predictable and limited repertoire of actions - they 
set fire to or stoned buildings, boycotted classes, attacked prefects and teachers, refused 
food and engaged in petty acts of ill-discipline such as refusing to stand in church 46 In the 
vast majority of cases, when questioned, they maintained they were protesting against the 
poor quality of food. The 1946 Lovedale ‘riot7, which saw 152 students arrested and 
charged, was allegedly concerned with the rationing of sugar, while a disturbance at 
Healdtown in the same year was blamed on a reduction in the bread ration.47 Students did, 
however, ‘strike7 or ‘riot7 for other reasons. At Adams College in 1950, students refused 
to eat, would not sing in chapel and boycotted classes because the college authorities had 
refused the Zulu Society permission to stage a ‘tribal dance7 to celebrate Shaka Day.48 
Hyslop has convincingly argued that the upsurge in student militancy after the war focussed 
on ‘nominal issues7 around which ‘wider and deeper political and social discontents 
condensed.749 He suggests that student insurgency reflected the mood of Africans in society 
more generally50, and that their actions were directly related to their understanding of and 
frustration with the ordering of society inside and outside of mission institutions.
The connection between disturbances in schools and the political situation in South Africa 
as a whole, was forcefully made by the government committee appointed to enquire into the
45 On 29 May 1949 a strike took place at Grace Dieu Training College over food, and students 
refused to eat, or enter classrooms. The police were called and three boys were expelled. Two years later a 
further four boys were expelled for ‘trying to create trouble5. WC AB750 Grace Dieu Training College B1 
Governing Body, Minutes 29 May 1949 & 31 May 1951. B. J. Jordan also recalls a strike at St. John's
College in 1946 over food. See B. J. Jordan, We Will Be Heard: A South African Exile Remembers (Boston,
1986), pp.28-30. In 1953 the principal of Lovedale claimed that there had been 60 disturbances in mission 
schools since 1933. R. Shepherd, ‘Bantu Education at Cross Roads’, Star. 4 Dec. 1954.
46 Hyslop, ‘Food, Authority’, p. 5.
47 Hyslop, ‘Food, Authority’ p. 17.
48 Ida Grant, end of school year letter, 8 Oct. 1950. See also, S. Marks (ed.), Not Either an 
Experimental Doll (London, 1987), p, 28.
49 Hyslop, ‘Food Authority’, p. 6,
50 See chapter two.
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disturbances that reported in 1947. This was a liberal document that went far beyond most 
contemporary thinking undoubtedly because of the open-minded views of its authors. It was 
chaired by D. MckMalcolm, who had been Chief Inspector of Native education in Natal 
(later senior lecturer in Zulu at the University of Natal) whom Brookes described as having 
a ‘progressive outlook.’51 The other members were DDT Jabavu, RE Phillips and HR 
Storey. DDT Jabavu had been educated at Lovedale and Fort Hare and was president of the 
All African Convention (AAC.)52; he had previously chaired the Non-European Unity 
Movement53, and was committed, through the use of non-violent action, to achieving full 
African rights. Storey was a Methodist minister and Phillips was an American Board 
missionary and social worker (he had been principal of the J H Hoftneyr School of Social 
Work for Africans) who was concerned to rouse whites to the problems that faced Africans, 
so as to deflect African radicalism.54
The report them linked the political turmoil outside of the schools and the trouble within, 
remarking on its opening page,c.. .the political situation within South Africa itself has had, 
and is still exercising, a profound influence upon African thought and reaction towards the 
European.’55 Students, it noted,
heard their parents discussing heatedly and sometimes bitterly their small measure 
of representation in Parliament, the colour bar which seems to deny them economic 
opportunity, and the social disabilities in housing, education and leisure time
51 Brookes, A South African Pilgrimage, p. 69.
52 The AAC was an umbrella African political movement established in 1935 to try and halt the 
removal of African voters from the Cape franchise. It sought support by entering into alliances with 
sympathetic groups, African, Indian and Coloured. For a time it posed a challenge to the ANC but lacked 
cohesion and fell away as the ANC revived in the 1940s.
53 The NEUM was created in 1943 by members of the AAC and the Anti -Coloured Affairs 
Department movement to offer a united voice to all the oppressed, and oppose the Africanist elements 
within the ANC. It looked to challenge the government through non-collaboration rather than through direct 
confrontation.
54T. Couzens, ‘“Moralising Leisure Time”: TheTransatlanticCoimectionandBlackJohannesburg 
1918-36* in S. Marks & R. Rathbone (eds.) Industrialisation and Social Change: African Class Formation. 
Culture and Consciousness 1870-1930. p. 319,
55 WC AD1760 Committee Appointed to Enquire into Disturbances at Native Educational 
Institutions, Pietermaritzburg, 26 July 1947, p. 1.
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activities, under which they live. They hear the European referred to as callous and
oppressive and they are inclined to regard all the Europeans they meet as cold,
calculating and unfriendly56
In similar vein DDT Jabavu told the Inquiry into the Lovedale disturbance in 1946 that
the real cause [of the disturbance] is that all present day students grow up in homes, 
rural and urban, where the principal staple of conversation is the colour bar, unjust 
wages, lack of faith in the white man generally, and the whole gamut of anti-Native 
legislation and ill-treatment by public officers57
That students viewed ‘Europeans’ in a poor light did not necessarily mean, however, that 
they would ‘riot’. After all, missionaries prided themselves on providing Africans with an 
environment in which they would be educated into a common civilisation. Mission schools 
were supposed to be places where Africans were shown more respect than anywhere else, 
for the African students were, under missionary guidance, to be taken into the fold of 
‘European civilisation5 to become the educated elite and transcend divisive human frailties 
such as tribalism and racism. The report into the disturbances itself noted that
The missionary and European member of an institution staff are looked upon by 
many students and parents as those who should be friendly; should treat the African 
kindly; should exemplify the Christian ideal of a common brotherhood of all men 
under One Father58
The fact that students did ‘riot5 and ‘strike5 however, suggests that mission institutions were 
not the havens of racial harmony and mutual respect that liberals and missionaries assumed 
them to be. In fact, in what can only be considered as a major critique of mission education, 
the report argued that there were enough ‘disruptive influences at work within the schools
56 WC AD1760 Committee Appointed, pp.3-4. It continued ‘African students come to the 
institutions with a stereotyped picture of the European which makes them suspicious of the good intentions 
of any white man’, p. 6. In 1947 the SADRR noted that the ‘riots’ ‘appear to be symptomatic of a general 
unrest among the African people throughout the country.’ Race Relations Survey 1947. (Johannesburg, 
1947), referenced from Hyslop, ‘Food, Authority’, p. 12.
57 Quoted from C. Kros, ‘They Wanted Dancing and Not Just the Lambeth Walk: A Reassessment 
of the 1940s School Disturbances with Particular Reference to Lovedale’, African Studies Seminar Paper, 
No. 318, University of the Witwatersrand, 27 July 1992.
58 WC AD1760 Committee Appointed...., p. 7. (Original emphasis).
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themselves to account for such disturbances.’59 Beyond such issues as the state’s funding 
of African education and the salaries of teachers, the report squarely blamed the mission 
authorities themselves for being too authoritarian, unsympathetic to student and parental 
concerns, and discriminatory towards African teachers and students.
Despite this conclusion the report began by trying to assess the influence of political 
agitation on mission institutions. First, it dealt with the ‘phenomenal development in the 
provision of newspapers and periodicals for Africans’, before providing evidence that copies 
of the left-wing Guardian and Torch60 were freely distributed to staff and students in a 
number of institutions. It also claimed that it had unearthed ‘traces of propaganda emanating 
from outside the institutions’ and that strike leaflets from the Witwatersrand had been found 
in a number of schools. Nevertheless, the Report concluded that the likelihood o f ‘strikes’ 
or ‘riots’ being organised from outside the institutions was ‘highly improbable. ’61 Hirson has 
categorically rejected the notion that organised political movements directly incited 
disturbances in mission educational institutions, arguing that until the early 1950s political 
movements would have rejected the idea of organising students, because
the aspirations of the political leadership during that period [pre-1950] would have
made them unsympathetic to militant school action, and there was no likelihood that
these elders would have deigned to ‘talk politics’ with ‘children’62
Hirson is referring to the more conservative generation of African political leaders from the 
pre-1949 ‘Programme of Action’ period. These leaders, such as Dr. Pixley ka I. Seme and 
Rev. Z.R. Mahabane both of the ANC, would undoubtedly have rejected the idea of 
politicising students directly and inciting them to violence, preferring to confront the 
problems that faced Africans through dialogue and debate. However, despite the
59 WC AD1760 Committee Appointed.,... p. 18.
60 The Torch was founded by the NEUM and came under Trotskyite influence - it championed 
complete withdrawal from white society via non-collaboration. The Guardian was a socialist paper which 
supported the Communist Party and chronicled the anti-apartheid movement.
61 WC AD1760 Committee Appointed..... pp. 4-6 & pp. 17-18. The report noted that ‘...there does 
not seem to be any concerted drive by the Communists to organise students or to precipitate strikes’, p. 6.
62 Hirson, Year of Fire Year of Ash, p. 29.
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conservatism of its parent organisation there is some evidence that the ANCYL did influence 
students, especially those on the Rand, in the latter part of the 1940s, and, in particular, after 
its mass recruitment drive of 1948.63 The activities of the ANCYL at Fort Hare64 certainly 
influenced student opinion in neighbouring institutions. Fort Hare students had been 
politically active from the 1930s when a so-called ‘Social Studies Society’ was formed as 
a forum for political discussion. In the late 1930s Prof. DDT Jabavu, an academic at Fort 
Hare, further encouraged the discussion of political issues amongst students by leading the 
African opposition to the removal of Africans from the Cape voters’ role.65 An ANCYL 
group formed at Fort Hare in 1948, and in 1949 became involved in a strike at Victoria 
Hospital, on the Lovedale Campus. The influence of this group on the political awareness 
of the students at Lovedale is recalled by Bojana Vujisile Jordan who attended Lovedale 
from 1948 and remembers that
On the weekends, the leading members of the League regularly visited our 
dormitories to initiate us into the intricacies and complexities of African 
nationalism... .These were young men considered firebrands of nationalism not only 
at Fort Hare but throughout the nation....We used to look forward to weekends, 
when we could leam about the national situation66
Another Lovedale student remembers meeting Fort Hare students at a river that ran between 
the two institutions, and being ‘nursed’ in politics by them.67 A student, and later teacher, 
at Healdtown recalls how students from Lovedale, Fort Hare and St. Matthews gathered 
under the pretext of a Christian Movement, but were actually meeting to discuss politics.
63 See Clive Glasner, ‘ Students, Tsotis and the Congress Youth League: Youth Organisation on the 
Rand in the 1940s and 1950s\ Perspectives in Education. Vol. 10, No. 2, 1988/9.
64 Fort Hare was the first higher education college for Africans established in South Africa. It was 
opened as the South African Native College in 1916 on land adjacent to Lovedale, granted by the Church 
of Scotland.
65 Karis & Carter (eds.), From Protest to Challenge. Vol. 2, p. 99.
66 Jordan, We Will Be Heard, pp. 53-54. Esk’ia Mphahlele (novelist and previously secretary of the 
Transvaal African Teachers Association) argues that in the 1940s ‘Fort Hare University College featured 
in the events of the time’, E. Mphahlele, Down Second Avenue. (London, 1959), p. 147. See also B. 
Pogmnd Sobukwe and Apartheid (New Jersey, 1991) pp. 27-43.
61 Cecil Manona, interview with author, Grahamstown, 18 Jan. 2000.
44
He recollects that ANCYL activity was ‘rife’ at Healdtown.68 There can be little doubt that 
in the latter part of the 1940s some African students were awakened politically by members 
of organisations such as the ANCYL, and the distribution of political leaflets and 
newspapers. However, this does not account for the student ‘riots’ in the mid 1940s and 
does not indicate that student disturbances were provoked by direct political interference. 
There was simply not the political will, nor the organisational capacity, to actively recruit 
students in this period and incite them to protest. While the wider political situation in South 
Africa featured in student;, actions, it seems that political movements played a minor part 
in shaping student attitudes to missionary authority and education. In the 1940s and 1950s 
those running mission institutions themselves provoked in Africans a degree of resentment 
that enabled them to link injustices outside of institutions to those that took place on a daily 
basis within them. Mission conservatism and authoritarianism provided a fertile breeding 
ground for student bitterness to boil over.
The most vocal criticism in the report examining student disturbances was the missionary 
failure to appreciate the nature of what it called the ‘new African’. Indeed, the supposedly 
changed nature of African students becomes its central focus;
students in institutions today are rapidly passing from the docile, unquestioning, 
infantile stage into adolescence. They are becoming critical o f  all authority; 
irritating; delighting to shock conservative opinion; they are trying their wings, 
asserting their independence.
‘In the old days’, it continued, students ‘accepted discipline without query, now they 
question it at every turn. This represents a complete change of attitude on the part of the 
African. ’ One unnamed headmaster remarked that ‘present day students are a changed type. 
They are more critical and less inclined to take what is given them. ’ At the same time the 
report pointed out ‘...authority, as represented by the Heads of institutions, still clings in 
many cases to a belief in the efficiency of cold pontifical pronouncement, and shuts its eyes 
to the advent of the ‘new African.” This ‘new African’ was, according to the committee, 
urban, for as an African witness remarked:
68 Jelico Njokweni, interview with author, Headtown, 18 Jan. 2000. Njokweni recalls teachers 
having to sleep in the male dormitories to prevent students from Fort Hare arriving during the night.
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Trouble may arise by reason of the fact that Heads do not know the type of student 
they are dealing with. They know the old type of student, but do not know the 
modem bumptious lad from the city.
Summing up the evidence it noted that ‘it is frequently stated that boys from urban centres 
are less amenable to discipline than boys from rural areas,'69 because of the breakdown in 
family life in the cities, but neglected to offer a more subtle connection. It failed, for 
example, to make the link between the general radicalisation of Africans in the cities, 
through actions such as bus boycotts and pass campaigns, and the effect this may have had 
on urban students.70
If missionary failure to understand the ‘new African5 was crucial the Committee was 
also‘...continually impressed by the fact that the strikes and disturbances arise out of 
conditions which are considered by the students as repressive and ffustrative [sic].’71 One 
significant area of concern to African students was that of discipline. Kuzwayo vividly 
remembers the nuns at the Catholic school of Mariannhill which she attended in the 1930s
We lived with them, they taught us and supervised our manual work 
sessions....everywhere I moved I felt shadowed by a nun. I found them rigid, cold 
and strict, dominating and disciplinarian....The nun that lived with us in the 
residence was old and dogmatic about her Catholicism. For every small mistake a 
student made, she told us we would bum in hell and that the offender was Satan’s 
child72
Esk'ia Mphahlele, who attended Adams College, remembers its ‘ascetic American Board
65 WC AD1760 Committee Appointed... pp. 50-1,57-8. A teacher told the Committee’ present-day
students will not stop a thing until they are convinced by reason. They will not stop because they are told
“Don’t do that’” , p. 14. The Committee highlighted the needfor ‘the Heads of institutions to know the urban
African to-day - the lad who has seen too many white men, of all sorts, to have any respect for white men. ’
p. 17.
70 Many students at mission institutions in the 1940s would have had parents directly involved in 
political organisations and political campaigning. Segregation disillusioned many of the petit bourgeoisie 
from which some of the students parents came-
71 WC AD1760 Committee Appointed...., p. 7.
72 Kuzwayo, Call Me Women p. 81. The motto of Mariannhill was ‘Pray and Work.’ She also 
attended Adams College where she noted that ‘discipline was quite strict’, p. 85.
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atmosphere’ comparing the college to a mine compound;73 an entire boy’s hostel might be 
punished by having to fast for a day.74 At. St, Angar’s Michael Dingake recalls the ‘rough 
justice’ meted out to students at St. Angar’s Institution.75 A letter placed on a noticeboard 
at Lovedale in 1945 called it c....a place of oppression, of tyranny and dictatorship.’76 In 
1946 Torch, criticised the ‘Nazi-like control’ of the mission authorities over students.77 It 
was not only the harsh discipline that students resented, but the excessive control exercised 
over their everyday lives. Jordan recalls how at St. John’s College in Umtata students were 
forbidden from leaving the school campus during the week, and could only go shopping, 
and socialise with girls, once a week.78 Phyllis Ntantala, who attended Healdtown in the 
1940s maintains that
if  there was anything the authorities at Healdtown feared, it was the free mixing o f  
young people, boys and girls. To be seen talking to a boy, without the permission 
o f the matron or the boarding master at the designated places, was an offence. Some 
children were expelled for infringing this regulation79
Control over students’ lives also extended to attempts to limit what they thought. 
Committee members noted that there was ‘a quite universal censorship by the authorities 
of debating questions and subjects for discussion. Questions of a political nature are rigidly 
excluded from the programmes.’80 Such censorship was felt by the students to ‘betray a 
weakness in the authorities’ giving them the impression that the institution authorities were 
not being honest, and were attempting to deny, or at the very least downplay, the social and
73 E. Mphahlele, Down Second Avenue, p. 147 & 145.
74 ibid. p. 145.
75 M. Dingake, Mv Fight Against Apartheid (London, 1987), p. 14.
76 Quoted in Kros, ‘They Wanted Dancing...’, p. 8.
77 Quoted in Hirson, Year of Fire Year of Ash, p. 32.
78 Jordan, We Will Be Heard.... pp. 20-21.
79 P. Ntantala, A Life’s Mosaic. (Berkeley, 1992), p. 66.
80 WC AD 1760 Committee Appointed..., p. 15.
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economic inequalities in society.81 Mission authorities were clearly unwilling to allow 
students to engage in debates which challenged the position of \ whites in society, both 
inside and outside of institutions. There was certainly a prevailing fear over the radicalisation 
of students and its possible consequences for mission education. The extent of the control 
over student lives is demonstrated by Ntantala’s comment on Healdtown.‘Healdtown! ’ she 
remarked, ‘ What a cultural desert! There was nothing to do but go to class and church, eat, 
sleep and play sport.’82 In the autobiographies of Africans who attended mission schools in 
this period one is struck by the emphasis placed on sport by mission authorities.83 This 
would appear to be another attempt to regulate student behaviour by defusing energy and 
frustration through muscular Christianity.
Students were not only frustrated by the control of their daily lives, they were also 
increasingly aware of white racism. The 1947 committee heard student complaints that head 
teachers and white staff members did not bother to learn their names, and simply called them 
‘boy’, causing deep resentment. Students also resented ‘the way African staff members are 
treated by the authorities like big babies’.84 The empathy that African students had with 
African staff members may have shaped their opinion of missionary motives and authority. 
Jack Grant, the principal of Adams College during this period of turmoil, noted that when 
he arrived at Adams there were racially segregated dormitories for the staff. He decided 
against changing this, fearing that ‘any such attempt would jeopardise still further the 
precarious existence of the College’.85 Ntantala also comments on how racist Healdtown 
was in the late 1940sj
81 WC AD1760 Committee Appointed..... p. 15. It continued, ‘radical opinions and wild statements 
will more and more find there way into the institutions. They should be met by candid and frank 
examination and discussion, not by censorship and repression’, p. 21.
82 Ntantala, A Life’s Mosaic, p. 66,
83 In particular see Matthews & Wilson, Freedom for My People p. 41.
84 WC AD1760 Committee Appointed...,, p. 13.
85 J. Grant, The Jack Grant Story (London, 1980), p, 93. He does note, however, that he removed 
a dividing wall in the staff room which enabled mixed teacher gatherings and Ted to improved relations 
among the members of staff, p. 93.
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...Outside our various departments there was no mixing between black and white 
teachers. At the girls ’ school, the two matrons - both white - ate alone in the dining­
room, while the African women teachers ate with the students in the dining-hall. At 
the boys’ school, the white unmarried teachers ate with the other staff in the 
Governor’s living quarters, while the African staff ate with the boys in the boys’ 
dining hall. Most of the staff played tennis but they never played together86
At Lovedale too, white and African staff members did not eat together, and did not eat the 
same food. In the dining hall, white staff members ate at the ‘high’ table, whilst African staff 
members sat with the students. Z.K. Matthews recalls that ‘from their raised dias the white 
staff looked down every mealtime not only on the black students but on the black members 
of staff as well.’87 The report noted that staff members were also discriminated against in 
such matters as seating in church, access to sports facilities, and the provision of common 
rooms; in addition, they were segregated at socials, reprimanded before students, and called 
by their first names in public. On top of this they were often housed in inadequate dwellings 
which were appallingly basic compared to those reserved for whites.88 Members of the 
committee ‘discovered in all institutions visited... .a vital connection between the conditions 
of African staff housing and the attitude of students towards authority.’89
The committee revealed a long catalogue of practices and traditions in mission institutions 
that students deplored. Yet most principals ‘appeared to be quite oblivious of the seething 
discontent at their very doors’.90 It was sharply critical of the absence of communication 
between African staff and mission authorities, and lamented the failure of the authorities to 
listen to, let alone act upon, student grievances. It concluded
Sometimes.... smouldering resentment at alleged unjust treatments bursts into flame, 
whereas, if the authorities had been able to feel the pulse of the institution with any
86 Ntantala, A Life’s Mosaic, p.67.
87 Matthews & Wilson. Freedom for my People, p.32.
88 WC AD1760 Committee Appointed...., p. 13.
89 ibid. p. 89.
90 WC AD1760 Committee Appointed...., p.26.
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sensitiveness, they would have detected the signs long before.91
Jordan recalls complaining about the food at St.John’s College in Umtata. Students ‘kept 
sending delegations to protest and recommend improvements. When the authorities, who 
were predominantly white, ignored our pleas, we decided to go on strike.’92 The committee 
recommended that staff should become more aware of student concerns, and be less 
autocratic in their decision making, implying that to do so would defuse potentially 
explosive situations.
It was not only African pupils who were rejecting mission authority in the 1940s; African 
teachers were also becoming increasingly militant, as they to began to question the nature 
of mission hegemony. African teachers had organised themselves into associations and 
unions from the turn of the century, but it was not until the 1940s that they became 
politically active. Before then they had been rather ineffectual, dedicated to polite lobbying, 
and more concerned with maintaining a professional aloofness from political issues. 
However, as Hyslop notes, ‘during the 1940s the same social changes that were prompting 
a rise in African nationalism generated a new teacher radicalism.’93 The roots of this 
radicalism can be traced back to the 1930s when African teachers’ salaries were cut during 
the depression, and were never fully restored. Moreover, war-time inflation meant that real 
wages for African teachers fell again.
In 1941 the Transvaal African Teachers Association (TATA) launched a wage campaign, 
and followed this up in 1943 with the ‘Blanket Campaign’, which saw teachers attending 
school wrapped in blankets as a sign of their poverty. By 1944 TATA was ready for more 
assertive action, and a mass demonstration was held in Johannesburg. A mile-long crowd 
of teachers and parents walked into the city centre. The subsequent rally was addressed by 
Dr. Xuma, then president of the ANC, an indication of the teachers’ willingness to be
91 WC AD 1760 Committee Appointed...., p.48.
91 Iordan, We Will Be Heard, p. 28.
93 Hyslop, ‘Teacher Resistance in African Education from the 1940s to the 1980s\ in M, Nkomo, 
Pedagogy of Domination, p. 93.
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associated with direct political campaigning for the first time. The Cape African Teachers 
Association (CATA) also became more radical in the 1940s and, at its 1944 conference, 
there were calls for its affiliation to the AAC. Those in favour argued that the time had come 
for boycott and non-collaboration, and, at the 1948 conference, CATA was officially 
affiliated to the AAC.94 At the 1947 conference of the Orange Free State African Teachers 
Association (OFSATA), its president, L.K. Ntlabati signalled its turn towards a more 
militant outlook when he contended that the time had come to fight against the ‘indefensible 
state of affairs’ for African teachers.95
The growing radicalism of African teachers in the 1940s was undoubtedly a manifestation 
of the wider political turmoil of the period. It was also a reflection of the influence that 
graduates from Fort Hare had on the teaching profession. Ntantala recalls how new blood 
was infused into the CATA in the 1940s as many of its politicised graduates left Fort Hare 
and entered the teaching profession with political convictions they had formed at the 
institution. Many of the leading figures of African politics over the next generation 
graduated from Fort Hare in the 1940s.96 These leaders powerfully influenced African 
political movements and their radicalisation, and many were, or had been, teachers.97 As a 
result teacher organisations also changed, increasingly they rejected quiet appeals to the 
government and began to link their own suffering to that of all Africans. This new mood is 
exemplified in a CATA statement in 1948:
It is clear that our struggle is inextricably bound up with the struggle of the African 
labourer. Even our slogan ‘Equal Pay For Equal Work’ is an old trade union slogan 
... In short, to seek equality between white teacher and black teacher is to seek full 
social, economic and political equality between White and Black in South Africa.
Our slogan therefore implies that our struggle is the general political struggle for
94 R.L. Peteni, Towards Tomorrow: The Story of the African Teachers’ Associations of South 
Africa. (Algonac, 1979), pp. 30-1.
95 ibid. p. 74.
96 These included Nelson Mandela (graduated in 1940), Oliver Tambo (1941), G.M, Pitje (1944) 
Tennyson Makiwane (1947), and Robert Sobukwe (1949).
97 Most of the participants at the conference that founded the ANCYL were teachers.
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the emancipation of the African. There can be no escape from this conclusion.98
For mission schools, teacher radicalism represented another threat to stability. As the 
principal of Lovedale wrote to his counterpart at Blythswood:
African teachers, particularly graduates, are claiming exactly the same treatment 
and to have the same customs as Europeans who are their fellow-teachers. If they 
see European teachers who are careless about church attendance and so on, they 
claim (inwardly if not vocally) that they cannot be blamed or dealt with differently 
from Europeans. African teachers feel that their salaries, as compared to European 
teachers doing the same work, are too low.... A European teacher of ours was getting 
£360. Now an African fills his place and gets £117. These things cause trouble."
We have already seen how teachers were discriminated against by mission authorities, and 
the 1947 enquiry noted that disharmony between white and African staff was a ‘fundamental 
factor’ in the disturbances.100 It claimed that discriminatory practices and wage disparities 
meant that the loyalty of African staff could not be guaranteed if trouble were to flare up. 
The threat to the stability of educational institutions of teacher resentment was expressed 
by an unnamed principal who told the committee there would never be ‘harmony in the 
schools so long as there is differentiation in salary and housing.’101 Given the potential for 
the politicisation of students by teachers, it is surprising that the committee did not deal with 
this issue in any practical way, it is likely that disgruntled African teachers hoped to gain the 
sympathy and support of their African pupils. Jordan remembers the political influence that 
African teachers could have:
My favourite teachers were Mr. Knowledge Guzana....and Mr. Cadoc Mnqweno 
....These two would digress from the syllabus and introduce us to the politics of
98 Quoted in Ntantala, A Life’s Mosaic, pp. 147-8.
99 CL MS14714 Records of DHW Shepherd 1899-1970 File A. Shepherd to Amott 23 April 1945.
100 WC AD1760 Committee Appointed...., p. 52. In addition to the grievances that students cited 
over the treatment of African teachers the report also noted that many African teachers did not feel that they 
were full staff members, often being excluded from decision-making forums, (p. 53) They also complained 
to the commission that they were not promoted like white teachers (p. 83), that they had inadequate, if any, 
pension rights (p. 23), that their names were always put on the bottom of lists, their hands were not shaken 
and they were not greeted outside of the schools by white colleges, (pp. 8-9).
101 WC AD 1760 Committee Appointed...., p. 23.
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South Africa. Both were involved in what was happening to the community outside 
the classroom102
In 1946, R. Feldman, a member of the Labour Party and the Transvaal Provincial Council, 
wrote to the then Minister of Education, J.H. Hofmeyr, remarking that
For the past three years I have pleaded the cause of the African teachers.., .1 need 
hardly stress the state of frustration and despair in which African teachers find 
themselves. They have been extremely patient [yet] they are becoming desperate and 
engender a bitterness amongst their pupils which may in time have serious 
consequences103
While Feldman may well have been trying to push Hofmeyr into improving pay and 
conditions with this image, many whites feared that teachers would transmit radical political 
ideas and programmes to their students.
However, the actions and attitudes of individual African teachers during this period of 
turmoil in mission schools remain largely unknown. Although it is clear that they were 
mobilising to fight discrimination on a national scale during this period, the position of 
individual teachers at institutional level remains ambiguous. While they may have agreed 
with the more combative stance of provincial teachers’ associations their fears over job 
security probably prevented their speaking out more publicly. This could explain why the 
committee seemed unconcerned about the role of teachers in the student disturbances. That 
teachers feared that political activity would lead to their dismissal is certain.104 Ntantala 
remember that teachers at Fort Hare were
the most frightened people I have ever had the misfortune to meet. They were not 
happy about the discrimination there, but they spoke of it in whispers, for fear of 
losing their jobs. Racism was rampant105
102 Jordan, We Will Be Heard, p. 25.
103 WC A804 R. Feldman Papers 1914-68. Feldman to Hofmeyr 8 Nov. 1946.
104 See chapter ten.
105 Ntantala, A Life’s Mosaic, p. 123.
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What is remarkable about this observation is that it described teachers in the institution that 
produced the leaders of African nationalism after the war. But there is evidence to suggest 
that by the 1950s, if not before, some teachers at least were using their position to influence 
students. The following circular, which is worth quoting in full, was issued by the Transvaal 
Education Department in 1952 to all schools and was to be posted in school log books to 
be read and signed by all staff members
Cases of teachers taking part in political activity and movements are being brought 
more and more frequently to the notice of the Department....It has further been 
learned that there are teachers who use their position as teachers to further private 
or party political aims or ideologies to encourage disobedience or resistance to 
constituted authority or the laws of the State. The Department takes a very serious 
view on [sic] this matter and all parties concerned are hereby warned that
(a) any teacher found guilty of abusing his position as outlined above, will 
be struck off the role of teachers, and under no circumstances be re-employed by 
the Department or approved of for appointment in registered schools
(b) should it be found that any authority controlling a school is supporting 
such a teacher or passively permitting any such activity or generally fostering the 
propagation of subversive activities, then serious consideration will be given to the 
withdrawal of the financial assistance of the Government106
It was not only dissident African teachers who were undermining the viability of mission 
education. The period of unrest in the 1940s and the general political and social climate of 
South Africa saw a reduction in the number of white teachers seeking work in mission 
educational institutions. The warden of St. Matthews College noted in 1950 that ‘it is very 
difficult to find the necessary men and women to carry on the work efficiently. No 
Europeans appear to wish to take up Native educational work.5107 Adams College also had 
difficulty recruiting staff with Ida Grant lamenting in 1950 that it was ‘one of Jack’s chief 
concerns. ’108 The report o f1947 had similarly emphasized this problem and deplored the fact 
that many positions were being filled by whites who had been sacked from positions in white
106 WC AB750 Grace Dieu Training College 1906-69, A/2 Log Book. Circular No. 70 of the 
Transvaal Education Department, 1952. Given the nature of the threat the reluctance of some teachers to 
become involved in politics seems understandable.
107 CL MS16598 File 5 Administration 1923-76, Warden’s Report for 1950, p. 4.
108 Ida Grant end of school year letter. Nov. 1950. The principal of Grace Dieu noted in 1951 that 
‘....the great problem continued to be the shortage of teachers.’ WC AB750 B1 Principal’s Report 31 May 
1951.
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schools, and were now ‘finding refuge’ in African schools.109 It seems likely that many 
teachers disliked the thought of teaching in African schools because of the threat of ‘riots’ 
and ‘strikes’, and because of their poverty.110
The nature of mission schooling also came under attack from students’ parents. The 
organisation of parents principally took place in the Cape with the formation of the Cape 
African Parents Association (CAPA) in 1946. This was created in direct response to the 
disturbances of the 1940s and had two aims; to promote better understanding between 
students and authorities in institutions and to present the views of African parents on 
problems affecting their children ’ s education.111 CAPA was headed by the Rev. James Calata 
(Anglican Priest and President of the Cape Provincial branch of the ANC). From its 
inception it fought for the rights of students expelled by institutions after disturbances, and 
strongly opposed mission authorities’ handling of disturbances. We have seen that students 
‘rioted’ in a predictable fashion; and mission authorities responded to those ‘rioting’ in an 
equally predictable manner. Their repression of student dissent was very severe with a 
common willingness to call in the police and follow this up with the mass expulsion of 
students. The ‘riot’ at Lovedale in 1946 saw the arrest of 157 students (152 of whom were 
found guilty and charged) and the subsequent expulsion of 87. In the same year police were 
called to St. John’s where their first act was to spray tear gas on the students and round up 
the entire school population on the playing field. The next morning those involved were 
marched by the police into Umtata and all were found guilty.112
These are just a few examples of the use of police made by mission authorities in response 
to student rebellion.113 While CAPA was troubled at this willingness to involve the police, 
their major concern was the mission determination to expel all students active in the
109 WC AD1760 Committee Appointed..... p. 88.
110 The government insisted that white teachers in mission schools were paid the same as those in 
white schools.
111 WC A1729 Calata Papers E5 Cape African Parents Association. Conference 13 Jan. 1951.
112 Jordan, We Will Be Heard pp. 28-30.
113 For further examples see Hyslop, ‘Food, Authority’, p. 19.
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disturbances. In a letter sent from CAPA to the Association of Heads of Native Institutions, 
i t 4 deplored the intervention of the police and the indiscriminate sending home of innocent 
children.’114 CAPA was so concerned about the criminal charges brought against students 
that it set up a legal defence fund which, it argued, ‘has proved advantageous in so far as 
a measure of justice was meted out to the students in that many who might have been put 
in gaol with innocent consciences were saved’.115 The parents were particularly concerned 
about the mass expulsions as they effectively ended an individual’s educational career. There 
were agreements between the major mission schools not to admit students expelled from 
another institution.116 The seriousness of this for students was obvious, but it also had an 
enormously negative effect on parents who had often sacrificed much to send their children 
to mission institutions.117 After a disturbance at Healdtown in 1953, which resulted in 
several expulsions, the Port Elizabeth Parents’ Association wrote to the school’s Governing 
Council:
Whoever is responsible for sendingthese students home has overlooked the fact that 
the parents are standing to lose the huge amount of money they have already spent 
over these children for five years. Thus any hopes of getting a career for some of 
these students have been frustrated and in some cases the careers have been 
destroyed for life118
Parents and students also resented the fact that students were in effect punished twice if the 
police became involved, for they were potentially subject to criminal prosecution as well as
114 CL MS16295 Association of Heads of Native Institutions, Minute Books 1926-55, Minutes 9 
May 1950. After a disturbance at Healdtown in 1953 the Port Elizabeth Parents Association noted that 'To 
[sic] the opinion of the parents this incident was of a domestic nature. Therefore the calling of the police, 
which undoubtedly cast a slur on the good name of Healdtown, was unwarranted.’ CL MS 16598 File 5 
‘Memorandum Submitted....’, p. 2.
115 WC A1729 E5 Conference 13 Jan. 1951.
116 See Ntantala, A Life’s Mosaic, p. 127 and Mphahlele, Down Second Avenue, p. 147.
! 17 For a fascinating account of the lengths that students were prepared to go to in an attempt to get 
themselves readmitted see, J. Bolnick, ‘Double-Cross: Potlako Leballo and the 1946 Riots at Lovedale 
Missionary Institution’, African Studies Seminar Paper, University of the Witwatersrand, No. 265, Feb. 
1990.
118 CL MS 16598 File 5 ‘Memorandum Submitted,,.’ pp. 1-2.
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dismissal from school.119 In addition, parents were alarmed at the disciplining procedures, 
claiming that missionary authorities acted as accusers and judges at the same time.120
The 1947 committee also condemned the harsh actions of mission authorities. It 
recommended that the record of individual students be taken into account before action 
was taken, and suggested that students, rather than being expelled, should be readmitted on 
probation. In addition it condemned the practice of schools in refusing entry to students 
expelled from elsewhere.121 After the publication of the 1947 report, the Governing Council 
of the Society for the Sacred Mission122 appointed a committee of its own to consider the 
report which concluded
we are satisfied that if the matter is properly sorted out, there should be very few 
expulsions after a riot: perhaps none, but rather some apology might be due from 
the authorities to the students who [sic] last resort was to strike.123
Thus there were some mission authorities who were critical of the handling of students after 
disturbances, and felt students were not always dealt with fairly and justly. The principal of 
Adams College, J. Grant, expelled over 200 students in 1950 after a minor case of student 
disobedience. Looking back, he observed T was definitely wrong in my method....I make 
no claim to have handled the situation well. I was distressed that I had taken such drastic 
action.’124
119 See Bolnick, ‘Double-Cross’, p. 6.
120 CL MS 16598 File 5 ‘Memorandum Submitted....’, p. 2.
121 WC AD1760 Committee Appointed....,p. 2.
122 This Society was a religious order which had its routes in the Christian Socialist movement in 
Britain and was committed to alleviate poverty and suffering through social action.
123 WC AB2049 Society of the Sacred Mission File M3 Native Education. Memorandum of meeting 
between the Governing Council of the Modderpoort Schools and the Administrative Committee of Schools, 
which met to discuss the findings of the Committee Appointed no date.
124 Grant, The Jack Grant Story, pp. 93-4, In the college magazine for 1950 Grant concludes the 
principal’s letter by remarking that ‘my heart is very heavy’, Iso Lomuzi: The Adams College Magazine. 
Vol. 17, No. 29, Nov. 1950, p. 7.
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CAPA’s criticism of mission handling of student disturbances was matched by their 
determination to offer advice to mission authorities on how to avoid the ‘riots5 altogether. 
They recommended that, where possible, all boarding masters, mistresses and wardens 
should be African; they demanded representation on school governing bodies; and, to avoid 
student rebellion they argued that ‘students should have their own meetings or councils5 in 
which they should ‘be allowed to ventilate their grievances5.125 This need for students to 
engage in effective dialogue with mission authorities was also stressed by Grant who, again 
reflecting on his handling of the 1950 disturbance, remarked
the whole episode gave me to think in terms of how best to prevent another such 
strike. One of the more obvious things to do was to keep in closer touch with my 
student leaders and to work for better communication between those in authority 
and those under authority.126
The radicalisation of parents with vested interests in mission education also eroded its 
credibility. The report into the disturbances recommended that parental opposition could, 
and should, be defused by the appointment of African parents onto school committees and 
councils.127 However, four years later CAPA lamented the fact that only one school in the 
Cape had ‘promised5 to allow them representation on a governing council.128 The 
incorporation of African into school committees became of vital importance in the Bantu 
Education Act of 1953. The Nationalists were quick to recognise the importance of giving 
parents the impression that their opinions were worthy of consideration.
Conclusion
By the 1940s mission education was in a state of near collapse, and while this was partly due
125 CL MS 16295 Association of Heads of Native Institutions, Minute Books 1926-55. Minutes 9 
May 1950.
126 Grant, The Jack Grant Story, p. 94.
127 WC AD1760 Committee Appointed...., noted ‘There can be little doubt that African sympathy 
on the side of the institutions would be more heavily enlisted if African parents were represented on all the 
various councils and committees’, p. 50.
128 CL MS 16295 Minutes 9 May 1950.
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to grossly inadequate funding, its major crisis was its increasing inability to appeal to African 
students and parents. The essential failure of mission education was that, at a time when the 
majority of Africans, inside and outside of schools, were beginningto question and challenge 
white supremacy fundamentally, missionaries failed to divorce themselves from mainstream 
white opinion. The 1947 report into the disturbances remarked that the missionary of the 
day was ‘succeeding or failing by the manner in which he stands up to the critical 
judgements of students who are on the watch to see how he will identify himself with 
them.'129 In general, missionaries failed to stand up to the critical judgements of Africans, 
and consequently mission education failed with them.
Missionaries became increasingly out of touch with educated African youth, as they failed 
to accept the emergence of the ‘new African.5 As CAPA remarked, ‘many Europeans who 
are working in African educational institutions do not understand the new mental outlook 
of the African child.’130 The irony of this was that missionaries themselves were partly 
responsible for the emergence of this ‘new mental outlook. ’ Their failure to recognise their 
vital role in giving many Africans the tools from which they could broaden their political and 
social awareness was not lost on the 1947 committee which noted
The churches which control African education are largely conservative in their 
outlook but the Committee suggests that they might, with benefit to themselves and 
the African, adopt a more liberal attitude towards the changes which are taking 
place and are largely inevitable as a result o f  this education for which they 
themselves have been responsible131
The reason why missionaries did not have a ‘more liberal attitude towards the changes’ was 
because of their continued belief in the power and agency of ‘trusteeship’ as a vehicle for 
the gradual integration of Africans into a superior ‘civilized European world’,132 which 
missionaries hoped would gradually replace the inferior ‘African world’. Mission education
129 CL MS 16295 Minutes 9 May 1950, p. 9.
130 WC A1729 E5 Conference Address 13 Jan. 1951, p. 2.
131 WC AD1760 Committee Appointed...., p. 51.
132 The Committee of 1947 thanked the missionaries for ‘holding aloft the torch of civilization5,
p. l .
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was to teach Africans how to think and act in a ‘European’ manner to allow for their 
integration into a wider common society.133 The Africans who passed through mission 
institutions such as Lovedale and Adams College were, as far as the missionaries were 
concerned, the lucky few who would lead other Africans by example into the fold of 
‘European civilization.’ Missionaries expected these Africans to be grateful for the 
opportunity that they were being offered. Es’kia Mphahlele, who attended Adams College 
recalled the ‘grim-looking white missionaries who were always telling us at speech day how 
lucky we were to receive an education.’134 In similar fashion, Z.K. Matthews remembers 
how students at mission schools ‘were not supposed to allow any extraneous feelings of our 
own to get in the way of the essential emotion of gratitude’.135
For mission educators, student radicalism and acts of violence during ‘riots’ and ‘strikes’ 
fundamentally undermined what they were trying to achieve. There was a sense in which 
they felt betrayed by student militancy, for these were the very students who were supposed 
to be an example to the rest of South Africa. Ida Grant observed after the 1950 disturbance 
at Adams that the whole episode had ‘been a heavy disappointment to us.’136 If anything, 
missionaries hoped that educated Africans would be less prone to radicalism, having been 
educated in an environment that championed constructive thought over destructive action. 
That there was violence and conflict deeply disturbed mission educators because it indicated 
the failure of their belief in gradual, peaceful change under their guiding hand. That they 
came down hard on those involved in disturbances is thus not surprising, for not only were 
these students damaging property and threatening violence, they were also challenging the 
very basis of missionary endeavour. The alternative response would have been to to 
liberalise schools and institutions and give Africans more influence in policy and authority.
133 Matthews argued that mission education’s ‘avowed purpose was to do things for Africans’, 
Matthews & Wilson, Freedom for Mv People, p. 42. (Original emphasis).
134 N. Chabani Manganyi, Exiles and Homecomings: A Biography of Es’kia Mphahlele 
(Johannesburg, 1983), p. 64. Despite being a biography much of Manganyi’s book is written in the first 
person which I have assumed are transcripts of oral interviews conducted with Mphahlele. For this reason 
I have quoted Mphahlele directly from this text.
135 Matthews & Wilson, Freedom for Mv People, p. 42.
136 Ida Grant, End of School Year Letter, 8 Oct. 1950.
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That missionaries chose not to do this is indicative of their unwillingness to give more 
responsibility to Africans, demonstrating their continued faith in trusteeship and their own 
often unconscious racism.
Missionaries were not trying to create politically aware students, and that they were in effect 
doing so was deeply worrying for them. The churches and mission societies which ran 
African education shied away from confrontational politics and actions in their day-to-day 
existence and they expected the same from students attending their schools. Missionaries 
chose not to recognise or acknowledge the "new mental outlook’ of African students as to 
do so would have subverted the purpose of mission education. They could not take 
responsibility for African radicalism, instead blaming the problems that swept through 
mission schools on the wider political situation. Ida Grant reflecting on the Adams ‘riot5 
commented, "we realise that it is the price we have to pay for living in a land where race 
relations are not happy.’137 By failing to examine their role in producing student militancy, 
mission authorities failed to recognise the repressive and racist atmosphere that existed in 
most mission institutions. An unnamed witness to the 1947 commission observed, The 
institution is a microcosm identical to the world without. The student’s agitated state of 
mind is not eased by the conditions within the institution.’138
Even when mission authorities identified racist practises they were reluctant to challenge 
them. Lavinia Scott, the principal of Inanda Seminary school wrote in 1951 ‘it seems quite 
wrong for our two staff groups to be so separate, but the practical difficulties in the way of 
closer fellowship are very real, and hard to overcome. ’139 Mission authorities were unwilling 
to take concrete steps to address the racism in their institutions and thus demonstrate to 
African staff and students a real commitment to racial equality. The inability of mission 
authorities to appreciate that conditions inside mission institutions in many ways reflected 
the racist society outside of them was demonstrated by Ida Grant’s comment in 1952, that
137 Ida Grant, End of School Year Letter, 8 Oct. 1950,
138 WC ADI760 Committee Appointed...., p. 7.
139 KC MS52907 Inanda Seminary File 5b Misc. Correspondence. Lavinia Scott to John Reuling 
(African Secretary' of the American Board Mission) 17 July 1951.
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despite ‘living in an explosive atmosphere in this country....Adams is still an oasis.’140 It
seems highly unlikely that African students and staff members would have agreed with that
noV
description of Adams. Missionaries themselves may^have been racist but the report of 1947 
seems to indicate a serious level of institutional racism within many mission institutions. 
Despite the best intentions of individuals, striking reference is made time and again to racist 
customs and habits which white missionaries seemed oblivious to. Life for African staff and 
students was ruled by racist routines which undoubtedly did much to undermine the 
credibility of mission education.141
It is not surprising that by the 1940s there was an increasing tide of opinion, including 
among many missionaries,142 that greater state intervention in mission education was 
essential. The Union Advisory Board on Native Education recorded its belief in 1948 that
a goodly number are beginning to despair at the trends in present missionary 
control...there is undoubtedly increased weight of opinion that all education, 
including High School and Teacher Training should be handed over to the 
Government143
By the 1940s mission education was desperately in need of change. It was riven with internal 
contradictions as missionaries preached notions of racial harmony from institutions plagued 
by racist practises. Africans were told to fight for what they believed in through dialogue 
rather than confrontation, yet were denied a voice within the institutions themselves. African 
teachers had more in common with African students than they did with other staff members,
140 Ida Grant, End of School Year Letter, Oct. 1952.
141 In 1952 ZK Matthews remarked ‘in essence, Lovedale has remained a mirror of the society of 
which it is part. It has provided advantages for Africans, but it has also reproduced all the circumstances 
against which Africans must contend.5 Matthews, Freedom for Mv People, p. 43.
142 R.H. W. Shepherd, noted as early as 1943 ‘For ourselves we would not mourn if the churches 
did less in the management of schools’, R.H.W. Shepherd, ‘The Churches and the Future of Native 
Education: An Individual Viewpoint (Lovedale, 1943), p. 7. In the same year he told the South African 
Outlook, that ‘the gradual shifting of education from the Church to the State is a natural development in 
all communities’Dec. 1943,p. 165. The South African Outlook was the official organ of the CCS A and its 
readership consisted of the liberal multi-racial elite. Huddleston argued that mission education in this period 
was ‘hopelessly inadequate’ a situation that ‘least of all the Christian missionary, would have a wish to 
deny.’ Huddleston, Naught for Your Comfort, p. 163.
143 SAB BNE Box 1. Minutes, 22 Feb. 1948.
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who shunned them because of the colour of their skin. And, in the face of the post-war 
emergence of African nationalist radicalism, most mission authorities, bereft of vision and 
courage, reaffirmed their belief in the respect for authority, and the agency of trusteeship for 
African advancement and gradualist integration - the very policies and principles that 
Africans were rejecting.
In 1948 the Nationalists came to power determined to reinvent African education to ensure 
that the radicalism that swept the schools in the 1940s did not repeat itself. How the 
government proposed to address this issue is examined in the following chapter.
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Raising Schools to ‘Mighty Instruments*1 :The Commission on Native Education in the
Union (Eiselen Report) and Apartheid
The Commission on Native Education in the Union made its Report available to the House 
of Assembly on the 11th February 1952. The Report, signed by all members of the 
Commission, covered 233 double columned folio pages and included the "dissentient 
remarks relative to certain paragraphs of the Report’ by Professor A. Murray.2 The Report 
was the culmination of three years of investigation into the position of "Native’ education 
in the Union. It had involved 158 public hearings across the country, visits by commissioners 
outside the Union and the distribution of a questionnaire to all those who expressed an 
interest in African education.
W.W.M. Eiselen was Chair, and there were seven other members of the Commission: J. de 
Wet Keyter, Professor of Sociology and Social Work at the University of the Orange Free 
State; A. Murray, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Cape Town; P. Cook, 
Director of the National Bureau for Educational and Social Research; G. Gerdener, 
Professor of Theology at the Stellenbosch Seminary; M. C. de Wet Nel, a Nationalist 
Member of Parliament and later Minister of Bantu Affairs and Development; W. Hofmeyr 
from the Gape and J. Macleod, a former Chief Inspector of Native Education in Natal.3 Six 
of the Commissioners were academics (which contrasted with the amateurism of the 
missions), six were members of the "Dutch’ churches and Afrikaans speakers and 
"none,... opposed the fundamental principles of apartheid’.4
1 Eiselen Report, p. 144
2 ibid. Murray's dissentient remarks ran to a not inconsiderable 16 pages but received no comment 
from the other commissioners or acknowledgment in the conclusion of the Report. However, as the South 
African Outlook noted, ‘It must not be thought...that Professor Murray is greatly at variance with his 
colleagues on the main issues, and he is certainly not more liberal. ’ The South African Outlook, March 1st 
1952, p. 36.
3 Bram Fleisch, ‘The Teachers’ College Club: American Educational Discourse and the Origins 
of Bantu Education in South Africa 1914-51', Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Columbia, 1994, p. 
243-4.
4C.Kros, ‘Economic, Political and Intellectual Origins of Bantu Education, 1926-51', Unpublished 
PhD thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, 1997, p. 323. The South African Bureau of Racial Affairs 
journal commented, ‘From its composition it is evident that the Commission was expected to study the 
problems connected with Bantu Education in a scientific and objective manner.. .the choice of members was
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All the major statutes of apartheid have emerged from Commissions of Enquiry - the 1913 
Natives Land Act, the 1936 Representation of Natives Act, the 1953 Bantu Education Act, 
and the 1959 Bantu Self-Government Act. These Commissions of Enquiry, ‘symbolic rituals 
of the state’, addressed the ‘Native Question’ in South Africa as a technical matter of 
administration requiring rational solution.5 They were created as arenas where problems 
could be solved as workable policies were hammered out. Simultaneously, through public 
dialogue, they attempted, as Crain Soudain argues, ‘to conjure up the appurtenances of 
neutrality and accountability.56 In keeping with this analysis, the parameters of the Eiselen 
Commission Report were defined by ‘experts’ who argued that social problems could be 
solved by rational, considered plans of action. The Report was an attempt to justify the need 
for a racially differentiated educational system necessary for the maintenance of white 
domination.
Although it is not my intention to give a detailed account of the origins of the Eiselen 
Report, it is necessary to locate it within the context of apartheid policy-making.7 Deborah 
Posel has convincingly demonstrated that the National Party did not come to power in 1948 
with a single ‘grand plan’ for the total separation of the races in South Africa: the idea of 
apartheid was fiercely contested and there was no clear agreement among members of the 
National Party as to what it actually meant in practice.8 In 1948 apartheid promised the 
simultaneous pursuit of white supremacy and white economic prosperity, but there was no 
general agreement on how best this could be achieved. From 1948 some members of the 
Nationalist alliance, such as the Dutch Reformed Church and the South African Bureau of
a sound one.’ ‘The Commission on Native Education (1949-51): Summary of Findings and 
Recommendations’, The Journal of Racial Affairs April 1952, Vol. 3, p. 6.
5 This understanding of Commissions of Enquiry is taken from A. Ashforth, The Politics of Official 
Discourse in Twentieth Century South Africa (Oxford, 1990), pp. 1-21.
6 Crain Soudain, ‘ Racial Discourse in the Commission on Native Education (Eiselen Commission), 
1949-51: The Making of a "Bantu” Identity’, unpublished paper.
7 For an explanation of the legislative changes that the Eiselen Report generated via Bantu 
Education legislation see appendix.
8 See D. Posel, The Making of Apartheid 1948-1961: Conflict and Compromise (Oxford, 1997).
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Racial Affairs (SABRA)9, called for the immediate introduction of vertical10 apartheid, but
this was rejected by National Party leaders. Prime Minister D.F. Malan argued in 1950
Total segregation is not the policy of our party and it is nowhere to be found in our 
official declarations of policy...I said it clearly on platforms, that total separation 
was impracticable under present circumstances in South Africa, where our whole 
economic structure is to a large extent based on Native labour.11
The reason for Malan’s rejection of total separation was clear; the South African economy 
was far too reliant on cheap African labour to be able to function effectively without it. The 
apartheid policy of the Nationalists during their first term in office reflected their immediate 
pressures and priorities; capitalist interests in South Africa, including Afrikaner ones, needed 
an urban African population to serve the interests of white industry. During, and especially 
after, the Second World War a boom in manufacturing led to the modernization of 
machinery and a concomitant growth in the demand for semi-skilled labour, a demand that 
was increasingly filled by urban African workers. The first, and to some extent the second, 
periods of office for the National Party were characterised by a recognition that two ‘types’ 
of African labour were needed for the immediate future - the detribalised urban worker and 
the rural worker. Thus, party leaders bowed to what was practical and adopted a pragmatic 
policy towards apartheid, in what has become known as apartheid’s first phase.12 The 
Eiselen Report and Bantu Education represented an integral part of this policy.
However, the Eiselen Report and Bantu Education should also be considered within an 
international context.13 Sue Krige has argued that
9 SABRA was established in 1948 as an academic institution attached to the University of 
Stellenbosch. Its main purpose was to act as a counterpose to the South African Institute of Race Relations. 
Despite its own claim to political neutrality Broedetbond and National Party members were active within 
its ranks. For an analysis of SABRA’s role in the creation of apartheid see, J. Lazar, ‘Verwoerd Versus the 
“Visionaries”: The South African Bureau of Racial Affairs (SABRA) and Apartheid, 1948-61', in P. Bonner, 
P. Delius, D. Posel (eds.) Apartheid’s Genesis, pp. 362-392.
10 Vertical apartheid alluded to the total segregation of the races in South Africa, geographically 
as well as politically.
11 Quoted in Posel, The Making, p. 62.
12 It is important to remember that Verwoerd himself told the 1955 National Party congress that 
apartheid could take 300 years to complete. See Lazar, ‘Verwoerd Versus the “Visionaries’”, p. 371.
13 The Commission visited Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Kenya, Congo, Uganda and Tanzania. Whilst in 
Kenya, Eiselen remarked that the problems facing Native Education in South Africa were shared across
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worldwide trends in education away from education systems and ideologies based 
on private (often religious), community-based voluntarism, towards expert driven, 
secular state control and bureaucratization can be seen emerging in South Africa 
in the early twentieth century.14
She contends that during the interwar period a scientific approach to educational planning 
began to develop in South Africa, driven essentially by ideas which originated in the 
southern states of America in the early twentieth century. Its early protagonists, such as 
Anna T Jeans and Booker T Washington, believed that education should be made more 
relevant to the everyday needs of black Americans, and that traditional education methods 
neglected to consider the environment in which children were growing up. They argued that 
education should be used to promote the general welfare of whole communities through an 
emphasis on practical skills. These ideas were expanded upon by the Columbia Teachers’ 
College, New York and the Phelps Stokes Commissions (that visited Africa in 1921 and 
1924) and saw the creation of a complete pedagogy based upon the idea of ‘adapted’ 
education.15 This championed practical skills and an appreciation of the local environment, 
and rested upon five essential ingredients: sanitation and health; agriculture and simple 
industry; the decencies of the home; healthful recreation and religion. The school was seen 
as the instrument for the social transformation of whole communities by linking the syllabus 
to the home life of communities and the everyday problems of villagers. At the same time 
the state had to take a larger role in educational planning to enable it to undermine the
most of the continent and that it was very helpful to ‘swap notes. ’ Star. 22 July, 1950.
14 S. Krige, ‘Segregation, Science and the Commissions of Enquiry: Education and the Place of 
the 'Natives' in South African Society, 1930-36', paper presented to the Journal of Southern African Studies 
Twentieth Century Conference: Paradigms Lost, Paradigms Regained?, York, 1994, p. 4. See also, ‘Should 
Education Lead or Follow the Social Order: The Welsh Report and the Policy of Segregation, 1935-40', 
South African Historical Journal. Vol. 28, 1993, and ‘Secularisation and Segregation; Experts, Missions 
and African Education: A Re-Evaluation of the Work of Charles Loram in South Africa, 1920-30', paper 
presented to ‘Challenging Orthodoxies; New Perspectives in Histories of Education’, Toronto, 17-20 Oct. 
1996.
15 ‘Adapted’ education looked to make education more relevant to local needs. Proponents argued 
that an academic ‘bookish’ education did little to help support African communities in any practical way. 
Through ‘ adapted’ education, teaching was to be far more practical as agricultural and technical skills were 
promoted at the cost of academic study. Pupils were ‘taught’ how to farm effectively, the importance of 
sanitation, and the use of the school as an instrument for wholesale community development. Those who 
supported the idea argued that only these methods would reduce African poverty and subsequently ‘raise’ 
Africans slowly towards European civilization.
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academic elitism associated with mission education.16 These basic ideas were adopted by 
several South African educationalists, chief amongst whom was C.T. Loram, who 
completed a Ph.D at Teachers’ College, Columbia University, and was Chief Inspector of 
Native Education in Natal between 1918 and 1920. After the publication of his book The 
Education of the South African Native and his. reform of education in Natal, Loram was 
‘regarded as the foremost expert on “Native Education” and exponent of “adapted 
education”5 in South Africa.17 A paternalist and segregationist, he not only believed that 
‘Native Education5 needed to be ‘adapted5 to local conditions, but was also convinced that 
educational planning had to be systematic, efficient and centrally planned.18
Krige examines the conflict in the inter-war period between Loram and his supporters, and 
the mission churches over ‘Native Education5, and shows how the missions rejected the ‘rise 
of science5, the ‘secularization of knowledge5 and the emergence of the ‘expert5 in 
educational discourse as they sought to reinforce the primacy of religious education. 
Although Loram5 s ideas did not achieve nationwide institutional dominance in educational 
planning between the wars, due to missionary opposition, Fleisch has argued that they came 
to fruition in the Eiselen Report and Bantu Education.19 He demonstrates how American 
educational discourses dominated the findings of the Commission with its emphasis on 
centralized governance, expert control, educational efficiency, social planning, and 
educational differentiation.20 He comments,
rather than a bizarre and tragic exception to the general trend in educational thought 
in both the industrialized and the third world, Bantu Education was the logical 
extension of a commitment to efficiency, expertise and a social philosophy of
16 Krige, 'Secularisation and Segregation’, pp. 6-7.
17 Krige, ibid. p. 7.
18 Fleisch, ‘Bantu Education and the Bureaucratisation of the African Schooling’, p. 1.
19 Fleisch, ‘The Teachers College Club’, chap. 5 & 8.
20 Fleisch, ‘Bantu Education....5, p. 1. Fleisch also emphasizes the importance of the roles of two 
other educationalists influenced by the American education discourse. They were E. G Malherbe, who had 
been Director of the National Bureau for Educational and Social Research and W. P. Cook, a member of 
the Eiselen Commission and Malherbe’s successor at the National Bureau.
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education.21
Kros also maintains that ‘the [Eiselen] Report bears some testimony to the prevalent ideas 
of the tim e/22 Part of a wider modernist project which looked to maximise economic 
productivity and produce a stable political situation,23 it promised ‘supposedly unfettered 
development [and] the appeasement of a proscribed “Bantu” society/24 Both Kros and 
Fleisch see Bantu Education as part of an elaborate attempt by the apartheid state ‘to sketch 
the foundation for a regulated and centrally controlled society/25
The attraction of American educational philosophy to the framers of the Eiselen Report was 
that it assumed the continuation of white supremacy. It rested upon two basic premises: that 
whites would remain in power for many years as Africans were at a lower stage of 
development, and that Africans were a rural people whose future would, for many years to 
come, be in the countryside. The practice o f ‘adapted’ education, it argued, would lead to 
more productive and content rural Africans, able to support themselves, and therefore not 
needing to work in the city. Thus, race antagonism, fuelled by competition for work in the 
cities, would be avoided as would the perceived moral decline of Africans in urban areas. 
Africans would help themselves within their own communities towards greater prosperity. 
A select few would be educated academically, but only to assume responsibility in their own 
affairs, to avoid the creation of disgruntled Africans who could not find a role in white 
society but were divorced from their own communities.26 This philosophy was adopted by 
leading ‘liberals’ in South Africa, such as Loram, not only because it maintained white 
supremacy but also offered what they considered a ‘better deal’ to Africans: an education 
that acted to reinforce social cohesion, rather than erode it, that encouraged African agency
21 Fleisch, ‘AmericanEducation...3, p. 9.
22 Kros, ‘Relocating and Reinterpreting the Eiselen Commission on Native Education’, paper 
presented at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 12 Jan. 1995. p. 10.
23 ibid, p. 3.
24 ibid. p. 11.
25 ibid. p. 4.
26 See R. Hunt Davis, ‘Charles T Loram and the American Model for African Education’, in 
Kallaway (ed.) Apartheid and Education, pp. 108-139.
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(within 'African society’) rather than thwarted it, and that diffused social conflict rather than 
incited it.
There is no doubt that, as Fleisch and Kros assert, the Eiselen Report adopted many ideas 
from America, but it also reflected many of the educational policies and objectives pursued 
in British African colonies, which were themselves heavily influenced by American 
educational thinking. In the 1950s there was a spate of reports in British Africa which 
looked to reform educational policy. The impetus for these came principally from the 
changed international political climate during and after the war. The British government had 
fought the war allegedly to uphold the principles of freedom and self-determination. The 
shift in power towards the United States and the Soviet Union after the war had left Britain, 
France and Portugal isolated as the only powers which maintained significant empires in 
Africa. Both the new 'superpowers’, for differing ideological reasons, opposed the 
maintenance of these empires and used the United Nations to pressure colonial powers to 
abandon or at least transform their possessions.27 The morality of colonial relationships were 
also challenged by African nationalists who were well aware of the justifications on which 
the war was fought and increasingly demanded a say in their future. This changed climate 
saw colonial powers introduce reforms, both economic and social28
The Colonial Development and Welfare Acts of 1940 and 1945 saw £9m spent on 
educational reform in British African colonies29 These educational reforms were designed 
to prepare Africans gradually for participation in administration, until they gained self- 
government. In the 1940s and 1950s it was assumed that African countries would gain 
independence at different stages; some within fifty years, others only after a hundred.30 
However, such piecemeal reforms did little to undermine the dominance of white interests
27 M. Crowder argues that the United Nations was hostile to colonial powers which were ‘subject 
to inspection and criticism of their administrations...they were thus held politically accountable for their 
stewardship in many ways.5 M. Crowder, ‘The Second World War: Preclude to Decolonisation in Africa’, 
in M. Crowder (ed.), The Cambridge History of Africa Vol. 8 1940-75 (Cambridge, 1984), p. 44.
28 The reforms also included ones which were purely economic and looked to get the colonies to 
maximise their value in an attempt to help reconstruct Britain after the war,
29 Lord Hailey, An African Survey (Oxford, revised 1957 ed.), p. 1167.
30 H. Wilson, African Decolonization. (London, 1990),
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in colonies in east and southern Africa, where large settler populations were unwilling to 
give up their economic, social and political supremacy. It was in these colonies that reports 
on the education of Africans shared many similarities with the Eiselen Report.
Two education reports in particular can be compared to the Eiselen Report, primarily 
because both were the products of colonies with significant white settler communities: the 
1951 Southern Rhodesia Native Education Commission (Kerr Report) and the 1949 African 
Education in Kenya Report (Beecher Report). The latter was undertaken to ‘examine the 
scope, content, and methods of the African education system,’31 the former to examine 
African education in relation to ‘the present and probable future needs of the African’ and 
the ‘social and economic development. ’32 To a lesser extent the Binns Report (West Africa) 
and the Jeffrey Report (East and Central Africa) also shared similarities with the Eiselen 
Report and, where appropriate, will be drawn on for comparative purposes.33
The Eiselen Report as Critical Exercise
The Eiselen Report had five terms of reference which are worth reproducing in full:
1. The formulation of the principles and aims of education for Natives as an 
independent race, in which their past and present, their inherent racial qualities, 
their distinctive characteristics and aptitude, and their needs under ever-changing 
social conditions are taken into consideration.
2. The extent to which the existing primary, secondary and vocational educational 
system for Natives and the training of teachers should be modified in respect of the 
contents and fonn of syllabus, in order to conform to the proposed principles and 
aims and to prepare Natives more effectively for their future occupations.
31 Beecher Report, p. 1.
32 Kerr Report, ‘Terms of Reference’.
33 These two reports, Binns looking at education in East and Central Africa and Jeffrey in West 
Africa, were funded by the Nuffield Foundation and the Colonial Office. They were inspired by political 
changes taking place in Africa and the need to think education ‘out afresh....[to] design and provide a 
system of education which will enable the emergent peoples of Africa to take their full place in the modem 
world. ’ African Education: A Study of Educational Policy and Practice in British Tropical Africa (Oxford, 
1953), Introduction, p. 2. This publication printed both reports in full, and the proceedings of a conference 
in Cambridge which took place to discuss the reports.
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3. The organisation and administration o f the various branches o f  Native Education.
4. Tire basis on which such education should be financed.
5. Such other aspects o f Native education as may be related to die preceding34
These Terms of Reference were complemented by a questionnaire sent to all those who 
professed an interest in ‘Native Education.’ Its first six questions reproduced the attempt of 
the first term of reference, to consider ‘Natives as an Independent Race’. They attempted 
to establish the ‘independence’, ‘racial characteristics’, ‘special qualities’, and ‘aptitudes’ of 
Africans as well as the ‘changes at present taking place in the social conditions of the 
Natives’ and how ‘these factors should determine the principles and objectives of Native 
education.535 The terms of reference and questionnaire were deliberately designed to narrow 
the commission’s focus and stressed the need to evaluate the education system of the 
‘Native’ as a ‘separate and independent race’ as ifthis were a given fact. Consequently, there 
was no room for debate concerning the position of Africans in South Africa.
Given its terms of reference, the Eiselen Report’s assumption that Africans had a different 
future to that of whites, was entirely predictable. Its recommendations concentrated on the 
belief that Africans were culturally different to whites and thus ‘required’ an education 
system more in line with ‘their needs,’ one that was, in other words, a form of ‘adapted 
education.’ The notion of culture, and cultural difference, was essential to the Report, as it 
was used to justify the need for racially differentiated education. The Commissioners clearly 
viewed culture as static and biologically determined. Immutable and innate, it meant that ‘the 
Bantu’ had a racially distinct culture requiring preservation. Christian National ideas 
concerning the sanctity of cultural difference, and the belief that all cultures should be 
preserved has a great deal of relevance in this instance. In fact much of the Report attempts 
to justify itself in terms of Afrikaner Nationalist ideology. Kros has convincingly argued that 
culture ‘proved to be an effective foundation for the discourse of the Commission, since 
nearly every witness subscribed to its basic concepts in some measure’, and this meant that
34 Central Archives (Pretoria). Union Education Department UOD E53/71 1384, Vol. 1, ‘Terms of 
Reference’ (Pretoria, 1 April 1949).
35 Eiselen Report, Amexure B. A copy of the questionnaire is reproduced in the appendix below.
72
at some stage most witnesses ‘ended up admitting the need for differentiation’.36
The Report began with an attempt to locate ‘the Bantu’ in South Africa. A crude attempt 
to define the word ‘Bantu’ and distinguish ‘the Bantu’ from other African people is followed 
by an examination of the increasing failure of the reserves, indicating the absence of an 
effective peasantry, and a review of the decline of traditional forms of authority and the rise 
of the individual.37 An extensive survey of educational establishments and other institutions 
involved in child care, such as nursery schools and reformatories is the prelude to a sustained 
attack on the state of African education. Four main areas of concern are emphasized:
(a) Bantu education is not an integral part of a plan of socio-economic development;
(b) Bantu education in itself has no organic unity: it is split into a bewildering 
number of different agencies and is not planned.
(c) Bantu education is conducted without the active participation of the Bantu as a 
people or on a wider basis.
(d) Bantu education is financed in such a way that it achieves a minimum of 
educational effect on the Bantu community and planning is made virtually 
impossible.
In addition, the Report criticised:
(a) The inadequacy of the present system of inspection and supervision.
(b) The failure to couple vocational education with economic development.
(c) The inadequacy of the measures taken to combat the problem of early 
elimination from school.
(d) The inadequate functioning of teachers in schemes of Bantu development.38
The brunt of the attack upon existing provision was that it lacked a clearly defined objective, 
and that there was no overall understanding of what ‘Native education’ was trying to 
achieve.39 The Commissioners examined the role o f ‘the Bantu’ in society and argued that
36 Kros, ‘Economic, Political...5, p. 380. Kros notes further, ‘The cultural discourse of the Eiselen 
Commission, with its deep intellectual resonances, succeeded in closing off other ways of thinking and 
talking about mass based education.5 p. 380.
37 ibid, p. 381.
38 Eiselen Report, p. 31.
39 See in particular, ibid. pp. 103-104, p. 122, p. 128.
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a vagueness in education policy existed because of a failure throughout the educational 
system to understand and fully appreciate what this role was.40 The result was that
Much of what is taught and learnt in Bantu schools is never applied in practise, 
because the economic incentives which should operate when children leave school 
are either absent or of such a nature as to undo the work of the schools41
This contention that the education system failed to appreciate the position of The Bantu’ in 
society was the bedrock upon which the Report was written and its recommendations made. 
All its other criticisms were based around this fundamental point.
The Commissioners strongly objected to the dual control of education between the Union 
government and the provincial authorities,42 arguing that the Union government had almost 
no direct administrative control over policy within the provinces. They also condemned the 
anomalies in control, financing and administration that existed between the provinces 
themselves, which thwarted a coherent educational strategy. Instead provincial control led 
to the ‘harmful and frustrating severance of the schools from other agencies set up by the 
State, under the control of the Central Government, to develop the economic and social life 
of the Bantu’.43
They asserted further that the existing system of financing was ‘unplanned’ had ‘no 
priorities’, or ‘clear objectives’ and was characterised by a ‘bewildering mass of uncorrelated 
activities and expenditure’, so that it was allegedly impossible to know exactly how much 
money was spent on education from year to year.44 The Commissioners concluded ‘all the
40 Eiselen Report, p. 103.
41 ibid, p. 104.
42 Under the existing system the provinces had direct control of the schools as far as syllabi, 
organisation and authority were concerned, whilst the Union government was charged with the entire 
expenditure on such schools. Other than its control of the purse strings the only other influence the central 
state had on provincial education policy making was via the Union Advisory Board for Native Education. 
An Advisory Board that was condemned by the Report for having no meaningful influence on provincial 
educationalists, ibid, p. 108.
43 ibid, p. 112.
44 ibid, p. 159.
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prerequisites for efficient administration are lacking/45
The role of mission churches in African education also came under fire. Commissions argued 
that the multiplicity of religious bodies involved contributed to thwarting any overall 
strategy for cBantu education/ It denounced their mutual rivalries, and their overlap in 
distribution and function, which had led to the wasteful duplication of services in many 
areas.46 They were also condemned for not adequately involving Africans in the 
administration of education via institutions such as school boards and parent teacher 
groups.47
The schools themselves were targeted. Primary schools were failing their pupils because 
their syllabi suffered from being too ‘general.. .what seems to be lacking is a series of detailed 
interpretations of the syllabi, each of which will be particularly adapted to the local 
conditions.’48 They were said to overlook the needs of their pupils by not concentrating on 
the use of the vernacular as a means by which theoretical concepts could be better explained. 
School buildings were condemned for being of poor quality, and problems were exacerbated 
by a shortage of inspectors to maintain standards.49 Secondary school education was 
described as being too ‘bookish’ and theoretical and, returning to its central theme, the 
Report noted that, ‘one of the chief criticisms of the present secondary schools is that there 
is a confusion of purpose and function.’50 The use of the same syllabi in African secondary 
schools as in white secondary schools, was deemed inappropriate as it led to ‘unrealistic 
expectations’ on the part of African students.51
45 Eiselen Report, p. 159.
46 ibid, p. 112.
47 The Report argued that the position of Africans in education planning was ‘ill-defined and 
variable/ ibid, p. 113.
48 ibid, p. 118.
49 ibid, p. 118-121. The Report suggested that Africans should be employed as school inspectors 
as soon as possible to address these shortcomings.
50 ibid, p. 122. The Report also argued that schooling more generally was ‘too academic/, p. 163.
51 ibid, p. 122.
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The Commissioners argued for separate education by highlighting the inherent dangers of 
the existing system:
schools o f a western type have been introduced, schools which are concerned 
primarily, not with reinforcing, or being reinforced by, the other social institutions 
o f Bantu society but more largely with the transmission o f  ideas, attitudes and skills 
which have not been developed in Bantu society itself and are often not in harmony 
with its institutions52
In their view such schools had produced a
group o f people who break away too rapidly from the views and habits o f  their own 
people and sometimes act against their own community. Such a stray minority is 
readily formed where two cultures are in close contact.. .he is an outcast among his 
own people and can find no anchorage with the people o f  the other culture53
The Report attempted to show how the 'staggering power and glitter of Western culture'54 
had an adverse effect upon the 'relatively simple social organisation of the South African 
Bantu.'55
The Commissioners reasoned that African education though well intended, was 
inappropriate given the nature of the relationship between Africans and whites in South 
Africa. Existing policy created Africans who were divorced from their milieu, but who found 
little opportunity elsewhere, because, as a culturally distinct race, ‘the Bantu’ could not be 
successfully assimilated into ‘European culture.' The picture painted was one of impending 
doom; the country was seen to be facing social crisis as Africans were educated for an 
unattainable lifestyle which, they argued, could lead to social and political turmoil.
Although the Eiselen Report can be seen as part of a wider project the reports from British 
settler colonies condemned the existing state of African education in remarkably similar
52 Eiselen Report, p. 130.
53 ibid, p. 128.
54 ibid, p. 130.
55 ibid, p. 129.
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terms. Thus, the Beecher Report referred to a ‘general criticism of the school system 
because of its lack of identity with the true needs of the community.’56 All the reports 
condemned the ‘bookish’ and unrealistic nature of African education, Binns arguing that 
‘enlightened teachers and administrators [must be] alive to the danger of a theoretical and 
bookish education.’57 They also argued that existing education policy created Africans who 
were averse to manual labour and strove for white-collar jobs.58 The Beecher Report noted 
that
African chiefs and responsible African leaders indicated in evidence that they 
are much exercised by this element in African society which, in their 
judgement, is capable of becoming a discontented and indeed subversive 
force’59
The Kerr Report noted that this group of academically educated Africans was acquiring 6 
a deep sense of frustration and grievance - a state of mind capable of having an effect on an 
educated group similar to that which a detonator has on dynamite. ’60
The Eiselen Report as Solution
Kros has argued that ‘the foundations of ‘Grand Apartheid’ are clearly apparent in the 
Eiselen Report. ’61 The solution to the problems of African education, as it saw them, could
56 Beecher Report, p. 34.
57 Binns Report, p. 66.
58 See in particular, Beecher Report, p. 39,. The Jeffrey Report noted that ‘Contempt for manual 
work is certainly widespread5, Jeffrey Report, p. 20.
59 Beecher Report, p. 39.
60 Kerr Report, p. 12.
61C. Kros, ‘Economic, Political.., p. 325. She adds ‘The Report should be read as a programmatic 
outline of apartheid5, p. 324. On the one hand this seems to contradict Posel’s assertion that there was no 
‘grand plan5 for apartheid, however, it also supports her contention that there was considerable tension 
within the National Party as to what apartheid actually meant. Despite the fact that the Eiselen Report was 
a ‘visionary’ document this does not mean that it was not to be tempered in its early stages by a period of 
pragmatism (which would explain Hyslop’s contention that Bantu Education was partly conceived to 
stabilise the African urban youth). As Lazar has remarked ‘ apartheid ideology was a complex, changing and 
often contradictory mix of both short-term pragmatism and general ideological thrust.5 Lazar, ‘Verweord 
versus...’, p. 362.
77
not be via simple piecemeal improvements. The Report emphasised a massive programme 
of social and political engineering that drew the central state, and all its constituent parts 
which dealt with ‘Bantu affairs,' into a unified ‘plan' to finally address the ‘Native Question’ 
in its entirety. Eiselen was committed by the late 1940s to the idea of complete territorial 
separation. In 1948 he told the Witwatersrand People’s Forum that he understood the word 
apartheid to mean:
the separating of the heterogeneous, ... population of this country, into separate 
socio-economic units, inhabiting separate parts of the country, each enjoying in its 
own area full citizen rights62
It would appear the Commission was never solely concerned with education and greatly 
overstepped its initial purpose.63 Rather, it was concerned with the role that education would 
play within an elaborate plan for the wholesale socio-economic development of ‘Bantu 
Communities’. In a particularly revealing passage it argued;
Bantu development and Bantu education should be largely synonymous terms. 
Education is more than a matter of schooling...Education must be co-ordinated with 
a definite and carefully planned policy for the development of Bantu societies64
It continued, ‘It has become essential for Bantu education and all other Bantu social services 
to be co-ordinated in a series of reforms. ’65 The phrase ‘plan for Bantu development’ occurs 
repeatedly throughout the Report. This emphasis on the need for a programmatic 
examination of all aspects of ‘Bantu life’ was, unsurprisingly, welcomed by the SABRA 
which commented
In our view the Commission has undoubtedly succeeded in carrying out its
62 Eiselen to the Witwatersrand People’s Forum 8th August 1948. KCL H. Nicliolls Collection, File 
3 ‘Bantu Affairs. ’
63 The Commissioners even admitted as much, ‘Your Commission is aware that the 
recommendations which follow are of a far-reaching nature and perhaps exceed the limits usually prescribed 
for an education Commission’, Eiselen Report, p. 132.
64 ibid p. 130. The Report continued ‘we conceive education not as an end in itself but as a means
to the general development of the Bantu’, p. 163.
65 ibid, p. 104.
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task...[T]he Commission has,.,.endeavoured to approach the problems before it in 
the right way by not confining itself to the mere investigation of educational matters 
alone but by envisaging education generally as a part of Bantu development66
The Commission sought to lay the foundations for an education policy that would 
complement a wider scheme or ‘plan’ for the ‘development5 of Africans in South Africa. For 
this ‘plan5 to work, the rehabilitation of the Reserves was necessary and became something 
of a refrain from the Commissioners, so that it seems likely that the Eiselen Commission was 
conceived of as counterpart to the T omlinson Commission. The Tomlinson Commission was 
appointed to investigate the position of the Reserves, and to ascertain whether they were 
in a viable position to accommodate a greatly increased number of South Africa's African 
population. Although the Tomlinson Commission did not report until 1956, work began 
from the beginning of 1951, during the writing up of the Eiselen Commission, and the man 
credited for its conception, M.D.C. de Wet Nel was also a member of the Eiselen 
Commission. The Eiselen Commissioners argued that is was ‘not [their] purpose to 
enumerate or discuss problems in the social or economic field,556 but as far as the condition 
of the Reserves was concerned this is precisely what they did. Again, it is worth quoting the 
report at length
If the social aim of Bantu education is as important as your Commission believes 
it to be, it follows that the reserves [sic], being areas in which the Bantu culture 
functions most completely, have a special task to perform in the furtherance of the 
development of Bantu culture and schools... .Nevertheless many educated Bantu feel 
that the Reserves are fast becoming economic and cultural slums; places to be 
avoided by the educated and the enterprising. Your Commission feels that special 
steps should be taken in the Reserves to facilitate and encourage the evolution 
of a progressive, modern and self-respecting Bantu order of life., .ifthe Reserves 
are to play their part they must be developed57
The Commissioners were very aware of the poor conditions in the Reserves and saw them 
as a direct hindrance to the proposals they were making. The idea of a direct policy linkage 
between the Eiselen and Tomlinson Commissions is further supported by the 1951 Bantu
66 ‘ The Commission on Native Education (1949-51) Summary of Findings and Recommendations ’, 
Journal of Racial Affairs. April 1952 p. 23.
56 Eiselen Report, p. 163.
57 ibid. p. 131 (original emphasis).
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Authorities Act which aimed at reinforcing the authority of local ‘tribal’ chiefs within the 
Reserves through the establishment of rural local authorities, an idea first mooted in the 
Eiselen Report.58 Part of its recommendations cater for the development of an educated 
African ‘elite’ to staff the Bantu Authorities created in 1951.
There is little doubt that the Eiselen Report was part of a larger ‘Bantu development plan. ’ 
The emphasis in the Eiselen Report on the rejuvenation of the Reserves prefigured the main 
thrust of the Tomlinson Commission. That Tomlinson’s recommendations were largely 
rejected by Verwoerd in 195659 and did not reach their fruition does not undermine the 
notion that in the early 1950s the idea of a ‘grand apartheid’ scheme was very much alive 
within the Eiselen Commission.
However, such a conception of ‘grand apartheid’ was, in the context of the first phase of 
apartheid, not without its pragmatism. The Commissioners warned that while they envisaged 
that ‘the conduct of schools’ would be transferred to the Bantu Local and Regional 
Authorities this would take place ‘over a period of time in which the Bantu Development Plan 
would crystallize...The process ... should be a gradual one.’60
The vagueness of the time scale envisaged by the Commissioners61 suggests a degree of 
pragmatism within an ideological framework. In 1948 Eiselen remarked to the 
Witwatersrand People’s Forum:
Separation...represents an aim which cannot be achieved without a constructive 
policy, a policy making people ready for separation...which requires careful 
planning... separation means an evolutionary and not a revolutionary 
process...Constructive separation will require many years of careful planning,
58 Eiselen Report, p. 133.
59 The Commission called for a sum of £104,000,000 to be invested in the Reserves to allow for 
their development to support large African populations. This was rejected by Verwoerd on largely political 
grounds. See Lazar “Verwoerd Versus the ‘Visionaries”’, p. 374.
60 Eiselen Report, p. 137 (original emphasis),
61 What is also striking is the report’s emphasis on the period of time in which the ‘Bantu 
Development Plan would crystallise’, rather than simply the plan for ‘Bantu Education’, which once again 
highlights the main thrust of the Commission.
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preparation and purposeful action62
Eiselen appealed to the audience to realise that whites would have to make sacrifices to 
make apartheid work. Land would have to be given up by white farmers and cheap African 
labour would have to be gradually withdrawn from the economy.
On numerous occasions the Report acknowledged the poor social and economic conditions 
that prevailed amongst the majority of Africans remarking ‘in the economic field the 
conditions in the Reserves and in the urban areas reveal both the poverty of the Bantu and 
their low productivity.563 They concluded that ‘we firmly believe that the schools are not 
being used nearly as effectively as they ought to be in helping to solve the numerous 
and urgent problems with which we are faced.’64 In general the role of Bantu Education 
in rural areas has been well researched, but Hyslop has also drawn attention to its important 
urban dimension. He argues that
Although the Nationalists posited the creation of autonomous political entities for 
blacks and whites and the establishment of a purely migrant black work force in 
‘white’ areas as their long term political-ideological goal, more immediate tasks 
confronted them65
One of the ‘more immediate tasks’ was to stabilise the African urban working class. In 
apartheid’s ‘first phase’ African worker urban and rural, were required. Hyslop suggests 
that the prevailing urban social, economic and political conditions threatened the very 
reproduction of the urban work force. The Commission drew attention ‘to the very 
important aspect of the problem of discipline among Bantu youth’ noting a ‘serious lack of 
a sense of responsibility on the part of pupils. ’ They claimed that this was the product of 
‘confused moral values’ and ‘social disruption.566 As previously indicated, chronic poverty,
62 Eiselen to the Witwatersrand People’s Forum, 8th August 1948. Killie Campbell Africana Library. 
Durban. H. Nicholls Collection, File 3 ‘Bantu Affairs’.
63 Eiselen Report, p. 163.
,J'1 ibid. p, 163, (Original emphasis).
65 Hyslop. ‘State Education Policy.,.’, p. 448.
66 Eiselen Report, pp. 22-23. They noted that pupils were subject to ‘foreign ideologies and 
doctrines’ having to make a ‘tremendous leap from his cultural level and background, from liis former group
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poor housing and high levels of crime in the 1940s had led to the growth of community 
movements, trade unions and African nationalist political campaigning.67 Simultaneously 
mission education was finding it increasingly difficult to cope with the demands being placed 
on it in the cities. This meant that many thousands of African children received little or no 
education. In 1952, for example, school inspectors estimated that, of the children of school- 
going age on the Rand, only some 58,138 out of 116,276 were in school.68 According to 
Hyslop not enough children were being educated to meet the demands of the growing 
secondary industrial sector, and those who were not in school posed a serious threat to the 
social order, This ‘urban crisis’ was addressed by Bantu Education which was established 
to assist ‘in the state-directed reorganisation of the reproduction process of the working 
class. ’69 By drawing children off the streets and into schools it represented an attempt to 
fight the rising tide of crime and political militancy through incorporating children into the 
schooling system.70
To try and solve the problems of low attendance the Report sought to provide, by 1959, 
sufficient places in the first four years of primary schooling for all pupils between eight and 
eleven years old, which was ‘roughly a doubling of the number of lower and higher primary 
pupils.’71 The Commissioners also called for an increase in secondary education but argued 
that:
The Commission regards the lower primary school as being particularly important 
as it is at this stage of the educational process that the present very high wastage of 
pupils occurs and a low standard of work is found72
subordination to a relatively, and sometimes advanced, individualistically orientated independence in 
outlook and action.’ pp. 22-23.
67 See chapter two.
68 Hyslop, ‘“ADestruction...’ p. 396,
69 Hyslop, ‘State Education Policy...’, p. 450.
70 This argument was exactly what mission and liberal opinion was calling for itself, thus in a sense 
the Eiselen Report was making a reformist gesture.
71 Eiselen Report, p. 162.
72 ibid, p. 164.
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The increase in enrolment called for did actually take place. In 1953 there were 852,000 
African pupils in primary schools, only two years later the figure had risen to 970,000 and 
by 1960 there were 1,452,000 Africans in primary school.73 Once again the pragmatism of 
apartheid’s first phase was demonstrated; the Commissioners advocated a rural future for 
Africans, but, until there was the political will and economic strength to make this a 
possibility, ‘Bantu Education’ would be used to stabilise a temporary African urban 
workforce.
Similar concerns over African discipline and morality, supposedly brought about by the 
erosion of ‘traditional’ tribal sanctions on behaviour, and most associated with urban living, 
also greatly exercised the authors of reports in British Africa. Binns and Beecher lamented 
the social problems caused by rapid urbanisation74 while the Kerr Commissioners, for 
example, heard
complaints that Africans have lost their discipline and respect instilled by their 
former tribal sanctions and have not yet gained the sense of responsibility and of 
discipline that are so necessary75
SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS
The Eiselen Report’s recommendations amounted to 35 double columned pages, and dealt 
with numerous diverse issues, from the overall control of education policy to the training 
of police. Here only those recommendations that directly affected mission and church 
schooling are relevant.76 At its most basic level the Report recommended that the state take 
educational control from the Provinces, and that the ‘Bantu community’ should take local 
control from the missions.
73 E. Unterhalter, ‘Changing Aspects of Reformism in Bantu Education 1953-89', in Apartheid 
Education and Popular Struggles (London, 1991), p. 37.
74 Beecher Report, p. 55, Binns Report, p. 67.
75 Kerr Report, p. 7.
16 This will be broadly inclusive, to include issues such as the position of teachers, parents and 
students within the new system.
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We have seen that the Report suggested that education, as a social service, should be 
integrated organically with all other state institutions which planned for 'Bantu 
development.’ A direct consequence of this was its suggestion that full control of African 
education should pass to the Native Affairs Department (NAD), under a Division of Bantu 
Affairs.77 Within this Department a Development Authority was created to 'evolve 
comprehensive plans for the development of all aspects of Bantu life’.78
These recommendations also found their counterpart in the British Colonial reports. In 
Rhodesia the education of Africans had been under the control of a centralised Native 
Affairs Department since 1933 and Kerr noted:
African witnesses were unanimous in their desire to have the Native Education 
Department transferred to the Education Department (European)....This general 
policy has not been accepted by the Government, and we are not satisfied that any 
advantage would accrue [from its adoption]....on the other hand, the Native 
Education Department, as a section of Native Affairs, can be properly co-ordinated 
with all aspects of African development- a most desirable aim79
This statement could have come directly from the Eiselen Report. Although Kerr highlighted 
African opposition to a racially organised education structure, it still recommended the 
continuation of such differentiation and stressed the need to co-ordinate education policy 
with other aspects of development. The Beecher Report was equally sure that African 
education should remain separate from that given to other races
African education in relation to African society cannot be compared with
education in European and Asian society European and Asian education
have a much longer history.. .The peculiar nature of African education, with 
its limited achievements, and long range objectives, is such that long-term 
planning alone, and consequently long-term financial provision are 
appropriate. We are only at the stage of establishing a means by which future 
results may be achieved; European and Asian education systems are
77 The Report argued that this change would ‘raise the schools to a mighty instrument, not for 
the one-sided development of a small minority of isolated individuals but for the general development 
of the Bantu community’ , Eiselen Report, p. 144 (original emphasis).
78 ibid, p. 135.
79 Kerr Report, p. 54.
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concerned with maintaining long and well established standards80
At a local level Eiselen recommended that control of schools should be handed over to 
Bantu Local Authorities.81 No suggestions were made in the Report as to how, and indeed 
when, the transfer of schools should take place, other than being ‘gradual.582 It simply stated 
that all those schools wishing to claim full state-aid would have to become Government 
schools. Those schools unwilling to be transferred would not be compelled to do so, but 
would not be entitled to foil state aid, having instead to apply for subsidies from the Local 
or Regional Bantu Authority. No new schools could to be created without the permission 
of the Authority concerned and the approval of the Department.83 While the Report was at 
pains to ‘thank5 the missions for the work that they had put into ‘Bantu Education’, it 
nonetheless argued that ‘this guardianship now hampers the balanced development of the 
Bantu community and for that reason the guardian should stand aside if he desires to fulfill 
his mission.’84
Once school transfers were advanced the Commissioners recommended the establishment 
of school committees, with representatives from the Bantu Local Authority, parents and the 
‘religious body,’ if present. These ideas were, however, left rather vague and undetermined 
in the Report, seeming to await the foil elaboration of the ‘plan for Bantu development’.
The continued promotion of ‘Bantu’ involvement in the control of schools displayed the
80 Beecher Report, p. 57. This is a spurious argument. The fact that African education was so 
underdeveloped was not a reason for it to be separate. If anything, the development experiences of 
‘European’ and ‘Asian’ education would presumably have been of enormous benefit to fledgling African 
education provision.
81 The Eiselen Report argues ‘It should be emphasised.. .that what the Commission urges is not the 
abolition of local control by missions but rather the creation of a new and more effective system of local 
government which necessitates that local control of schools be taken over by Bantu Local Authorities’, p. 
135. In fact Bantu Local Authorities took over the running of Lower and Higher primary schools, whilst 
Bantu Regional Authorities were to take over High and Secondary schools.
82 The Report stated its desire that ‘the change from mission to community schools should be an 
orderly development and not a sudden and radical change’, noting that any local authorities would have to 
pass the ‘cash, competence and consent’ test before taking control of schools. Eiselen Report, p. 145 & p. 
137.
83 ibid. p. 145.
81 ibid, P- 145.
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Commissioners' desire to commend their proposals to a cynical African audience. They 
argued that ‘Bantu’ control of schools and local government was ‘required’ because only 
through such control would these institutions ‘reach their full social significance.’85 
Apparently, this phrase mean that only ‘the Bantu’ could folly understand the needs and 
desires o f ‘the Bantu’ an idea that fitted neatly with the Report’s stress on the need for an 
‘adapted’ education. This emphasis on active participation by ‘the Bantu’ was also 
indicative of wider white concerns over the growing degree of African political activity in 
the Union. The National Party was well aware of this growing politicisation and acted to 
stem it through the incorporation of Africans into administrative structures at both local and 
regional levels within the Reserves and the cities, as Verwoerd made clear in 1952;
taking foil cognisance of the growing African nationalism which is noticeable 
everywhere in the country today.. .we must allow space for the flowering of African 
nationalism. It is dangerous, if not fetal, to try to curb this development.. .some form 
of separate development would remove this sense of frustration that plagues the 
non-whites in South Africa, and would give them opportunities that were denied 
them before86
Once again, the Commissioners went well beyond the terms of references when arguing for 
the creation of Bantu Local Authorities. They even laid down a set o f ‘guiding rules’ for 
these Authorities.87 What the Report suggested was the creation of a blue-print for the 
political incorporation of Africans into the apartheid structure. Such incorporation was on 
the government’s terms and extended right down to the individual school level. Once again, 
the reports from British settler colonies were in broad agreement with Eiselen in that they 
all stressed the need to encourage local African participation in education.88
While the Eiselen Report advocated the removal of mission control of schools, the 
Commissioners were at pains to stress that this did not mean the end of a ‘religious
85 Eiselen Report, p. 133.
86 Quoted in Norval, Deconstructing Apartheid Discourse, p. 132.
87 Eiselen Report, p. 133.
88 Kerr Report, p. 55, Beecher Report, p. 95, Binns Report, p. 62.
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atmosphere’ in schools. Indeed education should have ca definite Christian character’89 and 
religious instruction should be a compulsory subject, with a definite time allotment and 
regular inspection. It also suggested that the mission bodies be asked to establish religious 
instruction curricula. In a passage clearly designed to reassure the mission bodies, the 
Commissioners remarked:
that the control of Bantu schools should gradually be transferred to Local 
Authorities does not imply a desire to see a reduction in the activities of religious 
bodies on behalf of the Bantu. On the contrary, it is the earnest desire of the 
Commission that this work should grow and expand, and that the religious bodies 
should do all in their power to support and promote work [sic] of the schools90
The emphasis on a Christian atmosphere within the schools could hardly have been ignored 
given the religious character of the majority of Commissioners and the wider influence that 
Christian National Education exerted on policy making.
In relation to the financing of ‘Bantu education’ the Commissioners looked at who should 
pay, and how that money could be correlated with wider4Bantu development plans,’ rather 
than trying to establish an equitable arrangement whereby Africans paid according to their 
means. Its major advice was that Africans should contribute more to their education via 
direct taxation. In a complicated and rather convoluted fashion, it demonstrated how 
expenditure on education benefited a community by raising its national income. By making 
Africans pay more for their education now, they would benefit in the future.91
The Report’s recommendations in regard to syllabi and more general pedagogical matters 
are conspicuous by their brevity. ‘The general approach of the Commission to problems of 
curricula’, it declared, was ‘that as soon as the general development plan has been 
satisfactorily drawn up the educational authorities will have a clear picture of the types of 
individuals they will be called upon to produce’.92
89 Eiselen Report p. 130.
90 ibid, p. 155.
91 ibid. p. 160.
92 ibid, pl64. The functionalist interpretation of the purpose of schools can be seen here.
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The basis of our approach to Bantu education [it continued]... is the conviction that 
the system of Bantu education should be closely integrated with a general 
development scheme, and that it should be proceeded with a clear formulation of 
such a scheme. For this reason our recommendations in connection with the more 
advanced stadia of education will be only tentative until such time as a formulation 
has been drawn up93
Consequently, only Tentative’ and somewhat general assertions were made concerning 
educational content. Lower Primary Schools were to be created, catering for the seven to 
ten-year age group. They were to concentrate on the three CR V  to enable children to 
acquire the technical skills of reading, writing and numeracy. They were also to introduce 
one official language so that Africans could communicate with their potential ‘European’ 
employers.94
Higher Primary Schools, for the eleven to fourteen years olds were to follow a similar 
pattern for the first two years, after which they were to split into two streams, the one 
academic, the other vocational. High Schools were to cater for the fifteen to nineteen-year 
olds and would consist of a similarly streamed five year course, leading to a Junior 
Certificate after three years and matriculation after a further two years.
In line with its calls for ‘adapted education’ the Commission proposed that agriculture 
should feature more prominently within the school system. Lower Primary Schools were to 
promote ‘an interest in the soil’ while Higher Primary Schools were to give ‘increased 
attention ... to the teaching of manipulative skills and (where possible) gardening and 
agriculture’.95 While, the promotion of agriculture is unsurprising given the Report’s stress 
on the need to develop the Reserves to enable complete separate development, this too was 
part of a wider educational pattern96 Reports from British settler Africa also stressed 
agricultural education as a core part of syllabus development, Beecher, for example, called 
for
93 Eiselen Report, p. 150.
94 ibid. p. 140,
93 ibid, p. 140, 147.
90 The promotion of agriculture and ‘adapted’ education also promised to reinforce traditional rural 
bonds and social structures.
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the restoration of a practical basis to education appropriate to the kind of life which 
the great majority of the products of this expanded programme will lead; we call for 
the inclusion of right attitudes to rural problems.97
This prioritising of agricultural training reflected the post-war drive for agricultural 
efficiency within British Africa.
Recommendations concerning hostels under the control of mission and church groups were 
vague: the management of such hostels should be the responsibility of the school principal, 
and ‘the Bantu5 should have more influence in hostel life. Details of how this was to be 
achieved were absent.
The Commissioners did, however, make detailed recommendations on the place of the 
vernacular and the official languages in education. They believed that ‘the question of 
mother-tongue medium is vital to the whole system5,98 and attempted to use the idea of 
‘mother-tongue5 education to create and perpetuate ethno-linguistic divisions within South 
African society, both between Africans and whites, and between Africans themselves.99 The 
Report recommended that all education should be through the ‘mother-tongue5 for the first 
four years of study, with this principle being extended progressively throughout the next 
four years of study. Its use in secondary schools and teacher training colleges was also 
encouraged.100
The emphasis on the increased use of the vernacular was defended by the Commission in
97 Beecher Report, p. viii.
98 Eiselen Report, p. 145. This is despite the fact that the report did not highlight mother-tongue 
education, or the lack of it, as a criticism of the present system.
99 The use of the 'mother-tongue5 was championed in the report as an inalienable right for the 
‘Bantu’ peoples in much the same why that some Afrikaners themselves had 'fought5 for Afrikaans. 
Language policy in the provinces differed. In the Cape teaching in the vernacular lasted for the first four 
years, after which all lessons where taught in one of the official languages. In the Transvaal teaching in the 
vernacular was used for four years but was extended in certain lessons, such as religious education and 
hygiene. In the Orange Free State teaching in the vernacular was compulsory for the first four years of 
schooling, after which it was to be replaced by an official language. There was no formal regulation in 
Natal, but instruction in Zulu was common for the first four years, after which English and Zulu were used 
in equal measure, ibid. p. 73.
100 ibid, p. 146.
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terms of efficiency. As some 75.2 per cent of all pupils in South Africa were in the first four 
years of primary schools, it argued ‘that not to use to the fullest the mother-tongue as the 
medium of instaiction is to impose a very heavy burden on both pupil and teacher’.101 
However, the use of the ‘mother-tongue’ had inherent value to the architects of apartheid 
for a number of other reasons: language could help students define who they were, and, as 
importantly, who they were not. Through the ‘mother-tongue’ policy it was hoped Africans 
would perceive of themselves in a certain way, and understand that they were a ‘separate 
people’ with a certain destiny and expectation. The vernacular was to be used ‘as a vehicle 
for the preservation of pride in national tradition.5102 It was not only the ‘division’ between 
Africans and whites that was to be reinforced. Use of the vernacular would also separate 
Xhosa from Zulu, Zulu from Sotho, etc. Thus, Africans could be denied a collective identity, 
and language could assist a policy of divide and rule.103 The Reserves and Bantu Authorities 
were vital to this plan as language differentiation would lead to the ‘rationalisation of the 
“homogenous” groups which were to become the basis of new local administration.’104
From the 1930s the use of the vernacular in the first few years of a pupil’s life had become 
the pedagogical recommendation. In 1930, for example, the London Institute of African 
Languages and Cultures stated that all education for the first three years should be in the 
vernacular.105 The Kerr Report also believed that all instruction in schools should be through 
the vernacular for the first five years, arguing that this was a ‘fundamental tenet of 
educational theory’.106 In another statement that could have been from the Eiselen Report,
101 Eiselen Report p. 164.
102 ibid, p. 132.
103 The ANC Congress Youth League struggled with the issue of ‘mother-tongue’ instruction. 
Whilst it was somewhat hostile to the use of English as its lingua franca it was anxious of promoting 
language rights for fear of dividing its members.
104 C. Kros, ‘Economic, Political...’, p. 390. The Report emphasized the important role that 
‘mother-tongue’ languages could make ‘for their own use and for other institutions of Bantu life, e.g. Bantu 
Courts and Councils.’ Eiselen Report, pl31.The advancement of ‘mother-tongue’ education was perhaps 
also encouraged to support fledgling Afrikaner publishing houses which would benefit greatly from the 
much needed publication of textbooks in the vernaculars.
105 S. Sivonon, White-Collar or Hoe Handle? African Education Under British Colonial Policy 
1920-1945. (Helsinki, 1995), p. 125.
106 Kerr Report, p. 21.
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the Binns Report declared that ‘to preserve the vernacular languages of Africa is to preserve 
the tribes which speak them and to strengthen the moral sanctions that bind them.’107
The promotion of ‘mother-tongue1 education also meant the demotion of English as a 
medium of instruction and communication. We have seen how the Commissions argued that 
mission education offered Africans a false perspective on their future roles in society.108 
While this was not openly stated, the use of English as a medium of instruction in schools 
was seen as a contributory factor. Africans saw English as the language of opportunity, as 
it was the gateway to better employment (usually as teachers and nurses) and was the 
language of politics. There seems little doubt that Afrikaner nationalists feared the use of 
English as a medium of instruction for political reasons, as competency in English opened 
Africans up to a liberal literature which opposed the principles by which the National Party 
ruled South Africa. By denying Africans English they denied them the chance to be 
influenced and inspired by this literature. Nevertheless, the Commission stated that 
‘economic considerations make it absolutely necessary that the Bantu child should obtain 
a knowledge of one or both of the official languages while he is at school.,109 It suggested 
that these should be taught in the Lower Primary school so that ‘the Bantu child will be able 
to find his way in European communities; to follow oral or written instructions; and to carry 
on a simple conversation with Europeans about his work’.110
In sum, the Report suggested an entirely new basis for African education. Its aim was to 
encourage the further separation of the races, by attempting to demonstrate how Africans 
had an entirely different cultural heritage to whites which, it was argued, meant that they had 
a different destiny. The Report insisted that cultural and racial ‘differences’ between
107 Binns Report., p. 80.
108 In 1952 Verwoerd argued that mission education was the ‘wrong education’ for it led to 
‘frustrated persons [with] expectations beyond what life in South Africa could offer them5 Hansard, House 
of Assembly Debates, 1953, cols 3834-5.
109 Eiselen Report, pl46.
110 ibid. p. 146. This quote suggests the degree to which the Commission attempted to create an 
education system geared to the needs of the economy. Whilst aware of the fallacy of seeing the Report in 
singularly economically reductionist terms, the skills suggested in the above quote would seem to have a 
direct relevance to the increased need for semi-skilled as opposed to unskilled African labour. The Report 
continued ‘in the teaching of the languages their utility should be concentrated on throughout’, p. 146.
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Africans and whites were permanent and that integration would only lead to disaster for 
both communities. It therefore recommended a form of ‘adapted education’ ostensibly 
designed to celebrate the ‘cultural heritage’ of Africans. Thus, education had to be 
‘Bantuised’ so that at every level of administration ‘Bantu’ life and culture would imbue the 
education process. At every possible opportunity the Commissioner’s static notion of a 
‘Bantu Culture’ was to be celebrated and promoted to enable the effective severance of 
‘dangerous’ liberal ideas which Africans were open to within mission schools . Mission 
education had to be removed from the equation because it was incompatible with the 
Commission’s desire to reinforce racial and cultural differences which it hoped would close 
off avenues of political, cultural and economic expression within South Africa generally.
However, the Commissioners argued that they were opening up more ‘authentic’ avenues 
for African political, cultural and economic expression along ‘Bantu lines’, in ‘Bantu areas’. 
This was opposed to the spurious wisdom of the liberal notion of assimilation which, as we 
have seen, was anathema to Afrikaner nationalists who argued that it was against God ’ s will. 
Thus, the Eiselen Report could be justified in that it reflected God’s will when He created 
separate nations, as opposed to the ‘false’ assimilation of the missions. Despite this rhetoric, 
however, Bantu Education was designed to disadvantage Africans by offering them an 
education system designed to limit their horizons.111
The key to the success of ‘Bantu Education, ’ as far as the Commission was concerned, were 
the Reserves, the only place where ‘Bantu life’ as they understood it could be fulfilled. Thus, 
development planning went hand-in-hand with educational planning, as Bantu Education 
could only serve its ultimate purpose through development.112 This could only come to 
fruition with the wholesale renovation of the Reserves, and when the South African 
economy was able to end its reliance on cheap African labour.
111 The Black Consciousness view maintains that missionary education and liberal universalism was 
a false aspiration. It argues that it actually destroyed African culture and was a form of colonial 
indoctrination.
m The Commissioners commented ‘before a satisfactory plan for Bantu Education can be 
formulated, there must be a plan for Bantu development’, Eiselen Report, p. 132.
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Many of the recommendations of the Eiselen Commission were in accord with mainstream 
opinion outside of South Africa. Indeed, in 1957 Lord Hailey remarked ‘the Eiselen Report 
was studiously moderate in its expression and reasonable in its proposals.’113 Norman 
Goodall, the secretary of the International Missionary Council, who visited South Africa in 
1954 on a fact-finding mission also believed that Bantu Education was an expression of the 
‘positive intentions of the Government’:
The avowed aim of the measure... is the constructive working-out of an educational 
policy which will take greater accoimt of Bantu history, culture and aptitudes than 
has so far been characteristic of schools which mainly reflect the European 
tradition. In principle, at any rate, there is something here which corresponds with 
laudable concern for educational reformers elsewhere.114
However, a note of caution needs to be sounded. There were fundamental differences in the 
long term objectives of African education between Eiselen and the other reports. Whereas 
Eiselen denied Africans any role in a multi-racial democratic South Africa115, education 
policy in British Africa did have as its final objective (at least theoretically) the assimilation 
of all citizens including Africans into a multi-racial society.116 In the colonial reports, 
education was concerned with developing the personality and character of individuals who 
could take their place as competent citizens in an inclusive society. Eiselen looked instead 
to promote group identities; Africans were to be educated to take their place within their 
racial groups. While he hoped to ‘uplift’ Africans through education, this was to be done 
in a narrow and prescribed fashion, and not to enable them to take their place in any 
equitable integrated society.
The use of the English language clearly illustrates this. All the colonial reports stressed the 
need to increase the use of English at all levels, excluding the lower primary, because it was 
only through English that Africans could be successfully integrated into a non-racial society
113 Hailey, An African Survey, p. 1149.
114 Lambeth Palace Library (henceforth LPL), London. Correspondence of Geoffrey Fisher, 
Archbishop of Canterbury 1945-61. Vol. 131, f. 255-362 N. Goodall, ‘Some Reflections of the Racial 
Situation in South Africa5, p. 4,
115 Of course apartheid denied the very possibility of a multi-racial state.
116 Kerr Report, p. 10.
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and be ‘prepared5 for eventual independence.117 The Eiselen Report on the contrary, hoped 
to reduce and eventually eliminate the use of English as a medium of instruction in 
schools.118 By doing this it was hoped to reinforce the use of the vernacular to encourage 
group identities and cultural and social homogeneity. In addition English was seen by 
Afrikaner nationalists as a language that transmitted ‘liberal’ values which they considered 
corrosive and dangerous.
Nevertheless, despite these significant differences, the overall similarity in many of the 
immediate policy objectives remains. In the context of the early 1950s, whatever the 
rhetoric, equality remained a very distant objective in most of colonial Africa. The Eiselen 
Report looked to diffuse opposition to the Colour Bar, and racial segregation. The colonial 
regimes in British Africa were dealing with very similar issues. Whereas the Kerr Report 
condemned the Colour Bar as a ‘political’ rather than educational ‘problem’ it did not 
recommend any policy which threatened its operation. As white settlers in these colonies 
were not prepared to give up their economic, political and social hegemony, there were 
severe constraints on what could be recommended in Rhodesia and Kenya.119 At no stage 
did any of the reports challenge the fundamentally subordinate position of Africans in 
colonial society.120 On the contrary, the reports recommended education policies that 
accommodated the prevailing colonial structures and the existing inequality, and reflected 
the racist norms of the societies from which they originated.
The work of Kros and Fleisch, who argue that the Eiselen Report was in line with much 
general education thinking outside of South Africa, is thus supported by this brief 
comparison of policy in British settler Africa. Many prevalent ostensibly ‘liberal’ educational
117 It was no doubt hoped that future interactions, political and economic, between Britain and 
Africa would be assisted by this move as language could be used to maintain and enhance British influence 
in these areas.
118 English would still be taught, but only to allow Africans to be able to communicate with whites, 
not with each other.
119 Indeed, many of the social ills described in these reports were the product of the settler regimes ’ 
unwillingness to offer Africans full and free access to labour markets.
120 D. Mungazi remarked that the Kerr Report ‘did not address the critically important issue of 
equality in society’, D. Mungazi, Colonial Education for Africans: George Stark’s Policy in Zimbabwe, 
(New York, 1991), p. 81.
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ideas were expressed within the Eiselen Report, even if they were manipulated to serve the 
designs of the apartheid ideologues. Denominational church and mission links throughout 
Africa121 meant that ideas about education percolated into South Africa, thus, in the same 
way that they influenced the Eiselen Report, they also shaped mission understandings of 
appropriate African education and their reactions to Eiselen. Missionary reactions in South 
Africa to the Eiselen Report, how they evaluated it and how they proposed to counter it, are 
dealt with in the following chapter.
121 Kerr, for example, was Honorary Secretary of the Church of Scotland Mission Council in South 
Africa, and a previous headmaster of Lovedale.
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‘The Emphasis is Clearly on “Bantu” and Not on Education'; Mission Church Reactions
to the Eiselen Report
From the evidence submitted to the Commission and from their analysis of the Report itself, 
church and mission organisations clearly viewed it as an attempt by the state to further the 
aims of apartheid through extensive social engineering. Fearful of growing African political 
militancy they adopted a somewhat contradictory attitude towards the findings of the 
Commission. While they rejected the total separation of the races implicit in the document, 
they nevertheless championed a form of segregation. Infused with the duty of trusteeship, 
and informed, to a certain extent, by ‘adaptionist’ educational theory, they chose to adopt 
the ‘middle road.’ In fact, they were unable to offer an alternative vision of how society 
should be organised, and what role education should play in any new conception of society.
The Commissioners
The Commission’s composition was accepted by the churches with a remarkable degree of 
uniformity, despite the absence of mission church representation. The appointment of 
Eiselen as chairman seems to have satisfied missionary opinion as he was highly regarded 
by the church community. Rev. Z. Mahabane1 of the Christian Council of South Africa 
(CCSA) commented on the ‘highly talented man in the person of Professor W. W. M. 
Eiselen,’2 whilst Kerr, expressed his ‘complete confidence in the honesty of Dr. Eiselen.’3 
In even more complimentary terms, Rev. Fraser of the Church of Scotland argued
it is not possible that educationalists such like [sic] Dr. Eiselen, brought up a 
missionary’s son, and much loved by the African teachers, may, in close proximity 
to the people and their problems, have thought out some better presentation of
1A Methodist Minister who was twice President-General of the ANC, Vice President of the AAC, 
and President of the Interdenominational African Minsters Federation. This Federation was founded in 1945 
and was committed to unifying the churches to coordinate their opposition to racist legislation.
2 WCL AC623 Christian Council of South Africa, Rev. Z. Mahabane, ‘Native Education’, p. 1.
3 NLS ACC7548 B359 Kerr to J. Watt, 26 March 1955. Eislen was the son of a missionary as were 
two other members of the Commission.
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education to them.4
The reaction of the South African Outlook to the appointments was noncommittal; but it 
also complimented Eiselen, as "an able and experienced chairman5 a man with ‘a reasonable 
and liberal mind motivated by a genuine concern for the welfare of the Native.55
The questionnaire6 produced by the Commission, and distributed to all those interested in 
African education, was also welcomed; the South African Outlook observed that it was
a good one, skilfully drafted, comprehensive and penetrating. We hope that 
everybody in Native Education will study it very carefully. It constitutes a searching 
examination paper which will do them a great deal of good if they will set down 
their own answers - whether for the enlightenment of the Commissioners or merely 
for their own private benefit.7
However, there were some within the mission community who criticised both its 
questionnaire and its terms of reference. The Education League remarked that the latter 
meant that the Commission was ‘prejudiced5 from the start.8 Quintin Whyte, chair of the 
SAIRR, feared that there was
a premise latent in the term(s) of reference which will be liable to obfuscate the 
clear analysis of the situation.. .the terms of reference should merely have asked 
for the formulation of the principles and aims of Native education without 
prediction of any kind.9
4 NLS ACC7548 Annual Report of Rev. Fraser, Gooldville, 8 March 1955.
5 South African Outlook. Editorial, 1 Feb. 1949, p. 17.
6 Reproduced in appendix 1.
7 South African Outlook. May 2 1949, p. 67.
8WCLAF1216 Education League Minute Book 1948-60, May 271952. The Education League was 
a Christian organisation committed to the integration of all education in South Africa. Initially campaigning 
was limited to ending single-medium schooling, and the outright rejection of C.N.E. but expanded into 
African education in the 1950s. It was particularly committed to establishing an inclusive South African 
parent teacher federation. Its membership was mainly drawn from English-speaking parents, teaches 
and university lecturers. Bloomburg, noted that the Education Leagues opposition to Christian National 
Education ‘became a Tallying point for a rare upsurge of English-speaking nationalism.5 Bloomburg, 
Christian Nationalism p. 211
9 WCL AD1715 Education Material 1933-60. Whyte to van Zyl, May 11 1949.
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The Inter-denominational African Ministers5 Federation (IAMF) put it bluntly: The 
Commissioners have largely been guided by the spirit of the Terms of Reference which 
are based upon the Government’s policy of apartheid.’10 The questionnaire was also 
fiercely criticised by the Board of Education of the Anglican Diocese of St. John’s who 
claimed it contained ‘vague and cloudy expressions, which, in the present context, may 
well defy definition, and may even be considered misleading and thus frustrate the whole 
value of the Questionnaire.’ They regarded it
with mixed feelings of disappointment, in that, by reasons of its limitations, it 
will prevent that help being given to the Commission which all who have the 
welfare of South Africa and its people at heart would wish to give.11
The St. John’s Education Board was in fact so angered by the questionnaire that it 
refused to answer it directly and instead submitted a memorandum which, it contended, 
‘may be a greater help to those whose responsibility it is to furnish a Report on 
Education, than ad seriatim answers to the questionnaire.512 The Education League was 
equally disappointed with the questionnaire and was ‘surprised that these questions 
should be considered material for serious discussion.’13
These isolated criticisms, and a general silence in their archives concerning ‘Native 
education’ during 1949-51, suggest that mission and church bodies adopted a ‘wait and 
see’ approach to the Commission. They appeared satisfied with the appointment of the 
Commissioners and awaited the publication of the Report before entering into any critical 
dialogue.
The reaction to the Report itself was rather more mixed. As the previous chapter showed
lQWCL AC623 IAMF, ‘Report of the Committee’, p. 3.
11WCLAB1886 Diocese of St. John 1858-1982. B1 Bantu Education, ‘Memorandum to be Placed 
Before the Commission set up to Take Evidence and Report on Native Education. Embodying the Views 
of the Sub-Committee Appointed by the Board of Education of the Diocese of St. John’s (Transkei)’, p. 1.
12 ibid, p. 1.
13 WCL AD843 Education League, ‘Evidence to be Submitted to the Commission on Native 
Education’, p. 2.
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the Eiselen Commission proposed an elaborate and detailed plan for the wholesale 
development o f ‘the Bantu’ that went far beyond the recommendations expected from an 
education commission. This feature of the report was acknowledged by members of the 
mission church community. Pitts argued that ‘some may feel that the Commission has 
gone beyond its terms of reference, at least it cannot be said to have considered education 
in a vacuum.’14 Similarly a South African Outlook editorial noted
...the Commission has gone far beyond its mandate and worked out in some 
detail a separate system o f  administrative departments for Africans, thus 
duplicating existing ministries, creating numbers o f new consultative bodies or 
administrative departments, with their officials and secretaries, not only for 
education, but also for what is pretentiously but cryptically called ‘development’, 
a term which seems to include the administration o f  justice, o f  lands, o f  
agriculture, o f local government, o f  health and o f labour...it involves in fact a 
dual system o f governments in the country.15
The Education League remarked that the Report’s ‘emphasis is clearly on “Bantu” and 
not on education. ’16 The developmental stress within the Report, according to the South 
African Outlook, ‘smacks of apartheid, of the Nationalist brand, from beginning to 
end.’17 The IAMF claimed that the Report was ‘based upon the Government’s policy of 
apartheid [and] marked another instalment in the Government ’ s Master Plan to implement 
the policy of Apartheid.’18
However, such bold expressions from mission and church bodies categorising the Report 
as a statement on apartheid are not representative of the majority of responses which 
complimented it a valuable and much needed piece of research. A Committee established
14 South African Outlook ‘Conference on the Eiselen Report’, Aug. 1 1952, p. 116. Pitts was the 
Governor of Healdtown, the leading Methodist institution.
15 South African Outlook May 1 1952, pp. 72-75.
16 WCL ADI 158 SAIRR 1929-79 ‘The Background to the Bantu Education Bill and the Future of 
Bantu Education’, paper published by the Education League, 18 Sept. 1953, p. 7.
17 South African Outlook. ‘The Native Education Conunission Report: Some Features’ March 1 
1952, pp. 36-39.
18 WCL AC623 Inter Denominational African Ministers’ Federation of South Africa, ‘Report of 
Committee’, pp. 1-4.
99
by the Anglican Bishop of Johannesburg, Bishop Reeves, thought it ‘worthy of careful 
consideration.’ It was ‘grateful for the painstaking care that has gone into the collection 
of data’ as was the Rev. S, Pitts, writing in the South African Outlook, who enthused ‘no 
one engaged in Native Education can afford to neglect a Report of this nature... [T]his 
present Report is a thorough painstaking piece of work. ’19 The Transvaal Missionary 
Society was equally impressed with its ‘sincere and painstaking attempt to reform the 
present conditions of the School Education of Native children.520 In similar fashion a 
South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR.) Conference wished
at the outset, to pay tribute to the most thorough and painstaking Report, and the 
welcome and careful analysis of facts which form a preamble to the Report, and 
the timely criticism of much of the present system which needs review and 
alteration.21
While the IAMF recognised the ‘scholarly Report submitted by Professor Werner W. M. 
Eiselen and his highly talentef [sic] colleagues.,22 The Bantu World remarked that it was 
‘conceived in a spirit of benevolent responsibility.’23 The terminology used in the praise 
of the Report is striking in its consistency: ‘painstaking’, ‘thorough’, ‘sincere’, ‘timely’ 
and ‘careful’. The apparently scholarly and exhaustive nature of the Eiselen Commission 
clearly impressed a broad spectrum of missionary opinion. In general, the great majority 
of mission churches failed to evaluate or acknowledge the Report’s overall plan, 
preferring instead to highlight and condemn only certain recommendations.
19 WCL AC623 Diocese of Johannesburg, ‘Memorandum on the Report of the Commission on 
Native Education 1949-51', p. 1 and ‘Conference on the Eiselen Report’ South African Outlook. Aug. 1 
1952, p. 116.
20 WCL, AD843 South African Institute ofRace Relations (SAIRR) ‘Memorandum of the Transvaal 
Missionary Society Concerning the Report of the Conunission on Native Education’, p. 1.
21 WCL AB191 Church of the Province of South Africa (CPSA) G. Clayton, correspondence with 
the SAIRR, 1951-55, ‘Record of the Proceedings of the National Conference Convened by the Institute in 
July 1952, to Study the Report of the Native Education Commission’, p. 2. Pitts was the Governor of 
Healdtown, the premier Methodist institution.
22 WCL AC623 Inter Denominational African Ministers’ Federation of South Africa. ‘Report of 
Committee on Native Education’, p. 4.
23 ‘Mr, Lekhela Analyses Education Report’, Bantu World. July 12, 1952, p. 7.
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Culture and the Meaning of'Interdependence'
If relatively few missionaries and churches criticised the overall plan of the Report, their 
response nevertheless rested upon a wholly different interpretation of the aims of 
education, an alternative conceptualisation of culture, and an insistence on the 
interdependence of all South African citizens. Their analysis was informed by a 
commitment to the liberal tenets of universalism and individual freedom.
Of course, the concept of universalism was, and is, problematic due to the contradiction 
inherent in the Enlightenment ideology of equality and the persistence of inequality in 
society, and between its ideals and its practice. While the Enlightenment did ‘establish for 
the first time, in theory at least, the possibility of human emancipation' it did so ‘in social 
circumstances that limited the expression of its emancipatory potential.’24 Kenan Malik 
for example, argues that the persistence of social divisions (necessary for the success of 
capitalism) in a society which proclaimed its belief in equality, led to the development of 
the concept of ‘race’ which was used to account for social inequality in terms of the 
natural order of things. Thus, Post-Enlightenment thinkers argued that social divisions 
(inequality) was natural, and was the product o f ‘race’. Malik contends that this belief 
degraded the concept of universalism and led to a position where liberals could accept 
social inequality by arguing that it was due to ‘natural’ differences between races. In this 
understanding race became hierarchal, with the ‘European race’ placed at the pinnacle.25
Universalism thus became a philosophy based upon European concepts of what 
constituted ‘civilization’ and what any ‘civilized universal’ society should be like. From 
the perspective African societies were considered ‘primitive’ and thus relatively 
worthless. This in turn helped to explain the existence of inequality between Europeans 
and Africans and allowed Europeans to justify the destruction of African culture, in
24 K. Malik, The Meaning of Race: Race. History and Culture in Western Society (McMillan, 
1996), p. 68.
25 Initially post-Enlightenment theorists argued that Europe was made up of different ‘white races ’ 
which accounted for social inequality in Europe. However, over time such distinctions faded (due to imperial 
expansion and social stability in Europeans states) and race became determined solely by skin colour.
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favour of ‘ superior’ European culture. This could only be achieved, however, if Africans accepted 
European ‘civilisation.’26
These attitudes pervaded much of the missionary evidence to the Eiselen Commission as mission 
bodies concluded that Africans were ‘primitive’ compared to the ‘advanced culture’ of western 
nations, but could be ‘improved’ and become part of a wider universal society under God. This 
belief that Africans could be ‘improved’ was, however, very significant for whatever its 
limitations, universalism did hold out the possibility of advance, and offered Africans at least 
some wider opportunities which were completely denied to them under apartheid.
This meant that the Report’s interpretation of culture was rejected by mission and church groups 
who argued that there was only one cultural heritage, that of ‘humankind’, although some 
cultures were more ‘advanced’ than others.27 There was general consensus amongst respondents 
that ‘Native’ culture was ‘backward’, compared to the ‘advanced’ culture of western nations. For 
example, the memorandum submitted by the Diocese of Johannesburg suggested that ‘native’ 
culture was ‘of a primitive type’28, whilst die Transvaal Missionaiy Association noted diat ‘Bantu 
culture is primitive.’29 This ‘backwardness’ was, however, explained in terms of die differing 
environmental conditions that prevailed in Africa. As Brother True, a representative of the 
Anglican Society of the Sacred Mission made clear, ‘Every race has perhaps special 
characteristics dependent on climate, environment... The characteristics he has are the result of his 
environment and fight for preservation.’20
M One of the main ways to achieve this was via education. The terms ‘race5 and ‘culture5 are 
contentious. In contemporary debates race is seen as a subjective socially defined categorisation and not an 
objective ‘fact5. Most missionaries used ‘race’ as a legitimate tool of categorisation, highlighting ‘unique5 
African racial characteristics. Most modern interpretations of ‘culture5 mirror the missionaries’ 
interpretation of it as a common collection of social, psychological and historical behaviours. Some 
missionaries, however, used both terms interchangeably, demonstrating a blurring of the concepts and their 
definitions. What they all agreed however, was that as a ‘race’ or ‘culture5 Africans were inferior to whites.
27 With differing degrees of complexity tins notion of culture was adopted by the mission church 
community in its depositions to the Conunission, It reflected the central Christian belief that all were created 
equal in the image of God.
2R WCL AC623 Diocese of Johannesburg, ‘Memorandum on the Report5, p. 1.
29 WCL AD843 ‘Memorandum from the Transvaal Missionary Association...5, p. 1.
20 WCL AB2049 Society of the Sacred Mission. M3 Native Education, ‘Memorandum to the 
Commission on Native Education.5 Brother PatriclcTruc, Principal Moddcrpoort Schools, pp. 1-2. Through 
their insistence that environment and not innate differences caused cultural variety, missionaries were able
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Similarly the CCSA argued that differential patterns of ‘cultural behaviour’ between 
‘natives’ and ‘Europeans’, including those relating to landownership, familial organisation 
and divisions of labour, were solely due to environment and ‘were not innate’.31 As 
previously indicated, Kros suggests that the idea of culture proved to be an effective 
instrument for the Commission since all those questioned about it subscribed to the basic 
concept of cultural difference. While the missionaries acknowledged cultural difference, 
however, this did not imply their approval for the type of differentiated education that 
was proposed by the Commission. The evidence presented to the Commission by mission 
church groups shows that they did support a differentiated education policy, but it was 
one that ultimately had the same aim as that given to white students. As Rev. W.H. 
Kinsey of the Presbyterian Church of South Africa asserted:
The ultimate aim of Native Education, as of all education, should be to fit the 
coming generation for life, and for the attainment of full citizenship in the best 
and fullest sense. In the case of the Native this must be, in view of their 
background and slower adaptability, a gradual process and must be based on a 
system which will recognise that they are entitled to every opportunity which 
European civilization has to offer.32
Similarly the CCSA argued that the principles and aims of education were the same for 
all races, but argued that ‘Native education’ should concentrate fully on the need to 
improve ‘native’ literacy and technical skills.33 The American Board Mission noted, for 
its part,
that the principles and aims of Native education should be the same as for 
European education. This does not, of course, rule out the teaching of Bantu
to defend the educatabilitv of the ‘native.’
31 WCL AC623 CCSA ‘Answers of the Education Section to Questionnaire of Conunission on 
Native Education’, p. 1. The Potchefstroom Joint Council argued ‘Characteristics, qualities, aptitudes are 
modified and develop by changes in the environment and are not inborn and immutable,’ AD1715 SAIRR 
Potchefstroom Joint Council, p. 1.
32 University of Cape Town - Manuscripts and Archives (henceforth UCTL), BC282 Native 
Education Commission (Eiselen Commission) A. 18 Presbyterian Church of South Africa, Rev. W.H. 
Kinsey, ‘Questionnaire on Native Education’, p. 2.
33 WCL AC623 CCSA, ‘Answers of the Education...’, pp. 1-2.
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languages or other specific subjects in Native schools.34
The above quotations are a fraction of the material presented by church bodies which 
argued that the aim of education was the same for all children, but that cultural 
differences, in terms of the relative ‘development’ of African society, meant that 
education policy had to be appropriate to the specific needs of Africans. While this may 
appear in accord with the designs of the Eiselen Commission, ultimately it was not, 
because, critically, the mission church community at a certain level believed in the 
incorporation of all human beings into a single inclusive society under God. As a 
representative of the Church of Scotland observed:
it is for a mixed and comingled social environment that the education of the 
Native must be directed, and its guiding principle must surely be to fit him for 
competent, effective and rewarding membership of the community thus 
regarded.35
This belief led the church and mission groups to reject the Report’s emphasis on ‘the 
Bantu’ as an ‘independent race’ vehemently. The report of the 1952 SAIRR conference 
which examined the Eiselen Report remarked, ‘Africans are not culturally, economically 
or politically ‘independent’, they are an integral part of South African society.’36 
Missionaries regarded the universalism of humanity as the premise upon which their 
whole work rested. In regard to education this meant that its ultimate aim and purpose 
was the same for all, but variations in cultural ‘development’ could be taken into 
consideration when formulating policy. While Africans had the fundamental right to share 
in and benefit from a world culture, they would do so under the trusteeship of whites, 
who were the guardians of a ‘superior’ culture that would be slowly and gradually 
revealed to Africans. This was certainly not non-racial, as it took as given the superiority 
of white culture, but it differed drastically from the aims and principles of the Eiselen 
Report which looked to ensure the permanent separation of people and their cultures.
34 UCTL BC282 Native Education Commission, A l . l l  ‘Government Commission on Native 
Education - Questionnaire: Reply by the American Board Mission5, p. 2.
35 WCL AB938 Rev. Amott, ‘Commission on Native Education5, p. 1.
36 WCL AB191 ‘Record of Proceedings5, p. 2.
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The Mission Alternative
The Johannesburg Joint Council of Europeans and Africans saw the contradictions 
clearly37. It pointed out that mission education was ‘imprisoned in a vicious circle/ for 
if it championed equality in education it was ‘imprisoned’ by the Colour Bar, yet if it 
advocated differentiated education to accommodate the Colour Bar, it was ‘imprisoned’ 
by being associated with segregation and apartheid.38 The most obvious way for the 
churches to try and break this cycle was to preach and practice unlimited racial 
integration in all walks of life. However, as they were unwilling and incapable of 
championing such a democratic and non-racist society39 they did little more than reaffirm 
their belief in trusteeship, wherein mission education would play a key socialising role. 
As Sue Krige has argued in relation to the 1935-6 Interdepartmental Committee on 
Native Education (Welsh Report) which was ‘in direct opposition to segregationist 
thinking’ and yet demonstrated ‘the inability of the liberal-mission network to develop 
much of an alternative to the status-quo, and to challenge the ideology of segregation 
through the platform of African education. ’40
The ‘imprisoning’ effect that segregationist and apartheid discourse had on mission 
educators is evident in their attempts to define the objectives of mission education. In the 
long term they sought the incorporation of all people into God’s kingdom on earth; in the 
shorter term, however, their objectives appeared uncertain. This uncertainty was caused 
in part by the restrictions the pupils faced when they left mission schools. As the 
Transvaal Advisory Board on Native Education41 remarked in terms similar to those used
37 The Joint Councils spread throughout South Africa from 1921 and were intended to improve 
dialogue between all races in South Africa on issues that effected them.
38 WCL AD1433 Joint Council of Europeans and Africans, 1924-54 CJ2.1.1 Johannesburg Joint 
Council ‘Evidence to be Submitted to the Commission on Native Education’, p. 1.
39 The reasons for this will become apparent when individual church responses are examined.
40 Krige, ‘Should Education L e a d . p p .  151 -176.
41 The Transvaal Native Education Advisory Board was established as a forum where provincial 
policy- makers and mission educationalists could discuss the future direction of policy and any problems 
that were being encountered. Such Advisory Boards were scrapped after the introduction of Bantu
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in the Eiselen Report itself:
The education of the African people suffers from uncertainty of aim...[T]his 
uncertainty is due to uncertain Native policy - political, economic and social, 
uncertainty as to the environment for which the Natives are to be educated.42
Missionaries knew what society they wanted their pupils educated for, but given the 
constraints of apartheid they acknowledged that mission education did not function 
effectively for the majority. For example, the Education Board of the Diocese of St. 
John’s saw as an ‘undoubted failure’ of mission education the fact that a
minute minority have used it as a stepping stone to earning a livelihood in a 
pathetically small and inflexibly controlled employment market.. .it is something 
exotic to the essential life of the community43
The Society of the Sacred Mission also realised that there was ‘little or no correlation 
between courses and work available after students have left the schools. ’44 Other mission 
churches recognised equally well that existing mission education was not serving the best 
interests of the African community, because it was based on what was taught to 
‘European’ children who had full access to political, social and economic opportunities 
in South Africa.45 As the IAMF pointed out
while it has produced thousands of educated Africans ... it has failed to produce 
a class of people who find no difficulty in taking up their rightful place in [the] 
socio-economic or political-industrial set up of the country.46
Education.
42 WCL A394 Rheinhallt Jones C44 (f) Transvaal Advisory Board on Native Education 1949. 
‘Replies to Questionnaire’, p4. This statement is somewhat ironic given the very certain directive given to 
‘native policy’ by the Eiselen Commission.
43 WCL AD1886 Diocese of St. John’s, ‘Memorandum to be Placed..,’, p. 2.
44 WCL AB2049 Society of the Sacred Mission, ‘Memorandum to the... p’ 2.
45 The Hermaimsburg Mission noted the ‘grave failure to relate education to reality. ’ UCTL BC282 
A. 17 Hennannsburg Mission ‘Memorandum on Questions of Native Education Conunission’, p. 3.
46 WCL AC623 IAMF, ‘Report of Committee...’, p. 4.
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These concerns led missionaries to highlight, as did the Eiselen Commission, the 
frustration that Africans felt upon leaving mission schools and finding inadequate 
employment opportunities. The Transvaal Missionary Board, for example, argued that 
a combination of mission education and the Colour Bar led to ‘the creation of resentment 
in the minds of those trained.’47 What heightened these concerns further for the 
missionaries was their fear that this ‘resentment’ was no longer controlled and suppressed 
by ‘traditional tribal sanctions’.
All mission church bodies pointed to the accelerated erosion of these ‘tribal’ constraints 
and their memoranda are littered with expressions of anxiety lamenting the destruction 
of customary controls over behaviour, because of the ‘revolutionary effect’ o f ‘western 
culture’48 on the ‘primitive’ nature of indigenous culture. Moreover, rapid adoption of 
‘western culture’ was not only leading to the destruction of traditional patterns of social 
discipline; it also led to the adoption o f‘European’ vices such as alcoholism, prostitution 
and gambling.
Thus, the Swiss Mission alluded to the ‘breaking up of the tribal system without an 
adequate social order to replace it,’49 while the Society of the Sacred Mission argued that 
‘detribalisation has led to the breakdown in loyalty and obedience’50, and a St. Matthew’s 
school memorandum referred to ‘the break up of tribal authority and the emergence of 
the irresponsible individual freed from tribal sanctions.’51 All agreed that the net result 
was an increase in criminal activity and a general breakdown in social stability.
The missions’ own role in this was also considered. According to the Transvaal 
Missionary Society Christianity was ‘one of the foremost agents in upsetting the original
47 WCL A394 Rheinallt Jones, ‘Replies to Questionnaire...’, p. 18.
48 WCL AD843 ‘Memorandum From the Transvaal Missionary Association... ’, p. 1.
49 WCL AC1084 Swiss Mission ‘Questionnaire on Native Education...’, p. 1.
50 WCL AB2049 ‘Memorandum Submitted...’, p. 4.
51 WCL AB398 St. Matthew’s ‘Questionnaire,,.’, p. 1,
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culture.552 What concerned the mission community was not simply that ‘tribal sanctions’ 
were being undermined, but that they were not being replaced by Christian morality. As 
the Church of Sweden noted
The breaking up of the old Native Society, individualism replacing collectivism, 
old Native laws loosing [sic] their significance, the Christian principles having 
not yet become part and parcel of the Native society. A general confusion ensues.
Christian Education needed.53
Similarly Rev. Kinsey of the Presbyterian Church commented on the ‘decay of old tribal 
sanctions and the lack of any moral or disciplinary code to replace them.’54 Nor w iere 
these concerns limited to white missionaries, they were even echoed by the African Natal 
Teachers’ Society which pointed to
the rapid disintegration of tribal life and the consequent rapid deterioration in the 
power of tribal social sanctions. It was probably inevitable that this 
disintegration would occur; but the danger lies in the rapidity with which it is 
taking place in contrast with the much slower development of missionary and 
educational endeavours to substitute something better than tribal social 
sanctions.55
The mission churches recognised two dangers, the ‘frustrated’ educated ‘native’ and the 
‘detribalised native’ bereft of any social responsibility. Both of these ‘dangers’, they 
argued, were being created by the incompatibility of current education policy with 
apartheid. Thus, in effect, the churches admitted to the Commission that the situation as 
it stood was unsustainable, and did indeed threaten the continuation of white rule in 
South Africa.
Mission educators realised that African education failed to reflect the realities of the 
Colour Bar and other repressive legislation, but rather than challenge the structures that
52 WCL AD843 ‘Memorandum From the Transvaal Missionary Association....’, p. 1.
53 UCTL BC282 Native Education Commission Al.3.1 Church of Sweden, ‘Reply to the 
Questionnaire Sent Out by the Government Commission on Native Education’, p. 1.
54 UCTL BC282 A. 18 Rev. W.H, Kinsey, ‘Questionnaire on Native Education’, p. 2.
55 UCTL BC282 AIN ‘Opinion of the Natal Teachers’ Association’, p. 2.
108
thwarted the integration of Africans they opted to work within the stifling confines of 
segregation. This is illustrated by the Transvaal Advisory Board on Native Education 
which contended:
There are possibilities of ‘careers’ for Africans which will permit of their 
contributing to the national well-being without creatinf [sic] racial tension. These 
are in occupations dealing with the social life of their people, such as mental, 
nursing and teaching professions, trading etc. And as their people’ sneeds expand 
the other opportunities for serving their own people will develop.56
The SAIRR Conference noted that ‘there is a wide field of opportunity for Africans in 
commerce, especially in African townships and reserves’ emphasising the role that 
Africans were to play within ‘their own communities.’57 The submission to the 
Commission from the Methodist St. Matthew’s College, remarked ‘They [the Africans] 
must be equipped to take their full share in the control and administration of their own 
affairs’58 while the Bloemfontein Joint Council suggested that ‘training should fit them 
for work at their trades in their own community.559 The CCSA remarked ‘since Africans, 
whether in the Reserves or in the towns naturally tend to associate with their own people, 
they are in need of all the services which a society normally requires.’60 All these 
statements assume the existence and continuation of racial segregation, indicating that 
mission educators struggled to find a position outside of the dominant segregationist 
discourse.
The paradoxical nature of the missions’ position was well illustrated by Rev. Amott of 
the Church of Scotland who remarked:
56 WCL A3 94 Rheinliallt Jones, Transvaal Advisory Board on Native Education, ‘Replies to 
Questionnaire’, plO. Presumably the ‘racial tensions’ referred to were those created by the Colour Bar.
57 AB191 ‘Record of the Proceedings..’, p. 3.
58 WCL AB938 St. Matthew’s College, ‘Questionnaire on Native Education’, p. 1.
59 WCL AD1433 Bloemfontein Joint Council, ‘Reply to Questionnaire...’, p. 3.
60 WCL AC623 CCSA, ‘ Answers to Education Section... ’, p. 2. The Council seems oblivious to the 
fact that the ‘Africans’ tendency to associate together would have been enforced legally in most cases.
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Native education should have a double objective: (a) correction - to reduce, and 
so far as possible to remove, the incidence of damage to the structure of Native 
life: and (b) planned provision, in intimate balance and inter-relation of all 
aspects and grades, of training designed to render satisfying and effective the 
Native’s membership of the South African community.61
Clearly, these objectives were incompatible and reflected the confusions in a mission 
education which produced students ‘fit’ for a society that did not exist. The CCSA 
argued, for example, that education as it stood Cneglect[ed] the pupils’ life needs’62 whilst 
the Education League lamented the ‘dissociation of the work of the class-room from the 
life of the community.’63 This contradiction was exactly what the Eiselen Report set out 
to address.
There were also numerous memoranda from the missions condemning the ‘bookishness’ 
and ‘unreality’ of mission education.64 The solution for this was sought in a form of 
‘adapted’ education. The Swiss Mission noted that education policy ‘should bear in mind 
the background of the Native child is very different to that of the European’65 while a 
CPS A committee remarked that
syllabuses should be adapted to different conditions. ..[and] be more practical in 
their content and less theoretical. Syllabuses should not be designed for the 
privileged few who go beyond the Primary or Secondary stage, but for the pupils 
who can spend at most five years at school.66
‘Adapted’ education provided the missions with a means by which they could remove, 
or at least alleviate, the ‘frustration’ resulting from an education that was incompatible
61 WCL AD968 Rev. Amott, ‘Commission on Native Education’, p. 2.
02 WCL AC623 Christian Council of South Africa, ‘Report of Education Section’, p. 2.
03 WCL AD843 Education League ‘Evidence to be Submitted’, p. 6.
64 See for example, WCL AB2049 Society of the Sacred Mission CCSA ‘Answers of Education 
Section’, p. 2. WCL AB938 Rev. Amott ‘Commission on Native Education’, p. 4.
65 WCL AC 1084 Swiss Mission ‘Questionnaire on Native Education’, p. 1.
66 UCTL BC282 A1.7 The Bishop of St. John's Committee, ‘Answer to Questionnaire on Native 
Education’, p. 3.
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with segregation and apartheid. It promised, to a certain degree, to reestablish ‘tribal 
sanctions’ by focussing life on the more immediate community and its concerns. 
Missionaries did not, however, see in this policy any diminution of their influence, which 
was needed more than ever to instil Africans with Christian morality.
While the mission churches in South Africa categorically rejected the Eiselen Report’s 
call for the permanent separation of the races, there was much in the Report which they 
agreed with. Unable to offer an alternative vision of society they conceded the continued 
existence of segregation, recognised the incompatibility of mission education with this, 
and sought a policy that would ameliorate the threat to white society that existing 
practice seemed to represent. This meant that most missionaries found themselves 
advocating changes which harmonised educational endeavour with segregation.
This position contrasted dramatically with the attitude adopted by African associations67 
before the Commission. In general, they repeated the concerns of missionary and church 
groups but did not appeal for further missionary trusteeship. The Teachers’ League of 
South Africa (TLSA)68 rejected the cpious hypocrisy of trusteeship’69 while even the 
IAMF remarked that mission education had
produced thousands of educated Africans yet it has failed to produce a 
class of people who find no difficulty in taking up their rightful place in 
the socio-economic or political-industrial set up of the country.70
In general, the associations linked the plight of African education to apartheid which they 
saw as ‘closely related and inter-linked’. As CATA remarked:
61 See UCTL BC282 A.17, A1.21, Al.3.1, A. 18, A1.30.
68 The TLSA was a militant ‘coloured’ teachers association which was affiliated to the NEUM. It 
encouraged all ‘Non-Europeans5 to resist apartheid by refusing to collaborate with it at any level.
69 ibid, p. 2. The TLSA stated that ‘The Church cannot and should not be responsible for education. 
It is one of the functions of the state to educate its citizens5, p. 6.
70 WCL AC623 IAMF ‘Report of Committee on Report of Commission on Native Education5, p.
4.
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segregation in education must be seen as an integral part of a whole 
political and social system designed to perpetuate the dominance of the 
European section on the one hand and economic enslavement of the Non- 
Europeans on the other.71
Africans thus condemned Bantu Education outright as an important part of apartheid. 
The TLSA observed, ‘the system of “Native Education” and the lack of opportunity 
correlate with the denial of political rights and economic slavery into which the African 
has been forced.’72
The only solution was the state assumption of all education under one non-racial 
department, as TATA demanded: ‘One nation, one education. ’73 Thus, many Africans did 
not simply reject Bantu Education, but mission education with it.
Specific Recommendations
It is logical to assume that the most obvious point of contention between the mission and 
the Commission would be its recommendation that missionaries should be removed from 
the field of education. Yet their general response to this was surprisingly muted, perhaps 
because of their growing realisation that state control of education was much needed and 
somewhat inevitable. The Diocese of Johannesburg £deplor[ed] the passing of control 
from the missions.,74 The conference organised by the SAIRR argued that as some two- 
thirds of ‘natives’ of school-going age were not in school the government clearly still 
needed the missions.75 Most mission opinion supported the view that they should work
71 UCTL BC282 A1.8 CATA ‘Memorandum on “Native Education’” , p. 1.
72 UCTL BC282 A. 17 ‘Memorandum on the Education of Africans Submitted by the Teachers’ 
League of South Africa to the Commission on “Native Education’”, p. 5. The TLSA claimed that Bantu 
Education was ‘a calculated system of indoctrination whereby the African people may be kept in a state of 
subservience and docility.’ p. 1.
73 UCTL BC282 A1.21 TATA ‘Memorandum on African Education Submitted to the Government 
Commission on Native Education.’, p. 4.
74 WCL AC623 Diocese of Johannesburg, ‘Report of the Conunission’, p. 4.
75 WCL AB191 ‘Record of Proceedings’, p. 4.
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in partnership with the state to help provide as much education as possible for Africans.
What concerned the mission church community far more than the actual call for the 
transfer of African education was the nature of the transfer itself, which, as we have seen, 
was left vague and uncertain. The Transvaal Missionary Association lamented
We may well ask what the mission are expected to do? Are they to continue to 
pioneer more schools in order to meet the needs of the school-less children, 
knowing that when they have done so, they will be asked to give up control76
Similarly the representatives of the Diocese of Johannesburg wrote:
We would submit it is unfair to ask religious bodies to maintain their keen 
interest in schools if they are to do so for an indefinite interim period...we are 
convinced that if the state is to take over the schools it mustio so immediately 
and then plan the future policy77
For those running schools uncertainty presented numerous problems in terms of the 
appointment of staff, the construction of new schools and buildings, the collection of fees 
and the teaching of complete courses to pupils.
The issue of who should control Africa education, provincial or central government, 
occupied much of the Report and the responses to it. The reaction to the proposed 
transfer from the provinces to the NAD is best summed up by the Transvaal Missionary 
Society:
On the whole we agree with the criticism of the present system.. knowing that 
there is much need for improvement. We would welcome a Union system of 
Education, but not under the Native Affairs Department78
Thus, the mission churches were generally reconciled to the idea of state control, and
76 WCL AD843 ‘Memorandum from the Transvaal Missionary Association’, p. 2.
77 WCL AC623 Diocese of Johannesburg, ‘Report of the Commission’, p. 4.
78 WCL AD843 ‘Memorandum from’, p. 1.
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welcomed the acknowledgment of this in the Report79 However, they were, without 
exception, opposed to ‘native’ education becoming the sole responsibility of the NAD. 
The Diocese of Johannesburg warned that NAD control
would not be so constituted to ensure that education would be in the hands of 
those who had the interests of education most at heart, nor would this authority 
be acquainted with the problems of education80
Missions feared that under the NAD education policy would be directed by political 
concerns. Like most Africans, they rejected the differentiation implicit in having a 
separate department of education for Africans, and argued for the Union Department of 
Education to take control of African education in tandem with white education.
The recommendations by the Commission for the increased ‘use’ of ‘the Bantu’ in local 
administration were cautiously welcomed: given their rhetoric concerning the need for 
greater racial integration the missions could hardly be seen to oppose African 
involvement,. The SAIRR endorsed ‘the view of the Report that it is desirable that the 
African people should be accorded greater participation in directing the education of 
Africans,’81 while the Johannesburg Joint Council commented ‘there is much to be said 
for an effective committee working in harmony with the School Manager or School 
Board’82 while a Church of Scotland representative indicated, ‘there is every reason for 
persisting with their formation’, although he added that they ‘have not yet often proved 
successful.’83
79 The CCSA remarked that ‘it has become apparent that the task of educating the African so as 
to make him a more serviceable citizen within a reasonable time is beyond private enterprise and thus duty 
should be assumed by the state.’ WCL AC623 CCSA ‘Answers of the Education Section...’ p. 5.
80 WCL AC923 Diocese of Johannesburg, ‘Memorandum on the Report’, p. 5.
81 WCL AB191 ‘Record of the Proceedings’, p. 5. In this quote one can see the segregationist 
discourse informing the Conferences resolutions. They welcomed the involvement of ‘Africans’ in shaping 
the education policy of ‘Africans. ’
82 WCL AD1433 Johannesburg Joint Council, ‘Evidence to be Submitted’, p. 4.
83 WCL AB398 Rev. Amott ‘Commission on Native Education’, p. 12.
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However, the role that Africans were actually to play in the control of schools via their 
involvement in the Local and Regional Bantu Authorities was condemned. The Education 
League called the system ‘very involved’84, while representatives of the Diocese of 
Johannesburg argued that ‘the proposed elaborate structure.. .will offer less scope and less 
incentive for hitherto active participation.’85
The position of religion in the new structures was obviously of vital importance to the 
churches. As we have seen, Krige argues that during the interwar period mission 
educators fought against the encroachment of secular forces into the educational sphere.86 
While these concerns continued into the postwar period, it appears that the Eiselen 
Report’s insistence on the central role that religious education should take under ‘Bantu 
Education’ mollified many missionaries. The SAIRR welcomed the emphasis in the 
Report on a Christian basis for education but warned that ‘Christian education with the 
inspiration of a vital faith’ was unlikely to be adequate ‘under a system of education 
organised and controlled solely by government agencies’87, and the South African 
Outlook condemned the ‘purely secular agency of the state’88
Missionaries reacted to the financial implications of the Report by indicating its failure 
to recommend any significant increase in the funding of African education. Despite the 
reforms suggested, the Education League asserted that ‘the state has hardly begun to 
shoulder its responsibilities in regard to Native Education.’89 Such comments prefaced 
the majority of missionary evaluations of its financial implications, with unanimous 
agreement that the state had a pressing responsibility to increase its budget for African 
education. The missions pointed to the dangers inherent in an inadequate education
84 WCL AF1216 Education League Minute Book, 1948-60. Minutes 19 June 1952.
85 WCL AC623 Diocese of Johannesburg, ‘Memorandum on the Report’, p. 5.
86 See chapter four.
87 WCL AB191 ‘Records of Proceedings’, p. 2.
88 South African Outlook. 1 May 1952, p. 72.
89 WCL AD843 Education League, ‘Evidence to be Submitted’, p. 10.
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system. The Education League’s demand for increased spending was accompanied by 
concerns over the ‘recent increase in juvenile delinquency and crime’; moreover a 
‘growing political awareness’ was creating an ‘explosive temper’ amongst Africans.90 
Rev. Amott of the Church of Scotland warned:
the existence of an illiterate and impressionable mass within the 
community.. .constitutes a potential danger both in itself and to the extent that it 
affords opportunity for unfriendly propaganda91
The political and social context of the Report once again shaped the missionary 
responses. By accentuating fears over social unrest, the missionaries not only 
demonstrated their own concerns but also suggests that they were attempting to 
manipulate the Commissioners themselves into paying attention to what they were 
saying. For the missionaries, education clearly had a role to play as an agent for social 
control, and they saw this as part of the value of education in a more general sense.
The emphasis on the use of the vernacular proposed by Eiselen caused great 
consternation amongst mission church bodies. Almost all were in agreement that the 
vernacular was only of use in the lower standards, and should then be gradually replaced 
by the official languages.92 They were adamant that the use of the vernacular should not 
be extended further in the education system. The North Western Province Teachers’ 
Union made its opposition to this clear, ‘one can conceive of no method more effective 
for making African education sterile and narrow than the use of the Bantu languages.593
90 WCL AD843 Education League, ‘Evidence to be Submitted3, p. 10.
91 WCL AB398 Rev. Arnott, ‘Commission on Native Education3, p . 14. One would assume that 
by ‘unfriendly propaganda3 Amott meant communism. The argument advanced by Arnott is reminiscent 
of the opinions expressed calling for the introduction of mass education in nineteenth century industrial 
England.
92 For example, the Cape Advisory Board forNative Education remarked ‘the mother-tongue should 
be used in the lower standards, but as soon as possible an official language should be used to fit the student 
of modem conditions of life.’ UCTL BC282 A1.15 Cape Advisory Board for Native Education, 
‘Government Commission on Native Education’, p. 8.
93 WCL. AD843 ‘ Views of the North-Western Districts Teachers3 Union: Report of the Commission 
on Native Education 1949-51', p. 4.
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Opponents of the vernacular believed that proficiency in at least one of the official 
‘European’ languages was essential to the progress of Africans within society. The 
SAIRR conference argued that ‘they are regarded by the Africans as the “second mother 
tongues”’94, while, in the words of the CCSA, the official languages were ‘the gateway 
to the modern world of which the African is an. integral part.’95 The missionaries feared 
that the vernacular would be used to isolate Africans permanently from ‘ European culture 
and civilization’. By extending the vernacular into the higher reaches of education, the 
mission church community feared the Report would in effect condemn Africans to an 
immutable future as a ‘separate and independent race.’
As opposed to the group identity and nationalism of the Eiselen Commission the mission 
churches stressed an education policy that was based upon universalism and the 
individual. They rejected the overall aim and intention of the Commission which they saw 
as a means to perpetuate racial divisions in South Africa. They realised, however, that 
the current education system could not be maintained, because they were aware that it 
exacerbated the frustrations that Africans felt about their political, economic and social 
position in society. Unable and unwilling to confront the wider issue of race relations in 
South Africa, the missionaries somewhat fatalistically resigned themselves to a form of 
differentiated education. This was to be a pragmatic practical policy which would exist 
only until the awaited demise of apartheid. They did so while advocating an educational 
ideal that would see the gradual incorporation of all Africans into a common society, a 
common society that, for the most part, they had neither the courage nor the wisdom to 
conceive in the period under examination. Instead, they reaffirmed their faith in the 
principles of trusteeship, and awaited the enlightenment of whites. As Rev. Arnott 
remarked
The status o f his membership o f this community thus regarded will remain a 
subordinate one, but it must not be one without hope - that way lies only a 
deepening frustration, which might issue an attitude antagonistic to, and a course
94 WCL AB191 ‘Record of Proceedings’, p. 6.
95 Wcl AC623 CCSA, ‘Report of Education Section’, p. 4.
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of action destructive of, South African society.96
This broad examination of the missionaries’ pedagogical and philosophical objections to 
the Eiselen Report provides us with an understanding of what the churches hoped to 
ultimately achieve through missionary education and how this contrasted with the designs 
of Eiselen and Verwoerd. The following four chapters seek to examine from a more 
practical point of view the reactions of individual denominations to Bantu Education. 
They examine the churches’ priorities; their regional and local systems of governance; 
their abilities to sustain investment in education; and the wider difficulties they faced with 
the coming of Bantu Education.
96 CPS A AB938 Rev. Arnott, ‘Commission on Native Education’, p. 1.
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b .
‘Liberation from the Burden of Maintaining Schools':
The Church of Scotland and the Bantu Education Act
The next four chapters will examine in detail the response of specific denominations to 
Bantu Education, including, where possible, case studies of the major secondary institutions 
under their care.1 I will begin with the Church of Scotland because of the historical 
importance of its school, Lovedale, which ZK Matthews called ‘the greatest school for 
Africans in the country52, to the education of Africans in South Africa.
The main educational efforts of the Church of Scotland centred on four main areas around 
existing mission stations. These were Lovedale, Blythswood and Emgwali in the Cape, and 
Pholela in Natal. At these mission stations schools had been established in the nineteenth 
century and, by the turn of the twentieth century, had flourished into major secondary 
educational institutions. In addition to these institutions the Church of Scotland also ran 
many primary schools that acted as feeders for the larger schools.3 In general the Church of 
Scotland adopted a conciliatory approach to Bantu Education, trying to preserve what it 
could of its educational endeavours whilst striving to maintain a ‘responsible5 and non- 
conffontational relationship with the government.
During the negotiations that took place the Church of Scotland was organised at national 
and local level, and was under the nominal authority of its leadership in Edinburgh, 
Scotland. Locally each institution was controlled by a headmaster and Governing Council 
who were under the direct authority of the national Mission Council (hereafter MC). This 
MC, which met periodically, was itself subject to the controlling hand of the Foreign 
Mission Committee (hereafter FMC) of the Church of Scotland in Edinburgh. This chain of 
authority effectively gave Church leaders at all levels the chance to influence decision-
1 For an detailed explanation of the changes demanded by Bantu Education legislation see 
appendix.
1 Matthews, Freedom for my People, p. 30. Kuzwayo remembers Lovedale’s ‘dignified atmosphere’ 
and the ‘fame’ of the institution. Kuzwayo, Call me Women, p. 92.
3 Whilst is has not been possible to establish the exact number of primary schools controlled by the
Church in this period, it certainly ran into the hundreds.
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making. Despite its dependence on the ultimate approval of the FMC, the Church of 
Scotland in South Africa generally composed and initiated its own response to Bantu 
Education.
No secondary institution was more important than Lovedale in the Eastern Cape in 
determining the Church of Scotland’s response to Bantu Education. Founded in 1835, 
Lovedale had grown into a major institution providing primary and secondary tuition in 
addition to teacher training. By the time of the Bantu Education Act, it also included a Bible 
School, a press, and a hospital, and was considered the premier African secondary school 
in sub-Saharan Africa.4 Its influence on the formal education of Africans cannot be 
overestimated, and many of its former students had leading roles in Southern Africa.5 MC 
and FMC minutes are disproportionately concerned with the fate of Lovedale and the 
attitudes of those Church leaders charged with responsibility for it.
In 1953 Lovedale was under the principalship of R.H.W. Shepherd, who served there 
between 1942-55. Shepherd had an ‘austere and unforgiving personality5 and was a firm 
believer in discipline and obedience.56 He grew up in Scotland, in a poor and strictly 
Protestant family dominated by a strict disciplinarian patriarch. Through hard work during 
the day and study in the evenings, Shepherd won a scholarship to Dundee University 
College, and, after completing a Divinity degree at New College Edinburgh, decided to 
commit himself to missionary work in Africa. Arriving at Lovedale in 1918 he was made 
chaplain in 1926, and principal in 1942. He bought to Lovedale a ‘stem moral self- 
righteousness5,7 a faith in the dignity of labour, and a belief in deference to authority,
4 Victor Murray described the institution as 'having a university feeling’. V. Murray, The School 
in the Bush: A Critical Study of the Theory and Practise of Native Education in Africa. (London, 1938), p. 
117.
5 Ex-students included; J. T. Jabavu, the founder and editor of the first African weekly, Imvo 
Zabantsundu: Prof. D.D.T. Jabavu, the first African graduate of a British university; Prof. Z.K. Matthews 
the first African LL.B, and R.V. Selope Thema, editor of Bantu World. This is but a limited sample of the 
prestigious alumni.
6 Joel Bolnick, ‘Double-Cross: Potlako Leballo and the 1946 Riots at Lovedale Missionary 
Institution’, Wits African Studies Institute Paper, No. 265, Feb. 1990, p. 7.
7 ibid. p. 7.
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remarking in 1945, ‘I personally don’t want a God who is only full of “forgiveness, 
gentleness and tolerance” I want a moral Governor on the throne of the Universe.’8
A typical ‘liberal paternalist’, Shepherd devoted his life to the social reproduction of the 
values and ideas of such liberals9 including a firm belief in the notion of trusteeship. 
Discussing the creation of a separate Presbyterian Church for Africans in South Africa, he 
observed:
I think we need to accept a certain amount of separateness at this stage, so as to 
give the African the opportunity to do things for himself and in his own 
environment. It may well be that when he has developed and is more on the 
European level in administrative and cultural experience the necessity for 
separateness will pass away.10
Thus, Shepherd saw his task and indeed that of the Church of Scotland, as ‘developing’ 
Africans for their future roles. The church’s duty was to ‘civilize’ Africans through 
education and hard work, thus allowing them to ‘benefit’ from European civilization.11 He 
believed change would come through hard work and patience, not political radicalism or 
violence, and envisaged Europeans as the natural rulers of South Africa for the foreseeable 
future. For Shepherd the ‘gift’ o f ‘civilization’ was not to be taken lightly and he expected, 
in return for his paternalism, loyalty and obedience from Africans. His regime at Lovedale 
was thus very authoritarian. Cecil Manona, who attended the college in the early 1950s 
remembers Shepherd’s ‘reign of terror’ which was ‘very autocratic and very very 
strict...everything had to be done properly’.12
8 Quoted from Kros, '“They Wanted Dancing...’” p. 10. The details of Shepherd’s life are taken 
from G. Ooterliuizen, Shepherd of Lovedale. (Johannesburg, 1970).
9Bolnick, ‘Double-Cross...’, p. 26.
10 CL PR3682 RHW Shepherd Papers (1) Correspondence 1922-71. Shepherd to Haile, 12 Dec.
1949.
11 Shepherd continually stressed this in the pages of the South African Outlook which he edited 
from 1952.
12 Cecil Manona, interview with author, Grahamstown, 18 Jan. 2000.
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Shepherd was a leading figure in the Church of Scotland in South Africa. As well as being 
the head of its most prestigious institution, he was also a prominent member of the MC and, 
as editor of the South African Outlook, influenced the Church’s lay members. Before the 
passage of the Bantu Education Act Shepherd had already made his opinion known on the 
respective responsibilities of the church and state in African education. As early as 1943, he 
had argued that the responsibility for ‘Native’ education should be taken away from the 
provinces and handed over to the Union Education Department. The state should establish 
many new schools. Although mission schools should be maintained alongside these 
government schools as they were essential for the moral well being of the ‘nation’. He 
suggested that the government take more responsibility for their administration, ‘[F]or 
ourselves’ he remarked ‘we would not mourn if the Churches did less in the management 
of schools, but did better what they undertook. ’13 It is unclear exactly what Shepherd meant 
by this, though he cannot have meant the loss of control that took place under the 
requirements of the Bantu Education Act.14
A second figure who influenced policy was Alexander Kerr, the Principal of Fort Hare. Kerr, 
who had trained as a teacher in Scotland, came to South Africa in 1915 to head the newly 
established ‘native college’, a position he held until 1948. Kerr, described as a 
‘characteristically cautious Scot, ’15 developed it from a fledging institution of eighteen to 
one that attracted 330 students in 1947. During the period of transition to Bantu Education, 
Kerr was a member of the Lovedale Governing Council, sat on the Christian Council’s 
Education Section, and, until its dissolution under Bantu Education Act, was a member of 
the Union Advisory Board on Native Education.16 Given his vast experience in African 
education it is unsurprising that he played a prominent role in shaping the Presbyterian 
response to Bantu Education. Like Shepherd, Kerr was a strong believer in liberal
13 Shepherd, ‘The Churches...’, p. 8.
14 This quote hints at the demands that running mission schools placed on missionaries and 
churches more generally, both in terms of finance and time.
15 ‘His Work Part of Union’s Story’, Daily Dispatch. 11 May 1948.
16 Kerr also chaired the education Commission in Rhodesia which reported in 1951, see chapter
four.
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trusteeship and observed in 1950 that:
If all the civilised people of all colours in South Africa were united in their attack 
upon ignorance, inefficiency, and conservatism of the uncivilized majority of the 
inhabitants, the raising of these would still be a formidable task to be accomplished 
within a measurable time17
Kerr, then honorary secretary of the MC was first to comment on the likely effects of the 
Act on the Church's educational programme in a letter addressed to J. Watt, the secretary 
of the FMC:
The Education Bill has been introduced into parliament but beyond transferring 
Native Education from the Provinces to the Union ... there is not much to indicate 
drastic change. The Government seems prepared to add to the small number of 
Government provided and maintained schools ... we shall require to await the issue 
of regulations before we know what support there will be for the schools other than 
government schools, and therefore more adequate maintenance of missionary 
institutions.18
Considering Kerr’s long history of involvement in African education, this letter suggests a 
remarkable degree of ignorance of the Eiselen Report and the Bantu Education Bill then 
before parliament. He had not apparently read either the Report or the parliamentary debates 
on the bill which indicated that a drastic overhaul of mission education was proposed, with 
the potential removal of all missionary influence. The depth of Kerr’s misunderstanding is 
underscored by his hope that mission education would receive a funding increase. His belief 
was, to some extent, shared by Shepherd who remarked at the end of 1953
In all fairness it must be acknowledged that since our Hospitals came more fully 
under the Provincial Council in the Cape and the Union Health Department, 
financial and other conditions have been much easier, while there has been no 
restrictions on the spiritual side of the work19
17 CL PR4099 Kerr Addresses to Institutions 1922-66. Address to St. Andrews School, 
Grahamstown, 1950. He also remarked that the creation of the Bantu Presbyterian Church was a ‘voluntary 
and perfectly natural separation. ’
18 NLS ACC7548 B358 South Africa Secretary 1950-55, A. Kerr to Rev. JAR Watt 9 Sept. 1953.
19 NLSA, Lovedale Principal’s Reports, 1953, p. 4.
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This opinion was encouraged by others within South Africa who argued that there did not 
appear to be any determination on the part of the Government for a ‘sudden attack’ upon 
the churches at this early stage.20 This belief contrasted sharply with that of Watt in 
Edinburgh who wrote ‘it doesn’t look as if the Missions or Churches other than those in 
favour of apartheid would have very much influence on the future of education for the 
Bantu.’21 At this time the Secretary of the FMC was writing to leading Church of Scotland 
figures urging them to ‘hold onto education as long as we can.’22
Kerr and Shepherd’s initial hopes of increased funding were dashed in early 1954 when Kerr 
‘heard some suggestions, which in our opinion would make the running of them [the 
schools] by the Church impossible, including inter alia, a reduction instead of an increase in 
grants!’23 Only a few days later W. Arnott, the head ofBlythswood, told Watt that he had 
confidential information that
It seems almost certain that the degree of financial assistance permitted to Churches 
desirous of continuing their institution work will be so meagre that transfer to the 
Native Affairs Department will be the only feasible course; it also seems likely that 
the date of assumption of active control will be much sooner than we had expected24
Within a month the position had changed drastically, from hopes of increased funding and 
delayed transfer to fears that grants were to be reduced and transfers brought forward. Watt 
responded
What you say about Government intentions as to the future of the institutions is 
most disturbing. Onething is clear. FMC cannot add to its financial responsibilities 
in South Africa; some people are drawing attention to the fact that FMC is spending
20NLSB374Rev. W. Arnott (Principal ofBlythswood Institution) to Watt 15 Sept. 1953 &21Dec.
1953.
21NLS ACC7548 B374 Blythswood Principal March 1950 - May 1956. Watt to Arnott 5 Oct. 1953.
22 NLS ACC7548 A77 Letter Books of Rev. JAR Watt June 1953 - May 1954, Watt to Kerr 20 Oct. 
1953 & ACC7548 B374 Watt to Arnott, 5 Oct. 1953.
23 NLS B358 Kerr to Watt 27 Jan. 1954. Original emphasis.
24 NLS B374 Arnott to Watt 30 Jan. 1954.
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over £15,000 in South Africa.25
Watt’s comment effectively closed off an option as running any of their schools privately on 
reduced subsidies was impossible.26 Thus they were left with the choice of either closing 
their schools down or leasing / selling them to the government.
Primary Schools
Once the FMC made it known that no new money would be available for African education, 
the MC immediately made plans for the transfer of all its primary schools to the state. As 
early as February 1954 the MC recognised ‘the need for the rapid expansion of primary 
schools’ and therefore recommended
that all possible assistance should be given to the Department in establishing a 
sound system of popular control of such schools and that any missionaries or 
ministers who have served as managers or grantees should continue to act on local 
boards if invited or elected to do so27
By September the Bantu Presbyterian Church (BPC), which effectively controlled all 
Presbyterian primary schools with the assistance of local missionaries, was advising its 
members to give the government all the assistance they could in making the transfer of 
schools as smooth as possible.28 A statement by the Lovedale Governing Council recognised 
‘as inevitable the introduction of a system of public education for primary schools. This 
indeed is a necessity, and is long overdue, and approves of the scheme put forward by the
25 NLS B374 Watt to Arnott 11 Feb. 1954. Rev Dr. J. Dougall (Associate Secretary of the FMC) 
remarked to Kerr ‘One thing is more or less certain, namely, that we cannot offer to replace public funds 
by grants from the Foreign Mission Committee. ’ ACC7548 A56 Letter Books of Rev. Dr. J Dougall. Dougall 
to Kerr 2. Feb. 1954.
26 The FMC declared in 1954 that it was ‘unable for financial reasons to run even one of its 
institutions as a private school.5 NLS ACC7458 B370 Bantu Education Act Statement of the FMC 8 Nov.
1954. The Church estimated that it would cost £250,000 a year to ran all schools privately, ‘Church of 
Scotland and Bantu Education Act5, British Weekly. 25 Nov. 1954.
27 NLS B370 Minutes of the MC 22 Feb. 1954.
28 ‘Bantu Presbyterian Church General Assembly Resolutions’, South African Outlook. Nov. 1, 
1954, p. 164.
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Division.’29 The FMC agreed with the need to transfer the primary schools, with Watt 
arguing that to do any different would be ‘folly’.30
There were a number of reasons why the Church was keen to transfer its primary schools. 
Chief of these was the burden in time and money that they represented. Although they were 
nominally under BPC control much of the necessary administrative work was undertaken 
by missionaries. One such missionary from the Rainy Mission in Umtata ‘deliberately’ said 
‘nothing about the Act because it had not’
really affected any of my schools yet, and the work of school manager has gone on 
as usual, taking a disproportionate amount of my time, and involving me in dealing 
with just on 400 letters in the course of the year. I have had the usual trouble of 
misbehaving teachers, teachers defaulting in the payment of school requisitions, 
appointment of teachers, supervision of requisitions... So the Bantu Education Act 
will not be a loss to the Missionary.31
Another missionary noted ‘there is no doubt that control of teaching posts by ministers has 
sometimes led ministers into sin. I think that a purer Church will emerge from this purging’32 
The work load associated with primary schooling was not the only missionary grievance. 
A missionary in Gooldville complained of feeling
a continual inferiority complex when visiting the schools under the wing of the 
Church of Scotland missions in this province, seeing the tumble-down hovels and 
shanties, or often the whole schools [sic] which consisted of a few stones in rows 
under a tree... .This kind of thing depressed all concerned, and teachers felt that it 
would be better for the state to manage things....we cannot vie with their efforts.33
Watt confessed that education given in BPC primary schools was often ‘pretty poor and
29 CL MS17782 Lovedale Governing Council. Statement (110 date) ‘The Bantu Education Act" 
published by the Lovedale Governing Council.
30 NLS ACC7548 B394 Africa Sub-Committee 1954-61. Watt to Rev. WS McColm 16 Oct. 1954.
31 NLS ACC7548 C13 Foreign Mission Committee Annual Reports 1954. Rev. G. Lowson, Rainy 
Mission, Umtata, 22 Jan. 1955.
32 NLS ACC7548 B375 Blythswood General Dec. 1938 - Aug. 1956. Rev JS Drummond to Watt 
15 Aug. 1953.
33 NLS C13 1954 Annual Report Goodville Mission, 8 March 1955.
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many of the Ministers just don’t manage’.34 The picture that emerges is of inadequately 
funded primary schools administered by overworked and unmotivated missionaries. Kerr 
acknowledged that ‘the expansion of primary education has outgrown the capacity of the 
churches to administer it effectively’.35 The strength of opinion in favour of giving up the 
responsibility for primary schools was such that Watt remarked
In the period of transfer there will of course be great difficulty but the work of the 
primary schools...will go on almost as before and in a good many schools the 
situation will be improved....Some of our ministers think that for that reason the 
Bantu Education Act is a good thing36
The somewhat damning appraisal of Church of Scotland primary schools should be 
considered in light of the Church’s secondary institutions which were of a high standard and 
well respected as educational facilities. Given the scarce resources available it is unsurprising 
that the church decided to quickly wash its hands of primary schools in favour of these 
institutions.
The Secondary Institutions
Kerr remarked in early 1954
The gist of the Presbyterian position here is that we should do everything in our 
power to assist the government to set up effective local boards for the oversight of 
primary schools but that they should leave the institutions under the Councils as 
they are, with the promise of foil support.37
As we have seen, Kerr was aware that this was not a realistic expectation, at least 
financially, and consequently discussions quickly turned to how best the Church could 
preserve its secondary institutions. At Lovedale the Governing Council met in April and
34 NLS B394 Watt to Rev. S McColm 16 Oct. 1954.
35 NLS B370 Kerr to Watt 13 Dec. 1954.
36 NLS B370 Watt to Rev. R. Davidson, 7 Dec. 1954.
37 NLS B358 Kerr to Watt 4 March 1954.
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debated Bantu Education at length. It was agreed that a committee of Council members 
should approach the government to request that institutions such as Lovedale be allowed 
to continue under missionary control within the new system where they could "co-operate 
with the Government, and continue to offer our expert knowledge and advice. ’ The Council 
then appealed for special consideration to be given to Lovedale:
It is not the intention of the Lovedale Governing Council [to argue] that all 
Institutions are alike in efficiency, but it is submitted that there is special claim for 
consideration from the Division for long-established and efficiently managed 
Institutions. The Council does not suggest that an Institution like Lovedale should 
seek to stand out and maintain itself.. .but the Governing Council contends that not 
only what Lovedale has stood for but its very structure are worth preserving, as far 
as possible. Intimation has come from the Division that Institutions will require 
individual consideration, and we trust that in such consideration the facts mentioned 
will be given due weight38
This statement caused consternation within the Church of Scotland. Watt wrote to Kerr "Is
there a danger that Lovedale, the mother of them all, should forget her children?'39
By May 1954, the Church had settled on a general policy: they would hand over all their 
primary schools and would make a strong plea for the retention of the secondary institutions 
under their control. A proposal was put to the government offering the Bantu Education 
Department direct representation on the Governing Councils of these institutions, thus, 
hopefully, avoiding the need for wholesale reorganisation.40 In addition, if transfer were 
forced on the Church, the schools should be leased rather than sold.41 This decision was 
influenced by members of the Church who believed the government had overreached itself 
with Bantu Education, and the whole system was doomed to failure.42 There was certainly
38 NLS B370 Lovedale Governing Council Minutes 8 April 1954.
39 NLS B370 Watt to Kerr 11 May 1954.
40 NLS B358 Kerr to Watt 15 April 1954.
41 Watt cautioned against the idea of leasing the institutions, noting that the debts at Blythswood 
and Lovedale would probably necessitate their sale. NLS B370 Watt to Kerr 11 May 1954.
42 NLS ACC7548 B379 Lovedale Principal 1947 - 56. Shepherd to Watt 21 May 1954. Shepherd 
noted ‘this whole experiment might fail; many believe that Government has taken on a bigger business than 
it realises. ’
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a strong perception among Church of Scotland leaders in South Africa that the government 
was agonizing over how to execute the transfer of the larger institutions.43
This policy remained intact until the arrival of the government circulars in August setting 
out the registration conditions. Immediately concern was expressed at the speed with which 
transfer was to take place.44 Seeking clarification of the options in the circulars, the 
Lovedale Governing Council met inspectors W. Jensen and M. Prozesky to discuss the 
institution’s future. The inspectors contended that it was the government’s intention to take 
over all secondary institutions with minimum disruption, and that the best way to do so 
would be for the church to hand over the school buildings but continue to run the hostels.45 
A new Advisory Board would be established at Lovedale and, if the church agreed to run 
the hostels, a hostel committee would be created; one of its members would have a seat on 
the Advisory Board. The inspectors urged the church to run the hostels for a trial period of 
three years, claiming that they had nothing to fear as the department would not appoint a 
head at Lovedale who was unsympathetic to missionary work.46
After this meeting a long debate on the merits, or otherwise, of the Church’s retaining 
control of the hostels followed; an issue which remained unresolved until 1956. One 
unnamed Council member argued that running the hostels would be ‘disastrous’, because 
divided control between the mission in the hostels and the government in the schools would 
make student discipline impossible.47 A few days later Kerr also cast doubt on the proposal 
by observing that the Church’s poor financial position and the government’s probable 
unwillingness to guarantee the church against losses in the hostels, would lead to inadequate
43 According to Kerr1 the mind of the Department is obviously far from being made up.5 NLS B3 5 8 
Kerr to Watt 24 May 1954.
44 NLS B358 Kerr to Watt 20 Aug. 1954.
45 This policy was in line with the August circulars. Members of the Native Affairs Commission 
who visited Lovedale in November 1954 were said to be ‘very anxious that the Church should maintain 
control of the hostels. ’ NLS B358 Kerr to Watt 9 Nov. 1954.
46 WCL AC623 CCSA 13.3 Government Legislation Bantu Education Act Lovedale Governing 
Council Minutes 15 Sept. 1954.
47 NLS ACC7548 B377 Lovedale Governing Council Minutes March 1949 - Nov. 1955. 15 Sept.
1954.
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conditions. This was ‘bound to lead to discontent among the students, as has been amply 
proved in almost every institution over the last thirty years5.48 Kerr recognised that hostel 
conditions had been the focus of previous student disturbances, and was concerned about 
further disruption. Watt was also to note, ‘our doubts about the wisdom of undertaking the 
control of the hostels were the obvious ones, that in the past the hostels had been the focus 
of trouble in the institutions.’49
The fact that the government wished missionaries to retain control of hostels suggests that 
they, too, were well aware that they were the main focus of students antagonism. Assuming 
missionaries retained control, any disturbances would primarily be their concern rather than 
the government’s. In addition, by encouraging the missions to maintain the hostels the 
government hoped to project an image of continuity within the institutions. This was 
important on two levels; first students could be reassured that dramatic changes were not 
taking place; secondly, the maintenance of a missionary presence would lend much-needed 
legitimacy to the government's changes.
At the beginning of November 1954, the Committee appointed by the Lovedale Governing 
Council to consider the Act met. Here a‘tentative minute’ from the FMC, which called for 
all of Lovedale, excluding the press, the Bible school and a house for a chaplain, be leased 
to the government, was discussed.50 The Committee reluctantly agreed to these proposals 
and agreed that as long as the present system of control could be maintained,51 and they 
were protected from financial loss, they would consider running the hostels after all. They 
insisted, however, on worthwhile representation on any new advisory board, and the ability
48 NLS B358 Kerr to Watt 18 Sept. 1954.
49 NLS A77 Watt to Kerr 29 Dec. 1954.
50 Clearly by now the FMC had decided that 110 institutions could be supported without financial 
aid from government sources.
51 i.e. a single principal, advised by a governing council. This principal had ultimate authority for 
all constitute parts of the institution, thereby avoiding conflicts between the separate heads of the schools 
in the college. The Committee appointed to advise on the Bantu Education Act remarked that they should 
only run the hostels ‘if there can be co-ordination of control for schools and hostels’ WCL AC623 13.3 
Minutes 2 Nov. 1954,
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to influence decisions concerning the institution as well as the hostels.52 Several members 
emphasised, however, that this was ‘not because the Government’s scheme was felt to be 
right, but because it was the best that could be done in the circumstances.’53 On 11 
November the Governing Council agreed to maintain the hostels if their conditions could 
be met. The Committee was aware that if it agreed to run the hostels it was openly 
associating itself with Bantu Education. Although some members were uncomfortable with 
this association, Kerr was not among them. A few days earlier, after a visit from the Native 
Affairs Commission, he had remarked that running the hostels while the Government ran the 
schools would amount to ‘a continuation of the partnership between the Church and the 
State which has existed all along in Native Education.,54 A few weeks later Kerr confidently 
remarked that the MC was ‘settling down to the lesser of the two evils [which was] the plan 
of leasing the schools and retaining the hostels.,55 This also had the benefit of allowing some 
avenues for evangelical work to remain open; for Kerr hostels were ‘as much a means of 
true education as tuition in the classroom.,56
Given the government’s determination to wrest African education out of the hands of 
missionary bodies, the conditions imposed by the Lovedale Governing Council seem 
somewhat naive. Essentially the Council asked the government to grant the Church of 
Scotland authority over Lovedale even after its transfer suggesting that members still 
thought the power and prestige of Lovedale would influence government thinking.57 As 
Arnott noted
52 Kerr remarked that those running the hostels would have to have a ‘determining voice in the
admission and dismissal of students from the hostel with the power to fix fees.’ CL MS 17782 A. Kerr,
‘Should the Hostels be Retained?’ 5 Nov. 1954
53 WCL AC623 13.3 Minutes 2 Nov. 1954.
54 NLS B358 Kerr to Watt 9 Nov. 1954.
55 NLS B358 Kerr to Watt 2 Dec. 1954.
56 CL MS 17782 Kerr, ‘Should... ’ He wrote ‘Our view has come that wherever possible we should 
retain a base of operations in the hostels from which the Christian mission might still work amongst the 
youth.’ NLS B370 Kerr to Watt 13 Dec. 1954.
37 This suggests that the Council felt that public opinion was with them. Shepherd certainly used 
the South African Outlook to champion the cause of Lovedale.
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the optimism of the Lovedale Governing Council in even hoping, far less believing, 
that the Division would accept the ‘unified set-up’ that Council is seeking, rather 
astonishes me,.,it cuts right against the attitude the State has consistently held.58
Watt commented ‘we are, like you, surprised at the hopefulness of the Lovedale Council 
that their plan to carry on much as before would be accepted by the Division.’59 
Unsurprisingly, the conditions were rejected by Eiselen and the Council decided not to 
pursue the matter further, to give up the hostels, but actively seek to influence who was 
appointed to run them.60 Shepherd contended that all was not lost; the Lovedale chaplain 
could offer spiritual help to the students, without having the responsibility ‘for catering and 
discipline’.61 By the end of March 1955, agreement had been reached to lease the schools 
and hostel at Lovedale to the government and, by October, a lease had been drawn up 
ensuring the Church of Scotland an income of some £5750 a year.62
The situation at other institutions was different. Because of the size of its debt, Blythswood 
was sold in late 1955 to the South African Native Trust for £35,000, Why the Church was 
keen to sell Blythswood, when Lovedale was equally indebted, is unclear,63 but may have 
been because it was in a designated ‘African’ area, where the government could have forced 
its sale under Group Areas legislation. Records are extremely limited for Pholela and 
Emgwali; both were leased to the government while the Church retained control of their 
‘small’ and ‘uncomplicated’ hostels for a three-year trial period.64
From the start those running Pholela had made it clear that they desired to‘co-operate with
58 NLS B374 Arnott to Watt 9. Jan 1955.
59 NLS B374 Watt to Arnott 29 Jan. 1955.
60 CL MS 17782 10 March 1955.
61 NLS B379 Shepherd to Watt 12 March 1955. Once again the hostels were recognised as the focal 
point of previous school disturbances
62 NLS ACC7548 B359 South Africa - Minutes. Kerr to Watt 221 Oct. 1955.
63 There is no evidence to suggest that money raised from its sale was to be used to support other 
institutions such as Lovedale.
64 NLS B370 Kerr & Shepherd to Watt 8 July 1955.
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the Bantu Education Authority as far as possible provided that the religious functions of this 
Institution are safeguarded.’65 In his 1955 annual report, the superintendent of the hostels 
at Pholela noted that he had a seat on the institution’s Advisory Board which he believed 
gave the Church ‘an opportunity to use its influence in securing the choice of suitable 
members of staff. ’ He was sure
that the Mission work here at Pholela can be maintained under the changed 
conditions, at least while the Church retains control of the Hostel. Almost all the 
religious activities in the Institution relate to the Hostel...there is ample scope for 
the missionary work of our Church....[W]e do not think that the Church is served 
by saying we have only a Hostel Committee left to us, we have more than that66
vW
This represented a somewhat narrow description of mission work, and it is clear that school
A
was administered under the system of divided control rejected by the Lovedale Governing 
Council.67
The Lovedale Council may have refused this form of control because of its particular history 
and status. I have not found any reference to school disturbances at either Pholela or 
Emgwali, which contrasts starkly with the severe school ‘riots’ that took place at Lovedale 
throughout the 1940s. Given its history of turmoil it seems that Lovedale Council members 
were not prepared to risk an administrative structure that might precipitate student 
radicalism.
Pressure from Great Britain
Before the Church of Scotland began to address the Bantu Education Act seriously Watt 
remarked to Ken ’.
65 NLS ACC7548 B384 Pholela Institution Governing Council Minutes 1942 - 1956. Minutes 27 
Feb. 1954.
66 NLS ACC7548 B386 Pholela General Feb. 1945 - April 1956. Annual Report 1955.
67 In 1962 the superintendent, A. Moir, remarked ‘On the home front I get the impression that we 
are identified with the Government and Bantu Education’, NLS ACC 7548 C29 Annual Reports. Annual 
Report Pholela 20. Dec. 1962. Thus the concern expressed by some members of the Lovedale Governing 
Council that to run the hostels was to indicate approval of government actions, was founded.
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I am afraid that one of the troubles is that the Press in this country [Britain] is 
largely interested in South Africa as a source of horror stories about race
relations South Africa is treated as a sort of lay figure for the exercise of moral
indignation.68
This comment was to have wider significance in the struggles over Bantu Education. From 
the middle of 1954 the Church of Scotland, both in Scotland and South Africa, experienced 
a barrage of public pressure ignited by a series of editorials and articles which appeared in 
the British and South African press, written by leading Anglicans such as Father Huddleston, 
Bishop Reeves and Canon John Collins. These articles had two effects upon the Church's 
deliberations: firstly, they were deeply resented by Presbyterians within South Africa, and 
secondly they divided the FMC in Scotland.
Rev. Fraser of Gooldville Mission reported in July 1954, ‘Canon Collins has managed to 
annoy many people here by simply saying things and leaving us to it....Long range attacks 
of this kind don’t register.,69 These words perfectly capture the attitude of missionaries in 
South Africa who greatly resented what they considered mis-informed outside interference. 
But it was not only those outside of South Africa who were condemned by the presbyterian 
hierarchy in South Africa. Reeves had written in April 1954 on the approaching 
‘destruction’ of mission education in South Africa. Days later, in an extraordinary letter, 
Shepherd reprimanded Reeves:
May I say that, with thirty-five years of missionary experience in this land behind 
me, I believe also that a factor in the destruction if it comes will be your 
uninformed, inexperienced and one-sided pronouncements70 
Shepherd and Kerr rejected calls from figures such as Reeves, and those outside South
Africa, and repudiated those who condemned the Bantu Education Act openly and
politically. While disagreeing with some aspects of the Act he refused to be party to what
68 NLS A77 Watt to Kerr 30 Dec. 1953.
69 NLS ACC7548 B364 South Africa Minutes. Fraser to Watt 27 July 1954. Later he was to write 
‘Most people not in South Africa seem to be terribly shaken up with the Bantu Education Act, with the 
exception of all else. On the spot there is not so much to concern and stimulate, that we may be pardoned 
for impatience with some overseas reactions.’ ACC7548 C13 Annual Report of the Gooldville Mission, 8 
March 1955.
70 CL MS 14719 Shepherd to Reeves 1 May 1954.
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he considered were false claims which would only serve to fuel African radicalism.71 When 
a number of African teachers’ associations refused an invitation to join the SAIRR’s 
conference on Bantu Education, Shepherd accused them of 'rank irresponsibility’.72 The 
refusal to accept overseas criticism on the assumption that it was 'uninformed ’ demonstrates 
how much leading figures in the Presbyterian Church in South Africa had become part of 
white South Africa, unable and perhaps unwilling to see the extent of the injustices of 
apartheid. Throughout the debates that surrounded Bantu Education, there is little evidence 
of any linkage being made between the Act and the wider apartheid project, apart from a 
single limited comment by Shepherd.73 It was considered more an administrative and 
financial issue than a political or moral one.74 The refusal of the Church hierarchy in South 
Africa to address the Act in these terms contrasted greatly with the attitude of some in the 
FMC. In mid-October 1954 Watt wrote to Arnott lamenting articles in the British Weekly. 
which called the churches of the world to stand together and fight Bantu Education. He 
noted that some members of the FMC would 'take Herron’s75 line’, and to avoid any 
'foolish decision’ he argued that ‘some agreement about tactics should be reached. ’76 A few 
days later Watt observed:
Our Foreign Mission Committee meets today and we expect some fireworks on the
Bantu Education Actpalaver. There are one or two back-benchers who are disciples
of Shaun Herron and Father Huddleston, or at least read the British Weekly or the
71 Oosterhuizen remarked ‘Bloody revolution or violence was never in Shepherd’s programme for 
the improvement of the race problem’, Oosterhuizen, Shepherd, p. 157. Reeves, was not, of course, calling 
for cither Shepherd’s antagonism towards Reeves demonstrates the wide divergence of opinion amongst 
liberals,
72 Shepherd, African World. June 1953,
n In the annual report for Lovedale in 1955 he noted that given the impending transfer it appeared 
that ‘political and not educational considerations rule.’ NLSALovedale Institution Report 1954, 12 Jan. 
1955,
14 Biko remarked in 1972 that ‘Bureaucracy and institutionalisation tends to make the Church 
removed from important priorities and to concentrate on secondary and tertiary functions like structure and 
finance. ’ Biko, I Write, p. 57.
75 Shaun Herron edited the British Weekly a Non-Conformist periodical first published in 1886 which 
promoted the spread of Christian democracy and became increasingly political in the twentieth century.
76 NLS B375 Watt to Arnott 15 Oct. 1954. Watt remarked to Rev. McColm ‘one’s judgement of 
this case is not much altered by Shaun Herron’s fire works but there will certainly be some people in the 
Committee who will raise the issue.’ NLS ACC7548 B394 Watt to McColm 16 Oct. 1954.
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Sunday Observer and we are expecting that they will want some vigorous action 
taken77
The pressure on the FMC led its Africa Committee to demand the release of a statement on 
Bantu Education, an indication that it was concerned with public opinion. Writing to Kerr, 
Watt noted:
If only people in South Africa had to be considered we have no doubt that the 
Foreign Mission Committee would agree to say nothing, but people in this country 
are agitated about the Bantu Education Act and, moreover, people in other parts of 
Africa, Africans and missionaries, are watching what is happening78
The MC opposed the release of any statement, arguing that it would jeopardise negotiations 
with the government and pandered to ‘extreme expressions which may be variously 
motivated.’79 The pressure on the FMC continued to mount, however, with a ‘fringe 
element’ arguing that the Church should have nothing to do with Bantu Education; the 
Presbytery of Ayr called on the FMC not to hand over any schools by lease or sale.80 At this 
juncture Watt thanked Kerr for keeping him informed of opinion within South Africa, 
because if he had not done so ‘there would have been a grave danger of divergence of 
thinking between you in South Africa and us in this country’.81 Yet only a day before this 
letter was written the FMC had released a press statement, a copy of which was sent to 
Eiselen, clearly indicating that there was indeed a very distinct divergence of opinion 
between the FMC and the MC.
77 NLS B370 Watt to R. K. Orchard 19 Oct. 1954. Orchard was the Africa Secretary of the London 
Missionary Society. Orchard wrote back ‘we are feeling some pressure from people who have been reading 
the British Weekly and the Sunday Observer, and I quite expect we shall have to justify our line of policy 
at some length at our board meeting. ’ 27 Oct. 1954.
78 NLS B370 Watt to Kerr 1 Dec. 1954. Watt’s sympathy with Kerr and Shepherd may simply have 
been because he was convinced by their arguments. However, Watt’s personal position regarding race 
relations in South Africa may have been the key; in 1954 he remarked that total apartheid could be ‘ morally 
justified’.
79 NLS B370 Kerr to Watt 13 Dec. 1954.
80 NLS A77 Watt to Kerr 13 Dec. 1954.
81 NLS A77 Watt to Kerr 29 Dec. 1954.
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Unlike the MC the^directly linked i Bantu Education and the policy of apartheid.
They stressed the state’s duty to provide education for its citizens, and welcomed the 
increasing enlistment of Africans in the management of schools, but opposed the ‘eviction’ 
of mission schools from the new system. It also rejected ‘the racial policy on which the Act 
is based’, declaring that apartheid was ‘contrary to the law of God.’82
According to Watt
We don’t imagine that a statement made to the South African Government about the 
schools will really make any difference to their policy but we feel that we can’t just 
hand over our educational work without formally disassociating ourselves from the 
educational policy of the Union Government, and, so to speak, entering our 
discontent. It may be that in some time in the future it will be useful to have it on 
record.83
Watt’s comments suggest that there was a public perception that the Church was handing 
over its schools willingly, or at least without complaint. There seems to be little doubt that 
it was public pressure that pushed the FMC towards the release of the statement. Yet it did 
little to extinguish this pressure, which continued to mount. As Watt wrote to Kerr
There is considerable feeling in Scotland that the Foreign Mission Committee has 
been rather weak in its handling of the Bantu Education Act matter. The attitude of 
the Bishop of Johannesburg in closing the schools and the Adams College appeal 
for funds to keep the institution going with reduced grant-in-aid is much more 
attractive to certain firebrands.
He appealed to Kerr for ‘any ammunition with which to repel the attacks of the hot-heads. ’84 
There was undoubtedly consternation amongst Church of Scotland supporters that, unlike 
Reeves and the American Board Mission, the church had decided to hand over its 
institutions with little, if any, complaint. By June 1955 the pressure forced Watt to appeal 
directly to Shepherd to reverse the decision not to run the hostels at Lovedale. Despite the
82 NLS A77 Watt to Eiselen 28 Dec. 1954, The statement ended by appealing to the BPC to use its 
influence to ensure that Africans used what education would be available to their best advantage.
83 NLS B370 Watt to Orchard 19 Oct. 1954.
84 NLS ACC7548 A79 Letter Books. Watt to Kerr 7 March 1955.
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difficulties, running them, was perhaps ‘what God is calling us to do’ and would certainly 
go some way towards ‘satisfying the Foreign Mission Committee’.85 This is somewhat ironic 
given that previously there had been concern that to run the hostels was to identify the 
Church with Bantu Education. It appears that opinions changed within the FMC who 
increasingly saw the retention of hostels as a sign they were maintaining their Christian 
witness against apartheid, rather than a compromise with apartheid.
In response to this, Kerr and Shepherd sent a joint letter to the FMC. They rejected 
Reeves’s stand on the grounds that he was closing primary schools, the very schools that 
the MC in South Africa was pleased to be handing over to the government, nor did they 
‘object to the control of secondary schools by them [the government] where there is the 
likelihood of the formation of school committees sufficiently informed to be able to manage 
them’. Where they disagreed with the Government was over its handling of the larger 
missionary institutions ‘which might well, with advantage to the Native people and the cause 
of education generally, have been maintained alongside any provision they [the government] 
cared to make.,86 Once again the justification for their actions was divorced from politics, 
the letter focussing purely on financial and administrative issues. Evidently, neither Kerr nor 
Shepherd had any intention of bowing to the pressure of the FMC which they considered 
was being manipulated by uninformed and irresponsible figures from outside the 
Presbyterian Church.
Notwithstanding FMC pressure, there was no change in policy by church leaders in South 
Africa. Despite the publication of its statement, the FMC did not reverse any decisions 
made by the MC, who thus alone decided the fate of the Presbyterian mission schools.87
United Church Action
85 NLS B379 Watt to Kerr 30 June 1955.
86 NLS B370 Kerr & Shepherd to Watt 8 July 1955.
87 There is no doubt that the support of Watt as the South Africa secretary of the FMC helped the 
MC in South Africa.
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Another issue that occupied the FMC in Scotland and impinged upon its relationship with 
the MC was the hope of its members that the churches in South Africa would stand together 
over Bantu Education. As early as December 1953 Watt remarked ‘I hope that there is real 
cooperation between the various denominations in this matter, for the future of Bantu 
Education looks ominous.’88 In early 1954 Watt was urging Kerr to make sure that the 
Church of Scotland was at the forefront of any discussions concerning joint church action.89 
Watt wrote to Orchard of the London Missionary Society (LMS) asking him to consider 
ways in which church bodies could stand together in negotiations with the Department of 
Native Affairs.90 A month later Watt informed Kerr that the FMC wanted ‘all denominations 
to stand together’ but admitted that he ‘did not see how the solidarity suggested is to 
operate.’91
Watt’s doubts about a unified stand was based upon a damning personal appraisal of the 
churches in South Africa:
I feel what is happening in South Africa is in a way a judgement on our Churches 
and Missions there. If there had been a greater measure of co-operation, less 
denominationalism, more willingness to come forward in incorporating union, our 
Mission education in South Afr ica would have been so good and so strong that even 
Dr. Malan would not have cared or dared touch it. Our divisions have meant that 
our Christian service in education and otherwise has been very weak and so through 
Dr. Malan, the judgement of God has fallen on it.... We have been thinking along 
denominational lines, been [too] anxious to keep our beloved Institutions and 
Mission Stations going 92
Until the government took control of all the Presbyterian schools Watt lamented the lack 
of co-ordinated church action. In particular he expressed his disappointment with the 
inability of the CCS A to agree to run an institution as a witness for the mission churches.
88 NLS B374 Watt to Arnott 24 Dec.
89 Watt commented on the larger institutions ‘if they all stood together, Government might be 
daunted at the prospect of having to take over all the institutions immediately. ’ NLS A77 Watt to Kerr 16. 
Feb. 1954.
90 NLS A77 Watt to Orchard 13 April 1954.
91 NLS B370 Watt to Kerr 11 May 1954.
92 NLS A77 Watt to Greaves 17 May 1954.
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Kerr, himself a member of the Council’s Education Section, despaired over the organisation 
remarking ‘the Christian Council is such a motley body that it is really hopeless to expect 
any united point of view.193 The Presbyterian Church itself, however, made no particular 
efforts to bring the churches together itself beyond some limited correspondence between 
Watt and Orchard and its membership of the Christian Council. Within the Church itself, no 
uniform policy was followed and its institutions did not present a united front, given that the 
Lovedale Governing Council looked for favoured treatment.
An ex-Lovedale student has remarked ‘it seems that Dr. Shepherd’s great weaknesses were 
his autocratic nature and his tendency to disregard black opinion. ’94 At the beginning of 
1954, the MC passed a resolution which recognised ‘the prime interest of the African people 
in this matter the heads recommend that every opportunity of consulting them should be 
taken’.95 But this desire was inherently difficult to fulfill in a church whose leadership was 
predominantly white and within which African influence was insignificant,96 as Watt’s 
observed:
In some quarters it has been urged that Africans should be consulted before any
decision is made. That is a sound line, but it is difficult to see who you would
consult ... Could the BPC say anything? It is not accustomed to discuss the
institutions is it? Are there wise African individuals whose council you could take?97
The BPC could have been a vehicle for the articulation of African opinions but its leadership 
was dominated by whites well into the 1950s, and it was only concerned with primary 
schools.98 In September 1954 it stated rather tamely ’ that the government
93 NLS B358 Kerr to Watt 11 Sept. 1954.
94 C. Manona ‘Lovedale Institution 1841-1991' paper presented at Lovedale’s 150th anniversary day, 
1991, p. 9.
95 NLS ACC7548 B356 Mission Council Minutes 16 Feb. 1954.
95 In April 1955 of the 31 members of the Lovedale Governing Council seven were Africans, none 
of whom were ex officio.
97 NLS B370 Watt to Kerr 11 May 1954.
98 In this period the moderator of the BPC was a Rev. D. Matheson and its leadership included both 
Kerr and Shepherd. The BPC actually appointed a committee to review the impact of the Bantu Education 
Act which was chaired by Shepherd.
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should have established more schools to run alongside existing mission schools, rather than 
transfer the latter to government control. The guiding hand of white liberalism was evident 
appeal to Africans to offer all the support they could to the new schools boards and 
committees," a position endorsed by the FMC which called on BPC members to serve on 
the new boards and committees in the best interests of the church, while reminding them of 
the ‘necessity of loyal obedience to the law of the land in which they dwell.’100
In this period there was no representation for parents either101, yet Shepherd assured Watt 
that ‘Africans are being brought into consultation at all levels.’102 In response to the 
pressures exerted on the FMC from within Britain, Watt reassured fellow Presbyterians in 
Scotland that ‘the leading Bantu with whom our missionaries are in touch are quite certain 
that to refuse to cooperate at this stage would be to desert the Africans’.103 This particular 
line was maintained throughout by both the MC and the FMC, with African opinion 
apparently deciding that to close schools was to force children onto the streets.104 One 
missionary wrote
I am glad you did not instruct us to shut the schools, or I should have been unable 
to look any of my African people in the face again. I cannot see what good has been 
done by it, but I see vats [sic] harm, and much heart-break105
99 ‘Bantu Presbyterian Church General Assembly Resolutions’, South African Outlook. Nov l sl 
1954, p. 164.
100 NLS B370 Statement from the FMC to the BPC (draft) 19 Oct. 1954.
!0i Manona remarked ‘there was no involvement of people and parents at all.’ Interview with 
author, Grahainstown, 18 Jan. 2000.
102 NLS B379 Shepherd to Watt 21 May 1954.
103 NLS B370 Watt to R. Davidson (Orkney Presbytery) 7 Dec. 1954.
104 In addition Africans were said to have encouraged the Church hierarchy to lease rather than sell 
in the hope that the institutions would revert back to the missions at some future date. See B379 Shepherd 
to Watt 20 Sept. 1954. The FMC committee appointed to examine the Bantu Education Act reported that 
it ‘does not believe that the best interests of the African people will be served by closing its schools as one 
mission has done.’ NLS B370 Statement of Committee 8 Nov. 1954. This again demonstrates the pressure 
that Reeves’ decision placed upon the Church of Scotland. As will be shown (see chapter 9), many Africans 
did not want schools closed for exactly the reasons given by the MC and the FMC.
105 NLS B364 Fraser to Dougall 5 April 1955.
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Rev. Fraser, who attended the establishment of the local school board at Gooldville, noted 
that ‘Africans were given to understand that we held then in thrall for our own proselytising 
ends, and that the Government had set them free.’ It appears that either the local inspector 
of Bantu Education or a representative of the Native Affairs Department was present and 
sanctioned the transfer to nominal African control. Fraser concluded that by the end of the 
day ‘many Africans were going all out to praise all what the Government is doing. ’106 We 
have seen how the government sought to use the School Boards and Committees to put in 
place a co-opted African elite who would be sympathetic to its plans in exchange for 
increased local status and power. Thus, it is important to remember that the views of those 
appointed to these committees did not necessarily reflect the views of the local population.
The Church's efforts to seek African opinion were undoubtedly limited. The only fora for 
serious debate were Governing Councils where African influence was limited and regulated. 
This was because they were always in a significant minority (and thus unable to dictate any 
policy) and because of the hierarchical relationships between Africans and whites in 
positions of responsibility. In any case most of the Africans on Governing Council were 
themselves mission educated and sympathetic to their gradualist liberal ideas. Monona, for 
example, remembers how ZK Matthews was ‘extremely supportive’ of Shepherd’s
107regime/
The limited engagement of Africans in the decision-making process was equally true of 
teachers. I found only one instance where teachers were directly asked for their opinions on 
the changes occurring. In September of 1954 Shepherd called a meeting of staff at Lovedale 
to make their feelings known to the Governing Council on how best to move forward. He 
reported that this ‘largely attended meeting’ agreed unanimously with the Council’s decision
106 NLS ACC7548 C15 Annual Report Fraser, Gooldville, 1955. He noted ‘My old evangelist, once 
the staunchest friend, has become secretive, somewhat distant, since he was appointed to be chairman of 
the school committee. ’
107 Manona, interview with author, Grahamstown, 18 Jan. 2000. He argued that Africans given 
positions of responsibility at Lovedale were there to ‘rubber stamp’ the decisions of the whites.
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to lease the school.108 This solitary effort to engage wider opinions was symptomatic of the 
nature of institutional administrations. They were run by powerful principals with the 
guidance of Governing Councils, and there was little scope for the opinions of those outside 
of these forums being taken into account.
Concern over teachers during this period of transition was not over their opinions, but their 
scarcity. As early as May 1954 Kerr was bemoaning the fact that the ‘prevailing uncertainty" 
meant that staffing within schools was ‘deteriorating.5109 Watt replied that he could not offer 
any teachers from Scotland as the situation was ‘so murky5.110 This situation worsened as 
time passed, and white members of staff were particularly ‘restless5, many hoping to find 
‘shelter in European schools.5111 This was obviously not an option open to African staff and 
many more chose to stay on, rather than to leave.112 Because Church of Scotland schools 
were transferred to the government, African teachers did not lose their experience-related 
pay as they did when they agreed to stay on at schools such as Adams College.
Conclusion
The Church of Scotland opposed the Bantu Education Act because it denied them a role in 
the education and evangelisation of African children through the withdrawal of subsidies. 
Inexplicably the Church had initially been optimistic about the government5s intentions, 
speculating that increased funds would be directed towards the missionaries to maintain and 
expand their education system alongside a burgeoning state system. The Church was already 
approaching a point where it could no longer run either its institutions or primary schools,
108 NLS B379 Shepherd to Watt 20 Sept. 1954. Shepherd argued that’ it has been my constant 
endeavour to keep staff fully informed of developments.’ NLSA Lovedale Principal’s Report 1954, p. 5. 
Keeping staff members informed of events did not imply that staff opinions mattered.
109 NLS B358 Kerr to Watt 24 May 1954.
110 NLS ACC7548 A78 Letter Books Watt to Kerr 20 July 1954.
111 NLS B359 Kerr to Watt 4 June 1955, Kerr noted that four senior male teachers were leaving 
Lovedale.
112 NLSA Lovedale Principal’s Report 1955, pp. 6-7. As African teachers had no opportunities 
outside government schools (excluding Catholic schools) is makes perfect sense that they decided to remain 
where they were.
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without further financial assistance. When it became clear that funds would be withdrawn 
it attempted to negotiate with the government in the naive hope that, at the very least, 
Lovedale could be spared this subsidy withdrawal.113 As a rather disillusioned Lovedale 
Governing Council minuted in April 1955; ‘It had been hoped that the Government would 
be more liberal than its pronouncements indicated, but such hopes were dashed.’114 
Thereafter, the FMC and MC quickly and decisively came to the conclusion that they would 
not seek to maintain any of their schools.
In March 1955 Watt spoke enthusiastically about money being released from the institutions 
and being put into the BPC and wider Church of Scotland initiatives in South Africa.115 
Some like Amott, saw the loss of mission institutions as ‘liberation from the burden of 
maintaining schools and boarding departments.’116 But financial insecurity was not the only 
reason the Church rejected running its schools as private institutions. Mission authority in 
schools was breaking down across the Union, with Lovedale in particular the site of serious 
student disturbances. Unquestionably the Presbyterian Church feared the disintegration of 
relations between students and staff that was taking place at its mission schools. In 1955 the 
Lovedale Governing Council noted that ‘discourtesy and lack of co-operation were the rule 
among the majority of male students.. .It was pointed out that this type of behaviour was rife 
everywhere. ’117 A few weeks earlier Shepherd had written to Watt describing ‘these difficult 
days, when undisciplined youth continue to make riots in institution after institution.’118 
There is a definite sense in which the Church viewed these institutions as liabilities, it could 
not run its schools with less money, given that disturbances were triggered, at least 
nominally, by poor standards and poor food.
113 Dougall wrote to Kerr ‘it is no good telling mission or church bodies to claim their rights if they 
can only do so at the expense of Government grants. ’ NLS ACC7548 A56 Dougall to Kerr 2 Feb. 1954.
114 CL MS17782 Lovedale Governing Council 14 April 1955. Herron argued that in agreeing to 
lease their schools the English-speaking churches believed in the ‘doctrine that the bark of the Nationalist 
Government is worse than its bite.’ Herron, ‘Questions’, British Weekly. 18 Nov. 1954, p. 5.
115 NLS A79 Watt to Kerr 7 March 1955.
110 NLS ACC7548 C19 Lovedale Mission Report for 1957.
117 CL MS 17782 Lovedale Governing Council 10 March 1955,
118 NLS B379 Shepherd to Watt 17 Feb. 1955.
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If the Church was unwilling to run the schools privately why did it not close them? Shepherd 
and Kerr argued that in principle the Church of Scotland could not reject the 
acknowledgement of state responsibility for African education that was inherent in the Act, 
as there was no grounds in the tradition of the Presbyterian Church for doing so.119 The 
Church defended its decision not to close schools because of the effect this would have on 
Africans. As Shepherd remarked, ‘we took the view that it was better to hand it over...so 
as not to deprive the African people of the various forms of education at Lovedale.’120 
Another missionary contended that it was impossible to ‘justify refusing to lease school 
buildings and turn thousands of children on to the streets where they will learn no good.5121 
While many Africans probably rejected school closure, this was not the main reason why the 
Church refused to close them. It seems more likely they refrained from such a provocative 
act for fear of inciting African political agitation, as Shepherd’s letter to Reeves makes clear. 
The Church leadership was cautious in dealing with the Act, asserting that change would 
come through slow weight of changing opinion rather than through public acts of defiance..
Their refusal to acknowledge the wider moral and political implications of Bantu Education 
suggests the extent to which Kerr and Shepherd accepted white ruling class norms in South 
Africa. Their failure to engage adequately with African opinion meant that these issues could 
be effectively avoided by church leaders and they could deal with the Act as a purely 
administrative and financial issue. This clearly angered Church members in Britain who saw 
the decision to lease the schools as little more than acquiescence in the government’s 
demands.
The internal strife in the Church of Scotland was to be replicated within the Anglican 
Church. However, in the Anglican Church, those who opposed its general policy towards 
Bantu Education were publically active within South Africa, not easily silenced, and caused 
its leadership much embarrassment. These divisions that plagued the Church leadership are
119 NLS B370 Shepherd & Kerr to Watt 8 July 1955.
120 Shepherd, ‘The Bantu Education Act: The Future of Lovedale’, South African Outlook. 1 Sept. 
1955, pp. 132-4.
121 NLS B364 Matheson to Watt 22 Dec. 1954.
145
examined in the following chapter.
Wearing ‘African Spectacles': The Anglican Church and the Bantu Education Act1
No single piece of government legislation has had as profound an impact on the Church of 
the Province in South Africa (CPSA) as the Bantu Education Act. It precipitated a dramatic 
cleavage of opinion within the church, both amongst its leaders and followers, and its 
response to Bantu Education was fractured and controversial. The majority of the church’s 
leaders adopted a passive approach, opting for what they saw as the lesser of two evils, the 
leasing of its schools to the government. However, a minority, led by passionate charismatic 
churchmen, opted to defy the government by closing down the schools that fell under their 
control.
In contrast to the protracted debates in other denominations, the leaders of the Anglican 
Church determined their reaction to Bantu Education quickly and decisively. The CPSA 
archive contains substantial material relating to Bantu Education, but it largely describes the 
period after the decision to lease schools was made. This is because the decision was made 
exclusively by the Bishops, with minimal input from those outside the Synod. Excluding 
some attempts by Ambrose Reeves, the Bishop of Johannesburg, and Eric Trapp, the Bishop 
of Zululand, there is little evidence to suggest that the opinions’ of teachers, the clergy or 
other Africans with an interest in education were sought by the leadership.
The period from the passage of the Bantu Education Act to the circulars of August1954 was 
dominated by meetings in individual dioceses. As early as October 1953 the Board of 
Management of Mission Schools in the Johannesburg diocese had decided to halt all 
investment in schooling until the situation became clearer.2 A few months later Trapp 
reported that in his diocese there were ‘many conflicting views’: some school managers 
insisted they should not rent any schools, while others claimed this would ‘result in the 
closure of schools and much acrimony’. He appealed to other Anglican bishops to make
1 WCL CPSA AB388 Bishop Reeves, File ii. J. Calata to Reeves, 23 Nov. 1954.
2 WCL, CPSA AB2013 Diocese of Johannesburg 1802-1987, L2 Minutes Board of Management 
of Mission Schools, 9 Oct. 1953.
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their opinions known to him.3 In reply the Bishop of Bloemfontein, C. Alderson, wrote ‘all 
I can say is that the general opinion seems to be that our only alternative is to let the 
schools.’4 It is not clear whose general opinion was represented, but this view was also 
favoured by the Archbishop of Cape Town, Geoffrey Clayton:
I do not think myself that it is possible to avoid all co-operation with the 
Government [he commented]... I think we should be doing a very ill service to our 
Natives if we left the field wholly clear to the Government... .1 think we seize any 
opportunity we can get of bringing such influence as we can upon those who are 
being trained to be teachers and on the schools
According to Clayton at a recent meeting, African schools managers in Zululand were in 
‘unanimous5 agreement that the Church should try and maximise its influence within the new 
educational system.5 In Johannesburg, Reeves called a general meeting of all teachers from 
the diocese to find out ‘the current opinion of teachers’, although the results of this meeting 
were not recorded.6 Reeves believed that schools should be sold rather than leased, with the 
sales revenue funding a small number of private schools. By keeping some schools the 
Church could retain ‘a stake in African education/ although this would only be worthwhile 
if such schools ‘had a greater measure of control than at present.,7
From this limited evidence it appears the majority of Anglican leaders were prepared to 
work with the government, and lease their schools. After the arrival of the August circulars, 
matters moved quickly, as decisions had to be made before the end of 1954. The first church
3 WCL, CPSA AB1124 Diocese of Bloemfontein, Bantu Education. Trapp to Bishops of the CPSA, 
21 April 1954.
4 WCL AB1124 Alderson to Trapp, May 5 1954.
5 WCL CPSA AB19lClayton, Political Correspondence 1949-57. Clayton to Duncan, 2 June 1954, 
Note Clayton’s paternalist reference to ‘our Natives. ’ This claim that there was ‘unanimous’ agreement in 
the Zululand Diocese somewhat contradicts Trapp’s earlier contention that there were ‘many conflicting 
views. ’
6 WCL CPSA AB623 Diocese of Johannesburg Secretary 1949-62. T Bishop (Superintendent of 
the Board of Management of Mission Schools to All Teachers, 16 June 1954. Canon John Collins was 
invited to speak at this meeting. Collins, a Canon at St. Paul’s Cathedral, had visited South Africa, meeting 
many African leaders and white liberals. This experience resulted in him becoming a life-long opponent of 
apartheid.
7 Reeves to ? 6 May 1954, from J. Pear-Binns, Ambrose Reeves. (London, 1973), p. 118.
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leader to come reach a decision was Fr. Trevor Huddleston, who wrote to Eiselen only ten 
days after the arrival of the circulars. Managers at the Community of the Resurrection 
school, St. Peter's, had decided to close it down, because they could not afford to run it on 
reduced subsidy. Moreover he recognised that ‘as this school is situated in a European urban 
area, your Department would not be willing indefinitely to allow us to continue even if we 
desired to do so.’8
The Executive of the Provincial Board of Missions (PBM) met in October to discuss the
circulars and there was ‘protracted debate' about the church’s responsibility to Africans, and
the consequences of non-cooperation. Eventually a unanimous report noted that whilst the
leadership ‘deplored the ideology upon which the Act is based ... the Church should
nevertheless continue to participate in various ways in the education of Africans, even
though this may mean the disposal of property to the Government.’9 One unnamed Board
member suggested that every effort should be made to run a single private school. This
suggestion was rejected however; Church leaders argued that such a school would have to
follow ‘the new educational system’ and would suffer staffing difficulties and uncertainty
among its pupils.10 It was agreed that all Anglican schools would be rented at a nominal rate
0iDOtW \V
except where a significant^had been spent amount on school property, in which case an 
economic rent would be charged. Further, the clergy should become members of schools 
boards; fullest use of the right of entry for religious instruction be made; and hostels be 
given up, because of problems of divided control. Finally, they asserted that the Church 
Executive should seek ways to improve its evangelistic work among children via Sunday 
Schools and the training of extra catechists.11
8 WCL CPSA AB2089 St. Peter’s School 1932-67. Huddleston to Eiselen 12 Aug. 1954. Section 
6Ciii of the August Circular had stated that any school situated on ‘European5 land would be subject to the 
provisions of the Group Areas Act. Huddleston requested that the school should be allowed to remain open 
until the end of 1956 to allow all current students to end their courses.
9 WCL CPSA AB785 Provincial Board of Mission Executive Minutes, 6 Oct. 1954.
10 The Bishop of Bloemfontein had already rejected this idea remarking ‘It might even be a 
disadvantage to children to have been known to have been in private Bantu schools.5 AB1124 Alderson to 
Rector of the House of the Sacred Mission (England) 28 Aug. 1954.
11 WCL CPSA AB785 Minutes 6 Oct. 1954.
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After this meeting Clayton hoped there would be unanimity at the full provincial meeting in 
November and at the following Synod, and remarked to Bishop Roberts of the SPG ‘the fact 
that the Report is unanimous is a relief to me as it suggests there in not likely to be much 
difference of opinion’.12 However, when the PBM met there was not the unity that Clayton 
had hoped for. After ‘much discussion’ the report was agreed by the executive, with one 
dissentient. This was most probably Reeves who, as will become clear, changed his mind on 
how best to approach Bantu Education.
At the following the Bishops voted to lease their schools, after which Reeves asked Clayton 
A
if it was binding. After a night’s deliberation, Clayton declared that it was not. Following 
the Synod, the Bishops released a statement in which they ‘deplored’ the intentions of the 
Act, and were ‘of the opinion that the Church should not make itself responsible for taking 
part in such an educational system. ’ All they were ‘prepared to do’ was lease their schools 
to the government:
The majority of us think that in many cases it would be wrong to refuse to do so.
Such a refusal would throw many teachers out of employment and leave many 
children without the opportunity of any kind of instruction. It is incompatible with 
our duty to the African people to take action which might lead to such results13
The assertion that the Anglican Church was only ‘prepared’ to lease schools implies that 
there were other options which they were not willing to consider because they refused to 
make concessions. The only other alternatives open were either to run the schools privately, 
a plan which Clayton had rejected as ‘impossibly expensive’14, or to close all the schools 
down in defiance. In effect, the Bishops were making a spurious distinction in that they did
12 WCL AB191 Clayton to Roberts (Bishop D Roberts was the Secretary of the SPG) 25 Oct. 1954. 
Trapp has already cast his doubts on this when he wrote ‘ [Tjhe several dioceses concerned, may, of course, 
adopt very different attitudes, and it may not be possible to submit a memorandum which can truly claim 
to be the definitive voice of the CPSA as a whole. ’ WCL CPSA AB1124 Trapp to Bishops of the CPSA, 21 
April 1954.
13 WCL AB191 File Bantu Education, ‘Statement by the Bishops of the Church of the Province of 
South Africa on the Bantu Education Act’, Nov. 1954. Only Reeves opposed this decision, suggesting that 
the Bishops spoke with one voice on this issue.
14 WCL CPSA AB 1095 Corr. between Clayton and G. Fisher (Archbishop of Canterbury). Clayton 
to Fisher 27 Oct. 1954.
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exactly what the government wanted them to do, they leased their schools.15
Shortly thereafter, Reeves received a resolution from the ‘African Clergy and Laity of the 
Diocese of Johannesburg’ which noted that they were ‘deeply disturbed’ that the Bishops 
of the Province were planning to lease school properties to the government. They urged him 
‘to close every school within his jurisdiction’.16 Later in the day Reeves attended an 
extraordinary meeting of the Diocesan Board of Management of Mission Schools and 
informed them he was closing all 23 schools under their control from 1 April 1956.17 He 
explained he had reached this ‘painful decision’ because the Church
has no alternative but to refuse to co-operate in anyway in furthering an education 
policy which violates the principles from which all true education is sought, for it 
proposes to train the great majority of African children for a status in life which has 
been assigned to them18
In justifying his action to Clayton, Reeves maintained that Bantu Education was ‘morally 
indefensible’ and argued that ‘the church has no right to assist the authorities in carrying out 
their plans. ’19 This was a clear attack on the Bishops’ decision, and implied that the Anglican 
Church had compromised itself with apartheid. A few days later Reeves released a statement 
which claimed ‘any kind of co-operation would be a violation of conscience.’20
Nor were Reeves and Huddleston the only Anglicans to decide to close down their schools. 
At the end of October, the Provincial of the Society of the Sacred Mission in Modderpoort, 
Orange Free State, announced that he was closing a number of schools under the Society’s
15 Only their refusal to run hostels ran counter to the desires of the Native Affairs Department.
16 AB388 Papers of Ambrose Reeves File 1 Resolution Passed by the African Clergy and Laity of 
the Diocese of Johannesburg, 15 Nov. 1954.
17 WCL CPSA AB623 ‘Report on Mission Schools’ In 1954 there were 12,862 pupils and 264 
teachers in Anglican schools in the Diocese of Johannesburg.
18 Reeves, Forum. Dec. 1954, from Paton, Apartheid, p. 236.
19 AB388 Reeves to Clayton 15 Nov. 1954.
20 Press Release, 22 Nov. 1954, quoted in Peart-Binns, Ambrose Reeves, p. 122.
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control, convinced as he was ‘that the true welfare of the African people is being denied by 
virtue of a political theory and educational principles which we affirm to be contrary to the 
Will of God.’21
How it was possible for there to be such divergent opinions within a single church needs 
further exploration. Before examining the forces that motivated Reeves and Huddleston, 
however, it is necessary to examine the role played by Clayton in determining to lease 
schools,
Clavton
There are numerous reasons why Clayton acted as he did.22 At one level, the decision to 
lease was the best financial option available to the Church. Like other mission churches the 
CPSA struggled with the financial burden of mission education. In the Johannesburg 
diocese, considered the ‘richest’, an internal report in 1954 estimated that £6,500 needed 
to be spent on schools to satisfy existing court orders lodged against the Church to improve 
sanitary conditions. It suggested it was ‘highly likely’ that further court orders would be 
served; the only solution was to concentrate on larger urban schools and withdraw all 
funding from rural schools.23 The PBM meeting which considered Bantu Education also 
noted there was a ‘substantial measure of doubt’ within the Church regarding the long term 
viability of a significant number of its schools. Leasing the schools to the state would free 
the Church from ‘the routine tasks at present connected with [their] management’,24 and
21 WCL CPSA AB2409 Society of the Sacred Mission. ‘Notice of Closure’, pamphlet by R. 
Roseveare. Oct. 1954. The Bishop of Kimberley and Kuniman noted that while he recommended that all 
his diocesan schools be closed ‘I do not feel that I can override the conscience of boards of managers who 
feel unable to do so.’ ‘SPG Appeal to help S. Africa Tops £5000', British Weekly. 17 Dec. 1954, p. 1.
22 Undoubtedly, Clayton carried the opinion of the Bishops (excluding Reeves) with him, both 
because they agreed with him and because of his dominant personality. Huddleston remarked that Clayton 
‘was a very difficult bloke, he was such a strong person that most people became "yes men”. He was too 
frightening.5 WCL CPSA AB2261 Interview Worsnip and Huddleston, London, 24 May 1984.
23 WCL AB623 ‘Report on Mission Schools’ Board of Management of Mission Schools in the 
Diocese of Johannesburg, 1 Jan. 1954.
24 WCL CPSA AB785 Minutes 6 Oct. 1954. There is evidence to suggest that student disturbances 
continued in Anglican schools. The Principal of Khaiso school in Pretoria noted in his report for May 1954
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would actually generate income for the church. While the loss of evangelical opportunities 
was regrettable, the change provided for ‘a vigorous use of new opportunities [which 
would] enable the Church to discharge her evangelistic and pastoral duties towards Africans 
more effectively in the days to come’.25 The loss of schools was apparently not as significant 
to their evangelical mission as it had been for the Catholics. As the Bishop of Pretoria 
remarked:
it is difficult to assess the value of the work done by the schools in our diocese. In 
the early days these proved the most important means of evangelistic contact with 
our people, but latterly, the evangelistic importance of many of our schools has 
fallen away. The change which has been brought about by the Bantu Education Act 
may not, therefore, be altogether an ill wind26
Clayton, who believed somewhat prophetically that the "new system’ would ‘break down’, 
had already rejected selling the schools, lest it leave the Church with no buildings to take up 
their work again.27 Leasing was thus the only option because of the effect of closure on 
African children. For his part, Reeves was aware of the anguish his decision would cause 
realising that ‘...it means depriving African children of benefits we would gladly continue 
to give. But there is no other way.,28 For Clayton the reality of thousands of children being 
forced out of school was unthinkable:
‘the girls are ill disciplined and difficult.5 WCL CPSA AB2365 Diocese of Pretoria 14 Khaiso School, 
Principal’s Report May 1954. At the Society of the Sacred Mission institution at Modderpoort the principal 
noted in November 1954 that ‘The discipline of the boys house has given cause for concern from April 
onwards. The High School deteriorated so badly that it shut down in May....there were no attempts at 
strikes, but there were continued threats of violence and making of coshes.’ He blamed the trouble on an 
attempt to establish a branch of the Society of Young Africans at the school as well as its impending closure. 
WCL AB2049 H2 Principles Report. Nov. 1954.
25 WCL AB1095 Clayton to Fisher 12 Nov. 1954. Clayton noted ‘we have to devise other means 
to work among African children.’ To this end a committee under Trapp was established to examine the 
extension of Sunday School services throughout the Union. In December the Bishop of Pretoria created a 
diocesan Director of Religious Education to organise and promote Sunday Schooling. WCL CPSA AB2365 
Diocese of Pretoria, File D Bishop’s Senate Minutes 1951-58, 9 Dec. 1954.
“ Rhodes House Library (henceforth RHL) Oxford. USPGD5041939-57 Bishop of Pretoria, Report 
Jan. 1955 - Dec. 1955.
27 Quoted in Paton, Apartheid, p. 235.
28 Press Release 22 Nov. 1954, quoted in Peart-Binns, Ambrose Reeves, p. 121.
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I am haunted by the fear that if tlie number of school buildings available is greatly 
reduced by refusal of the missions to lease any of their buildings, the result will be 
the throwing of large numbers of children onto the streets..,,Even a rotten system 
of education is better than that which young children pick up in the streets.29
The complete closure of Anglican mission schools would mean that thousands of children 
would have been reliant upon their parents. But as Clayton noted Their fathers and mothers 
have to go to work and cannot supervise them.’30 The question that he probably asked 
himself was could an archbishop be directly responsible for exposing children to these 
‘dangers’? Was it not the church’s duty to do the exact opposite, to save children from 
those threats? The decision to close or not was both difficult and complex and needed 
wisdom and courage whatever was decided.
To close schools would have been a very political act which would have openly defied 
government policy and poured thousands of children onto the streets in an explosive 
political atmosphere.31
Claytons’ decision to lease was also dictated by his theological convictions. He believed that 
the Church was most effective by simply being The Church’. It was the Church’s duty To 
state clearly the moral problem and leave men to form their own personal decisions. ’32 For 
Clayton, the Church was a separate entity independent of worldly influences and affairs, its 
function to proclaim The principles laid down once and for all by the Head of the Church’ 
which were ‘eternally right’.33 Its primary role was the saving of souls and the salvation of 
the individual, not exerting conspicuous political pressure on governments and individuals
29 WCL AB191 Clayton Charge to the Cape Town Diocese, 1954.
30 iMd.
31 Clayton was also president of the CCSA and would have been aware of the attitudes of other 
churches, thus closing Anglican schools would have been an isolated act, at variance with the decisions 
made by the other denominations. This undoubtedly gave him further reason not to close the schools.
32 Quoted in Worsnip, Between, p. 32.
33 Clayton, ‘The Church and the Present Situation’, address Cape Town City Hall, 10 June 1955. 
WCL CPSA AB811 Clayton, ‘The Critical Years’, p. 154.
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in the hope of changing policies.34 Neither should it involve itself in political campaigns and 
align itself to any political party, as ‘a party is an ephemeral thing and the Church 
continues’.35 The Church’s duty was to proclaim and teach principles, leaving it upon those 
whom it taught to change earthly society. As Worsnip remarked/In this there is a sense in 
which the Church assumes the role of commentator, not entirely immersed in the warp and 
weft of politics. The Church remains somewhat aloof from the political affairs of society.,36 
For Clayton teaching the Bible was the most effective witness the Church could offer.37
This interpretation meant that ‘Clayton appeared quite prepared to live in a situation in 
which the state, no matter how brutal or oppressive its legislation, continued to safeguard 
the right of the Church “to be the Church.’”38 Despite restrictions placed on Africans by 
apartheid, Clayton believed that the state’s actions did not, as yet, restrict the activities of 
the Church. As he remarked to Bishop Roberts of the SPG in 1953 ‘I do not think that at 
the present time it is really true to say the Church has been muzzled.’39 He made it 
abundantly clear that the Church could only defy secular authority when it denied the 
Church the right to be ‘the Church’. At his enthronement in 1949 he said ‘the collapse of 
civilization only matters in so far as it is likely to involve the ruin of human souls.’40
Clearly, the archbishop did not believe that Bantu Education threatened the real work of the 
Church. In May 1954 he wrote to Malan emphasizing those issues which he considered
34 Clayton often stressed that people were citizens of two worlds and that the principle role of the 
Church was to prepare individuals for their heavenly salvation.
35 Quoted in Worsnip, Between, p. 28, He believed the Church had its own proven method of 
creating change, through the timeless wisdom of God’s word. This was similar to the attitude adopted by 
the Catholic Church.
36 Worsnip, Between, p. 36.
37 Alan Paton wrote that for Clayton the Church ‘meant the attempt to promote the study of and 
investigation of the problem of evangelising, and the establishing of Christian social order. ’ A. Paton, 
Apartheid, p. 234.
38 Worsnip, Between, p. 142.
39 WCL CPSA AB707 South African Church Institute. Letter Clayton to Roberts 1 Aug. 1953.
40 Quotes in Worsnip, Between, p. 34. Thus as long as human souls could be saved through the 
actions of an unmolested Church, society could descend into tyranny.
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‘jeopardised [the] liberty for all men to worship in accordance with their religious beliefs and 
to learn and teach religion,5 such as the Suppression of Communism Act, and its associated 
banning orders which prevented individuals from attending religious services. He also 
criticised ‘certain aspects of the implementation of the Bantu Education Act.541 Malan 
passed the letter to Verwoerd, who subsequently met with Clayton. While the exact 
‘aspects5 of the implementation of Bantu Education Clayton opposed are unclear, he 
remarked that he
had a long talk about the Bantu Education Act. I told him our lawyers interpreted 
the Act to mean that Sunday Schools and theological colleges would have to be 
registered. He said his lawyers said they wouldn’t. At certain periods during schools 
hours in Government schools the right of entry will be granted to any denominations 
which have a certain number of pupils. But it would have to be exercised by 
somebody either black or white who could give instruction in the mother tongue.42
While Clayton deplored the whole Bantu Education Act, he only opposed those parts which 
impinged religious freedom and was only prepared to challenge the government when he felt 
that religious liberty was at stake.
Clayton may also have opposed the closure of schools and adopted a more conciliatory 
approach because of his position as Archbishop of the Anglican Church in South Africa. In 
1952 he wrote
I am in what seems to be a difficult position, as Chief Bishop in a Church which 
includes people of all races, and in which it is fairly obvious that a large proportion 
of our European laymen do not agree with the teaching of the Church on racial 
matters43
The Church's member ship may have been broad and racially mixed44, but its leadership was 
overwhelmingly white and it relied predominantly upon money from its white adherents. As
41 WCL AB191Clayton to Malan 26 May 1954.
42 Quoted in Worsnip, Between, p. 128.
43 WCL AB191 Clayton to Duncan 22 Oct. 1952.
44 The Anglican Church had more African members than white members. See Paton, Apartheid.
p. 46.
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Paton remarked
The Church of the Province was a South African church and carried within itself
all the tensions and all the corruptions It being of South Africa, the colour bar
entered into every part of its life45
It was not until 1966 that an African Bishop was appointed46, and well into the 1970s no 
African in the Church ever supervised white workers. In 1982 there was still only one 
African Bishop in South Africa. When in 1984, Desmond Tutu was appointed Bishop of 
Johannesburg this was ‘bitterly opposed by many white parishes in the diocese’ 47
Thus, thirty years after the struggle over Bantu Education, many white Anglicans refused 
to accept the principle of non-racialism. Throughout the twentieth century synodical 
statements and resolutions did not reflect the attitudes and opinions of the vast majority of 
white Anglicans. Huddleston noted in 1957, ‘In the Church, as outside it, it is prejudice and 
fear and racialism itself which operate to confound the principles and ideas of episcopal 
pronouncements.’48 He continued
I think it would be true to say that in outspokenness; in the utterances of her 
Archbishops and Bishops; in the published resolutions of her synods - the Church 
has been outstanding. But, over the past twelve years at any rate, this witness has 
been totally ineffective in its influence on the mass of White South Africa.49
In 1955 Clayton reflected:
we are in a minority among white people ... it has been said lately, with a 
good deal of truth, that we do not carry our laymen with us. I think that is
43 Paton, Apartheid, p. 46.
46 Bishop Alpheus Zulu of Zululand.
47 Worsnip, Between, pp. 156-7, hi. 31.
48 T. Huddleston, Naught for Your Comfort, p. 76.
49 Huddleston, Naught, p. 70.
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true o f many o f the rank and file.50
The wholesale closing of schools seemed threatening to white South Africa, signalling open 
defiance of government policy and raising the spectre of thousands of African youths 
roaming the streets. It would have been difficult for Clayton to defy opinion that originated 
from the socially and economically dominant white group in ‘his’ Church, a group to which 
he also had a pastoral responsibility. Huddleston put the situation bluntly when he observed 
that the Anglican church was ‘conniving at a policy which openly proclaims itself one of 
racial discrimination...because it fears that an effective and determined opposition will lose 
it the allegiance of its white members’.51 Clayton lived in a white middle-class ecclesiastical 
world, far removed from the realities of life in South Africa for the majority of Anglicans. 
ffrench-Breytagh, Anglican priest and Clayton’s close associate, remarked
He only ever spoke about the ‘fundamental issues’ and ‘apartheid being wrong’ and
all that. But he never came across individuals who were suffering and he was an
unpersonable kind of person.52
In other words, Clayton understood suffering intellectually as an abstract notion, but never 
came directly in contact with it on a regular basis. Huddleston argued that for the white 
leadership of the Anglican Church poverty and suffering ‘was something they had no contact 
with. They simply didn’t understand it at all.’53
Trevor Huddleston
Undoubtedly, Huddleston’s public and vocal opposition to Bantu Education and apartheid 
was partly inspired by his daily association with Africans in Sophiatown. Huddleston had 
become priest-in-charge of the Community of the Resurrection in 1943. The Community,
50 LPL Fisher V. 163 Clayton address to SPG 26 April 1955.
51 Huddleston, Naught, p. 157. Paton argues that Clayton thought that Huddleston always 
overlooked the responsibility that Clayton had to white church members. Paton, Apartheid, p. 253.
52 Quoted in Worsnip, Between, p. 83.
53 WCL CPSA AB2261. Worsnip said of Clayton ‘His own position suffered from the deficiency 
of not having been informed by black opinion.’ Worsnip, Between, p. 117.
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committed to making ‘a deep and sacramental connection between individual sanctity and 
the needs of the world’54, had come to South Africa in 1903 and, before Huddleston’s 
arrival, had firmly established itself in Sophiatown.55 The previous priest-in-charge, 
Raymond Raynes, had also actively championed social causes during his tenure in 
Sophiatown. During his six years he oversaw the construction of three churches, seven 
schools, three nursery schools, and the expansion of the hospital. He supported campaigns 
for improved water, lighting and sanitation and, according to Paton, ‘fought for the poor 
and the persecuted’.56 Huddleston came into a situation where much was expected of him 
and where the Community of the Resurrection had already become politicised. The effect 
that living in Sophiatown was to have on his life is best expressed in his own words
I was working in those days in a slum area of the city, which no longer exists... .But 
in my day Sophiatown, one of the oldest African areas in the city, was very much 
alive. And my whole experience of poverty - my experience of what is meant by the 
word urbanization in the African context....one’s understanding of racial conflict 
actually in the heart of where it hit hardest - all this I learned within the context of 
this slum parish in Sophiatown. This was of course a very wonderful experience 
and one which I suppose more than anything else shaped all my views and my 
thinking, not merely about sociological problems, but about religion itself - it 
changed my views certainly, and gave me a completely new approach to life57
It was this experience which led Huddleston to identify himself with African opinion, and 
oppose the policies that caused the suffering he observed. Having described Sophiatown as 
‘one of the most vital places on earth’,58 in early 195 5 he witnessed its ‘forced removal. ’ For 
him, and many others, Sophiatown was of huge symbolic significance and its destruction 
greatly hardened his attitude not only towards the government, but also towards the
5,1 R. Denniston, Trevor Huddleston: A Life. (London, 1999), p. xvi. The Community of the 
Resurrection was a religious order which had its routes in the Christian Socialist movement in Britain. All 
members adopted a ‘socialist’ lifestyle under a vow of poverty and dedicated themselves to ‘applied 
Christianity’ where Christianity had real social implications. See A. Egan, ‘Douglas Thompson: Christian 
Socialist, Radical Democrat: A Political Biography’, PhD thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, 1999, 
pp. 46-54.
55 Clayton has asked the community to take over the Parish in 1934.
56 Paton, Apartheid, p. 125.
57 Quoted in Denniston, Trevor, p. 42.
58 Huddleston, Naught, p. 26.
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churches which failed to challenge its demolition.
Through these experiences Huddleston was better able to empathise with Africans and see 
the inherent evil of apartheid.59 He had a ‘consistent and passionate belief that basic human 
rights lay at the heart of the Christian gospel. ,6° Thus, it was the Church’s duty to ‘proclaim 
fearlessly, in season and out of season, the truth of the Gospel: and to recognise that this 
truth is revolutionary, and that it is the most powerful solvent for traditional social ideas.’61 
He argued the ‘Christian cannot escape the daily responsibility of choice’,62 meaning that in 
an oppressive situation ‘the Christian is always, if he be true to his calling, an agitator. ’63This 
meant opposing the state politically, for ‘when government degenerates into tyranny.. laws 
cease to be binding upon its subjects’.64 Unlike Clayton, Huddleston believed that the church 
was a political entity, with a permanent obligation to oppose unchristian practises directly 
and in a worldly manner. Because he found apartheid irredeemably evil, ‘a blasphemy 
against God’65 he argued that it was the duty of every Christians to do everything in his or 
her power to exorcise such blasphemy.
Clayton’s concern that the Church should remain true to itself was matched by Huddleston’s 
conviction that it was not doing so. He believed that the Church, through its compromise 
and inactivity, was threatening its very existence, and feared Africans would permanently
59 In 1956 Anthony Sampson, editor of Drum, wrote ‘Huddleston was so inextricably part of black 
South Africa, so much the fixed star against which all other liberal activities were judged.5 A. Sampson. 
Drum: A Venture into New Africa (London, 1956), p. 133.
60 Denniston, Trevor, p. xvi.
61 Huddleston, Naught, p. 252.
62 ibid, p. 59
63 Quoted in Sampson, Drum, p. 168.
64 Quoted in Rand Daily Mail. 16 Feb. 1953.
65 Huddleston, Naught, p. 180. He noted ‘ I believe that, because God became man, therefore human 
nature in itself has a dignity and value which is infinite. I believe that this conception necessarily carries 
with it the idea that the State exists for the individual, not the individual for the State. Any doctrine based 
on racial or colour prejudice and enforced by the State is therefore an affront to human dignity and ‘ipso 
facto5 an insult to God himself...There is no room for fence-sitting over a question such a racial ideology5, 
p. 18.
160
desert it if it continued on its present course. In 1953 he contended cIt is not only possible, 
but on a natural level probable, that the Christian Church may be facing her last opportunity 
of retaining the love and loyalty of her African people - for the gulf widens every day.’66
Given these beliefs it is unsurprising that Huddleston closed down the schools within his 
control, a decision which he claimed was not ‘a flamboyant gesture but the upholding of a 
principle against wrong racial ideology5.67 He argued that Bantu Education ‘emptied of all 
meaning all that was understood by the word education.568 For him there could be no 
compromise with such a fundamentally flawed piece of legislation.
mM
It was easier for Huddleston toAsuch a decision than for Clayton. Significantly, Huddleston 
did not have a white laity to concern himself with, as he was a parish priest in a African area. 
He was not the leader of a national church with differing communities to which he was 
responsible, rather he represented a brotherhood which was committed to alleviating social 
deprivation and its causes in its immediate vicinity. Huddleston identified apartheid as the 
cause of suffering and, within the Community of the Resurrection, strove through every 
means possible to seek its demise. From this point, the action taken by Ambrose Reeves, 
required even greater courage for Reeves did have a large and substantially white laity to 
consider and a significant national public role to fulfil.
Ambrose Reeves
Reeves was consecrated Bishop of Johannesburg in 1949, following Clayton's appointment 
as archbishop of Cape Town. Before coming to South Africa he had been a priest in the 
Liverpool area, where he worked with trade unions, playing a prominent role in the 1945 
Liverpool dockers5 strike. Thus, even before his arrival in South Africa it is clear that he 
was not afraid to extend the Christian Gospel into the political arena. In his very first charge
66 Huddleston, ‘For God’s Sake Wake Up!’, The Observer. 30 Aug. 1953.
67 WCL, CPSA AB2013 Clergy Synod Minutes. 21 Oct. 1954.
68 The Star 25 March 1955.
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to the Johannesburg diocese, Reeves appeared to attack the CPSA indirectly,
it is all too easy for any body such as a Synod to pass resolutions and to go away 
with a comfortable feeling that something has been accomplished. All that has been 
done is to decide on a certain policy. It is the carrying out ofthat policy which is all 
important69
Three years later his charge was more forthright:
While on the one hand it is our duty to create good citizenship and loyalty to 
authority, on the other hand we must criticise and challenge tyranny and injustice 
wherever we meet it. We ought to be deeply ashamed if we acquiesce dumbly in 
things as they are70
Reeves evidently believed that ‘tyranny and injustice5 were already part of South African 
society, and that it was the Church's challenge to face up to this reality. He aimed to do this 
by uniting political groups to oppose apartheid, believing that the Church could not 
complete its overthrow alone. In 1950 and 1951 he successfully brought together a ‘strange 
assortment5, which included trade unions, the SAIRR, the African and Indian Congresses, 
the white Congress of Democrats and the Liberal Party to try and coordinate opposition to 
apartheid. Paton argues that Reeves did so ‘with a measure of success that was surprising5,71 
While this alienated many Anglicans in the diocese ‘and aroused amongst the extreme-right 
wing whites a dangerous anger5,72 it showed that Reeves was not prepared to pay lip service 
to the white majority view in his diocese.
We have seen how Reeves, like Huddleston and Clayton, opposed the policy of Bantu 
Education because it ‘violated5 the ‘true principles5 of education and was designed to train 
Africans for permanent subservient status. While clear that no Anglican schools should be 
used to run government schools, he initially suggested selling the majority to fund a number
69 Quoted in Worsnip, Between, p. 122.
70 WCL CPSA AB1979 Diocese of Johannesburg. Reeves charge, 1953.
71 Paton, Apartheid, p. 204.
72 ibid.
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of private schools. Thus, at first, Reeves was willing to entertain the idea of teaching Bantu 
Education in Anglican schools, but by November 1954 he had changed his mind. This may 
have been due to the influence of Huddleston with whom he had an excellent working 
relationship,73 but seems more the result of the application of double-sessions74 in Anglican 
schools before the stated date for the assumption of control of mission education.
In early May 1954, Reeves was ‘greatly dismayed’ at the introduction of double-sessions 
in ‘his’ schools, arguing that by allowing it, the Church was ‘aiding and abetting’ a system 
to which it was opposed’.75 He wrote to de Villiers insisting the double-sessions end, noting 
that the government appeared to be implementing its schools policy before the churches had 
made any decisions about their future. De Villiers responded that if the churches wanted to 
receive government subsidies, they would have to abide by government regulations.76 
Angered by this rebuttal Reeves wrote back that if the government wanted to implement 
Bantu Education in church schools they would have to take them over at the end of the 
school year ‘because the Church cannot allow itself to be used as the instrument of carrying 
out policy with which it so profoundly disagrees’ 77It seems that the NAD attitude hardened 
Reeves’s resolve and contributed to his closing the schools under his authority.
Despite the fact that, unlike Huddleston, Reeves did not have daily contact with Africans, 
his determination to form an alliance of peoples against apartheid meant that he mixed with 
individuals who were aware of what was happening in South Africa, and was in part 
informed by their knowledge and experience. Luthuli, for example, said of him ‘I was 
deeply impressed by his stature as a man of God, by his insight into the true nature of what
73 See Worsnip, Between, p. 122
74 The school day was split into 2 sessions. This allowed more children to receive some schooling 
but significantly reduced the time that students were actually in school.
75 WCL AB388 Reeves iv Transvaal Native Education Advisory Board correspondence 1952-54. 
Reeves to R, Pretor, May 6 1954.
76 See Peart-Binns, Ambrose, p. 119.
77 WCL AB388 Reeves to de Villiers, 12 July 1954.
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is happening in South Africa, and by his courage.’78 Fr. Shand, whom Reeves appointed 
Director of Religious Education in the diocese in May 1954, also observed:
His concern with justice was never a bloodlessly intellectual appreciation of justice 
as a desirable thing, but [was] always as something that here and now affected the 
daily lives of men and women.. .Ambrose was highly sensitive to the emotional needs 
of the African.79
This contrasts sharply with Clayton, who, as we have seen, was a more distant observer of 
suffering. Shand also noted that Reeves made great efforts to get to know as many lay 
people in his diocese as possible, so that to him, African needs were ‘more immediate and 
clamant’.80
But Reeves, like Huddleston, also lived in Johannesburg in the late 1940s and 1950s where 
‘the struggle between Government and Church was most intense and most publicised and 
most spectacular.’81 Johannesburg was the focal point of most African political activity; it 
was arguably where they suffered most from the deprivations of apartheid, and where 
opposition to those deprivations was most vocal. By contrast, Clayton was in Cape Town 
and believed ‘the diocese of Cape Town is not, of course, affected. We are only very slightly 
concerned in the Bantu Education Act. ’82 Clayton’s opportunities to come into contact with 
African parents and those directly concerned with African education were fewer in Cape 
Town., but they did exist had he sought it.
It may be relevant that Reeves and Huddleston were also relatively new to South Africa 
compared to Clayton, By 1953 Huddleston had been in the country ten years, and Reeves 
only four, compared to Clayton’s nineteen. Huddleston observed in 1957
78 Luthuli, Let My People Go. p. 151.
79 Quoted in Peart-Binns, Ambrose, p. 127. Shand observed ‘His interest was never merely 
ecclesiastical.’
80 ibid, p. 127
81 Paton, Apartheid, p. 237.
82 WCL CPSA AB1429 Canon C. Wood 1903-1980 A5.3 Corr. with Clayton. Clayton to Wood, 
4 Jan. 1955.
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one of the terrible things that happens, after a while, to all of us in South Africa is 
the acceptance, imwiUing or otherwise, of a situation that cannot be justified on any 
moral principle, but which is so universal, so much part of the whole way of life, 
that the struggle against it seems too great an effort83
Whether Clayton had become tolerant of the racial situation in South Africa is unknown but 
he was somewhat complacent about both segregation and apartheid. Writing to Bishop 
Roberts of the SPG he remarked in 1953
Of course it is true that racial discrimination is the policy of the government, and 
has always been the policy of every government ofthe Union, It has been intensified 
by the present government, but it was in operation before.84
This may suggest that he had become somewhat desensitised towards racial discrimination 
in South Africa, contrasting starkly with the attitudes of Reeves and Huddleston.85
Reeves remarked in 1962 T did ask, somewhat insistently, on more than one occasion, that 
other church leaders should declare the point at which they were going to make their 
stand’.86 For him Bantu Education was the point at which he decided to make his stand 
against apartheid. In a letter to Clayton he elaborated
For some time passed I have been deeply disturbed by the tendency of the secular 
authorities in South Africa to exercise even greater control over the lives of our 
citizens. It has become increasingly clear to me that the point has been reached 
when the Church will have to make it plain beyond all doubt that it will no longer 
acquiesce in this continued and persistent encroachment on human life and liberty. 
I believe that in the way in which this act is being implemented shows that this point 
has now been reached, and that the Church must let its members, the African 
people, the Government, and the whole civilized world know where the Church
83 Huddleston, Naught, p. 34.
84 AB707 Clayton to Roberts, 1 Aug. 1953.
85 In 1955 Clayton remarked ‘we must make the best of the conditions in winch we have to work, 
regarding those conditions as given, as part of the problem we are facing, and go on with out pastoral and 
missionary work as long as we are allowed and as well as we are allowed’. Address to SPG 26 April 1955. 
LPL Fisher V. 163 f. 79.
86 Reeves, The Challenge to Christians, (London, 1962), p. 125.
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stands in this matter. Hence my decision to close the schools87
Reeves understood the significance of Bantu Education, and the role it was to play in the 
apartheid scheme, and his ‘stand against the Act was a kind of declaration of war.’88 As he 
saw it, the time had come to state the Church’s position on apartheid categorically, and 
move from opposing apartheid in principle to actually confronting it head on.
The Reaction
There is little evidence that CPSA leaders engaged African opinion over Bantu Education 
and equally little indicating how their decisions were received by the communities they 
affected. The only comment alluding to the attitudes of church members or members of the 
public to the decision to lease Anglican schools to the State seems to be Clayton’s remark 
that ‘African opinion is very divided’.89 Reeves’s decision, generated much comment 
however. Within days of schools closing Reeves received a number of letters congratulating 
him. James Calata, an Anglican Priest, President of the Cape African Parents Association 
and ex-President of the Cape ANC, wrote
Please allow me to give you my personal appreciation ofthe stand you have taken 
and the lead you have given to the Diocese of Johannesburg against the Bantu 
Education Act.. .this outlook has been the means of preserving the little confidence 
there still is in the leadership ofthe white man90
He added that Reeves had viewed the whole situation wearing ‘African spectacles’. Peart- 
Binns maintains that ‘Africans supported Reeves enthusiastically, emotionally and
87 AB388 Reeves to Clayton, 15 Nov. 1954.
88 Peart-Binns, Ambrose, p. 135.
89 WCL AB191 Clayton to Sulston, 7 Feb. 1955.
90 WCL AB388 Calata to Reeves, 23 Nov. 1954. In an unpublished letter to the Rand Daily Mail 
Feldman, who was a member of the Transvaal Provincial Council (1943-54) and the South African Labour 
Party wrote ‘Every generation in each community has its good men and saints. In present day Transvaal one 
such person is the Rt. Rev. Ambrose Reeves, Bishop of Johannesburg...few, if any, in South Africa every 
[sic] faced with so grave a decision...Bishop Reeves is saving the soul of White South Africa by his truly 
courageous stand.’ WCL A804 Feldman. Feldman to Rand Daily Mail, 23 Nov. 1954.
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unreservedly.’91 While there is evidence to suggest many Africans supported Reeves’ 
decision, there is also evidence to the contrary from Reeves himself. Speaking in 1958, he 
remarked cat the outset numbers of Africans welcomed the transfer of the control of the 
schools from churches and missionary bodies to schools committees and boards’.92 Two 
year later he observed ‘At the time when we closed our mission schools some African 
parents resented this decision, as it meant that the children were denied the use of buildings 
in which they had previously gone to school.’93
These statements indicate the lack of unanimity in African responses to Reeves’s decision, 
and the same can probably be said of Huddleston’s decision. While both acted partly 
because of their familiarity with African opinion, it is not safe to assume that such opinion 
represented all or even the majority of Africans. Their opposition to government policy 
mean that Reeves and Huddleston often came into contact with politically active Africans, 
who courted their attentions as part of the anti-apartheid struggle. There is little evidence 
to suggest that these activists had the full support of the teachers, parents and students.94
Reeves received a letter from Quintin Whyte the Director of the South African Institute of 
Race Relations who wrote
Th is just a personal note, and not written as the Director of the Institute, to 
congratulate you on the decision you have made to refuse to co-operate with the 
Government.. .some demonstration must be made at some point in time in opposition 
to the Government, and I think you have done this95
91 Peart-Binns, Ambrose, p. 122.
92 RHL, African Bureau Papers, South Africa MSS Air,S. 1681 Box 190 South Africa Churchmen. 
Statement by Reeves on the Johannesburg Riots, 20 Feb. 1958,
93 Reeves, The Challenge, p. 128.
94 The relative failure of the ANC’s call for a boycott of Bantu Education suggests as much. Clayton 
who we have seen was less in touch with African opinion remarked in his charge to the Cape Town Diocese 
in 1954 that ‘more vocal and politically minded Africans’ opposed leasing ‘but that is not the view of most 
of those who are themselves more intimately concerned with the matter.5 Quoted in ‘South African Church 
Schools Policy’, Church Times. 3 Dec. 1954, p. 1.
95 WCL AB388 Whyte to Reeves, 24 Nov. 1954.
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Peart-Binns argues that in general the ‘white clergy and laity had mixed feelings about the
wisdom of Reeves’ decision’.96 This was certainly true of Rev. C. Theyrise, priest-in-charge
. , who
of St. Mary’s Mission in Roodepoort, explained that although he agreed with the decision
A
he had his reservations:
With the closure of our school I foresee a great deal of backsliding, an increase in 
delinquency and an increase in lax morals. Many parents have told me that they will 
sent [sic] their children to no other school and have no money to send them to 
schools away from their homes. What is going to happen to these kids?97
This was indeed the problem that the leaders of the CPSA grappled with, and the concern 
expressed in this letter was the very one that Clayton looked to avoid.
While publically Clayton maintained that Reeves’s decision ‘commanded respect’98 privately 
he was dismayed:
he is incapable of acting as a member of a team and that he insists on doing 
everything entirely on his own. His refusal to lease schools is his own personal 
decision...he is determined to go his own way and is not prepared to act in unison 
with his brethren99
Writing privately a few weeks later to Cullen, the Bishop of Grahamstown, Clayton accused 
Reeves of being ‘an alarmist and by nature something of a fanatic’.100 To Clayton, both 
Reeves and Huddleston were activists who took the Church into the political realm where 
it did not belong. Paton maintains that Clayton never approved ofReeves101 and Huddleston
96 Peart-Binns, Ambrose, p. 122. The Vicar-General of the Johannesburg Diocese did not support 
Reeves at all. WCL AB191 Clayton to Wood, 18 Dec. 1954.
97 WCL AB1979 Theyrise to Reeves, 8 Dec. 1954,
98 Quoted in Paton, Apartheid, p. 235.
99 WCL AB191 Clayton to Wood, 18 Dec. 1954. Clayton noted that Reeves had not consulted any 
committee within the diocese to ascertain their opinion. This is not correct as Reeves had consulted the 
teachers of the diocese. There is no evidence that, aside from Reeves and Trapp, any other Bishop sought 
the opinion of diocesan committees.
100 WCL AB191 Clayton to Cullen 4 Jan. 1955.
101 Paton, Apartheid, p. 204.
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believed that Clayton was instrumental in his being sent back to England in 1956.102 Clayton 
was not alone in his disapproval of Reeves; in January 1955 Trapp, the Bishop of Zululand, 
remarked ‘the independent action of the Bishop of Johannesburg is deplorable on many 
accounts.’103
One constituency, however, was wholeheartedly behind Reeves and Huddleston and that 
was liberal opinion in Britain. In mid-1953, Wood, the Director of the South African Church 
Institute and Provincial Commissary to Clayton, wrote that ‘the popular opinion throughout 
England, very widely held but of course quite erroneous, is that the Church of the Province 
is “observing a prudent silence in so awkward a situation’” .104 Clayton responded in a rather 
literal interpretation of Wood’s letter that ‘nothing has happened lately which it seems 
necessary for the Church of the Province as a whole to speak out about.’105 In the same 
month Clayton also exchanged letters with Bishop Roberts of the SPG about the role that 
English churches could play in opposing apartheid. In common with leaders of other 
churches, he warned that ‘outside’ criticism would ‘hinder’ rather than ‘help’ by causing the 
government to stiffen its resolve against the CPS A.106 Some months later the SPG released 
a statement to its members acknowledging the ‘vigorous and forthright’ assessment 
Huddleston had made of the South African situation, as well as the sincerity of his appeal 
to British Christians.107 However, it concluded that, acting on Clayton’s advice, it had
102 WCL AB2261, Interview...
103 WCL AB191 Trapp to Clayton 25 Jan. 1955. Paton suggest that some members of the 
Community of the Resurrection doubted the wisdom of Huddleston’s decision. Paton, Apartheid, p. 242.
104 WCL AB707 Wood to Clayton, 31 July 1953..
105 WCL AB707 Clayton to Wood, 3 Aug. 1953. This comment from Clayton would seem to lend 
more evidence to the fact that Clayton had begun to accept the idea that racial discrimination was an 
inevitable part of South African life.
106 WCL AB707 Clayton to Roberts, 1 Aug. 1953. In this letter Clayton noted that one of the great 
failures of the CPS A was that none of its bishops were South African by birth, he argued that this meant that 
‘we tend therefore to be regarded as exotic, as foreign missionaries rather than an indigenous Church. 
Appeals to England made by us seem to substantiate this idea. ’ This quote indicates an insecurity much like 
that of the Catholic Church and helps to explain further Clayton’s reluctance to defy the government.
107 This alludes to Huddleston article ‘For God’s Sake Wake Up!’ which appeared in The 
Observer on the 30 Aug, 1953. In this article Huddleston called upon all Christians to realise that it was 
every Christian’s duty, no matter where they lived, to fight apartheid. This was followed by another article
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decided to cease protesting publically against apartheid, fearing that this made the CPSA’s 
task in South Africa ‘more difficult’.108 Rather, the SPG could best serve South Africa by 
sending out grants and people to assist the CPS A in its work.109 This statement illustrates 
Huddleston’s influence on British public opinion, and the feeling that the churches were not 
effectively opposing apartheid.
After the arrival of the August circulars, Roberts wrote to Clayton regarding the ‘anxiety 
and agitation’ in Britain ‘over the situation in South Africa’, and especially the 
implementation of the Bantu Education Act.110 Roberts stressed the need for the CPSA to 
respond to the Act in a practical way. In November Christian Action joined with the African 
Bureau to launch an appeal to raise money to fund a private school in South Africa.111 In the 
same month the Archbishop of Canterbury wrote to Clayton observing that the SPG also 
wanted to launch an appeal but were not prepared to do so until the CPSA and the Church 
of England agreed what it would be for.112 Fearful of losing funds to the Africa Bureau 
appeal113, and without Clayton’s approval the SPG launched its South Africa Emergency 
Fund appeal at the end of November. At the same time Reeves made it known that he 
proposed to open what he called ‘Church Family Centres’ in schools which had been
‘The Church Sleeps On’, 19 Oct. 1954,
108 Woodfield (Principal of Grace Dieu) remarked ‘Outside or ill-informed criticism has not helped 
us on the spot for the Government has been roused still further against us’, WCL AB370 Annual Report 
Grace Dieu. 1954.
109 WCL CPSA AB1289 USPG 1953-54 ‘Race Relations in Africa’ 12 Jan. 1954. This statement 
also rejected passive resistance as a means of opposing apartheid.
no WCL AB191Roberts to Clayton 20 Oct. 1954. Sulston wrote in early 1955 ‘it was the glaring 
results of the Bantu Education Act which had come home specially to the hearts of the people in this 
country.’ WCL AB191 Sulston to Trapp, 14 Jan. 1955, The actual loss of schools was a very tangible and 
obvious effect of apartheid which seemed to ignite public concern in Britain.
111 The Africa Bureau was created in 1952 by Michael Scott and sought to raise awareness in 
Britain of the conditions that prevailed in southern Africa. It sought to ‘ educate’ the British public and lobby 
parliament to seek educational and political reform in British colonies. It also acted to heighten awareness 
of the effects of apartheid. Christian Action was created by Canon Collins and sought to bring Christian 
insights and direct action into everyday life in South Africa. It campaigned throughout the period to raise 
awareness of the plight of those opposing apartheid.
112 WCL AB1095 Fisher to Clayton, 19 Nov. 1954.
113 To raise funds for any private schools which may be registered.
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closed,114 This was exactly what people in Britain were crying out for,115 and Roberts 
warned that it could lead to a diversion of funds towards the Africa Bureau/Christian Action 
Appeal116 because the SPG feared that their appeal would be linked to the actions of the 
CPSA more generally, ie. the leasing of schools to the state. Boys, the Bishop of Kimberly 
thought that
Between ourselves, I have the impression that the SPG staff are in quite an 
unreasonable agitation about the whole South Africa position. They feel Collins and 
company may appeal strongly to the popular mind, and may permanently damage 
the SPG’s publicity for their support of the Province [CPSA]117
Clayton remarked ‘the whole of this appeal business seems to me a nightmare.5118 To confuse 
matters further Reeves, who was leaving for England on six month’s leave at the beginning 
of December, announced that he was launching a £50,000 appeal for the Church Family 
Centres. Clayton once again lamented Reeves’ apparent inability to work with other 
Bishops, noting that he and ‘the other Bishops’ were ‘very angry about it.’119 Cullen, the 
Bishop of Grahamstown, raged that Reeves was ‘taking advantage of his presence in 
England to start a stampede.’120 The problem for Clayton and the SPG was that ‘their’ 
appeal was floundering because the CPSA had not made any definite proposals as to what 
they would do with any money. All that it had suggested was that money would be used to
114 These Centres aimed to provide religious instruction, music, drama, recitation, handwork and 
recreation to those children who were being forced out of schools.
115 Sulston remarked ‘the people in England have seen in the results of the Bantu Education Act 
a real crisis and they are expecting crisis action.5 WCL AB191 Sulston to Trapp, 14 Jan. 1955.
116 WCL AB191 Roberts to Clayton, 29 Nov. 1954. The African Bureau publically declared its 
support for Reeves in a statement which read ‘We applaud the decision of various Mission authorities in 
South Africa to close their schools rather than compromise with a system that is avowedly designed to limit 
Africans to an inferior status.5 RHL MSS Aff.S 1981 Statement by the African Bureau 11 Dec. 1954.
117 WCL AB191 Boys to Clayton, 26 Dec. 1954. Clayton wanted the South African Bishops to 
establish a unified scheme to present to the SPG. Collins became involved through his work with Christian 
Action and through his relationship with Huddleston.
118 WCL AB191 Clayton to Wood 4 Jan. 1955.
119 WCL AB1420 Clayton to Wood 4 Jan. 1954.
120 WCL AB191 Cullen to Clayton 29 Dec. 1954
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provide more catechists and Sunday Schools places. Sulston, lamented the poor results of 
the SPG appeal, because its ‘plans which were tentatively proposed were not of the kind to 
evoke active sympathy and support’ in contrast to Reeves’ ‘very striking scheme’.121 This 
was the result of Clayton’s caution lest a ‘hurried scheme’ would prove ‘unworkable’122 so 
that Reeves captured the imagination of the English public with his Church Family Centres. 
Clayton was well aware of the danger that this represented and remarked resentfully to 
Cullen
the Bishop [Reeves] has brought it about that he is regarded by large circles in 
England as the one person in South Africa who has had the courage to stand up for 
Christian principles, and the rest of us, especially myself, are regarded as weak- 
kneed traitors to the Christian cause123
Trapp was also concerned that ‘the Bishop is likely to gain credit as the only realist among 
us, the only one prepared to take the ‘crisis action’ which Sulston says the English 
churchmen are expecting.’124 These anxieties lasted well into 1956 and only appear to have 
eased when Reeves associated himself with the SPG appeal from which he also hoped to 
receive money.125
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine the success or failure of the appeals and of 
Reeves’ Church Family Centres. It can be seen, however, from the debates that surrounded 
the appeal, that public opinion in Britain was very much behind Reeves. This lends further 
support to the view that Clayton and his supporters had become desensitised to racist
121 WCL AB191 Sulston to Trapp 14 Jan. 1955. A memorandum from the SPG prepared in early 
January noted that ‘the SPG is anxious to be associated with Johannesburg’s appeal.’ WCL AB707 
‘Memorandum Prepared by the Chairman of African Sub-Committee’, 7 Jan. 1955.
122 WCL AB1420 Clayton to Wood, 4 Jan. 1955.
123 WCL AB191 Clayton to Cullen, 4 Jan. 1955. Cullen replied ‘The activities of Johannesburg are 
likely to drive a few nails into our coffin unnecessarily.’ WCL AB191 Cullen to Clayton, 6 Jan. 1955.
124 WCL AB191 Trapp to Clayton, 25 Jan. 1955.
125 Wood commented that there was still a ‘real danger [of] a split being made by the general public 
between “the Bishop of Johannesburg’s defiance” and the rest of the CPSA. ’ WCL AB945 Wood to Clayton, 
29 Dec. 1955. See also WCL AB707 Jeffery (replaced Wood as the Director of the South African Church 
Institute) to Agar-Hamilton (diocesan office, Pretoria) 29 Feb. 1956.
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policies, and were out of touch with the moral outrage that many people felt towards 
apartheid. His refusal to bow to this pressure also signified his continued belief in the ability 
of the Church to function in South Africa for the eventual good of all, without having to 
take a political stance. Clayton was undoubtedly exasperated that Reeves and Huddleston 
were viewed in Britain as the ‘legitimate’ voice of the CPSA as opposed to Clayton and his 
bishops who were seen as weak and ineffectual. Given Clayton’s views on theology this 
probably angered him greatly as he believed Huddleston and Reeves were endangering the 
Church by drawing it away from its mission by directly involving it in politics.
The difficulties that Huddleston and Reeves caused for the Anglican Church also surfaced 
within the Methodist Church. In early 1954, the Board of African Education of the 
Methodist Church had agreed to lease all its schools to the government on the grounds that 
they could not afford to retain any schools, and even if they could they would be hindered 
by staff shortages and insecurity of tenure.126 This decision was confirmed at a Conference 
a few months later which, in a statement, made known its ‘emphatic opposition to the policy 
underlying the Bantu Education Act.’127 In general agreement with Clayton’s position, the 
Methodist leadership argued that schools had to be leased ‘to provide for the immediate 
educational needs of the African people.,128 By early 1955, however, the General Committee 
of the Methodist Missionary Society in Britain was split over the decision with some 
members describing it as a ‘compromise’ using the word in a ‘derogatory sense.’129 
Beetham, the Societies secretary, remarked that the actions of Reeves and Huddleston was 
‘regarded as the shining example of the line Christian opposition to the Government should 
take.5130 Some months later he noted the ‘increased pressure’ that the Church was under to 
‘speak out publically in condemning the present South African Government’s policy’
126 SeeRundle, ‘Compliance or Confrontation...5, p. 10.
127 CL MS 15388 Methodist Conferences 1 Oct, 1954 Statement on Bantu Education.
128 ibid.
129 SOAS MMS Methodist Missionary Society South Africa 1947-55 Bantu Education, Beetham 
(Africa Secretary of the MMS) to Webb 6 Jan. 1955.
130 SOAS MMS Beetham to Webb, 25 Jan. 1955.
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because of Huddleston’s letters published in the Observer.131 Webb wrote back to him 
noting, in common with other denominations, that Huddleston’s public condemnation of 
Bantu Education and apartheid, had caused the church many ‘difficulties.’132 What this 
episode reveals is that the actions of Reeves and Huddleston caused division and anxiety 
within other denominations, illustrating the enormous impact that the two men had made 
on public opinion within Britain. Even outside of their church their action was seen by many 
as the only legitimate response to Bantu Education.
Conclusion
In November 1954, responding to pressure from England which clamoured for him to keep 
the schools in his diocese open as private institutions, Reeves observed ‘I believe it would 
be a waste of money as we should have to follow the syllabus laid down by the 
government. ’133 So strong was Reeves ’ and Huddleston’s opposition to the Bantu Education 
Act that they would not even countenance running private schools. Yet, less than four 
months later, just over a month after all the schools had closed down, both men agreed to 
run a private school ‘because the anguish of parents had been insupportable’.134 This school, 
previously the Community of the Resurrection school, St. Cyprians, was renamed Christ the 
King and was located in Sophiatown; by December 1955 it had over 550 students whose 
parents were paying ten shillings a month in fees.135 In March 1956 Reeves noted that five 
more applications had been made to the Minister for Bantu Affairs for private schools to 
open, remarking ‘if we can obtain sufficient financial support we should be rendering a
131 SOAS MMS Beetham Webb to 16 Sept. 1955.
132 SOAS MMS Webb to Beetham 26 Sept. 1955.
133 Quoted in Peart-Binns, Ambrose, p. 122.
134 Paton, Apartheid, p. 257.
135RHLMSS Afr.S. 1681 G. Sidebotham (priest-in-charge) to Benson, ?Dec. 1955, Sidebotham 
was hoping to increase the staff to fifteen and the enrolment to 600 pupils. In 1955 Reeves noted that he 
had only closed schools in his Diocese because there were other schools that could absorb dismissed pupils, 
he said that to close schools in rural areas with few schools would have been a ‘terrible decision. ’ ‘Special 
Interview with Bishop of Johannesburg’, Church Times. 14 Jan. 1955, p. 1.
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valuable service to the African people by establishing a number of private schools.5136 This 
change of heart signifies the ‘grievous choice of evils’ that faced the CPSA with the 
introduction of Bantu Education.
The leaders of the Anglican Church were tom between two options, neither of which was 
acceptable. Clayton was a conservative man, whose principle concern was ensuring that the 
Church could function unhindered in South Africa.137 He believed that in time the Church 
would reveal ‘the truth’ to all South Africans, leading to a more democratic and Christian 
society. He was not prepared to defy the state openly over Bantu Education as he did not 
share the concerns of a minority of Anglican leaders over its implementation. However, in 
1957, he did openly defy the government over the Native Laws Amendment Act which 
made it almost obligatory for church buildings to be segregated and, in some instances, an 
offence to admit Africans into ‘white’ churches. Clayton, after consultation with his 
Bishops, wrote to Verwoerd noting that no Christian could be bound by such a law, 
recording that he had instructed his clergy to ignore it. Clayton was only prepared to act in 
defiance of the state when he felt that the right of the church to be ‘the church’ was violated.
For Reeves and Huddleston the situation was precipitous, as they both felt that Bantu 
Education was the most pernicious piece of legislation instituted by the Nationalists and 
both understood itsAto apartheid. More importantly, both had a better understanding of 
African political opinion and the suffering that Africans endured under apartheid.138 Driven 
by a more activist interpretation of the church’s role in society, they concluded that ‘the only
136 RHL MSS Afr.S, 1681 Reeves statement to parents of Christ the King, Feb. 9 1956, and letter 
Reeves to Benson, 13 March 1956. In the Diocese of Pretoria, Grace Dieu was maintained as a private 
school until its closure at the end of 1957 due to ‘blank cheque conditions5 that had been placed on its 
registration by the Bantu Education Division. WCL AB370 Grace Dieu Minutes Governing Council 11 Nov. 
1957. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine the subsequent failure of these schools which Verwoerd 
personally ensured would not be registered.
137 Paton stated ‘Clayton did not wish to anger the Government; it was not that he was personally 
afraid, but he was anxious not to expose the Church of the Province and its manifold works to any danger5. 
Paton, Apartheid, pp. 248-9.
138 In 1953 Huddleston remarked ‘I know well the kind of attitude taken by young Africans.5 AB707 
Huddleston to Wood, 12 Feb. 1953.
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possible choice for Christians is identification with the African people’.139
The divisions that characterised the Anglican response were not to be mirrored by the 
American Board Mission. This was because, as we shall see in the next chapter, the ABM 
leadership did not have to pander to a white congregation, was more democratically 
organised and was able to draw on financial resources which enabled it to try and maintain 
a stake in African education.
139 Huddleston, ‘For God's Sake Wake Up’, The Observer. 30 Aug. 1953 (original emphasis).
176
a.
‘There is no Place in Bantu Education for any Institution which does not bow its knee to 
the Apartheid Idol*1: The American Board Mission and the Bantu Education Act
On the eve of the passage of the Bantu Education Act the American Board Mission 
controlled two major educational institutions and just over one hundred primary schools, 
all of which were located in Natal. The American Board adopted a somewhat contradictory 
approach to the legislation confronting it. While it wholeheartedly rejected the 
Government’s attempts to remove missionaries from the educational sphere, it was prepared 
to work within the Bantu Education system at the high school level, as long as its schools 
remained under private control.
Although it ran primary schools, the main focus of the American Board’s educational effort 
in South Africa was focussed on its two secondary education institutions, Adams College 
and Inanda Seminary. Adams, founded in 1853 as the Amanzimtoti Institute, consisted of 
a high school, teacher training college and industrial school, and by 1950 was attended by 
some 500 boys and girls.2 Inanda Seminary was a smaller venture, comprising a primary 
school and high school, with 241 female students enrolled in 1950.3 Educationally, both 
Adams, and to a greater extent, Inanda were influenced by the educational ideas and 
principles of American educationalists,4 and while these educational ideas were perhaps less 
fashionable in the 1940s5, their impact on the relationship between schools and local 
communities greatly affected the outcome of the struggle between the ABM and the 
government.
Until 1940 Adams College had been under the direct control of the American Board
1 Jack Grant, ‘Principal’s Letter’, Iso Lomuzi. Vol. 20. No. 34 ‘Final Number’, Nov. 1956. Iso 
Lomuzi was the Adams College Magazine.
2 Marks, Not Either, p. 19.
3 Wood, Shine Where, p. 133. Inanda began as a refuge for young women who had fled from 
arranged marriages. A role that continued well into the twentieth century.
4 See chapter four.
5 Excluding, of course, for the framers of the Bantu Education Act.
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Mission, with its headquarters in Boston, but in that year management of the school was 
handed to a local Board of Governors with the creation of Adams College Incorporated 
(commonly referred to as the Adams Association). G. Grant, or ‘Jack7 Grant as he was 
known, the principal of Adams College from 1949 to 1956, explained that ‘the time had 
come for handing over more and more responsibility for the management of the college to 
the men and women whose home was South Africa.76 The association was legally bound to 
maintain the college’s ‘distinctly religious foundation and character;’7 according to its 
constitution it had to remain a ‘Christian Educational institution for the Bantu People in 
perpetuity7.'8 To attract students from all churches it was also to remain non-denominational. 
Adams was committed to providing an education that would enable men and women to 
enter society as ‘responsible citizens’, securely grounded in Christian morality. Its pupils 
were encouraged to enter life as ‘model Africans’ who would serve their community and, 
through their Christian upbringing, facilitate greater understanding and tolerance between 
races. Institutions such as Adams, looked to produce Africans who could become leaders 
in their communities, as doctors, teachers and lawyers, citizens who, it was hoped, would 
lead the mass of the African people towards the ‘accepted’ standards of ‘European 
civilization’.9
Jack Grant, and his wife, Ida, were to play a significant role in the last years of Adams 
College. Both had been born into wealthy families, Jack in the West Indies and Ida in 
England. Both were educated at Cambridge and were committed Christians who chose 
teaching as a means by which to spread the Gospel. Before their arrival at Adams both had 
led unconventional lives. Jack Grant had been a headmaster in Rhodesia, as well as playing 
for the West Indies cricket team. He claims that his experiences in Grenada, where he lived 
much of his early life as part of a small white minority, meant that his attitudes to race were
6 J. Grant, Adams College 1853-1951. pamphlet published by the Natal Witness, no date, p. 5.
7 ibid. p. 5.
8 Quoted in ibid. p. 5.
9 The ABM policy was to ‘make them competent people, to take their full share in our multi-racial 
society.5 WCL AC623 CCS A ‘American Board Mission: Policy and Aims for Education of Africans5, Jan. 
1954, unsigned, p. 1.
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uncommon: life in Grenada meant that he ‘saw people as people rather than as people of 
different colours’.10 Ida Grant also taught in Rhodesia after studying at Cambridge and the 
University of Cape Town. In Cape Town, Loram ‘played a seminal role in opening Ida’s 
eyes to racial issues’ and, according to Jack, she shared his ‘advanced’ views on race 
relations.11 The unconventional nature of Ida’s life continued after Jack was appointed an 
officer of the British Colonial Education Service in Zanzibar in 1944. Here she became the 
first women appointed to the Zanzibar Town Management Board, in addition to acting as 
local reporter for two regional newspapers.12 Thus, the Grants had led varied and 
challenging lives before they arrived at Adams, and presumably held views that differed from 
the majority of white South Africans; a factor which influenced the way in which they 
approached Bantu Education.
Adams College was, in Grant’s words, ‘a pioneer in a number of far-reaching ways’.13 In 
1909 it became the first African college in South Africa to become co-educational, and in 
a bold step in 1925, it appointed Z. K. Matthews as head of its high school.14 In this position 
Matthews had direct control over a number of white staff at the college. Its progressive 
image was also founded on a comparatively relaxed attitude towards discipline, which was 
far more ‘co-operative’ than ‘authoritarian.’15 The ethos of the school was that students 
would learn from experience, and such experience could only be gained by allowing them 
a fair degree of freedom. An Adams student remarked in 1951 that there was a total lack 
of what she called ‘real discipline’,16 while Freda Matthews, the wife of Z. K., noted that
10 Grant, Jack Grant’s Story, p. 66.
11 Grant, Jack Grant’s Story p. 56. Interestingly Ida Grant refused to allow the word ‘obey’ to be 
in her marriage vows.
12 ibid. p. 79. She was also a sports reporter.
13 Grant, Adams College, p. 7. Marks has commented on the ‘more democratic and open Adams 
tradition.’ Marks, Not Either, p. 26.
14 Z.K. Matthews was followed by two more African high schools heads, Mr. D. G. S. Mtimkulu 
(1937-47) and Mr. B. C. Mtshali.
15 Grant, Adams College, p. 7.
16 Lily Moya, quoted in Marks, Not Either, p. 158.
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Adams ‘seemed friendlier and more open.717 Es’kiaMphahlele, who had previously attended 
St. Peter’s Anglican school, commented when he arrived at Adams
the first thing that hit me was, my word, I seemed to have come to a jungle in 
comparison with St. Peter’s. There was order in the dorms at St. Peter’s. There 
were standards of cleanliness, standards of hygiene. Not at Adams ... there you 
really had to survive.18
As evident in chapter two Adams College reflected South African society in that it had 
racially segregated hostels and staff common rooms.19 Nevertheless, it is equally true to say 
that in the 1940s and 1950s the college authorities were aware of the role that the college 
could play in fostering racial harmony and mutual understanding, and they attempted to 
broaden the horizons of pupils through open days with white schools. Throughout this 
period students from private white schools, such as Michaelhouse and Maritzburg College, 
visited Adams and engaged in sporting and social activities with its pupils. In addition, 
mixed staff teams competed against local church teams, and Indian teams from Durban.20 
Endeavours were also made to include African staff and community members in the day-to- 
day running of the college through the Council of Governors. This body effectively ran the 
school, and was elected by the members of the Adams Association. The latter was open to 
all ex-pupils of the school over 21 years and who could pay an annual fee of 2 s 6d; members 
and ex-members of staff who had taught at Adams for at least two years; those who had 
paid not less than £10 to the Association; members of the American Board resident in South 
Africa; and ex-members of the Council of Governors.
These rules enabled, at least in principle, African representation on the Council of 
Governors. The Council argued that this system was ‘extremely flexible’, making it ‘possible
17 Quoted inD. Burchell, ‘Adams College, Natal, c. 1920-1956: A Critical Assessment’, Journal 
of the University of Durban-Westville, p. 153,
18 Quoted in Marks, Not Either, p. 27,
19 See chapter two,
20 See Grant, Adams College, p. 8 and Burchell, ‘Adams College’, pp 154-5.
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for the Bantu to take an increasing part in the control of the College.’21 The college 
authorities attempted to create an environment for positive racial mixing, both among 
students and staff. This is not to say that they achieved this; on the contrary, segregated staff 
rooms and student riots were evidence that they failed. However, the image of Adams as 
an oasis of racial harmony, was significant for those controlling the school when faced with 
Bantu Education, for it helped to shape their actions.
Thus, the response of Adams College and Inanda Seminary to Bantu Education differed 
from that of other churches and missions. At Adams and Inanda, there were no local church 
authorities to negotiate with the government on the school’s behalf; the principles of the two 
schools, Lavinia Scott and Grant, together with the Adams Governing Council and the 
ABM Executive Committee, had to do so. Thus, the personalities of those directly involved 
with the colleges often influenced critical decisions about the institutions.
Although Adams and Inanda were the only ABM secondary schools in South Africa, and 
were close geographically they seem to have made little effort to unite in opposition to 
Bantu Education. While members of the Adams Governing Council were also members of 
the Executive Committee of the ABM, and visa-versa, there was no attempt to combine the 
appeals of the colleges. In part this was because the Adams Association was a distinct entity 
with no real connection to Inanda. In addition, the prevailing attitude seemed to dismiss the 
idea of cooperative action. There is no evidence of its being considered, let alone 
implemented. Their reaction to the Bantu Education Act is thus best looked at individually.
Firstly, however, it is necessary to briefly survey the plight of the ABM primary schools. In 
1952 the ABM had 104 primary schools under its control, supplying Adams and Inanda with 
some 20-40 per cent of their students,22 but was unable to run these schools without 
subsidy.23 By 1954, the idea of running any primary schools was rejected by the Executive
21 Grant. Adams College, p. 3.
22 Wood, Shine Where, p. 126.
23 KCL Inanda Seminary Records File 6, Scott to Reuling, 21 May 1952.
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Committee of the ABM, on the grounds that it would cost some £2000 a year to do so.24 
It then resolved to hand over the schools to the government, seeking suitable 
compensation.25 Wood has argued that the subsequent transfer of ABM schools to the 
government was ‘comparatively easy’,26 perhaps because the ABM had already begun to 
hand over control and responsibility for primary schools to the communities they served. By 
the time the Bantu Education Act was passed most were already under local African Boards 
of Control which had been approved by the Native Affairs Department (NAD) and received 
full government subsidy, but remained private. This was no doubt a cost-cutting exercise 
by the mission, but also suggests a willingness to hand over administrative control of schools 
to Africans.
Adams College
From the passage of the Bantu Education Act, Grant made his strong opposition to it public. 
Ida Grant remarked in 1953, ‘[W]e have fought it hard. We have spoken against it and 
written against it....We seek to arouse public opinion by speaking or writing, through the 
churches and other organisations.’27 In September 1954 Grant remarked to the General 
Assembly of the Presbyterian Church of South Africa
The Act is not an agreement between two parties who have co-operated amicably 
over the years. Rather, it is an Act of Aggression on the part of the State, which 
proposes to diminish, if not dispense with, the services of the Church...it is 
determined not so much by educational ideals as by political ideals... we cannot give 
the Act our blessing - we dare not approve in principle the transfer of our Mission
24 KCL Inanda File 23 ABM Executive Committee Minutes, 28 June-5 July 1954.
25 ibid It was also noted that primary school children would ‘continue to receive the Christian 
guidance of their homes and churches, in the communities where they live’.
26 Wood, Shine Where, p. 127.
27 Ida Grant to Friends of Adams College, 2 Nov. 1953. This letter, and all subsequent 
correspondence who from Ida Grant, shown to me by Shula Marks who was given them by Ida Grant. 
Brookes remarked that Ida Grant ’ s efforts were5 heroic1 throughout the fight to keep Adams open. Brookes, 
A South African Pilgrimage, p. 68.
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Schools to the Government28
The Grants’ very public opposition to the Act stemmed from their political profile during 
this period. As early as 1951 Ida Grant was to write to a friend, ‘Jack and I find ourselves 
drawn more and more into outside interests, such as attending various meetings and 
gatherings in Durban.,29 A year later she wrote
amongst other things we have been drawn into politics. Being very concerned about 
the condition of things in this country, we attended a political meeting early this 
year. The upshot was that we were drawn in to serve on the local committee of the 
United Party.30
In 1952 they both attended the SAIRR conference on Bantu Education held in 
Johannesburg, and Ida Grant represented their branch of the United Party at district and 
Provincial Congress level. In 1953, she became a regional committee member of the SAIRR 
and changed political allegiance, leaving the United Party to become a foundation member 
of the Liberal Party which was committed to a conditional universal franchise. Also in 1953 
the SAIRR asked Adams College Governing Council if they would be prepared to host a 
multi-racial conference to discuss race relations. They accepted and throughout August 
African delegates debated with leading white liberals on how best to address racial 
problems. Ida Grant recalled that during the conference detectives ‘were very interested in 
our doings, and haunted the premises all the time they [the delegates] were with us.’31
The Grant’s involvement in politics clearly reflected upon Adams College, as Ida’s role 
within the SAIRR led to its hosting of the conference. This meant that Adams College was
28 Grant quoted in Grant, The Liquidation of Adams College, no date, for private circulation. He 
continued ‘the Government is holding a veritable pistol at our heads ... the Bantu Education Act is not an 
isolated phenomenon. It is but one of a series of enactments emanating from a Government which believes 
in, and practises, apartheid ... if we can endorse such a policy why be members of the Christian Church?5 
‘Presbyterians Lay it on the Line for South African Government’, British Weekly. 7 Oct. 1954 p. 1.
291. Grant to M. Palmer, 1 Nov. 1951.
301. Grant to Friends of Adams College, Oct. 1952.
311. Grant to Friends of Adams College, 2 Nov. 1952.
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not simply identified as an educational institution32, but also provided sanctuary for those 
South Africans committed to changing race relations in the country. The attention of the 
police indicates the seriousness with which the government viewed the conference. Police 
interest intensified in January 1954 when the CID descended on Adams College with a 
search warrant. During a visit which lasted a number of hours they searched Grant’s office 
and home. Ida Grant remarked, ‘We knew we were under a cloud, and that the Government 
viewed us with suspicion... it was under that sort of intimidation that we began the College 
year.’33 Thus, Adams faced Bantu Education as an institution with a distinct reputation. It 
had seen major student upheavals in the 1940s, hosted political meetings, and was run by 
a politically active headmaster, who was married to a woman who held political office in the 
Liberal Party.34
Grant’s public hostility to Bantu Education contrasts sharply with the attitude of the major 
religious denominations which all sought to avoid public confrontation with the government. 
In contrast, the ABM gave Grant the license to act in what he saw was the best interests of 
the college. In January 1954, a private policy statement to ABM members stated that
Where and when the State seeks or insists that our enterprises serve a lesser purpose 
we must be ready to protest; for, as servants of God, we cannot be mere servants 
of the State. If controversial issues arise we should as persuasively and as firmly 
as possible make our position clear to the Powers-that-be35
This statement was conceived with Bantu Education in mind, and empowered Grant and 
Scott to resist it according to their Christian conscience, and there is no record that Grant 
was criticised by the American Board for his open opposition to the Bantu Education. The
32 Adams College was also closely identified during this period with the then leader of the ANC, 
Albert Luthuli, who, although banned, visited the College during its centenary celebrations in 1951. Luthuli 
had been a student and a teacher at Adams and in the early 1940s had sat on the Governing Council.
331. Grant to Friends of Adams College, Nov. 1954.
34 Ida Grant was invited to stand by the Liberal Party in 1954 as a provincial candidate, but was 
persuaded to withdraw by the Adams College Council which felt that her candidacy might threaten the 
chances of the College being granted private school status. After the closure of the College she was elected 
to the National Executive of the SAIRR in 1956.
35 WCL AC623 ‘American Board....’, p. 1.
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nature of his opposition to the Act had a great impact on the future of Adams College.
The first organised response to the Act took place in June 1954, with a special meeting of 
the Adams College Governing Council. Here it was agreed that the views of the American 
Board should be sought, and a committee established ‘to sound African opinion and 
ascertain African reactions to the Government’s proposals’ 36 In October the Adams College 
Association met to discuss the Act.37 This body was more representative of the wider 
Adams community than the college’s Governing Council, and the meeting was attended by 
‘a large number of African members. ’38 At this meeting the Governing Council indicated to 
the Association that they had provisionally decided to close down the training college, and 
keep the high school open as a private school.39 It appears that members of the Association 
were not prepared for this announcement and agreed to reconvene at a later date. In the 
mean time Grant decided that Association members could, if they wished, draw up 
memoranda to be heard at the Governing Council.
In late October Grant wrote to members of the Governing Council acknowledging ‘with 
regret that my staff, as a whole, do not see eye to eye with me.’40 He warned that the 
training school staff in particular were opposed to the closure of their school. He continued 
‘in these stirring times we have to think deeply and act decisively’ reminding the members 
of the Council that they had a ‘Christian purpose’ which they could not abandon. While
36 KCL Adams College MS57 Minutes of Meetings of the Board of Governors and Adams College 
Inc. Board of Governors, 1940-58, 15 June 1954. There is no further record of any such committee being 
established.
37 This meeting was not of great importance because Adams had now received the August circulars 
from the department. Ida Grant remarked that these circulars ‘plunged all of us into a whirl of doubt and 
uncertainty about the future’. I. Grant to Friends of Adams College, Nov. 1954.
38 KCL MS57 Minutes of Adams College Inc. 12 Oct. 1954.
391 was unable to find the Governing Council minutes which included this decision. There can be 
little doubt that the Governing Council would have rejected the idea of keeping the high school open whilst 
handing the training school over to the government, for this would have meant dual control of a single 
campus,
40 In 1954 there were 36 staff members at the school of whom fourteen were African, by 1956 there 
were seven African members out of a staff of seventeen. Iso Lomuzi Vol. 19, No. 32 Nov. 1954 & Vol. 20. 
No. 34. Nov. 1956.
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there was much they could be proud of, he warned, ‘we still conform too much to the 
standards of our day and generation’: they had accepted differential wages, practised social 
exclusiveness and failed to learn African languages. He maintained that they could not ‘go 
on in our familiar ways. ’ It was pointless simply continuing to prevent the government from 
taking over; rather ‘we have to make better use of what we have’. Adams had to continue 
‘if we are to be loyal to the faith that we hold’. Given the decision to remain open, he 
contended that the training school would have to close as a lion and a lamb could not lie in 
the same pasture. Nor could they accept a reduced subsidy from the Government as this 
would tie them to the state.41 Grant apparently recognised, albeit belatedly, the hypocrisy 
of life at Adams. When confronted with its potential closure he saw the weaknesses within 
it, and within those who were running it,42 The letter also revealed his belief that Adams had 
to remain open.
On 28 October the threatened training school teachers presented a memorandum to the
Governing Council meeting which began:
We feel that the Governing Council, through having in its number no single member 
of the Teaching Staff at Adams College, has been seriously out of touch with staff 
opinion. The Staff have lived with the problem, and reached something near to 
unanimity after long debate and heart- searching. Staff opinion is that our buildings 
should be leased to the Government.43
They proceeded to explain why the training and high schools should be leased. As teachers 
at Adams were devoted to the African people and did not have any ‘preconceived ideas 
about their status in society’ they would not subscribe to the political implications of Bantu 
Education. Whilst they agreed ‘fervently that a liberal education is to be sought for and 
fought for’ they saw no alternative to government high school and training school education, 
because the government would not allow private training colleges and the ABM could not 
afford to run Adams as a private institution. ‘Government education is vastly better than
41 KCL MS57 Grant to Adams Governing Council, 22 Oct. 1954.
42 He remarked in 1954 that Bantu Education created ‘a time of crisis and challenge - a time of 
deep spiritual crisis to the individual Christian. ’ ‘Presbyterians Lay’, p. 1.
43 KCL MS57 ‘Memorandum on the Adams Training College’, unsigned, 25 Oct. 1954.
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nothing’,44 they concluded.
Attacking the position adopted by Grant and the Governing Council, they argued that the 
decision to close the training school and run the high school privately was ‘contemplated 
for the chief purpose of waging an ideological war against the Department.’45 The 
memorandum claimed that the teachers in both schools
feel that the mission as a body is now powerless to play a useful part in what has 
become a matter between the Government and the African community. They believe 
that Mission intervention will be to the detriment of the children themselves who are 
our chief concern. They further believe that such a school would not meet with the 
approval of the local community, and could therefore be closed down on that pretext 
alone.46
The teachers maintained that it was illogical to reject government control by arguing that 
they could not count on the goodwill of the government, and then to hope for it to continue 
when Adams became a private institution. They called on the ABM to hand over the school, 
by sale or lease, to the government, in line with other churches in South Africa, and thus to 
meet ‘the wishes of the Staff and African community’.47
This statement gives us a significant insight into the wishes and concerns of staff at Adams. 
Undoubtedly some members of the African community within and outside of the school felt 
that the time for mission-based African education had passed. There is a sense in which the 
teachers were arguing that Africans could fight for their education without the ‘assistance’ 
of missionary paternalism claiming the right to control their own destiny. However, teachers 
and community members also voiced more practical concerns. If the teacher training college 
were to close, its staff would lose their jobs while those remaining feared the financial
4,1 KCL MS57 ‘Memorandum on the Adams Training College5, p. 2.
45 ibid. p. 3.
46 ibid, p, 3.
47 KCL MS57 ‘Memorandum on the Adams Training College5, p. 4. The memorandum argued 
rather sarcastically that issues of divided control on the campus could be overcome, especially by Christian 
missionaries.
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implications of keeping the high school open unaided They realised that this could mean 
wage cuts and a fall in living standards. In addition some community members and teachers 
were unwilling to defy the government lest the school be closed down entirely: ‘we believe 
that the issues at stake are too precious to justify a desperate gamble and incalculable risk 
to the interests of the African children themselves.’48
The Governing Council did not debate this memorandum at all, instead discussion focussed 
on a $10,000 grant offered by the ABM to keep Adams open. It resolved to close the 
training college,49 accept the money from the ABM and go ahead with registration. 
Members argued that they had no choice but to continue to run the school, on the grounds 
that its constitution forbade it from doing otherwise. It did, however, agree, to accept 
government subsidies despite Grants’s earlier concerns. Notwithstanding a clear assertion 
in the preamble of the resolutions that the Governing Council ‘consists of both Europeans 
and Africans,’ at this particular meeting there were twenty members, of whom only two 
were African.50
These resolutions were presented to the Adams Association in late November. Immediately 
an amendment was raised by Mr. Malcolm, a white teacher, who suggested that the College, 
excluding the hostels, should be handed over to the Government, because of his concern 
about what would happen to the African people if the school were forced to close.51 After 
a protracted debate this motion was lost ‘by a large majority’; while the Council’s 
resolutions were passed by a majority of 48 to ten.52 This result contradicted the claims of
48 KCL MS57 ‘Memorandum on the Adams Training College’, p. 4. School closure not only meant 
the loss of teaching jobs and school facilities; other employment opportunities would have ceased for African 
labourers, such as cleaners, gardeners and mechanics. Some teachers also saw opportunity in Bantu 
Education - see chapter ten.
49 It offered to continue training teachers until such time as the government had established 
alternative training facilities in the area.
50 They were Rev. H. M. Nawa and the head of the high school, Mr. B. C. Mtshali.
51 KCL Adams College MS62A/13 Documents Concerning the Closure of Adams College, ‘Minutes 
of the Adjourned Special Meeting of Adams College (Incorporated), 27 Nov. 1954.
52 ibid. Ida Grant recorded ‘four long and hard hours’ of debate. I. Grant to Friends of Adams 
College, Nov. 1954.
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the memorandum from the training school teachers and suggests that support for the transfer 
of the school amongst teachers and members of the Association was limited. Although 
Association membership cannot be considered representative of the wider Adams 
community, the training school teachers apparently underestimated support for the Council’s 
decisions.
Two days later the Council wrote to the training school teachers calling on them to support 
the college and principal ‘loyally’, and to ‘refrain from writing any more memoranda’ as the 
contents of their letter were apparently ‘already known to some close to the Government’ 53 
The Council’s concern that the memoranda had been leaked to government was matched 
by Grant’s growing unease at the divisions among the staff. In his annual ‘Principal’s Letter’ 
to the college magazine, Iso Lomuzi. Grant observed ‘dark clouds hanging over our heads’, 
continuing
it is most distressing to see the sharp cleavage that has arisen between those who 
think that this dark cloud will bring showers of blessing and those who think that 
it will bring showers of blasting. Indeed, to me the cleavage between colleagues who 
formerly thought alike and worked in harmony is one of the most distressing 
features of this dark cloud.54
The early months of 1955 were taken up with proposals to launch an appeal for funds to 
help the school remain open, and in dealing with government’s plans for registration. At the 
end of 1954 the Adams Council informed the government of its intention to remain open as 
a private institution and, in February 1955, Grant received a letter from Eiselen which 
crassly warned the college of the consequences of this decision. Eiselen argued that Adams 
should become a government school, as this was ‘a course which will have to be followed 
sooner or later.’55 This threat did little to extinguish Council’s determination to push ahead 
with an appeal for funds, ‘not to oppose the B.E.A., but ... to stand for what we have
53 KCL Adams College MS62A/12 Governing Council to Adams Training College Staff, 29 Nov.
1954.
54 Grant, ‘Principal’s Letter’, in Iso Lomuzi, Nov. 1954, Vol. 19, No. 32, p. 5.
55 KCL MS62A/10 Minutes of Staff Meetings, Eiselen to Grant, 3 Feb. 1954.
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ourselves always stood for: A Christian and Liberal Education5.56 Grant and the Council of 
Governors worked continually to disassociate the appeal from any broader political 
opposition to the Act. Grant was particularly anxious that the Adams appeal should not be 
associated with the African Bureau appeal which opposed the Bantu Education Act. As they 
wrote to a member of the British Council of Churches, ‘our approach, as you know, is 
different. We are attempting to work through the Act.557 The appeal aimed to address the 
predicted shortfall of £10,000 a year58 and was organised by an ‘appeal professional5 who 
focussed on individual donations and longer-term commitments from commerce and 
industry.59
Meanwhile members of the Council were preoccupied with their lack of support from the 
African community. At a General Purposes Committee meeting in March a member noted 
that more African members should be appointed to the Council, a ‘concern shared by all 
those present5.60 The following month Grant wrote
What support do we have? For instance, are the African people behind us? Are the
Churches with us? Sad to say, the African community is not solidly behind us.
Some do not favour the stand we have taken, while a large number remain silent for
fear of the consequences. It is only a minority that have dared to be vocal in our
support.61
Grant5 s concern that he did not have support from the African community may have 
prompted him to question whether registration would be approved at all. He was also
56 KCL NS62A/10 General Purposes Committee, 7 Feb. 1955.
51 SOAS Library, Conference of British Missionary Societies (hereafter CBMS). A (Africa) Box 
A/T.9/3 Southern Africa, Box 296, Adams College, Natal 1954-56. Grant to Greaves, 8 Feb. 1955. D. 
McDonald, the Chair of the Governing Council remarked to Greaves ‘My board has no desire to participate 
in what is, in effect, a political crusade. We are far to concerned with the immediate problem of how to 
continue to exist’, ibid. McDonald to Greaves, 21 Feb. 1955.
58 KCL 71 Meetings of the Advisory Board, General Purposes Committee and the Finance 
Committee. D. Rubenstein ‘The Future of Adams College5. Rubenstein, vice-principal of the college, argued 
that fees could not be raised too much for fear of ‘driving students away.5
59 SOAS CBMS, E. Henochsburg (Chair of the Governing Council) to Greaves, 1 April 1955.
60 KCL MS62A/10 General Purposes Committee 28 March 1955.
61 SOAS CBMS, Grant to Greaves, Good Friday 1955.
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disappointed with the CCSA which, he argued, had given them nothing but ‘good wishes 
in rather tame language’.62
These fears were confirmed in May 1955 when he received Eiselen’s response to the 
Council’s decisions. Eiselen opened by asking whether the Council was aware ‘that its 
proposals ... [did] not reflect the desires of the Bantu residents of the Umlazi district?’ 
According to Eiselen, at a meeting between chiefs and headmen of the Umlazi Magistracy 
a ‘unanimous’ resolution was passed ‘condemning the action of Adams Council in closing 
down the Adams Training College’, because much of the money that had gone into the 
college was donated by Africans and could not be used as the Council saw fit: ‘The Native 
people should have been fully consulted ... the attitude adopted by this meeting of Bantu 
leaders appears to be entirely reasonable and cannot be ignored.’ Given the wishes of the 
Chiefs, the Minister of Native Affairs had decided that if Adams applied for registration it 
would not be granted even a reduced subsidy, because of the ‘desire of the Department to 
use this institution for teacher-training’.63
This refusal was contraiy to the legislation, and demonstrated that Verwoerd was prepared 
to use the arbitrary powers granted him under the Bantu Education Act. Once again, the 
African community was more divided than most of the literature suggests, and the support 
of the chiefs for the government gave Verwoerd his opening. This prefigured the situation 
after the successful implementation of School Boards, in which African chiefs, who were 
often uneducated and illiterate, had a major influence on education policy.
This meeting of chiefs had taken place without any representation from the college and the 
Council responded by investigating the possibility of appointing a public relations officer as
62 SOAS CBMS, Grant to Greaves, 15 March 1955.
63 KCL MS62A/13 Eiselen to Grant, 26 May 1955. There is no indication as to who organised the 
meeting of the chiefs. It is possible that the Bantu Education Department (or the NAD) may have organised 
the meeting in response to the leaked memorandum from the training college teachers, which included their 
contention that the Council did not have the support of the local community.
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a ‘goodwill gesture to the African community5.64 This once again highlighted the Council's 
concern that it did not have the full support of Africans who lived and worked around 
Adams. To Eiselen it protested that its decision had been made not to ‘challenge 
Government policy but because they believed they could better contribute to the ‘benefit of 
the Bantu people’ by remaining open as a private institution. Morever, the Department had 
overlooked the College's ‘peculiar position', in that it was bound by its constitution to 
continue in its present form. Responding to Eiselen's accusation that it had not engaged 
African opinion, Council emphasized the composition of the Adams Association, noting that 
decisions had been taken at ‘general meetings' and that they consulted ‘all Bantu people 
interested in the College.,65
Grant’s continued concern with African opinion was eased somewhat in the middle of 1955 
when staff attitudes changed perceptibly. According to Grant,
What is most cheering is that the members of staff are now much more with us than 
they were last year when we made our decision. There are many reasons for this 
happy change, not least of which is that one of our chief opponents is now in 
Government employ.66
Ida Grant also recorded that three senior African staff members resigned their positions and 
moved to government schools. She remarked
a feeling of uneasiness and discontent followed their going. Several students left, 
discipline was difficult for those who stepped in.. .we feel that the opposition was 
not uninspired by those who were disaffected, and it was not at all easy to 
overcome.67
However, she also described how a senior African teacher, Mr. Moerane, joined the staff
64 KCL Adams College MS62A/12 Minutes of Governing Council 11 June 1955. Nothing appears 
to have come from this suggestion.
65 SOAS CBMS, Adams College Council to Eiselen, 21 June 1955.
66 SOAS CBMS, Grant to Greaves, 27 June 1955. It has proven impossible to ascertain who this 
member of staff was, but it would appear that a teacher, who opposed the Council, left Adams thus easing 
internal opposition to the Council.
67 Ida Grant to Friends of Adams College, 7 Nov. 1955.
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from a government school ‘in order to throw in his lot with us because he believed in our 
stand. ’ After his appointment their ‘ shaky morale’ improved and a ‘better spirit’ prevailed 68 
It is clear that the divided loyalty of the staff had quite an effect upon Adams. These 
divisions were, it appears, replicated amongst the students suggesting that staff members 
discussed the future of the college with them, perhaps leading to the disciplinary problems 
Ida Grant mentioned.
In June, Adams began what was to become a labourious process of applying for private 
registration. An application made in early June was Tost’ by the NAD, as was a second 
application handed to the Regional Director of Bantu Education to be forwarded to the 
department. A third application was sent and the school was told that it would have an 
answer from the authorities by the end of September 1955.69 At the end of September Grant 
noted
The delay in the Government attending to and answering our request is 
embarrassing us...first of all, what are we to do next year? Are we to tell our 
present students who do not complete their courses this year that we can or cannot
have them back next year?... .what are we to do with our staff? There is no need
to labour the point that the longer the Government delays its answer the more it will 
embarrass us. No school can flourish on such insecurity. At times, I confess, I have 
been restless to the point of losing patience.70
It is impossible to know whether or not the NAD deliberately delayed the Adams 
application. What can be said with certainty, is that it made running Adams very difficult. 
Given the problems with staffing and student discipline that the school had already 
experienced this delay could only have made a difficult situation worse.
Adams was eventually informed on 3 October that, due to the delay caused by the loss of 
registration forms, and in order not to penalise the college, registration was approved until
68 Ida Grant to Friends of Adams College, 7 Nov. 1955. Ida Grant concluded that they could now 
rely on the ‘staunch loyalty’ of the staff.
69 Durban Chancery Records (henceforth DCR), Durban Cathedral, Hurley Papers Bantu Education 
Act (BEA) 1953-56. Grant to Hurley, 30 Sept. 1955.
70 ibid.
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the end of 1956 with a 75 per cent subsidy71 and that members of the Native Affairs 
Commission would visit the school before a final decision about its future was made. This 
decision was greeted cautiously by Grant who remarked that it gave the college ‘a breathing 
space’ that would make them harder to dislodge.72
During these developments the Adams appeal gathered momentum. However, Council 
feared that public promotion of the appeal would damage the College’s chances of being 
granted private status. It was therefore decided that it would be launched only after that had 
been achieved,73 although, Grant questioned the wisdom of this policy pointing out the 
‘success of the R.C. appeal and ... the continued delaying tactics of the Government’.74 
However, pressure from church figures in England was also to cause him concern. Shaun 
Herron, editor of the Anglican Church publication British Weekly, had been anxious to 
promote the plight of Adams College and had specifically singled it out as the only 
Protestant institution in South Africa attempting to continue. Through a series of articles 
and editorials he had publicised the attack on mission schools to British readers.75 For Grant 
this proved most unwelcome, he wrote that Herron’s
... desire to help often embarrasses us... we are not likely to receive registration if 
Shaun Herron and others go criticising the Government and holding us up as 
knights in shining armour ... we want to stress a positive approach rather than an 
anti-approach .., when we get permission to continue then, and only then, would we 
want a militant appeal launched overseas76
71 This registration contradicted the letter from Eiselen that said even if registration was approved 
no subsidies would be paid.
72 DCRBEA Grant to Hurley, 7 Oct. 1955.
73 Ida Grant noted ‘We have launched our appeal, but have not yet been able to press it as we still 
await word from the Minister’, I. Grant to Friends of Adams College, 7 Nov. 1955. In fact, a grant of £500 
was paid to the school appeal by the British Council of Churches. This money had actually been raised by 
the African Bureau, but Grant had refused to accept it directly from the Bureau and it was routed to Adams 
via the British Council of Churches. SO AS CBMS Greaves to Mary Benson, 20 Oct. 1955.
74 SOAS CBMS, Grant to Greaves, 24 Jan. 1956,
75 See British Weekly Oct. 1954 to Jan. 1955.
76 SOAS CBMS, Grant to ? (probably Greaves), 30 Jan. 1956.
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Adams was in an awkward position. It needed financial support but was reluctant to accept 
overseas assistance for fear of antagonising the government. The College administrators 
were aware of the Nationalists’ sensitivity to external criticism and were keen to avoid any 
association with it. This, however, played directly into the hands of the government, for, by 
trying to silence the voices of those appealing on its behalf (before registration), the Adams 
Council jeopardised its interest and support from British Churches in the future. In addition, 
by stifling debate in Britain, foreign pressure on the government was diminished.
Matters continued in this unsatisfactory way until Grant took action to try and resolve the 
college’s future, apparently prompted by a meeting between the CCSA and Eiselen. At this 
meeting Eiselen informed members of the Christian Council that no purely secondary school 
would be encouraged to register as a private institution unless it had private primary schools 
to provide its students. Referring to Adams, he reiterated that the local community did not 
support it’s determination to remain open.77 On the same day, Grant wrote
Unless we receive an answer soon we shall not be able to keep our staff, much less 
strengthen it. And what is school without a staff? Many of our teachers are restless 
and want to know, as best they can, what the future has in store for them. They 
want a larger measure of security than the present silent uncertainty affords. If we 
cannot give them, and give them soon, some reasonable answer they will leave what 
... appears to them to be a sinking ship.78
For Grant the policy of waiting was ushering in a spirit of ‘lethargy, if not fatalism’ and he 
wanted to confront the government to force a decision. The College was being slowly 
strangled by the government’s inaction, as staffing became more difficult and the daily 
running of the institution more problematic.79 As he wrote, ‘Our chief hope lies in 
attack if we are prevented from what we desire to do, the sooner we know this the
77 KCL MS62A/13 Notes of Meeting Between Christian Council of South Africa (Action 
Committee) with Eiselen, 27 March 1956.
78 KCL MS71, Grant to A. Hopewell, 27 March 1956.
79 Ida Grant noted that during this time ‘It was difficult to carry on and to find adequate staff, I. 
Grant to Friends of Adams, Oct. 1956.
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better.’80
Members of the College Council, however, did not agree. At a General Purposes Committee 
meeting in April, D. Rubenstein, the vice-principal of Adams, lamented that there was no 
general agreement as to what the ‘next step" should be. There were still conflicting views 
amongst the Adams staff and management over what the ‘motives and purposes’ of the 
Department really were.81
These debates, however, were never to be resolved because the Department refused Adams’ 
application on educational grounds. It maintained that Adams was needed to train teachers, 
and therefore the training college had to be re-opened. It also argued that Africans had to 
have more say in the running of ‘their’ schools, and that Adams was planning to charge fees 
which was against government policy.82
Four days later the Adams Association agreed to hand the college back to the ABM. For 
Grant the reasons offered by the Government were ‘puerile and dishonest’.83 After all, the 
college had offered to continue to run the training school until such time as the government 
could make alternative provision, but this offer had been rejected. He also dismissed the 
notion that Africans would have more influence under government control, arguing that 
under the Adams Association the ‘responsibility we offer is real’.84
Matters drew quickly to a close. On 15 September the Association agreed to close the 
school at the end of the term, sell all movable property and wind up Adams College
80 KCL MS62A/10. Grant to the Adams Finance Committee, 7 April 1956,
81 KCL MS7, Rubenstein to members of the General Purposes Committee, 18 April 1956.
82 WCL AC623, Eiselen to J. Hosken (Secretary of the Adams Governing Council) 12 July 1956.
83 KCL MS62A/13, Grant to Tim and Janet (?) 23 July 1956.
84 CL PR4093 Kerr Papers, Grant to Friends of Adams College, 20 Aug. 1956. Grant also noted 
that the government had rejected the second application for private status, indicating that the department 
had not lost the second application.
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Incorporated.85 It was agreed to ensure that the new institution would not carry the name 
of Adams.86 That same day the ABM, acting through John Reuling87, then African Secretary 
of the ABM, agreed to sell its property to the government. The ABM argued that it could 
not run another institution, for example a Conference Centre, on the site of Adams, as 
Africans ‘strongly favoured allowing the Government to conduct a school at Adams, since 
no one else could legally do so.’ Despite calls for it to be leased in the hope of it returning 
as Adams College in the future, it was decided to sell the property because the government 
had made it clear that it intended erecting a major new building on the site.88
Inanda
Inanda Seminary was a girls-only institution, which aimed to provide girls with the skills 
necessary for them to become ‘good Christians and home-makers.’89 It promoted healthy 
Christian living and aptitudes that it believed would be useful to women in married life and 
in work. It was the first all-female boarding high school in the country created for the 
daughters of African converts. Heather Hughes has argued that the education offered by 
Inanda was ‘always gender-specific, stressing subjects that would equip students for a life 
of domesticity or the female professions (teaching and nursing)’ 90 Nevertheless, it did not 
educate women for a life of subservience as domestic workers, but provided an education 
that was deemed suitable for the daughters of the African petty bourgeoisie.
85 KCL MS57 Extraordinary Meeting of Adams College Incorporated, 15 Sept. 1956.
86 Grant suggested the college should become the ‘ Verwoerd Institute.5 KCL MS62A/13 Grant to 
Tim and Janet 23 July 1956.
87 Reuling was later Secretary of the United Board of World Missions. He had previously been Dean 
of Men and Training School Head Teachers at Adams. Brookes remarked ‘I never knew a more hard­
working man. ’ Brookes, A South African Pilgrimage, p. 60.
88 KCL MS56/11 1953-57 Documents Concerning the Liquidation and Closure of Adams College, 
‘Statement to Adams College’, S. Kaetzel (Secretary of the ABM Council, South Africa), 26 Sept. 1956. 
The school was eventually sold in August 1957 to the South African Native Trust for £151,354. KCL 
FCM71 General Purposes Committee, 8 Aug. 1957.
89 Wood, Shine Where, back cover.
90 H. Hughes, “ ‘A Lighthouse for African Womanhood”: Inanda Seminary, 1869-1945', in C. 
Walker, Women and Gender in Southern Africa to 1945 (London, 1991), p. 197.
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Inanda was more closely associated with the American Board Mission than Adams, as 
matters relating to its running were dealt with by the Executive Committee of the South 
African Mission of the ABM, Through this committee the school liaised with the American 
Board, via John Reuling. While this arrangement gave the American Board some control 
over the daily running of the seminary, in practise it interfered very little in Inanda’s affairs, 
preferring to defer to the experience and advice of those in charge 91 It had established an 
African Advisory Board in 1935 Tor the purpose of bringing Inanda Seminary closer to the 
Church and the Christian community in general, and to give opportunity for discussion to 
everyone’s mutual benefit.592 According to Agnes Wood, ateacher there from 1929 to 1965, 
it was ‘a real help in keeping the administration in touch with African public opinion.’93 
Significantly, ten of the twelve members on the Advisory Board in 1936, were African.
Whereas Adams forged links with white colleges and Indian communities, Inanda worked 
to establish closer relations with its immediate community. From the 1910s Sunday Schools 
were started around Inanda, and, by the end of the 1920s, were thriving throughout the 
district. Such was the success of the Sunday School system that from 1932 an annual 
meeting was held at the seminary for all those who taught at and attended them. The 
following year six associations of ex-Inanda students in the district were organised into self- 
help groups, sharing skills they had learned at the seminary with the local community.94 In 
addition, agricultural shows were held at the seminary every year from 1925.
These community links gradually decreased during the latter part of the 1940s and 1950s. 
This was partly due to a transformation of educational principles which saw ‘adapted’ 
educational ideas go out of fashion. Inanda gradually moved away from its emphasis on 
practical home craft skills towards a more academic course structure, promising women 
careers as well as successful marriages. From 1936 a specialised nurses’ training course was
91 The head of Inanda Seminary, Lavinia Scott (who was head from 1937-69), was also secretary 
of the Executive Committee of the American Board Mission in South Africa.
92 Wood, Shine Where, p. 108.
93 ibid, p. 150..
94 ibid, pp. 84-89, p. 98.
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started and girls were encouraged to move on to Adams to train as teachers.95 In 1944 a full 
academic matriculation class was introduced, the first in South Africa at an African girls 
school. By the 1950s Inanda had become the premier educational institution
for African girls interested in an academic as well as a practical education. Despite these 
changes, however, it maintained strong links with the community in comparison to Adams.96 
One student who attended in 1951/2 remarked ‘You know Inanda Seminary taught us more 
than just the academic, it went outside. One was community outreach, we were very 
interested in what was happening in the community.’97 Rev. Bekisipo Dludla who became 
pastor of Inanda Church in 1958 and served on the Inanda Seminary Governing Council 
commented
You see having lived there myself for six years you would find missionaries at 
Inanda Seminary who were both teachers and part of the community, going out into 
the villages with some of the students to spread the Gospel among the people.. .That 
made a lot of difference because it made Inanda Seminary a community, part of the 
large community of Inanda. They didn’t see themselves isolated from the 
community, they found themselves being part of the community.98
These close links were to have a powerful effect on how it faced the introduction of Bantu 
Education. From the outset, the school’s principal, Lavinia Scott, made an effort to keep 
herself informed of developments, and by March 1954 she was advising that they should 
‘hold on just as long as we can, to real control of our institutions... I believe that in all our 
decisions we should have the fullest possible consultation with the people of our churches 
and the teachers in our schools. ’"
95 Both these careers were still very much in the mould of what was deemed acceptable for young 
Christian women.
90 Numerous comments from those associated with Inanda stressed its continued relationship with 
the community.
97 D. Dlilomo, interview with author, Durban, 12 June 1998.
98 Rev. Bekisipo Dludla. interview with author, Durban, 16 June 1998. Mable Christofersen, who 
taught at the school from 1945 to 1978, recalls ‘we realised that we needed to be more a part of the 
community.’ Interview with author, Durban, 3 June 1998.
99 KCL M52295 ‘The New...’, p. 6. (original emphasis)
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Scott had arrived from America in 1936 and within a year had become Inanda principal, only 
retiring in 1969. She was a committed and tenacious character who steered the seminary 
through the difficult war years without any problems. She had a progressive attitude to girls 
education; while she agreed that Inanda existed to strengthen the church she insisted that 
it had an important role to play in the ‘inspiring and training of leaders’.100 In her view the 
school was not simply there to create homemakers but to help women assume full and 
responsible roles in society. In July 1954 she remarked
We are in a safer position than Adams, also, because we have only girls. The 
Government preaches separate education of the sexes, and ... is not likely to be so 
concerned about the teaching of girls as of boys... I think it quite likely that we will 
be ignored.101
Her words suggest that Scott believed that Inanda was safe because it was a girls schools: 
the government would not consider it a threat because it did not consider that women 
would, or could, become political actors. She was clearly prepared to use the government’s 
prejudice to Inanda’s advantage.
After the arrival of the government circulars in August a period of intense debate followed. 
The ABM was resolved to run the school as a private institution as it ‘believed that there 
was a continuing need for distinctly Christian education for the girls who were to be 
teachers and nurses.’102 Like Adams, Inanda was prepared to teach Bantu Education, but 
Scott argued ‘if the nurses and teachers and homemakers of the years to come are to have 
any strong Christian influence....we will have to keep some definitely Christian schools 
alive.’103
100 Wood, Shine, p. 128.
101 KCL Inanda file 6 Scott to Reuling, 15 July 1954. A teacher who was at Inanda during the 
transfer recently remarked ‘we weren’t such a threat being a girls school. ’ M. Christofersen, interview with 
author, Durban, 19 June 1998.
102 Wood, Shine Where, p. 126. Note ‘teachers and nurses’, not leaders.
103 KCL Inanda, file 6, Scott to Reuling, 31 Aug. 1954. The ABM certainly did not accept that 
Bantu Education was to provide the Christian basis to education that they sought.
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Records relating to the role the African Advisory Board at Inanda are scarce, but, by August 
of 1954, Scott was able to note that her ‘entire staff were behind the idea of the school 
applying for private status; in addition there was ‘fairly unanimous support’ for the decision 
from those interested in the school.104 However, Scott did not think her staff would accept 
a 25 per cent wage cut. On the other hand, ‘both the staff and a fairly large number of 
students that I have consulted feel that parents would be prepared to pay somewhat 
increased fees.’105 This in turn suggests that parents of Inanda students also supported the 
school’s decision to apply for private registration despite the costs involved. Inanda was 
offered additional funding from the ABM amounting to £4000 per year which allowed 
teachers’ salaries to be maintained at their previous level.106
Until its application to run privately was submitted in September 1956 the seminary 
continued to mn as before, but with a reduced subsidy.107 By mid-1956 it appears that Scott 
was not so confident of African community support as she had been. While the Pastors 
‘wholeheartedly’ backed the school many of the chiefs did not, and, as she noted, in the new 
dispensation, ‘they are the ones who are said to speak for the people’.108 It may be that the 
government was manipulating Inanda chiefs into opposing private registration as they had 
successfully done at Adams.
Wood records that the application for registration was made with the blessing of the circuit 
inspector, Mr. R. Hawksley, and the Regional Director of Bantu Education, Mr. S. Dent.109 
This seems highly unlikely given the government’s determination to control mission
104 KCL Inanda. file 6, Scott to Reuling, 31 Aug. 1954.
105 ibid. She suggested raising them from £20 a year to £24 a year.
106 KCL Inanda. file 6, Reuling to Rev. S. Kaetzel (Secretary of the American Board Mission, 
Mphumulo), 28 Oct. 1955.
107 Wood noted that teachers were made to sign a new contract on the 1 April 1955 where they 
promised not to work against the government, suggesting that it came under Native Affairs Department 
control. Wood, Shine Where, p. 126.
108 KCL Inanda, file 6, Scott to Reuling, 17 May 1956.
109 Wood, Shine Where, p. 127.
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education, and is confirmed by a letter from Scott which noted:
You will be interested to know that Mr. Dent came to see me on the 21st September, 
to urge us to reconsider our decision to apply for registration as a private school - 
because he thinks we are in grave danger of being refused.110
Dent may have feared that, because of the attitude of local Chiefs, Inanda’s application 
would.be rejected, as Adams’ had been. Shortly after learning this the ABM decided to 
divert £10,000 originally intended for Adams to Inanda.111 In December 1957 the school 
was granted private status subject to a list o f‘puzzling’ conditions112 making Inanda the only 
non-Catholic African private school in South Africa.113
Conclusion
The Governing Council of Adams College decided to try and run the college as a private 
school because in part its constitution prevented them from doing otherwise; the college was 
incorporated to exist in perpetuity as a Christian institution dedicated to the education of 
Africans, a binding commitment that could not be broken. As the secretary of the Governing 
Council remarked to Eiselen ‘I am requested to ask you exactly what the Department 
requires of Adams College Incorporated bearing in mind its legal inability to hand over its 
schools.’114 It is also clear, however, that those in charge became increasingly committed to 
the idea of maintaining it as a symbol of their rejection of Bantu Education and apartheid. 
The Grants were the driving force behind this and both underwent a political and social
110 KCL Inanda, file 6, Scott to Reuling. 13 Oct 1956.
111 KCL Inanda, file 6, Reuling to Kaetzel, 31 Oct. 1956.
112 KCL Inanda, file 6, Scott to Reuling, 4 Dec. 1957. These conditions were not noted.
113 In fact a very small number of Seventli-Day Adventist Church schools were granted private 
status. This was because they had never accepted government subsidies and ‘were never involved in 
opposition to its [the government] policies ... moreover the white leadership of the South African Union 
Conference promised the Government that African Seventh-Day Adventist schools would never engage in 
negative activities against the Government. ’ A. Makapela, The Problem of Afficanitv in the Seventh-Dav 
Adventist Church (Lampeter, 1996), p. 277.
114 SOAS CBMS, Secretary of the Adams College Council to Eiselen, 21 June 1955.
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awakening during their time at the College. Grant’s correspondence shows a growing 
determination to do what he thought was right, both from a Christian and from a moral 
political perspective. In this he seems to have carried with him the majority of the Council, 
even if he could not achieve the same in the Association.115 In 1956 he wrote Tor our part, 
we have, I verily believe, fought a good fight...we know that we have acted in obedience to 
our vision of Christian discipleship.’116
In 1957 Ida Grant reflected that ‘except for a few understanding friends, Adams had to face 
the struggle misunderstood and almost alone.,117 During the period that Adams battled on, 
it never carried with it the total support that its governors expected. Amongst the teachers, 
there is a good deal of contradictory evidence. Clearly some felt that they had not been 
adequately involved in the discussions over the college’s future. Although teachers were 
engaged in the debate via the Adams Association, this engagement was limited and 
somewhat superficial. Mass meetings were not the ideal fora for deliberations, nor were 
‘real’ decisions taken by the Association.118 It was an advisory body, there to guide the 
Adams Council, but not to make decisions. African staff members felt insufficiently 
represented on the Council itself, a problem which the Council recognised but failed to 
remedy. Thus, ultimately, it was predominantly whites who determined the course of action 
at Adams College.119 For all their liberalism, the school authorities reflected the norms of 
South African society: decisions were essentially made for Africans rather than with 
Africans.
115 What becomes clear during the debates is that there was also a determination to try and hold 
onto Adams College because of its history, and because of the time and effort that had been expended to 
make it what is was. There was a feeling that it could not be simply handed over, and that it stood for 
something (a ‘liberal1 education) that was worth fighting for.
116 Grant, ‘Principal's Letter’, Iso Lomuzi. Vol. 20, No. 34 ‘Final Number’, Nov. 1956, p. 5. The 
CID’s raid on his office and home in 1954 was a very real and personal intrusion by the state and may have 
gone some way towards reinforcing his determination to fight for Adams College.
n7 Ida Grant to Friends of Adams College, May 1957.
118 A teacher at Adams from 1954-56 remembers that the issues at stake were often only debated 
in staff meetings. Nora Moerane, interview with author, Durban, 19 June 1998.
119 A teacher at the time remarked, ‘you see the Church was ruled by whites, just like everything 
else, so they ran the school.’ M. Christofersen, interview with author, Durban, 3 June 1998.
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The wider African community around Adams also had an impact upon its future and it is 
clear that the Council failed to gain its support. Explaining why Adams was refused 
registration M. Christofersen remarked 'they hadn't been enough part of the community, 
least we felt that'.120 The Rev. Dludla commenting on Inanda noted ‘they didn’t see 
themselves isolated from the community, they found themselves being part of the 
community, whereas at Adams it was different.’121 It is not clear why Adams made little 
effort to engage its local community, as it was active in promoting relationships with white 
schools. It may simply have been down to the personal preferences of those who ran the 
school or because it increasingly saw itself as an elite school. It was a far more academic 
institution than Inanda, taking older students who concentrated on academic study. Adams 
looked to train an ‘elite’ group of Africans who would enter professional careers in the 
‘modern’ economy, distinct from ‘traditional’, rural lifestyles. Adams may have remained 
deliberately aloof from the rural community around it in an attempt to isolate its pupils from 
its influences and help them on the path towards a ‘modern’ and ‘civilised’ existence in a 
multi-racial South Africa. Like Fort Hare, it also accepted many students from Southern 
Africa, so that many of its pupils had no relationship with the local communities. The move 
away from the ABM that took place at Adams in 1940 may also have weakened the 
influence of American educational ideas which stressed the need to develop a strong 
relationship between school and community.
Whatever the reason for Adams’ distance from the community, this played directly into the 
hands of the government. The NAD sensed that its Council did not have the support that 
it hoped for and undermined its efforts. As Ida Grant remarked:
The Government sought means of discrediting the College in the eyes of the public, 
particularly the African public. Actions of the College authorities were 
misrepresented in such a way as to place on the College the blame for the closing 
of the Training College and non-cooperation of the Government.122
120 M. Christofersen, interview with author, Durban, 3 June 1998.
121 Rev. Dludla, interview with author, Durban, 16 June 1998.
122KCLMS62A/91. Grant4 Adams vs Apartheid’ , May 1957, p. 3, Nationalist MP, Mr. W. Maree, 
a member of the Native Affairs Commission, told the Natal Mercury on 22 June 1955 ‘The College had
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It is impossible to know whether the meeting of the African chiefs which condemned the 
Council was genuine or staged by the government.123 What is certain, however, is that it 
damaged the credibility of those who said that they acted with the support of the African 
community. The government alleged that the Council was acting against its Bantu Education 
policy when, in fact, by applying for private status, it was acting within the regulations. 
Despite the NAD’s stress on the wishes of the African people, it showed little respect for 
them. Rather, by manipulating African opinion against the Adams Council, it undermined 
the Council’s determination to continue its fight, whilst presenting itself and the African 
people as victims of the ‘Council’s intransigence’.
Crucially, it appears the government was successful in convincing a significant number of 
Africans that the Council’s actions threatened the very existence of Adams, given that the 
government had the power to close schools presumed to be acting against it.124 This was of 
pivotal importance and explains why some Africans did not support the Councils’ course 
of action. By suggesting that it was the Adams Council, and not they, who were working 
against the interests of the people, the government gave Africans the impression that the 
school was jeopardising its long term future by making a private application. This obviously 
had serious consequences for Adams pupils, their parents and future generations. As one 
teacher remarked ‘we can’t be too dogmatic about the whole thing, the parents wanted their 
children to study.’125 In the end the decision of the ABM to hand over the school, rather 
than close it was due to African pressure to keep the school open, no matter who ran it.
The government’s determination to run Adams College was motivated by both political and
refused to cooperate with the Government in applying the Bantu Education Act and as a consequence was 
closing down. ’ Maree appears to be referring to the closure of the training school, not the whole college.
123 However, one teacher at Adams has remarked ‘the chiefs around Adams College were very much 
influenced by the Government and they didn’t stand by it at all, and that’s how it was that we had to close 
up.’ Joyce Evans, interview with author, Durban, 17 June 1998. Financial constraints prohibited 
consultation of government archives in Pretoria which may have shed more light on this matter.
124 The College’s failure to become involved with the local community obviously damaged its 
chances of trying to convince Africans otherwise.
125 Rev. Dludla, interview with author, Durban, 16 June 1998.
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practical concerns. The political nature of the college, through the Grants, and its 
relationship with African leaders and the SAIRR, was seen as a disruptive and dangerous 
influence in Natal. Scott, who attended a meeting with de Villiers in March 1954, remarked 
‘Mr. De V. mentioned at Pretoria that one Principal who was undermining respect for the 
Government among his students is endangering the future of his institution without knowing 
it.’126 Scott later confirmed that she took this as a direct reference to Grant.127 The 
government was simply not prepared to have a single school, governed by unsympathetic 
persons, undermine Bantu Education. Given the state’s determination to remove ‘liberal’ 
missionary influences, it is unsurprising that they would not allow perhaps the most ‘liberal’ 
of all institutions, whose leaders had publically condemned the Act, to remain open in 
defiance of their wishes. However, it is also apparent that the training college at Adams had 
to remain open to maintain an adequate supply of teachers to ensure the success of the 
Bantu Education project.128
The decision to deny Adams College its private registration had been made at an early stage. 
This is clear from the comments Eiselen and de Villiers made in early 1954 concerning both 
private registration and Grant. The delays in processing the application indicate the 
government’s unwillingness to take over Adams between 1954 and 1956, perhaps signifying 
difficulties in organising the administrative structures and staff necessary to run the 
institution.
Asked why he thought Inanda was granted private status the then Pastor of Inanda Seminary 
Church, remarked
because we felt that it has a unique position in that it provided education for African 
girls and no male students, so we thought that Inanda was playing a very vital role 
in preparing young African women for future responsibilities in the land...it’s the
126 KCL M52295 ‘The New Bantu Education Act - Report by Lavinia Scott to the American Board 
and Mission5, p. 2.
127 KCL Inanda file 6, Scott to Reuling, 25 March 1954,
128 This was especially true given that Catholic training colleges were only producing teachers for 
Catholic schools.
206
women who make the home129
That Inanda was a girls school was vital to its registration being granted. The government 
had made clear its intention of replacing male teachers with women in the lower classes and 
it is fair to assume that Inanda was providing the ideal students to enter the near-by teacher 
training college at Adams. It may also have been granted private status simply as a matter 
of finance; if the government were happy with the ‘products’ of Inanda seminary they had 
little to gain from the expense of taking it over. Teachers I have spoken to are convinced 
that it was due to the support and approval of the African community around it. One teacher 
commented ‘when it came to 1956 when the Government was making a mess of all the 
education the local people stood by Inanda, the chiefs stood by them.5130 Another recalls ‘we 
realised we needed to be part of the community.. .the community couldn’t fight with Adams 
College, they couldn’t back them up with “we need this, and this is ours’”131 The problem 
with this argument is that it assumes that the government cared about what Africans wanted. 
Nevertheless, having the support of the local community meant that the government could 
not attack those who looked to continue Inanda as a private school on the grounds that they 
did not carry African support.
The fact that Adams was refused registration and Inanda granted it, illustrates the fears of 
the government, its prejudices and the purpose of Bantu Education. Adams had a history 
of student disturbances, was the venue for political gatherings and was creating a male 
intellectual elite that the government feared. Inanda had a history of student loyalty and 
cooperation132 and, as far as the government was concerned, was creating apolitical 
homemakers and nurses. Adams was exactly the type of institution that Bantu Education set 
out to destroy.
The government’s refusal to register Adams but accept Inanda within the Bantu Education
129 Rev. Dludla, interview with author, Durban, 16 June 1998.
130 Joyce Evans, interview with author, Durban, 17 June 1998.
131 M. Christofersen, interview with author, Durban, 19 June 1998.
132 Wood, Shine Where, p. 116.
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system was based upon a assessment of risk - an assessment which, as is demonstrated in 
next chapter, was to turn out favourably for the Catholic Church which had also applied for 
the private registration of its schools. Unable to compromise on the issue of religious 
education, but capable of raising the necessary finances for private control, the Catholic 
Church was able, after pledging its loyalty to the government, to fashion for itself a unique 
position within Bantu Education.
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‘Only History Will Tell Us How Tragic This Has Been':
The Catholic Church and the Bantu Education Act1
The Catholic Church in South Africa considered Bantu Education an attack upon religious 
freedom and, after debate from its strictly white hierarchy, refused to surrender control of 
its institutions. Driven by its adherence to stringent dogma, the Church was torn between 
its refusal to compromise on matters which it considered of vital religious importance, and 
its unwillingness to antagonise the Government.
After the end of the Second World War, the Catholic Church attempted to establish itself 
as a more South African-based denomination. In 1947 it founded the SACBC and in 1951 
the South African hierarchy was created through the appointment of an Apostolic Delegate. 
This replaced the control of the Propagation of the Faith in Rome. In this period it also 
began to make piecemeal attempts to introduce African representation into its leadership 
with the appointment of B. Dlamini as Bishop of Umzimkulu. These changes, however, 
remained limited with the Archbishop of Cape Town, Owen MacCann, informing the 
Catholic weekly, Southern Cross2 that it would be ‘dangerous and wrong to force the pace’ 
when it came to appointing Africans.3
It is essential to stress the importance of schooling to the Catholic faith. Archbishop Hurley4 
has recently written that schools were the Church’s ‘most precious institutional jewels and 
its main centres of evangelism’.5 For Catholics, schools were the most potent guarantee of 
the preservation and cultivation of the faith. This was especially true in non-Catholic
1 Southern African Catholic Bishops Conference (henceforth SACBC) Archives, Pretoria. AVI 
Administrative Board Minutes, 1948-63. Minutes, 26-7 Aug. 1958.
2 The Southern Cross was financed by the SACBC. It had a circulation of 12,000 in 1953.
3 Southern Cross. 28 July 1954, p. 6.
4 Archbishop Eugene Hurley was the Archbishop of Durban throughout the transition to Bantu 
Education and served as ‘Chairman’ of the SACBC and as ‘Chairman’ of the SACBC African Affairs 
Department from October 1954.
5 Hurley, ‘The Mission Church and the Bantu Education Act’, draft chapter of forthcoming 
publication given to me by the author., p. 1.
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countries where they were viewed as institutions where children could be ‘immunised5 and 
‘protected5 against other religions, most obviously Protestantism.6 In South Africa there 
was, in Hurley's words, ‘a certain degree of anti-Protestant and anti-public school attitude
in the enthusiasm for Catholic mission schools.57 Catholic schools were where children
formed characters ‘pleasing to God,58 and this could only take place in a school that was not 
merely Catholic in name, but imbued all things with a ‘Catholic atmosphere5. As an editorial 
in the Catholic African Teachers Federation publication, Lumen, made clear;
to us the Catholic atmosphere is vital. Religion is not simply a subject to be 
imparted at certain hours; it is something to be lived at every moment, something 
to engage every faculty of mind and body, something that is as vital to the well­
being of the soul as the air we breathe is to the well-being of the body; it is 
something which must in every truth be the foundation and crown of a child’s entire 
training9
Without this Catholic atmosphere the salvation of children would be at risk.10 Education was 
fundamentally necessary for every child and the absolute responsibility of Catholic parents 
who had the inalienable right to insist on a Catholic education. The Church’s role was to 
assist parents in their obligation to God by providing a Catholic education in distinctly 
Catholic schools.
For Catholics the rights of the state in this matter were very different. The state’s role in the
6 This can be traced back to the period after the Act of Emancipation in England when Catholics 
felt that ordinary schools exposed their children to essentially anti-Catholic views. Hurley, interview with 
author, Durban, 19 June 1999.
7 Hurley ‘The Mission Church’, p. 1. __
8 Southern Cross. 7 Nov. 1954, p. 7,
9 Lumen, Dec. 1955, p. 23. Original emphasis.
10 The Southern Cross remarked, ‘There is no choice in the matter...you can choose which school 
that your child will attend, but it must be a Catholic school’, 14 Jan. 1948, p. 4. Pope Pius XI had remarked 
‘Catholic education consists essentially in preparing man for what he must be and for what he must do here 
below in order to attain the sublime end for which he was created ...Parents have, by nature, the right to 
instruct their children...Their rights cannot be surrendered. They are prior to any right of civil society or 
of the State. ’ SACBC, A2 African Mission Schools, AA11 Bantu Education Act ‘Pastoral Letter of the 
South African Hierarchy to the Clergy and Faithful of the Country on the Future of Our Mission Schools’,
p. 2.
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development of education included setting standards, determining syllabi and inspecting 
schools, obligations that it was committed to fulfil as it was publically funded. It was not, 
however, competent to offer a school with the correct Catholic atmosphere, only the Church 
could do this. This was the will of God, and was not negotiable and could not be 
compromised in any way.
The Catholic Church’s memorandum to the Eiselen Commission gave a direct indication of 
what it considered to be the rights and obligations of the Church, family and state in the field 
of education. The state’s obligation was to foster peace and security and raise monies, 
thereby providing the conditions for the Church to educate its followers, ‘to protect in its 
legislation the prior rights of the family as regards the Christian education of its offspring, 
and consequently also to respect the supernatural rights of the Church in this same realm of 
Christian education’ .11
The question of religious instruction for Catholic children was, however, ‘completely and 
exclusively within the competence of the Catholic Church’ which provided ‘maternal care’ 
to protect children from ‘all kinds of doctrinal and moral evil.’12 This duty crossed all racial 
and cultural ‘boundaries’, as Christ had commanded ‘Teach ye all nations.’13
The memorandum was conceived as a pre-emptive measure to impress upon the government 
the seriousness of the Catholic claim to the right to control and run their own schools in the 
face of the threat that Commission represented to existing educational arrangements. Hurley 
recalls that the hierarchy was ‘very anxious’, realising that ‘things were going to change 
dramatically and rather substantially’, and mission schools ‘would no-longer exist as 
such’.14 In October 1949, the Native Affairs Department of the SACBC initiated a campaign
11UCTLBC282 AI.3,1 ‘Memorandum Presented on Behalf of the Catholic Bishops of S. A. on the 
Questionnaire on Native Education’, p. 3.
12 ibid. pp. 2 & 6.
13 The memorandum did, however, suggest that for ‘practical reasons’ there should be, temporarily, 
separate schools for whites and Africans, ibid, p. 4.
14 Hurley, interview with author, Durban, 19 June 1998.
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to collect signatures from its teachers to present to the Commission as a statement of their 
support for the Catholic school system. An accompanying letter of support from teachers 
in Cape Town noted:
Catholic parents and many non-Catholic parents with children at our Catholic
Mission Schools not only approve of these schools, but together with us will oppose
any attempt to secularise them....15
Nevertheless, the Commission and its implications for African education were not discussed 
at Plenary or Administrative Board level. Nor did the Catholic press debate the issue until 
after the publication of the Eiselen Report in early 1952. In June 1952 Lumen pondered the 
Report and, while welcoming its ‘national scope’, warned that there were ‘also great 
dangers lurking’. It advised its readers to ‘wait and see, and meanwhile prepare for the battle 
of the Catholic school in South Africa’.16 The Bishops’ silence was finally broken after the 
first parliamentary reading of the Bantu Education Bill, when W. Whelan, the Bishop of 
Johannesburg, publically expressed his ‘grave misgivings’ about it.17 A month later he 
declared that the Act’s intention to force children to attend non-denominational religious 
education classes would be a ‘tyranny and an usurpation’ of parental rights.18
Following the passage of the Act, the hierarchy sought clarification on the government’s
intentions and the first of many meetings between the SACBC and the government took
place in October 1953. At this meeting Verwoerd stressed the government’s intention to 
pursue the Act’s objectives vigorously. Hurley’s impression was that despite Verwoerd’s 
determination
it would take a considerable time before the Government would be able to put the
provisions of the Bill into effect. So the Church had a breathing space in which to
15 SACBC Box M l African Affairs Department - General Education. Catholic Teachers of the 
Cape Town Vicariate to Eiselen, Oct 1949. The Native Affairs Department of the SACBC dealt with all 
matters relating to African affairs in which the Church was involved.
16 ‘Where Are We Going With Bantu Education?’, Lumen. June 1952, p. 11.
17 Southern Cross. 26 Aug. 1953, p. 2.
18 Southern Cross, 30 Sept. 1953, p. 10.
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prepare itself. Moreover, the Minister was still ready to hold discussions, so it 
would be unwise to launch an attack on the Bill and antagonise the Government19
This interpretation contrasts markedly with Rev. Fr. D. St. George’s20 conclusions after he 
met with de Villiers in March 1954.21 St. George, the Catholic representative to the Natal 
Native Education Advisory Board, realised that the government sought to push on 
‘energetically’, to complete its task by the end of 1954 or early 195 5 at the latest,22 and that 
the Church had ‘very little “breathing space.’”23 Shortly after this meeting de Villiers met 
another deputation from the Church where he revealed what official policy would be, pre­
empting much of Verwoerd’s statement to the Senate on 7 June. For their part Church 
representatives stressed their wish to appoint all teachers in Catholic schools and reaffirmed 
their commitment to ‘fight’ against Communism, teaching ‘at all times respect for law and 
order24 This was typical of the Church’s dealings with the government; they outlined their 
concerns, asserted what they considered their rights, and them attempted to placate the 
government with promises of loyalty and support.
Fr. J. Ochs25, who attended the meeting, expressed his concern over the proposed 
establishment of school committees and boards, whose members would be largely drawn 
from local African communities and did not have to be Catholic: ‘subjecting our schools to 
such a system can, to say the least, only fill us with mis-giving. ’As he saw it, the Church
19 Hurley, ‘The Mission...’, p. 3. The unwillingness of the Catholic Church to antagonise the 
government was a consistent theme in its deliberations, both publically and privately
20 Fr. St. George was a cleric in the archdiocese of Durban who was particularly interested in 
African education, he was appointed Secretary to Native Schools in the Archdiocese of Durban in 1950.
21 Hurley described the periods of time between meetings with the government as filled with 
‘uncertainty, enquiry and research’, interview with author, Durban, 19 June 1998.
22 SACBC PS1 Plenary Sessions 1952-63. Notes on the meeting of the Natal Native Education 
Advisory Board with de Villiers, 3 March 1954, p. 1.
23 DCR Hurley Papers Bantu Education Act (BEA) 1953-56. St. George to Hurley 15 March 1954.
24 SACBC A2, ‘Report of an Interview with Mr. de Villiers in which the New Proposals for the 
Bantu Education Act Were Discussed’, p. 3.
25 Ochs, the General Secretary of the SACBC, remarked of de Villiers ‘I might say offhand that 
we were not impressed by the said gentleman’, DCR BEA Ochs to Hurley 26 March 1954.
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would have to ‘drive a hard bargain for substantial safeguards. The right to veto the 
appointment of any teacher is one point; another is the question of the school principal.’26 
The Church should not oppose the ‘active participation of the Bantu’ but rather ‘certain 
Bantu27; clearly it could not appear to oppose greater African responsibility.
Ochs also found the position regarding government binding ‘very unsatisfactory and vague 
except that bill state aid would not be forthcoming’ and argued that
The subtlety of the whole plan seems to have been of diabolical origin. If we accept 
bill state-aid we stand in the greatest danger of saying good-bye for ever to the 
Catholic character of Native education. If we accept the reduced subsidy we are 
quite likely to struggle on miserably for a few years just to lay ourselves open to 
easy extermination in the end.28
The Church faced a dilemma in fighting against the Act from either a religious or 
educational standpoint. If it opposed it as persecution against Catholics the government 
could protest that all denominations were being treated the same, while to fight against it 
in the name of education would ‘take up the government on their much vaunted (but largely 
suspect) claim that they are genuinely concerned for the welfare of the Bantu’.29 Ochs did 
not suggest fighting the legislation as a product of apartheid, perhaps because this would 
have meant direct confrontation with the government. After another meeting with de 
Villiers, Bishop Whelan wrote to Hurley:
I stressed very strongly that the Catholic Church, while not allowing itself to be 
made a party to press and propaganda, cannot surrender its rights in the sphere of 
education. Our attitude is to co-operate with the State in every way possible and to 
seek every possible means of arriving at an amicable agreement with the State. Our 
whole history gives clear example of our good faith and our honourable co­
operation.30
26 SACBC A2, ‘Report of.....5, p. 3.
27 ibid. p. 4.
28 DCR BEA Ochs to Hurley, 26 March 1954, p. 4.
29 ibid, p. 4.
30 DCR BEA, Whelan to Hurley, 12 April 1954.
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Whelan noted, however, that de Villiers had ‘suggested how unfortunate it is that the State 
must deal with missionary schools as a whole.’31 He saw this as a sign that the Catholic 
Church could expect some form of preferential treatment from the government, so that 
‘[T]he door has not yet been closed to us. It may be possible to approach the NAD with 
suggestions for a modus vivendi.’32 This was the climate in which the Catholic hierarchy 
attended an extraordinary plenary session in April 1954 to discuss Bantu Education.
The plenary session was opened by Archbishop C. Damiano, the Apostolic Delegate, who 
reminded the bishops of the ‘prudent manner’ in which the Church had so far managed its 
relations with the Government.33 Hurley indicated that the Church could follow either 
compliant or vigorous policies. The compliant option would be to surrender at the first 
refusal of their requests, the vigorous one to make a ‘clear and forceful presentation to the 
state’, to consult non-Catholic bodies, and to make a strong appeal to the public. He wanted 
the Church to reject the community system, having ‘no great hopes for the success of 
negotiations’ fearing the inevitability of a public appeal. He maintained that
it would mean a clash with the Government, but that was bound to come sooner or 
later. We could not avoid it. If the clash did not come over the Education issue it 
would come over some other application of apartheid. Apartheid had been elevated 
to a formal doctrine, As such we could not compromise with it, it was opposed to 
justice, charity, the unity of the human race and the unity of the Mystical body.. .the 
sooner we clash the better. It would be better to fight while our moral position was 
strong, instead of weakening ourselves with compromise.34
For Hurley, apartheid was ‘doomed; one day a policy would arise to take its place’ and ‘only 
those who fought it would have the right to speak later’. He concluded, ‘if fighting meant 
suffering we should be prepared for that.’35 This forcefi.il address made the obvious link
31 DCR BEA, Whelan to Hurley, 12 April 1954
32 ibid.
33 SACBC, PS1 29 April 1954, p. 3.
34 ibid, p. 5.
35 ibid, p. 6. Hurley remarked recently that T appear to have gone to this session in a somewhat 
prophetic and provocative mood, seeing the Bantu Education Policy in the setting of the worst possible 
interpretation of apartheid’, Hurley, ‘The Mission...’, p. 7.
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between Bantu Education and apartheid, and pushed the Bishops to reveal their attitudes 
towards what was actually at stake. For Hurley, who became the leader of a small ‘radical’ 
faction within the Conference, the Church should not compromise, even if this would bring 
the Church into direct conflict with the government. Hurley, however, was no radical; he 
saw entry into the community system as unthinkable, but not the teaching of Bantu 
Education. He was not prepared to defy the government in the way that Grant or some of 
the Anglicans did, but he was ready to break the church’s silence and state publically that 
it did not agree with the state’s policy.
He found support from Bishop Boyle of Port Elizabeth, Bishop van Velsen of Kroonstad 
and Rev. Lamont, the Prefect Apostolic of Umtali, who argued that the Act was ‘immoral’ 
and ‘should be opposed without compromise.’36 For Hurley, Boyle and Lamont, what was 
‘immoral’ and ‘should be opposed without compromise’ was the secularization of education, 
and not Bantu Education per se. Their voices were, however, in the minority as most 
Conference members rejected any confrontation with the government. Bishop McBride of 
Kokstad argued for a cautious policy that ensured they were not identified with other 
denominations.37 Bishop Whelan observed that the former Apostolic Delegate, Archbishop 
Lucas, had reached a cordial understanding with Malan which should not be jeopardised. 
He rejected Hurley’s attack upon apartheid arguing that
We must not become involved in politics. Apartheid was practised in South Africa 
long before the present government came to power. Openly opposing it would not 
help us much. The Holy Father had indicated how, without surrendering our 
principles, we must be tolerant towards others and take into account the situation 
in which we find ourselves. We must think very seriously before opposing 
authority.38
The Conference’s prevailing attitude was summed up by Bishop Bilgeri of Eshowe: ‘We 
are not concerned with the policy behind the Act; what we want to safeguard is our right
36 SACBC, PS1 29 April 1954, p. 6.
37 ibid. p. 6.
38 ibid. p. 8. Whelan warned of the ‘dangers’ of mixing with non-Catholics, as to do so would draw 
the Church into politics.
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to teach.’39 They agreed to present a memorandum to the government and undertake further 
negotiations to allow them to continue running their schools on full subsidies. If these failed, 
they arranged to hold another plenary session to reconsider their position. Furthermore, they 
rejected the renting of schools as it allowed the government too much control, and passed 
a resolution calling on the Church to maintain ‘full control5 of its schools. Finally, they 
released a statement indicating ‘serious concern over the manner in which it appears that the 
Bantu Education Act will be applied’ but also stating the Church’s hope ‘to negotiate with 
the Government with a view to reaching a solution acceptable to both parties’.40 While the 
Bishops agreed that they could not forfeit the right to maintain Catholic schools, they were 
divided over how to deal with the government: should they follow the established route of 
private negotiation and diplomacy, or condemn the policy as a denial of religious freedom?
The SACBC memorandum was presented to the government in August. It was a dozen- 
page treatise on how the Catholic Church in South Africa had, in close co-operation with 
the government, helped to ‘civilise’ Africans through Christianity, thereby reducing the 
‘dangers’ of Communism and nationalism. It pointed to the ‘Church’s unvarying spirit of 
friendliness and positive co-operation with the State’, claiming that its ‘record of opposition 
to Communism and extremism requires no commendation here’.41 It argued that it was the 
‘common desire of all right-minded people to further the civilization of the Bantu. It is 
generally agreed that spreading the Christian religion among them is the best, and indeed, 
the only way to achieve this objective.’42 Additionally, the work of Christianizing and 
civilizing the ‘Bantu’ was ‘nowhere near completion’; ‘should the Christian element be 
abolished in Bantu schools’, it would remove ‘the one element that works for moderation’,
39 SACBC, PS1 29 April 1954, p. 7.
40 SACBC, PS1 29 April 1954 p. 10. Bishop Boyle wanted the statement to include the Church’s 
belief that Bantu Education was not in the interests of the Bantu, but this amendment failed to gain the two- 
thirds majority required.
41 SACBC, A2 AA11 ‘Memorandum Concerning the Implementation of the Bantu Education Act 
of 1953', pp. 7-8.
42 ibid, pp. 1-2.
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and leave ‘the field free for the rapid and violent growth of national extremism’ .43
The Catholic Church also objected to the non-denominational character of the religious 
education to be given under Bantu Education, asserting that it could only be successfully 
taught if it was
imparted as a way of life....No child can be impressed with the value of religion if 
it is relegated in school to a secondary position in the curriculum, if it does not in 
some way permeate the atmosphere of the school.44
To justify their continued existence in African schooling, Catholics tried to appeal to white 
fears of African radicalism and nationalism. They highlighted the growth of what they called 
‘African sects’ which were giving ‘very grave cause for uneasiness’, contending that these 
dangers could only be avoided through partnership with mission educators.45 In addition if 
whites were withdrawn from African education
it would be easy for the propagandists of Bantu nationalism to operate under cover 
... If a universal and exclusive community school system were imposed upon the 
Bantu ... we gravely fear that a ready field would be provided for the propagation 
of Bantu nationalism wrapped up in the jargon of Marxist dialectics.46
In conclusion, the memorandum proposed that they be allowed to keep their schools, as 
owners and managers, with a 100 per cent grant; their only concession was to suggest the 
establishment of special Catholic School Boards, consisting of nominees from the Church, 
Bantu Education Department and Regional Bantu Authority, and elected ‘Bantu 
Representatives’. These proposals, it suggested, were ‘in harmony with the policy which 
aims at encouraging initiative and responsibility in an as yet immature people, while 
safeguarding the direct beneficent influence of Church and State in the sphere of
43 SACBC, A2 AA11 ‘Memorandum Concerning , p. 6.
education.’47
The Catholic Church was effectively demanding the government reverse its policy, as 
Verwoerd was aware:
He [Verwoerd] wishes to emphasise that it must be quite clear that the proposals
with which your memorandum concludes, contain the direct negation of the Bantu
Education Act.. .These proposals suggest that fundamentally the Government revert
to the policy and practise of the past which it deemed necessary to wholly reform48
Despite this rejection a further deputation met Verwoerd in September. Verwoerd expressed 
his appreciation at the manner in which the Catholic Bishops had dealt with Bantu Education 
for they had not ‘indulged in irresponsible press publicity, but had come to put their case in 
a reasonable manner.’49 While, he declined their demands he ‘admitted that the Catholic 
schools and institutions had a very good record of discipline and sound achievement’, and 
he ‘regretted that he could make no exceptions.’ He conceded that it was a ‘pity the 
Catholic Church had to suffer; but he could not risk the success of the whole system by 
making exceptions in the case of the Catholics’.50 These comments suggest that the 
Nationalist Government did not share the concerns of some within its ranks, or those of the 
Dutch Reformed Church, that the Catholics were thsRoomse gevaar51 On the contrary, the 
Nationalists seemed to see the Catholics as the most accommodating of all the ‘English- 
speaking’ churches at this stage.52
47 SACBC, A2 AA11 ‘Memorandum Concerning , p. 12.
48 DCRBEA, ‘Interviewof SACBC Delegation with Dr. Verwoerd’, Verwoerd’s Private Secretary 
to Hurley, 26 Aug. 1954.
49 DCRBEA, ‘Interview...5, p. 1. Verwoerd was no doubt alluding to the press campaign instigated 
by the Anglican Priest Huddleston.
50 ibid. p. 1.
51 An Afrikaans term meaning ‘Roman danger’ - the threat that the Catholics supposedly 
represented to the Protestant Afrikaner people.
52 The Church’s tradition of cordial and non-confrontational relations with the government 
undoubtedly promoted an atmosphere wherein the Church felt it could negotiate with the government. 
However, it is equally clear that it was in the interests of the Nationalists to allow the cultivation of a 
Roomse gevaar mentality among its supporters because this had a powerful effect upon the confidence of 
the Catholic Church within South Africa. However, after 1948 Afrikaner nationalists needed to maintain
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Verwoerd told the deputation that the gradual withdrawal of subsidies was inevitable, and 
was designed to ‘soften the blow’; he could not promise permanent reduced subsidy 
arrangements.53 This, he noted, was not an infringement of rights but the withdrawal of a 
privilege. The deputation attempted to impress on Verwoerd the necessity of maintaining 
a ‘Catholic atmosphere’ in schools. Verwoerd replied that they were perfectly entitled to run 
their schools as private institutions but could not then expect any subsidy. Eiselen, who was 
also present interjected asking the Bishops ‘How can a school receiving a 100% State 
subsidy be justified for instance in asking the children to pray for the defeat of Dr. Malan’s 
party?’54 This seems incongruous given the otherwise cordial atmosphere of the meeting and 
suggests an underlying frustration and mistrust of Catholic intentions.55 Hurley recalls that 
he had the impression ‘that here was a decision that had been taken and no change was 
going to be made’.56
As had been agreed another extraordinary plenary session met in late September. Hurley 
opened it warning the Bishops that the government would not retreat ‘one step’.57 It soon 
became apparent that the divisions of the first session were to surface again as the session 
split between those who wanted to criticise the government ’ s intentions publically, and those 
who sought yet further negotiation.
Closing all their schools in defiance was debated, and quickly rejected. As McCann 
pointed out such a move would not influence the government’s decision, indeed it
a white laager against African nationalism meaning that white Catholics were increasingly welcome within 
their fold.
53DCRBEA, ‘Interviewof SACBC...’, pp, 1-2.
54 ibid. p. 3,Eiselen remarked that the Bishops should be pleased because, by breaking the 
denominational hold on schools, all children were now open to Catholic influence.
55 It could also indicate that Eiselen did not share Verwoerd’s view and failed to make any 
distinction between the Catholics and other English-speaking churches.
56Hurely, interview with author, Durban, 19 June 1998.
57 SACBC PS1 29-30 Sept. 1954, p. 1.
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would not even embarrass them.58 J. Gotthardt, the Vicar Apostolic of Kimberley, 
maintained that closing the schools would be a betrayal of the students who would be 
thrown onto the streets, while the Rev. Fr. A. Hartjes, representing Kimberley, claimed that 
such an act of defiance would see the expulsion of many foreign Catholics working for the 
Church in South Africa.59
The debate then turned to whether they should enter the proposed community schools 
system,60 In support, a faction led by St. George, argued that this was the only option, as 
the Church could not afford to run the schools on reduced or non-existent subsidies. He 
thought that the system might fail due to African hostility and encouraged the Bishops to 
enter the community system on short-term leases so that the Church could reclaim its 
schools when the system collapsed. He claimed that entering the system did not mean a 
complete loss of Catholic atmosphere and would give the Church ‘breathing space’ one of 
the things they ‘needed most.’61 In support the Bishop of Kimberley, J. Bokenfohr, argued 
that they had to save what they could from a bad situation, rather than lose everything.
Provocatively, Hurley asked those who argued for assimilation into the community network, 
‘What advantages would there be in collaborating?’62 He asserted that to enter the system 
meant the ‘Church was collaborating in the “Apartheid” policy designed to perpetuate the
58 SACBC PS1 29-30 Sept. 1954 p. 2.
59 ibid. p. 11. Bishop McBride noted that ‘closing down would deprive the Africans of education 
and teachers of their livelihood', p. 12.
60 The plenary session appointed a committee to decided whether entering the community system 
was an evil act or not. This committee reported that cooperation was participation in an evil act; however 
when the cooperator was forced to comply and did not do anything evil itself then it could be permissible. 
It should be noted that the Bishops’ were not debating whether to comply with apartheid was evil, rather 
they asking whether it was evil to comply with a course of action which could ‘jeopardise the propagation 
and consolidation of the FaitlT, see ibid. pp. 12, 18-19.
61 SACBC A2 ‘Memorandum Respectfully....’, p. 10. It is not clear what St. George thought the 
Church needed more time for; they had to make a decision which would have been binding.
62 SACBC PS1 29-30 Sept, 1954, p. 8. Hurley argued that to give schools over to the community 
system was ‘positive collaboration’, p. 9.
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serfdom of the Africans5.63 This was the first time African opinion was considered. What, 
he asked, ‘ would be the reaction of the people?564 Hurley argued that to stand against 
apartheid on principle would have a tremendous moral effect on Africans, and be an example 
to all non-Catholics. As before, Hurley stood alone in making the connection between 
government policy and the Bishops5 decision.
Hurley did, however, receive support for his stand from those who rejected the community 
system not because it compromised with apartheid, but because it denied the Church’s right 
to maintain its own schools. McCann argued that entering the system would mean their 
cooperation ‘in diffusing Protestant doctrine5. For him the Act’s most serious consequence 
was the secularization of schools which they had to ‘counteract5 in order to ‘carry on the 
Christian Education of children and the conversion of people.’65 This indeed reflected the 
majority view of those present.66
During the debates other issues surfaced. St. George asked if rejecting government policy 
and then accepting a 75 per cent subsidy from the same government was morally acceptable, 
for as Hurley remarked it appeared to be ‘refusing and accepting the government at the 
same time5.67 Despite this, it was decided to accept subsidies on the grounds that they were 
earned by Africans who would want the Catholics to use them.
63 SACBC PS1 29-30 Sept. 1954 p. 9, He argued that ‘If we went into the community system, then 
we would be proclaiming the system and would be encouraging our people to accept it5, p. 9.
64 Ibid, p. 9. Other than Hurley only Bishop Whelan reflected upon the attitude of Africans to the 
decisions. He told the Conference that ‘Africans would look upon their decision to give up schools as a 
betrayal5, p. 19.
65 ibid. p. 2. McCann5 s attitude to apartheid was demonstrated during the debate on whether schools 
could be rented to the government. Here he noted that ‘renting was not a direct co-operation with apartheid. 
For that situation already existed and they would be merely accepting a ‘de facto5 situation5, p. 3. This 
sentence appears to imply that McCann had already accepted apartheid as a permanent feature of South 
African life.
66 Bishop J. des Rosiers of Maseru noted that the Church had to keep its schools for a ‘point of 
apostolate was under attack.5, whilst Bishop Dlamini argued that ‘they must be a Catholic people and 
determine to keep their schools5, ibid. pp. 6 and 7.
67 ibid, p. 19.
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Another issue of future significance was that of teachers5 salaries. The Bishops recognised 
that dwindling subsidies would precipitate salary reductions. They argued that teachers 
would have to accept wages cuts to match the 75 per cent subsidy cutback. A. Streit, the 
Bishop of Mariannhill, noted that this news had already been communicated to the priests 
and sisters in his diocese, all of whom agreed to continue at the reduced rate; he was 
confident ‘many African teachers5 would also accept a wage reductions.68 Fr. Muldoon from 
Johannesburg argued that the situation ought to be very carefully explained to teachers who 
should ‘accept the challenge.569 The attitude of the majority of the Bishops70 was bluntly put 
by Bishop van Velsen
The teachers do not know the issues at stake, they did not appreciate the Catholic 
character ofthe struggle, they complained aboutNationalism andnot about religion.
Let the teachers and people have a lean time; let them realise through persecution 
their faith; let them be laid open to persecution to strengthen them.71
This unsympathetic approach was echoed by Whelan:
The teachers’ attitude has been that they have looked upon themselves as 
Government employees and the priest has been simply the agent to transmit their 
wages. The teachers have not become integrated in the Catholic life.72
As the loyalty of teachers had been, at best, mixed, the Bishops maintained that a reduction 
in wages would reveal the true Catholics amongst them to the greater benefit of the Church. 
A decision to go private would be a test for teachers, revealing to them the importance of 
Catholic teachings. According to Fr. Hartjes a 25 per cent reduction would not have a great 
impact upon teachers ‘as their standard of living was already higher than the ordinary
68 SACBC PS 1 29-30 Sept. 1954. p. 5. The only African Bishop, DIamini of Umzimkulu claimed 
that his teachers ‘were in favour of carrying on no matter what the wages were’, p. 25. Significantly the 
Catholic Church could rely upon the loyalty of monks and sisters to work in schools for little or no wages, 
a luxury that was denied other churches.
69 ibid, p. 10.
70 There was general agreement with van Velsen’s remarks.
71 SACBC PS1 29-30 Sept. 1954 p. 19. Van Velsen continued by remarking that teachers ‘must 
be made to realise that they must make sacrifices’, p. 24.
72 ibid, p. 20.
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people.’73 Bishop Bilgeri was the only one to object to Hartje’s remarks, statingcthey had 
talked about the teachers making sacrifices, what about the Bishops sacrificing?’. This 
comment was dismissed as Bishops argued that they could not afford to make any more 
financial sacrifices in their already overburdened dioceses.74
An unofficial consensus was reached that the schools would become private institutions and 
the Church would apply for the 75 per cent subsidy. Now the Bishops discussed yet another 
appeal to the government to change its policy. Bishop Boyle argued that he felt ‘sure that 
something could be achieved’, noting that ‘they should keep the door open and keep 
trying...The Government should be given the chance to try and do something. The worst 
they could do was refuse’.75 Bishop Hippel of Oudtshoorn, suggested that they should try 
and see the Prime Minister, all other avenues having been blocked.76 On the other hand, 
Hurley believed that it was hopeless to expect the government to change its mind at this 
stage, and Bilgeri agreed, noting that Malan was behind his Ministers and ‘had taken no 
steps to give them a different direction’ 11 Nevertheless the Bishops agreed to send a letter 
to Malan seeking an interview.
The Catholic Church in South African had come to the decision to maintain its schools as 
private institutions, not because of the crushing weight of African opinion, and not because 
of any political or moral objection to apartheid. Their decision was based upon the dictates 
of Catholicism which demanded that the Church reject government policy that threatened 
Catholic convictions. What is perhaps most striking in the plenary debates is the complete 
lack of any intellectual or moral input from Africans, the very people directly affected by 
Bantu Education. In two days of debate only two bishops, Hurley and Whelan, addressed
73 SACBC PS1 29-30 Sept. 1954, p. 15.
74 ibid, p. 15.
75 ibid.. pp. 15 and 36.
76 ibid. p. 4.
77 SACBC, PS1 29-30 Sept. 1954, pp. 4-5. Whelan remarked that ‘Doctor Malan might be kind 
but he was not the Government\ whilst van Velsen lamented that ‘outside of a miracle the government 
would not change its mind’, pp. 20 & 27,
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the attitude of Africans.78 In 39 pages of typed proceedings, the only African in the 
Conference, Bishop Dlamini, is credited with only a single comment.79 During debates 
concerning the reduction of teachers salaries, not a single teacher or representative of the 
Catholic African Teachers Federation was present to voice an opinion. It is also highly 
unlikely that any of the Bishops went to the conference having seriously consulted African 
clergy or congregations.
Hurley recalls a meeting he organised in his archdiocese to debate the implications of the 
Act and to develop strategies for the Church. It was attended by 45 priests and sisters, all 
of whom were white. With the benefit of hindsight, he recognises that this meeting spoke 
Volumes concerning the mentality of the time’.80 The unwillingness of the Bishops to 
engage African opinion meant that their was little room for dissenting voices in the 
Conference. Hurley and Whelan were the two members who represented the most African 
Catholics - Whelan as Bishop of Johannesburg and Hurley as Archbishop of the Durban 
Diocese, and it is possible that they were therefore more in touch with African opinion.81 
Why Hurley was the only Conference member to make the direct connection between the 
actions of the church and the dangers of compromising with apartheid is difficult to assess. 
He was certainly younger than most of the other Bishops, but he may also have been 
influenced by the reaction of the meeting in his diocese. Here a resolution was passed 
against surrendering schools to the government for that would be ‘compromising on 
principle’ with apartheid.82
78 St. George claimed they ‘ could not see the African mind, for the African mind was different from 
theirs.’ SACBC PS1 29-30 Sept. 1954, p. 26.
79 This may well indicate that Dlamini ’ s appointment as a Bishop was to enable the Church to avoid 
accusations of racism in its hierarchy. It could also indicate that Dlamini felt disempowered within the 
Conference as a lone African among influential and respected wliite Bishops. There was also one African 
‘consultor’ at the session, a Rev. Fr. F. Ngobese; it appears that he did not engage in the debate at all.
80 Hurley, ‘The Mission Church \  p. 5.
81 The great majority of African Catholics were in Natal and the major urban centres in the 
Transvaal. The Catholic presence in Natal was historically very strong and, as African urbanization 
increased, so Catholic ministering in urban areas, the Rand in particular, expanded.
82 DCR BEA ‘Report on the Meeting of Clergy and Sisters Held in St. Mary’s Hall. 
Pietermaritzburg, on Tuesday, March 30 1954, to Discuss the Implementation of the Bantu Education Act 
of 1953', p 3.
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The unwillingness of the Catholic Bishops’ to seek out African opinion was certainly a 
product of their position in South African society, but it was also a product of their 
continuing fear of ‘radical’ opinion. The Church dreaded action that might incite Africans 
to break the law. As Bishop Whelan put it, they
must call on the African people for co-operation, but subject to lawful authority.
They must stand by authority. They could not defy the Government... .They should 
tell the people to stand firm and calm, not to let resentment eat their hearts....The 
people should not be caught up in subversive action.83
At the meeting organised by Hurley some priests and sisters ‘pointed out the danger of 
conducting a campaign which might upset the Africans and give the Government 
justification for accusing the Church of agitating’.84 However, it was not only their 
identification with radical African opinion that concerned the Bishops. They also debated 
whether they should contact other denominations. In his memorandum to the plenary 
session, St. George argued that this was unlikely to help the Catholic cause as the Protestant 
Churches ‘have not got a leg to stand on’ because ‘they accept in principle the eventual 
taking over of education by the state’.85 Archbishop Gotthardt felt they could not seek the 
help of other denominations because they did not agree with their teachings.86 Fr. Ketterle, 
representing the Bishop of Umtata, noted that Huddleston had invited the Catholics to meet 
Malan in association with the Anglican Church. For Bishop Boyle this was unthinkable, as 
Huddleston ‘was one of the men that the Prime Minister would not see’ and they could only 
co-operate with ‘good non-Catholic people.’87 Clearly, the Church feared being associated
83 SACBC PS1 29-30 Sept. 1954, p. 21.
8,1 DCR BEA ‘Report of the Meeting...5, p.3. At the same meeting a priest objected to the word 
‘campaign5 being used in the context of an approach being made to the government. He asserted that there 
should not be ‘any sort of agitation5, rather it ‘came down to negotiating with the Government on the basis 
of an appeal’, p. 3,
85 SACBC A2 ‘MemorandumRespectfully...’, p. 3.
86 SACBC PS1 29-30 Sept. 1954, p. 4.
87 ibid 1954, p. 5, Seemingly against the wishes of the SACBC, Hurley wrote to the Anglican 
Bishop of Zululand, Eric Trapp, asking him if the Anglicans would be interested in joining a deputation 
to see Malan. Trapp wrote back complaining that it was ‘nearly a year since I myself urged Bishop Bilgeri 
to confer with Your Grace as to the possibility of combined action, and I have more than once mentioned 
the matter to him since that occasion. I fear that it may now be too late. ’ DCR BEA Hurley tp Trapp 20 Oct
226
with any opinion which opposed the government lest it undermine the harmonious 
relationship that they had cultivated with Nationalist leaders.
At the September plenary much debate centred on the precise wording of resolutions and 
the effect they would have on government opinion. Archbishop McCann appealed for a 
stronger condemnation of the community school system, but this was rejected.88 Similarly, 
McCann and Bokenfohr had wanted the first resolution to read cNo Catholic school shall 
be handed over unless we are forced’, but this was rejected in favour of the more neutral 
phrase ‘that we retain our Catholic school buildings for our own purpose.’89 On a number 
of occasions Bishops expressed their reluctance to antagonise the government and, in the 
letter to be sent to Malan, it was agreed that they should again stress their determination to 
‘obey the state and fight Communism.’90 This continued reluctance to confront the 
government stemmed from a persistent belief that they could extract concessions from the 
Nationalists.
The letter to Malan thus followed the established pattern. Once again the Church spoke of 
its ‘friendly co-operation’, tentatively suggesting that the it did ‘not look for special favours 
or for exceptions beyond the ambit of the Act’, for its sole concern was ‘a reasonable and 
friendly implementation of the Act in favour of our Christian work which we could not 
abandon without betraying the demands of our conscience’.91 And, once again, Malan 
rejected the letter, claiming, as before, that far from decreasing the opportunities for 
Christian endeavour the government was ‘opening up huge fields for spreading Christian 
influence’.92 During this correspondence the pastoral letter that was released was typically
1954 & Trapp to Hurley, 25 Oct 1954.
88 SACBC PS1 29-30 Sept. 1954, p. 28.
89 ibid, p. 29.
90 ibid, p. 24. Whelan had previously warned the Conference to think ‘very seriously before 
appearing to oppose authority’, SACBC PS1 29 April 1054, p. 8.
91 SACBC A2 Whelan to Malan, 7 Oct. 1954, The letter included a copy of the memorandum the 
Church had sent to Verwoerd on 6 Aug. 1954.
92 ibid. Malan to Whelan, 19 Oct. 1954.
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irenic, noting that the Church had
with calm serenity and untiring charity, striven by every possible means to reach a 
conclusion which would be satisfactory to the Church, to the State and to the 
parents of our Bantu children.93
The letter unwittingly highlighted the paradoxical situation that the Church found itself in:
We may never allow ourselves to be less than Catholic ... we may never descend to 
hatred or recrimination or to any course of conduct which is not in accord with the 
spirit of Christ. That very spirit, which urges charity and forbearance upon us, 
forbids us, nevertheless, to yield on principle. The Catholic Church in South Africa, 
therefore, maintains its right to continue helping parents in the education of their 
children.94
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine the developments in Catholic education that 
occurred after the Church’s decision to run its schools privately. The period from this 
commitment to 1960 and beyond was one of huge difficulty as the Church faced continual 
crisis over staff and finances, leading to ever-increasing challenges to the feasibility of 
running a privately funded African school network. However, one key issue during this 
period does shed more light onChurch’s priorities and helps explain its reaction to Bantu 
Education.
By December 1954 most Catholic schools had been registered as private institutions and had 
agreed to the conditions imposed by the Division of Bantu Education, one of which was to 
teach the prescribed religious education syllabus of the department.95 In part-subsidised 
Catholic private schools the situation remained as it was before; the Church created its own 
religious syllabus, subject to departmental approval. However, in early 1956 the department 
introduced its religious syllabus into all community and farm schools which was intended 
to be non-denominational to cater for adherents of all major churches.
93 SACBC A2 ‘Pastoral Letter... p. 1. The ordering of the priorities of this sentence speak volumes 
for the attitude of the Church.
94 SACBC A2 ‘Pastoral Letter,.,’, p. 1.
95 DCR BEA Eiselen to Hurley, 4 Dec. 1954.
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After the implementation of Bantu Education, and despite the continued existence of 
Catholic schools, a number of Catholic children were forced into these non-denominational 
community schools as a result of the Group Areas Act and the closure of some smaller 
Catholic primary schools which were not viable on reduced subsidies. In addition, in 
a somewhat surprising decision, the government also resolved to eliminate all missionary 
influence from farm and mine schools.96 Previously these schools, which were state funded 
and usually built by churches on privately owned land, had been under the control of church 
bodies. A circular in November 1954 forced landowners to decide whether to hand them 
over to the community school system or run them privately without church support.97 The
. . WtVj
decision^reversed in February 1955, when the department decided that farm and mine 
schools could retain their religious managers and principals if the land owner so wished .98 
The schools would, nevertheless, have to become community schools and would gradually 
lose their white missionary staff as and when suitable African staff became available.99
The significance of this for the Church was that 88100 Catholic schools became non- 
denominational community schools despite the wishes of the Church. For Bishop Riegler, 
Bishop of Lydenburg and Director of the Catholic African Affairs Department this meant
that the time has come for us to take a firm stand and to lodge a most vigorous 
protest with the Minister of Native Affairs. We owe this to all the Catholic children 
that have hitherto attended mission schools ... and who will be deprived of their God 
given right to receive Catholic education.101
90 It is unclear why this decision was taken although it may have been that as the vast majority of 
these schools were rural they would have provided an impetus for the creation of local school committees 
and boards.
97 SACBC A2 J. Riegler to Damiano, 27 Dec. 1954. Riegler remarked that the circular had come 
‘as a great shock to us all’.
98 In Jan. 1956 the Department required all fann school managers to sign their allegiance to the 
Bantu Education Act and to the departments non-denominational religious syllabus. The SACBC decided 
that in conscience priests could sign, SACBC AVI Administrative Board Minutes, 27-28 Feb. 1956, p. 4. 
This change may have been precipitated due to protest from the DRC.
99 SACBC A3 Bantu Education Act ‘Riegler Circular to Bishops’, 8 Feb. 1955.
100 B. Collins, Catholic Bantu Education. (Pretoria, 1957), p. 23.
101 SACBC, A2 Riegler to Damiano, 27 Dec. 1954,
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Again the motivation for opposing the effects of Bantu Education rested on the issue of 
religious freedom. The issue of Catholic children being forced to learn the department’s 
religious syllabus exploded into a ‘serious crisis’102 for the Church over the next two years, 
and led to a significant confrontation with the government. Despite its supposed non- 
denominational character the Catholics thought that ‘certain sections were definitely 
Protestant’, giving a Protestant definition of faith and ‘an entirely erroneous interpretation 
of what is necessary for salvation.’103
This syllabus could not be accepted as a matter of religious principle, for the same reason 
that they refused to hand over their schools to the community system. In April 1956 Hurley 
wrote to de Villiers pointing out that in European schools a ‘conscience clause’ allowed 
Catholic children to opt out of religious instruction.104 Nevertheless, in June a circular was 
sent out by all Regional Directors of Bantu Education stating that the department’s syllabus 
had to be taught in community schools without exception. As a concession Catholic priests 
were allowed into community schools for two sessions a week (out of four) to teach 
Catholic doctrine, although all children would have to take departmental exams.105 In 
response the SACBC Administrative Board released another memorandum setting out their 
opposition and resolved yet again to meet government representatives.106
In the memorandum they protested
against the measure of compulsion which is now operative in regard to Catholic 
children at Bantu Government and Community Schools in respect of religious 
instruction and examination therein. This objection and protest is made on the basis 
of freedom of conscience. The Catholic Church maintains that it alone is charged 
with the obligation of the teaching of religious knowledge to its members, and that
102 Hurley, ‘Fund-Raising...’, p. 5.
103 SACBC AVI Ad. Board Min. 27-28 Feb. 1956, p. 4.
104 SACBC AVI Ad. Board Min. 29-30 May 1956. In addition, under Provincial control Catholic 
Africans who found themselves in non-Catliolic schools had tliis right also.
105 SACBC A2 1 Regional Director of Bantu Education (Transkei) to Bantu School Managers, 8 
June 1956.
106 SACBC AVI Ad. Board Min. 28-29 Aug. 1956, p. 6.
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it cannot surrender that obligation and right to any other body In view o f the
foregoing it is asked that the right in conscience o f Bantu parents in the matter o f  
religious instruction be recognised, and adequate provision be made for them to 
fulfill such rights and obligations.107
Following this senior Catholics met with Verwoerd, Eiselen and de Villiers. The meeting 
opened with a unrestrained attack on the Catholic position by Verwoerd, who said that he 
considered the memorandum to be4 an accusation against the Bantu Education Department. * 
He claimed that the Department had been "more than fair’ to the Catholics by giving them 
right of entry into all schools, and that there was more religious tolerance in South African 
than in many countries. If all churches sought special treatment it would be impossible for 
the government to implement the Act. Accusing the Catholics of hypocrisy he maintained 
that when in the majority they tried to restrict the liberty of minorities,108 and when in the 
minority they demanded liberties of conscience which they denied to others. Finally he 
asserted that if Catholics withdrew from the religious instruction examinations it would 
‘bring about a complete collapse of the whole scheme. Therefore all requests had to be 
refused.’109
Archbishop Whelan spoke for the Catholics. He acknowledged that all churches could not 
receive special conditions, but observed that all other churches were Protestant, ‘holding 
essentially the same beliefs’, and that the Catholic position was unique when it came to 
religious instruction. Whelan then told Verwoerd, in unusually sharp terms, ‘that the 
Government was exceeding its powers when it presumed to tell us what Scripture we had 
to accept’. The meeting ended with his warning the government that the ‘Church could not 
let this matter rest and held herself free to pursue this matter in any way she so desired.’110
The confrontational stance adopted by the Catholics is striking. At no stage during the
107 SACBC A2 ‘Memorandum AA/14b/56.’
108 This was clearly a reference to Catholic private schools where all pupils had to follow Catholic 
religious syllabus whether they were Catholic or not.
109 SACBC A2 ‘Notes on Interview with Verwoerd, 30 Nov. 1956', p. 1.
110 ibid, pp. 1-4.
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negotiations over Bantu Education had they opposed government policy with such vigour 
and passion. Hurley summed up the attitude of the Church at this moment
Archbishop Whelan may have been tolerant and conciliatory in previous encounters 
with the promoters of apartheid. He was anything but in this encounter. Here the 
purity and integrity of the Catholic Faith was at stake so it was a case of no-holds- 
barred.111
After the meeting with Verwoerd, the Catholics decided to seek legal advice to see if the 
department was breaking any laws by denying freedom of religious conscience. At the 
Administrative Board meeting of the SACBC in March 1957, Advocate H. Vieyra argued 
that the actions of the Minister were a ‘contrary to the custom of the whole country5 and 
a ‘gratuitous interference with the ordinary wishes of the parents5 who, he argued ‘had a 
right to object on grounds of conscience! ' 112 On his advice the Board agreed to
initiate legal proceedings against the government in the hope that a successful court case 
would ‘undermine the whole edifice of the newly-established system of Bantu Education.5113 
Over the next year there is a silence in the records until the Administrative Board Minutes 
of August 1958 note that all Catholic children in community schools were to be withdrawn 
from general religious instruction and placed in Catholic instruction classes. The Catholics 
had evidently scored a victory over the department in this matter, without having to resort 
to legal action.114
The reaction of the Catholic Church during this whole episode suggests they prioritised their 
need to protect their religious beliefs. Hurley has remarked that
Quite clearly the stand taken by the Bishops in regard to schools was not a stand 
against apartheid. It was a stand against legislation that made it extremely difficult
111 Hurley ‘Fund-Raising...5, p. 5.
112 Clearly tliis was a reference to the situation that prevailed in white schools. SACBC AVI Ad. 
Board Min. 19-21 March 1954.
113 SACBC PS1 2-6 July 1957, p. 17.
114 Hurley, conversation with author, 23 Jan 2000.
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for the Catholic Church to maintain its own schools for Catholic children115
In 1955 the Dutch Reformed Church periodical Die Kerkbode ‘revealed’ that the Catholic 
Church merely pretended to support African education, charging that they only cared about 
fighting for Catholic education. In response, Fr. Stubbs, the editor of the Southern Cross 
remarked that this was ‘precisely what we ourselves have been proclaiming from the 
housetops’.116
Undoubtedly some Africans did see the Catholic’s decision as an act of defiance, for 
according to Hurley
... we did a good thing and it is often appreciated by African people saying that 
‘you fought the government on that’, but we weren’t  really fighting the government 
on that, w e were trying to keep our schools, but they saw it as an endeavour to 
oppose the government, which they appreciated117
This misinterpretation is ironic given the Church’s deeply conservative actions based upon 
narrow and inflexible religious beliefs. However, the reactions ofthe Catholic Church cannot 
be explained simply in terms of adherence to dogma. Its decisions were also the product of 
a white clergy who were, for the most part, totally divorced from the realities of daily life 
as experienced by Africans. The Church was still essentially a mission church, despite its 
somewhat piecemeal attempts to increase African representation in its decision-making 
forums. As a mission church it acted in paternalistic fashion, interpreting the best course of 
action as it saw it, rather than engaging with African opinion. As far as the Church was 
concerned, dangers lurked in associating with Africans. It was clear by the 1950s that South 
Africa was entering a turbulent phase politically, both in terms of the nature of repression 
exercised against Africans and their reaction to it. The moral persuasion of the inter-war 
ANC had given way to increasingly confrontational politics, any many Catholics found this 
discomforting. They were, however, accustomed to interpreting what was in the ‘best
115Hurley, ‘Fund-Raising....’., p. 9.
116 Quoted in Abrahams, The Catholic Church and Apartheid, p. 78.
117 Hurley, interview with author, Durban, 19 June 1998.
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interests’ of Africans and acting for them, because they feared the consequences of allowing 
Africans to actually think for themselves.
The Catholic Church seemed to view the problems it confronted over education within the 
context of the wider history of the Church’s struggle for religious freedom in Protestant 
countries. During the plenary session debate of September 1954 Whelan remarked that ‘the 
Church is older than legislation’ .118 Similarly, the editor of Lumen asserted in June 1954 
‘The Church had overcome innumerable difficulties during the past centuries and will 
certainly overcome the present ones.’119 This sense of a timeless struggle tended to imbue 
Bishops with a wider and less immediate perspective on the struggles of the Church in South 
Africa; ironically this partly divorced them from the harsh realities of the situation. The 
Bishops considered that their principles had ‘stood the test of 200 years’ while ‘other 
principles were recent and will soon disappear.’120
The desire ofthe Church to maintain Catholic influence in African education led it to adopt 
conflicting attitudes and policies towards the government. Its drive to maintain its apostolic 
interests compromised its moral position, because it did not respond to Bantu Education as 
a part of apartheid legislation, but simply as a threat to its religious mission in South Africa. 
For the leaders of the Catholic Church Bantu Education constituted religious, not racial, 
persecution. Religious dogma meant that they could not deny Catholic children a Catholic 
education by closing down their schools, or by entering a non-denominational system. In the 
end they took the only option they could, to run their schools as private Catholic 
institutions. As the editor of Lumen remarked in late 1954 ‘to us, since the details of the 
Bantu Education Act were known, the attitude of the Catholic Church towards the Act was 
a foregone conclusion.’121
118 SACBC PS1 29-30 Sept. 1954, p. 21.
119 Lumen. June 1954, p. 3.
120 Bishop Damiano address to the CATF 4 Jan. 1955. Quoted in Lumen. June 1955, p. 12.
121 Lumen, Dec. 1954, p. 14.
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The preceding chapters have illustrated how four major denominations confronted Bantu 
Education, and clearly show that Africans, in general, had little influence on the decisions 
of church leaders. The remaining chapter seeks to directly address African concerns and 
aspirations by examining the responses of those most intimately affected - the African 
teachers, pupils and parents themselves.
235
t o .
‘Awakening to the issues at stake’1: African Responses to Bantu Education
The majority of missionary organisations involved in African education failed to engage 
Africans in any meaningful fashion when dealing with Bantu Education, Within most 
churches only the few Africans who sat on institutional Governing Councils had any 
influence on decision-making. The opinions of African teachers, those most intimately 
involved in African education, were mostly assumed rather than listened to. There is also 
little evidence that the concerns of parents and pupils were sought, either systematically or 
even casually. In this chapter I explore the reaction of teachers, parents and pupils to the 
process of transfer to Bantu Education and examine African responses to the opportunities 
(or otherwise) offered to them under the new dispensation.
African Teachers and Bantu Education
As we have seen, apart from isolated meetings between teachers and institution leaders at 
a small number of institutions, the concerns and perspectives of African teachers were 
ignored by church and missionary leaders. Still imbued with notions of trusteeship, church 
leaders felt that they understood ‘the African’ and consequently knew what was best for 
them. This meant that African teachers had little, if any, say in the daily running of mission 
schools, where whites occupied almost all positions of authority. As this was the situation 
before Bantu Education, it is hardly surprising that African teachers continued to be 
overlooked throughout the transfer.
In the 1940s, some African teachers had begun to reject mission paternalism and control.2 
Their growing resentment was the product of several factors, all stemming essentially from 
the practices of segregation and apartheid. Previously, teachers had been somewhat aloof 
from the rest of African society enjoying a relatively high social status. However, this status
1 H. Dhlomo, quoted in T. Couzens, The New African: A Study of the Life and Work of H.I.E. 
Dhlomo (Johannesburg, 1985), p. 33.
2 See chapter three. See also appendix 3 for a letter from a teacher which illustrates the frustrations 
that teachers were experiencing.
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was riddled with ambiguity, as Herbert Dhlomo, the African playwright and poet observed 
in 1945
He is neither wholly African nor fully Europeanised ....Timidly and gropingly 
nationalistic in outlook and thought, he lacks a bold universal national philosophy.
He has lost the spirit and habits of tribal communism and is individualistic, yet finds 
that individualism in a country where his race group as a whole is discriminated 
against, does not pay, and that therefore as an individual he cannot go far. His 
destiny lies solely with his group.. .he admires the new and tries to be capitalistic and 
Christian, cultured and progressive...He accepts the authority and standards of 
Europeans in almost everything. He believes in and is friendly to the liberal, the 
missionary, the philanthropist, the good master, the benevolent administrator, the 
paternal ruler...Official propaganda and a missionary (religious) training and 
background, persuade him to believe in plausible stereotypes such as ‘We must win 
the confidence and goodwill of our rulers if we would be free’; ‘We cannot gain 
liberty and a higher social status till all our people are educated’3
According to Dhlomo these characteristics were being broken down by the emergence of 
what he called the ‘New African’. ‘New Africans’ were
awakening to the issues at stake and to the power of organised intellectually-led 
mass action and of progressive African intellectuals and leaders. The new African 
knows where he belongs and what belongs to him; where he is going and how; what 
he wants and the methods to obtain it,,,he wants a new social order where every 
South African will be free to express himself and his personality fully, live and 
breathe freely, and have a part in shaping the destiny of the country.4
While Dhlomo’s analysis was not targeted specifically at teachers it is relevant to changes 
that took place in some teachers’ attitudes and actions in the 1940s and 1950s. In this 
period, teachers began to realise that their predicament was inextricably linked to the plight 
of all Africans living in South Africa. Their frustrations, poor wages and limited employment 
prospects, were now seen to be the consequence of racist practices. In the past, many 
teachers had had faith in the intentions of white South Africans who had espoused 
trusteeship and believed in the gradual assimilation of educated Africans. Increasingly 
however, African teachers became aware that such promises were not being fulfilled and, 
with the victory of the Nationalists in 1948, were never likely to be. An editorial in CATA’s
3 Quoted in Couzens, The New African, p. 33.
journal, Teachers’ Vision, which discussed their 1953 conference noted:
There was a noticeable absence of those elements, who, in the past, had used 
Conference as a festive occasion and would slip in and out of the 
conference-hall with those convenient attache cases, on pleasure bent. There 
was an absence, also, of those teachers from whose Black mouths issued 
forth the White voice of the herrenvolk. This is not a new CAT A. It is the 
same CAT A that decided a few years ago to embark on the New Road of 
Struggle, but in the process of implementing its New Policy it had sloughed 
off all those elements that consciously tried to turn the Teachers’ 
Organisation into an instrument of oppression. What remains is a body of 
earnest men and women ... taking their place alongside their people in a 
determined struggle against oppression.5
This radicalised group, which became increasingly influential in a number of teachers’ 
organisations, did not, however, carry with it a number of teachers who rejected their 
radicalism and confrontational political style. This division between radicals and 
conservatives was to play a significant role in shaping teaching reactions to Bantu 
Education.
The cNew Africans’ in the teaching profession were strongly represented in CAT A and 
TATA. Both organisations had been at the forefront of the campaigning that had taken place 
in the 1940s for equal pay and conditions. CATA had worked throughout the 1940s and 
early 1950s to forge links with teachers in rural areas of the Cape, encouraging them to take 
an active interest in rural struggles, such as those surrounding the Bantu Authorities Act. 
From the publication of the Eiselen Report, CATA set out to discredit Bantu Education 
policy, claiming that it was designed to
increase the power of the ‘herrenvolk’ by producing ignorant, docile CHEAP 
LABOUR, CHEAP TEACHERS, CHEAP GOVERNMENT ofthe oppressed 
people divided into suicidal factions and feuds amongst themselves.6
5 ‘Editorial’, Teachers’ Vision. July - Sept. 1953, p. 3.
6 CATA Executive Report, Teachers’ Vision. Oct.-Dec. 1954, Vol. XX, No. 1, p. 15. Original 
emphasis. CATA president J.L. Mkentane noted in 1954 that the Bantu Education Act promised ‘perpetual 
mental enslavement’, Teachers'Vision. Jan.-March 1954, Vol. XIX, No. 2, p. 4.
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CATA’s political opposition led the Cape Education Department to withdraw its recognition 
ofthe Association in 1951. The then Chief Inspector of Native Education in the Cape, F. 
J. de Villiers, explained to members that he had done so as CATA ‘aimed to upset the 
present policy of the government.57 The withdrawal of recognition and the political stance 
that CATA adopted led to growing tensions within the organisation resulting in a split and 
the creation of the Cape African Teachers Union (CATU) in 1953. CATU, which 
immediately received Departmental recognition, was opposed to political campaigning and 
looked to foster harmonious relations with the Education Department. The 1950s were 
characterised by ‘a considerable struggle between CATU and CATA for control of the Cape 
Teachers’.8
CATA was affiliated to the AAC and the NEUM which had a major influence on the way 
that it interacted with other teaching organisations and with the ANC. After a failed 
compromise agreement in 1943 the AAC and the ANC drew apart, with the AAC opposing 
the strikes and law breaking urged by what it saw as an overly Africanist ANC. This 
antipathy to the ANC was also prevalent in the NEUM whose members were mostly 
teachers who refused to condone violence or run the risk of imprisonment, but were equally 
determined to oppose the ‘colour bar’. They proposed to oppose discrimination via a policy 
of non-collaboration and boycott, but in most instances this simply led to a situation of mere 
passivity, as the organisation looked to avoid direct conflict with state authority. This 
apathy was matched by a virulent sectarianism towards other political groups including the 
ANC, which meant that the NEUM was never able to create mass support9
In the Transvaal, after a period of political campaigning in the early 1940s, TATA came 
under the control of a more conservative leadership in the middle years of the decade. It 
now retracted from an active political role, preferring instead to travel the well worn path 
of quiet diplomacy. Angered by this reversal of policy, a number of radical urban teachers
7 Quoted from Hyslop, ‘Teacher Resistance...’ p. 102.
8 ibid, p. 104.
9 See Hyslop, The Classroom, pp. 30-32.
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revolted at the Association’s conference in 1949. Within a year this group had managed to 
wrest control ofthe Association from more conservative rural members who left TATA and 
formed the Transvaal African Teachers Union (TATU).10 Es’Kia Mphahlele, who became 
secretary of TATA, observed that after the split TATA represented a ‘hard core who 
believed in the African and took no instructions from the TED [Transvaal Education 
Department].’11 Under its new leadership, TATA launched a campaign against Bantu 
Education. It organised a speaking tour, with TATA leaders entering villages and towns 
during school vacations, attempting to educate Africans about the dangers of the Eiselen 
Report.12 However, by 1953 TATA had once again swung to the right, coming under the 
control of conservative elements who forced the removal of radical leaders. The politically 
active teachers could not rely on ANC support at this time, as the Defiance Campaign was 
underway.13 According to Mphahlele, ‘it took the ANC a long time to digest the message 
of our campaign of 1951 and 1952.,14 The change in TATA’s leadership did not signal an 
end to the Association’s attempts to combat the implementation of Bantu Education, but 
it did mean that by the mid-1950s CATA was ‘the sole remaining bastion of African teacher 
militancy’.15
After the passage of the Bantu Education Act in late 1953 teaching organisations 
immediately began to address the issue of how they could oppose it. For CATA the key lay 
in informing Africans of the dangers inherent in Bantu Education. The editor of Teachers’
10 TATU did not welcome the Bantu Education Act. At its annual conference in 1952 its president, 
S. Lekhele, remarked that there was no such thing as ‘native education5 but he argued that all teachers could 
do was to be ‘constructively dissatisfied.’ ‘Dissatisfied with Education Policy’, Star. 3 July 1952.
11 Quoted in Manganyi, Exiles, p. 155.
11 See Mphahlele, Down Second Avenue, p. 168, TATA also organised two conferences which 
condemned the Eiselen Report, see Hyslop ‘Teacher Resistance...5, p. 98.
13 The radical leadership was also undermined because of a failed boycott campaign against the 
sacking of a number of teachers in an Orlando school. See Hyslop, ‘Teacher Resistance...5 pp. 99-100.
14 Quoted in Manganyi. Exiles, p. 145. It appears that some TATAmembers were keen to join with 
TATU. In 1952 Eiselen made the first of his threats against teachers who opposed the new legislation. See 
L. Sihlali, ‘Bantu Education and the African Teacher5. Africa South. Oct.-Dec. 1956, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 47- 
48. Sihlali was dismissed from Queenstown Bantu High School in 1953 for alleged participation in politics.
15Hyslop, ‘Social Conflicts...5 p. 294.
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Vision remarked in 1953,
For generations now the teachers have fallen into the grievous error of making 
education the private concern of themselves...Now the time has come for the 
teachers to go out to the People and tell them what are the aims of ‘Bantu 
Education’16
At a union-wide conference organised by CATA in December 1953 it was resolved that it 
was ‘the special duty of the teachers to enlighten the people who alone could render 
oppressive laws unworkable’.17 A few months later, at a joint conference of CATA and the 
Teachers League of South Africa (TLSA)18 a delegate remarked
We are agreed on the question that we cannot fight for such an educational system 
[free and compulsory] without being compelled to fight for a democratic 
society...Parents and teachers must realise that restrictions on an individual are 
those ofthe whole group. The formation of Parent-Teacher Associations is a crying 
need at the moment19
This call from CATA was mirrored by TATA which, between 1952-55, despite its political 
swings, endeavoured to establish Parent Teacher Associations (PTA’s) to popularize the 
struggle against Bantu Education 20 In Natal even the Catholic African Teachers Federation 
(CATF) reflected on the
... wide gap between parents and teachers....Many of our teachers are guilty of 
neglect in this matter.. .If teachers are to a certain extent ignorant of what is taking
16 ‘Editorial: A Challenge’., Teachers’ Vision. Oct.-Dec. 1953, Vol. XIX, No. 1, p. 4.
17 ‘Union-Wide Conference’ , Teachers’ Vision, Jan.-March 1954, p. 6. This conference was only 
attended by 200 teachers, whom the Teachers’ Vision admitted were mostly CATA members. In the same 
issue the General Secretary noted ‘the source of our greater strength is THE PEOPLE’, p. 14 (original 
emphasis).
18 The TLSA was an equally political teachers association made up of ‘coloured’ teachers. Coloured 
schools were not directly affected by Bantu Education, but in 1963 the Coloured Persons’ Education Act (no. 
47) transferred control of schools for coloured pupils from the provinces to a Division of Education within 
the Department for Coloured Affairs.
19 NLSA AP326:37CA ‘Education for Citizenship’ Conference of CATA and TLSA East London 
25-26 June 1954.
20 Lodge, ‘The Parents’...’, p. 273.
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place, all the more so are the majority of parents.... A law has been enacted called 
the Bantu Education Act. What do the majority of people know about it and its 
effect on African education? Very little. They must be educated and that is why I 
urge now, more than ever, the formation of the Associations21
The attempt by teacher associations to educate parents presented them with various 
obstacles. Many teachers had a relatively high social status and little experience of reaching 
out to the African population, as they themselves acknowledged. To expect them to engage 
in dialogue with African communities meant the transformation of long standing social 
barriers. On the other hand, teachers were, on the whole, respected members of 
communities and it can be assumed that many parents would have attended meetings called 
by them. Organisationally it was an ambitious task, with the expectation that teachers 
throughout the country would volunteer their time to arrange and attend meetings with 
parents. Despite concerted efforts, only a limited section of parents came into contact with 
teachers tii&ugh PTAs in the short time available before the implementation of the Act.22
PTAs were not the only mechanism teachers used to oppose Bantu Education. CATA, 
appealed for a boycott of school boards, calling on Teachers and people not to operate the 
machinery of their own enslavement.523 The Union-Wide conference urged ‘all the oppressed 
people to pursue and co-ordinate the struggle.,24 This same rhetoric emanated from CATA 
until its demise at the end of the decade, but at no stage did it, or any other teaching body, 
call for support for the ANC boycott of schools which began in 1955. This lack of support 
was to be expected from CATA, given the state of relations between the NEUM and the 
ANC25, but this was not the case for other teaching groups, and suggests that there were 
other reasons why teachers' organisations failed to support the ANC schools boycott.
21 M. Sono ‘Parent Teacher Associations’, Lumen Dec. 1954, p. 7.
22 The creation of PTAs even in Johannesburg was disappointing. See Lodge, ‘The Parents’... \  p.
273.
23 ‘Union-Wide Conference’, Teachers’ Vision, Jan.-March 1954, p. 10.
24 ibid. p. 10.
25 The AAC called the boycott ‘adventurist ’, Lodge suggests that factional rivalry between the AAC 
/ NEUM and the ANC prevented them and CATA from supporting the ANC boycott. Lodge ‘The 
Parents’...’, p. 282.
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The ANC leadership was slow to respond to Bantu Education. It was not until December 
1954 that a decision was taken at its Durban conference to organise a schools boycott in 
opposition to its implementation. Here it was agreed that an indefinite boycott would take 
place from 1st April 1955, with local control delegated to the ANCYL, After some delay 
boycotts began in mid-April but from this date until the end of the boycott in 1956, no more 
than sporadic protests took place in Johannesburg and the Eastern Cape. At no time did 
more than 8,000 children boycott schools and, as Hyslop notes, ‘outside a few areas of 
particular militancy, the vast bulk of the black school-going population stayed inside the 
school system.,26 Reasons for the failure of the boycotts were many and included (in brief), 
the ANCYL’s difficulty in effectively mobilising African youth; inadequate preparations for 
offering alternative educational facilities; a lack of clear objectives within the ANC; state 
intimidation of teachers and pupils, and an unwillingness amongst teachers and pupils to get 
involved.
Aside from the ideological barrier that separated CATA from the ANC, teaching 
associations did not support the ANC boycott because it threatened their members long­
term employment prospects and because, by 1955, they were pre-occupied with the new 
regulations thrust upon them by the Bantu Education Division. By the time of the boycott 
most African teachers had resigned themselves to working within the new system. It had 
become clear that, apart from the Catholic Church, mission and church bodies had neither 
the will nor the resources to run private schools outside of Bantu Education. Teachers could 
thus either stay on in Bantu Education schools or seek employment outside the education 
sector. Job reservation, however, meant that the labour market offered few opportunities 
for educated Africans. Economically, teachers were trapped within their profession. The 
example of Nora Moerane, a teacher at Adams College, demonstrates this. She left Adams 
after the introduction of Bantu Education, asking ‘what was the point of us keeping on 
teaching this type of stuff to students?’ However, within months she had re-entered the 
teaching profession at the Ohlange Institute. She remarked ‘now you get to Ohlange, and 
apart from a situation whereby we don’t like this thing, your situation is that you need a job.
26 Hyslop, ‘Let Us...’, p. 5.
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You do it reluctantly. You needed a job.’27
This difficult situation was worsened by the teaching regulations published by the Division 
of Bantu Education in 1955. In June 1954 Verwoerd had informed the Senate that salary 
scales for newly-appointed teachers would be ‘less favourable5 than those existing. Teachers 
voluntarily breaking their contracts would, upon re-application, be subject to the lower 
scales whatever their previous salary had been.28 These conditions were confirmed in 
January 1955.29
The regulation was designed to discourage acts of defiance by teachers but was only part 
of a raft of regulations. These ensured that teachers could be penalised for encouraging 
disobedience to the laws of the state; joining a political party or ‘actively participating] in 
political affairs5; contributing any article to any publication; or acting 4 in a manner which 
in the opinion of the Secretary is deleterious to his position as a teacher.530 CATA 
commented that these regulations were ‘enslaving rules for people engaged in slave 
education5, making it ‘impossible for teachers to continue their fight for a democratic system 
of education within a democratic society.531 Undoubtedly this is exactly what the regulations 
set out to achieve, as they were created to silence criticism of Bantu Education.32
TATA refused to become involved in the ANC5s schools boycott, arguing that children 
should not be used in the struggle against the legislation, claiming that even Bantu
27 Nora Moerane, interview with author, Durban, 19 June 1998.
28 Verwoerd, Bantu Education: Policy for the Immediate Future (Pretoria, 1954), p. 19.
29 ‘The NAD’s Model Regulations for African Teachers’, Teachers’ Vision. Vol. XX, No, 2, p. 9.
30 ‘Regulations Governing the Conditions of Appointment, Service, and Discipline of Bantu 
Teachers in Government Bantu Schools’, Bantu Education Journal. May 1955, pp. 156-167.
31 ‘The NAD’s....’ p. 13. TATA remarked that they ‘make us virtually silent. They are full of 
don’ts.’ University of South Africa (UNISA) Documents Centre ASS212 CATU 10.2 Corr. with other 
bodies. TATA Annual Conference 21-23 June 1955, p. 2.
32As Jelico Njokweni remarked, ‘when Bantu Education was dominating we would not voice our 
opinion, if you voice your opinion you would be labelled that you were against the Government of the day. 
It was terrible.’ Jelico Njokweni, interview with author, Healdtown, 18 Jan. 2000.
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Education was better than no education.33 For Hyslop this ‘Right-Wing Backlash7 
demonstrated TATA’s retreat from political action.34 The question that needs to be asked, 
however, is what were teachers supposed to do? If we are to assume that they should have 
joined the ANC’s boycott, then certain conditions would have had to have been met. Firstly, 
they would have needed the support of parents, which, as will be seen, they did not have. 
Secondly, teachers who resigned their posts would have required alternative sources of 
income via an alternative education system capable of accommodating not only pupils but 
also teachers.35 The education system operated by the ANC during the boycott did not get 
remotely close to this.36 CATA, the most radical African teaching group, also failed to 
support the ANC boycott. A statement from its executive shows the impossible position 
teachers were put in
to enter into a new contract of employment with the Government under the Bantu 
Education Act will be a negation of all educational principles; a violation of the 
CATA and a betrayal of the principles of the Association....to refuse to sign the 
contracts would be an act of capitulation. If we voluntarily relinquish our posts we 
shall denude the educational front of our fighters.. .In this jungle that is South 
Africa, we are the custodians of the true educational values accepted the world 
over... .The Executive wishes to emphasise that the signing of the contract with the 
employer does not place any moral obligation to join the government sponsored 
conspiracy against education and our children... .we urge our members to take up 
the fight in the classroom with the fight for full democratic rights for all.37
33 R. Peteni, Towards Tomorrow: The Story of the African Teachers Association of South Africa. 
(Morges, 1978), p. 59. In 1949 TATA had rejected an ANC call to boycott the Eiselen Commission. J. 
Nhlapo from TATA argued ‘Everyone knows that the government will do what it wants with our education 
in spite of our boycott... let us put this boycott steak in the ice-chest and tell the government what we want 
and what we do not want.1 ‘Should Education Enquiry Commission be Boycotted?’, Bantu World. 14 May 
1949.
34 Hyslop, ‘Teacher Resistance...’, p. 102. At TATA’s 1955 conference the Presidential address 
noted that ‘teachers and politicians had the same struggle but the method of approach had to be different. ’ 
UNISA AAS212 TATA Annual Conference 1955.
35June Dliale who taught at Adams from 1937-57 noted ‘most blacks had to stay on because they 
didn’t have quite the opportunities.’ Interview with author, Durban, 14 June 1998.
36 A small number of ‘schools’ were opened by the African Education Movement, which was 
supported by Huddleston, and, as we have seen, Reeves opened ‘Church Family Centres’ to adsorb pupils 
involved in the boycott. In total no more than a handful of such ‘schools’ functioned during the boycott.
37 ‘ On Them Must Rest the Onus: Statement of the Executive Committee on the Signing of Service 
Contracts’, Teachers’ Vision. Jan.-March 1955, Vol. XX, No. 2, p. 15. Tins was also typical Unity 
Movement ‘double-speak’; pretending that to do nothing was in some way radical.
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Despite its rhetoric, CATA appealed to its members to enter the Bantu Education system 
even though it ‘violated CATA’ and was a ‘betrayal7 of its principles.38 It argued there was 
no realistic alternative for teachers but to remain in their posts. In the Transvaal 116 
teachers were dismissed in 1955 because of boycotts in their schools. The President of 
TATA received letters from district offices, particularly those on the East Rand (where the 
boycott was strongest), ‘pleading that the teachers affected be given jobs by the 
Department.5 In response to these letters, Executive Committee members negotiated with 
the Department and with its ‘help7 found new posts for all but seven of the dismissed 
teachers.39
At TATA’s 1955 conference, its Witwatersrand branch denounced the boycott claiming it 
was ‘unrealistic and detrimental740, in May of that year the weekly newspaper New Age 
remarked that ‘teachers have become so scared about how this step [the boycott] is likely 
to affect their positions that they are doing propaganda against the campaign and against the 
ANC.741
There is little documentary evidence of how teachers felt about the way the mission 
churches responded to Bantu Education.
In itself this silence my be revealing as it may suggest that teachers 
had already decided that the time had come for the state to assume responsibility for 
education. Much African teachers7 agitation in the 1940s had been aimed at improving their 
employment status - ensuring that they had civil service contracts, would receive a pension 
and would be renumerated directly from the state rather than via subsidies paid to
38 This was despite a call from CATA in 1954 which exhorted ‘parents, teachers and the African 
people generally not to operate the machinery of their own servile position. ’ Umthunvwa. 27 Feb. 1954.
39 UNISA AAS212 CATU 10.2 TATA Annual Conference 21-23 June 1955, p. 2. Clearly, the 
government viewed these teachers as innocent victims of the boycott and did not consider that they had 
engaged in any political activity, for if is had done so these teachers would not have been re-employed in 
government schools.
40 ibid, p. 4.
41 Quoted from T. Karis & G. Gerhart (eds.), From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History 
of African Politics in South Africa 1882-1964. Vol. 3 Challenge and Violence 1953-64. (Stanford, 1977), 
p. 32.
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missionary schools. These issues, and the institutional racism inherent in larger mission 
schools, had already turned many teachers against missionary education. Thus, they may 
not have lamented the demise of mission education, although, of course, this does not mean 
they welcomed Bantu Education.42
In late 1954 CATA condemned the Methodist and Presbyterian Churches for handing over 
their schools ‘without even making the pretence of consulting the people whose objection 
of [sic] the Act they know only too well.’43 One senior African teacher at the Methodist 
school, Healdtown, remembers arriving at the schools one morning to be told by white staff 
that the school was to be leased. He recalls, ‘it was terrible, we were not informed.. .we were 
not informed about the situation, everything just happened quickly.’ The President of 
CATA, N. Hlonono, launched a scathing attack upon the decisions of the mission churches, 
castigating their racism44 and condemning their ‘lip-service to the idea of equality of all 
men. ’ He criticised missionary-trained African intellectuals who represented the churches, 
claiming that their presence ‘comforted the whites.... [enabling] them to say that African 
opinion was substantially represented’. Hlonono noted the churches’failure to stand 
together, which, he claimed, had led to a dissipation of their energy and their ‘ignominious 
defeat’; had they united ‘the Government scheme would have been crippled.’45 An 
anonymous letter to Teachers’ Vision echoed these sentiments by arguing that the Churches 
‘while ostensibly rejecting Bantu Education have agreed to operate the Bantu Education 
Act!’46 Although CATA condemned the racism of institutions and the denominationalism
42 Of course the paucity of material also confirms that teachers voices were not heard in these
debates.
43 ‘The Churches Collaborate3, Teachers3 Vision., Oct.-Dec. 1954, Vol. XX, No. 1, p. 14.
44 Honono mentioned the ‘missionary institution ghettoes where non-white teachers reside in poor 
dwellings in keeping with the general pattern of the country.3 ‘Presidential Address3, Teachers3 Vision. July- 
Sept. 1955, Vol. XX, No. 4, pp. 8-9.
45 ‘Presidential Address3, Teachers3 Vision. July-Sept. 1955, Vol. XX, No. 4, pp. 8-9. p. 10.
46 ‘What Can be Done?3, Teachers3 Vision. Oct.-Dec. 1954, Vol. XX, No. 1, p. 16. CATA was 
particularly concerned with the chinches3 refusal to support their ban on joining school committees. One 
anonymous author condemned the ‘jackal-black clergy rushing in on the corpse of African education to see 
what scraps of offal they could get for themselves. So we find them serving on the NAD3s Committees and 
Boards.3 Pedagogue, The Role Being Played by the Churches’, Teachers3 Vision. April-June 1955, Vol. 
XX, No. 3, p. 13.
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of the churches, it is unclear what they expected the churches to do. Hlonono implies that 
if the churches had refused the government access to their schools, presumably by closing 
them down, Bantu Education would have been defeated .47 However, such an act would have 
led to the large-scale unemployment of teachers.48 As we have seen, it cannot be assumed 
that teachers would have supported the churches if they had closed down their schools.
The only other documentary evidence uncovered comes from the African teachers working 
in Catholic private schools. As previously shown, teachers who remained in private Catholic 
schools had to survive on 75 per cent of their previous salaries. According to Frank Pakose, 
a teacher in Durban, this
... had wide repercussions among the teachers, because i f  a teacher does not want 
the 75 per cent, he will have to leave. In that case, he will be guilty o f  a break o f  
service, and liable to the lower salary scales [in state schools] ... Hence he can 
neither take the one decision nor the other without serious financial consequences 
to himself. Consequently the teacher is being placed in a dilemma by his two 
masters - the Church and the State. I find it very difficult to reconcile my sentiments 
with this state o f affairs when I take into consideration the increased cost o f  
maintenance and living49
The reduction in wages was obviously a serious financial issue and over the following years 
many African teachers did leave Catholic schools to work in government institutions.50 The 
decision to leave, however, was not an easy one as the government tried to discourage 
African teachers from leaving private Catholic schools by warning them in popular 
newspapers that the Department could not 'create posts to accommodate all the teachers
47 Even though he labelled Reeves’ closure of schools as ‘useless.5
48 The government would have ended the payment of grants for teacher ’ s wages the moment schools 
were closed.
49 Hurley BEA 1953-6 Frank Pakose (teacher at Mazenod High School, Durban) to Hurley 23 
March 1955.
50 Sr. Josefila, who taught at Mariannhill from 1941 to 1996 told me that most African teachers 
with higher diplomas and qualifications left between 1955-59. She remembers that more nuns were required 
to teach as African teachers were not attracted to private Catholic schools. Interview with author, 
Mariannhill, 2 June 1998.
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who wish to resign from employment in church schools.’51 It was not only economic issues 
that concerned African teachers in Catholic schools, however. At the 1956 CATF 
conference a Johannesburg delegate observed ‘whilst we pledge our support to the 
hierarchy, we would appreciate information as to why they have accepted the Bantu 
Education Act and all it stands for?’ A delegate from Pretoria noted that ‘it would have been 
more effective if the Church had taken a sterner decision of closing down all schools.’52 
Neither of these comments received any attention in the minutes of the Conference, but do 
suggest that some African teaches in Catholic schools were unhappy with the decision to 
keep the schools open.
Other teachers lamented the demise of mission schooling in this period. A teacher at 
Mariannhill, when asked why he did not move to a government school after Bantu 
Education, declared
W ell I was so much attached to the school that I felt that I was part o f the family 
... another point was that we got a lot o f things free like, food, accommodation 
which I think they were trying to make up for the lack o f  wages.53
The divisions that became apparent within teaching associations, between those who 
supported direct political action and those who did not, and between those who condemned 
mission authorities and those who lamented the destruction of mission education reflected 
in many ways the generational gap within the teaching profession. This mirrored wider 
conflicts that were taking place within other African organisations at this time, such as in 
the ANC where younger, more radical members had begun to turn the Congress into a more 
activist body.54 Njokweni remembers debates with younger university-trained teachers in
51 ‘Government Subsidy and the Roman Catholic Schools’, appeared in Bantu World. 2 April 1954 
and Illange Lase. 16 April 1954.
52 ‘Catholic African Teachers Conference, Newcastle, 31 Dec.-Jan. 4 1955', Lumen, June 1955, 
p. 15. The Johannesburg delegate called on Bishops to make more effort to consult with the CATF.
53 E. Nxumalo, interview with author, Mariannhill, 27 June 1998. Asimilar opinion was expressed 
by J. Njokweni, interview with author Healdtown, 18 Jan. 2000.
54 The debate within the ANC as to the merits or otherwise of a schools boycott reflected this 
generational divide.
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the early 1950s over the issue o f who should control African education
they would talk about that [state control] in our meetings...‘The missionaries are 
doing good work but some o f us are not quite satisfied, w e feel that we should get 
this and this and this and this’....They saw state control after the church control, 
they respected church control, but they saw that if  the state would take over then 
somethings would be improved....they saw things differently.55
These divisions weakened the teachers’ position, not only because it split their organisations 
but also because it forced teachers themselves into contradictory positions. Younger 
teachers looking for change found some of their demands met by Bantu Education, at the 
same time as it imposed an education system that they could not approve of.56 Other African 
teachers lamented the removal of missionaries from the educational sphere, but unwilling 
to bring political matters into the schools, were reluctant to actively oppose the changes. 
The teachers’ resolve was also weakened by state victimisation during the first few years of 
Bantu Education. Teachers wages were paid directly to School Boards which could dismiss 
them without disciplinary proceedings and with no right of appeal. Members of the School 
Boards were often unsympathetic to teachers creating an atmosphere of trepidation in many 
schools. Margaret Ballinger, for example, received a letter from the National Council of 
Women of South Africa which asserted that
Every teacher lives in fear and trembling o f  doing something wrong, in case they 
should offend in some way. They have no security because once they loose their 
jobs in this way they will never get back another with the Department57
As a result of the withdrawal of subsidy from School Boards, 28 teachers, most of whom 
were CATA members, had already been dismissed in the Cape alone. Given the limited 
opportunities open to teachers it is unsurprising that such intimidation undermined their
55 Njokweni, interview with author, Healdtown, 18 Jan. 2000. By university he presumably meant 
Fort Hare.
56 R. Baloyi the Secretary of TAT A wrote to M. Ballinger ‘We fail to see why the Minister was so 
keen to take us away from the Missionary Societies only to still hide behind the same policy of saying we 
are not Civil Servants.’ WCL A410 Ballinger B2.14.5 Baloyi to Ballinger, 13 May 1955.
57 WCL AB410 T. Snitcher (Convener of the African Affairs Committee - National Council of 
Women of South Africa) to Ballinger, 23 April 1956.
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determination to oppose Bantu Education. Teachers were also harassed more directly by the 
state through police raids. In 1954 CATA was bemoaning the continual police raids on its 
leading members.58
Another issue that weakened the determination of teachers was the Government’s insistence 
on reducing the number of male teachers. An editorial in Teachers’ Vision in 1954 noted 
that ‘to say their [male teachers] employment has become insecure is perhaps an under­
statement.’59 A threatened decline in the quota of male teachers per school inevitably made 
male teachers unwilling to do anything that could be interpreted as politically motivated. 
Speculating on the decision to increase female teacher numbers, a member of the CATA 
executive remarked, ‘the reasons for this are not far to seek. It is cheaper to employ female 
teachers than men ...It is far easier to dominate women than men.’60
Despite the many negative aspects of Bantu Education there were minor benefits which 
appealed to some teachers. Notwithstanding the introduction of double sessions61, the 
expansion of schooling ensured an overall increase in the demand for teachers. Bantu 
Education also promised the Africanisation of the schools inspectorate, allowing Africans 
access to positions previously closed to them.62 Similarly the gradual removal of white 
teachers from mission schooling opened up senior positions for Africans. At Adams, Ida 
Grant noted in 1955 that three ‘senior’ African teachers had left for government schools 
which they felt ‘offered greater security and better prospects’.63
58 ‘Police Raids and Intimidation’ Teachers’ Vision. Oct.-Dec. 1954, Vol. XX, No. l,p . 13. In Jan. 
1955 the government banned the publication of Teachers’ Vision.
59 ‘Editorial’, ibid. p. 3.
60 ‘The Ramifications of the ‘Bantu’ Education Act’, unnamed CATA Executive member. 
Teachers’ Vision, Oct-Dec. 1954, p. 24. This quote demonstrates the patriarchal nature of the teaching 
profession.
61 Double-sessions had already become commonplace in some parts of Johannesburg and the 
Eastern Cape before the passing of the Bantu Education Act. East Province Herald. 12 April 1950.
62 This same process occurred within the nursing profession. See S. Marks, Divided Sisterhood 
(Basingstoke, 1994).
63 Ida Grant, end of year letter, Nov. 7 1955.
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In conclusion, two distinct phases can be seen in teachers’ responses to Bantu Education. 
From the publication of the Eiselen Report to the gradual introduction of Bantu Education 
(1952-54) teachers were generally vocal in their opposition to the legislation. After the 
capitulation of the missions, however, and the failure of any political group, including 
teaching associations, to prevent the imposition of Bantu Education, teachers began to make 
the best of a bad situation. For all the fiery rhetoric from CATA, teachers’ opposition to 
Bantu Education was weak and ineffective. This was because of the nature of the labour 
market, the divisions amongst teachers themselves and crucially, because there was little 
support amongst African parents for radical action against Bantu Education.
Parents and Bantu Education
Early on in the battle against Bantu Education teachers realised that parents had never been 
engaged in any meaningful way in relation to the education of their children. PTAs were, on 
the whole, non-existent and African parents had little if any influence on the decisions that 
affected their children.
However, it was not only teachers who neglected parents. Cecil Manona, a Lovedale 
student during the transition, remembers
mission leaders were not even knowing that there were people around. There were 
no advisory councils, none, there was no involvement o f people and parents at all, 
at all... .The whites did whatever they wanted to do.54
There were logistical difficulties in establishing PTAs in the larger institutions due to the 
distance which many parents lived from the schools. In urban areas this was not necessarily 
the case, but migratory working conditions and long working hours hampered the 
introduction of these associations. Despite these difficulties the lack of effort in seeking 
parents’ opinions was symptomatic of the missionaries'general failure to engage with 
African opinion. While it is therefore difficult to evaluate parents’ reactions to Bantu
64 Cecil Manona, interview with author, Grahamstown, 18 Jan. 2000. Nora Moerane who was at 
Inanda in this period remarked ‘very little was known of PTA’s. ’ Interview with author, Durban, 19 June 
1998.
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Education, it is illuminating to examine the reaction of parents to the ANC schools boycott.
Lodge has shown how a breakdown in relations between the ANC and parents occurred as 
a ‘result of worries over the quality of alternative educational options offered by the ANC.565 
For any mass boycott action to be sustained long-term educational facilities had to be 
provided, and this the ANC was unable to do. This was acknowledged by African parents 
who also realised that students would need qualifications to enter the existing labour market; 
they feared that alternative schools could not provide the necessary certification and would 
thus permanently damage their children’s future employment opportunities.66
The hostility to the boycott from many African parents was extreme. The Brakpan district 
of TAT A recorded in 1955 ‘teachers in the affected schools suffered a great deal from the 
public. Some were threatened, kidnapped and intimidated. Attempts were made to bum 
houses of certain principals.567 Phyliss Ntantala recalls driving around Orlando in April 1955 
seeing fathers with ‘big sticks5 protecting their children who were going to school ‘daring 
anybody to stop them5.68 Proponents of the boycott failed to recognise ‘the vicious circle 
that makes it imperative for working parents to leave their children in the care of a school 
during the day.569 For the vast majority of African parents schooling was a form of child care 
which kept children off the streets. They also saw education as a means of providing a better 
future for their children. Hyslop has argued that these two factors made Bantu Education 
Schools ‘sufficiently attractive for the large majority of black parents to consider it 
worthwhile sending their children to attend.570 It was not only the parents of students who
65 Lodge. 'The Parents’... \  p. 280. ZK Matthews argued that it failed ‘principally because of the 
difficulty of organising an alternative programme for the children.’ Matthews, Freedom for Mv People, p. 
180.
66 Hyslop, 'Let Us...’, p. 20.
67 UNISA AAS212 TATA Annual Conference 1955.
68 Ntantala, A Life’s, p. 161. In Port Elizabeth an anti-boycott movement was established by 
parents, see Feit, African Opposition, p. 173.
69Mpliahlele, 'Down...’, p. 192.
70 Hyslop, ‘Social Conflicts...’, p. 240.
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rejected the boycott, for Bantu Education greatly increased the number of pupils receiving 
primary schooling. In 1955 just over 1 million African children were at school, while by 
1960 the number had risen to over 1.5 million.71 Thus, more parents could, for the first time, 
send their children to school. Ntantala recalls a meeting of Langa residents that took place 
to discuss the boycott. One parent, Winnie Siqwana remarked
I am amazed the ANC, an organisation of the African people, who should know,... 
that education is the only hope the African people have, through which they hope 
to liberate themselves some day, could ever come up with such a resolution...there 
is not a single African parent who does not wish to see his or her child educated, to 
be in a better position than the parent. How then, can the ANC, an organisation of 
all these people, call upon them to do what they know the people will never do?72
Another mother commented ‘The fight is for us, not for our children.. we want our children 
educated.'73 The meeting resolved to send children to school and encourage teachers to 
ignore the boycott while doing all they could to counter Bantu Education. African parents 
desperately wanted their children to be educated and the state was able to tap into this desire 
and ensure the acquiescence of most parents.74 The state also severely punished those 
children who had been withdrawn during the boycott by permanently expelling them from 
schools. By April 1955 some 7000 pupils had been expelled.75 The NAD was given the 
power either to withdraw all funding from boycotted schools or to invite new pupils to 
permanently fill the vacated places. This had the effect of offering education to some 
children who had previously had no schooling at all,76 and, no doubt, causing division
71 Horrell, Bantu Education to 1968. p. 52.
72 Ntantala, A Life’s, p. 156. In a memorandum the ANC recognised this danger when it stressed 
‘it is not the ANC which is asking them [parents] to sacrifice their children...the ANC has not robbed them 
of anything.* Memorandum on Bantu Education prepared at the ANC’s 42 Annual Conference, quoted in 
Feit, African Opposition, p. 160.
73 ibid. p. 156. The Society of Young Africans (the youth wing of the AAC) condemned the boycott 
for shifting ‘the burden of the struggle on to the backs of our children. ’ Quoted from Karis & Gerhert, From 
Protest, p. 34.
74 During the course of the boycott 25 ANC members in the Cape had their membership suspended 
for sending their children to school.
75 Hyslop, ‘Let Us...’, p. 16, Most of these students were readmitted after the boycott ended.
76 Feit, African Opposition, p. 174.
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amongst parents.
Many parents also accepted Bantu Education because they were essentially ignorant of its 
implications. Mphahlele maintained that ‘several months were needed to prepare the minds 
of parents about what Bantu Education means in the classroom.’77 These difficulties were 
highlighted in a letter that appeared in Teachers’ Vision
To base our hopes of the people fighting the Bantu Education Act on its effects is 
dangerous nonsense. Not until the people have been taught to oppose their OWN 
ideas to those of the herrenvolk can they ever hope to change the situation. This is 
the immediate task of intellectuals.. .unless agitational and educational work begins 
NOW the people cannot be expected, nor will they in the future be able to see the 
need, to get out of the mt which they shall have been thrown into.78
Although patronizing in its implication that uneducated Africans were incapable of 
articulating effective opposition to apartheid, it nonetheless indicates the difficulties teachers 
faced when attempting to promote their concerns about Bantu Education. Honono, 
President of CATA lamented the parents ‘cancerous ignorance.... [who were] ignorant of 
the fact that they have certain rights to which they are entitled as human beings.’79
The governments creation of School Boards may also have been attractive to some parents. 
While offering to bring parents and teachers together in the interests of the child, they in fact 
drove a wedge between them. The Boards ‘offered real incentives for participation: on the 
one hand the control which parents could attain over teachers; on the other, opportunities 
to engage in the patronage politics of bribery and corruption.’80 Members were rewarded
77 Mphahlele, Down, p. 192.
78 Anonymous letter to Teachers’ Vision. Jan.-March 1954. Vol. XIX, No. 2. p. 18. (Original 
emphasis).
79 Honono, ‘Presidential Address’, Teachers’ Vision. July-Sept. 1955, Vol. XX, No. 4, pp. 16-17. 
Nora Moerane remarked in an interview in 1998, ‘you know the parents are just getting their child to go 
to school and as for what their opinions were at the time... ,1 think most of these parents were not as educated 
as many parents are now. So whatever the teachers did or whatever the government did at the time we would 
go ahead, as long as we can have the money to pay for that child to go to school’, Nora Moerane, interview 
with author, Durban 19 June 1998.
80 Hyslop ‘Social...’, p. 324.
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by increased influence within communities, especially over teachers, who had previously 
been the leading figures in the community. Despite the limited success of the campaign to 
boycott these Boards, by 1956 some 300 had been created, controlling approximately 4000 
school committees.81
Given that most African parents were against the ANC boycott, they probably also opposed 
the wholesale closure of mission schools. A successful boycott or closure would have 
resulted in the same thing; the denial of education to children. Ntantala, who toured areas 
in Johannesburg during the boycott, recalls seeing parents on the streets of Germiston, 
Benoni, Brakpan and Springs seeking admission to government schools for children who 
had been thrown out of schools closed by the Anglican Church. She recalls one principal, 
Mr. Ntombela of Albert Street School, remarking T have more children than I can take. The 
Anglican parents are clamouring for room for their children because Reeves has closed all 
his big schools.’82
The essential objective for African parents was to ensure that their children had an 
education, for as Father Huddleston remarked in 1956, ‘the truth is that the parents have no 
choice. ’83 Parents may have been disappointed that the missions could not afford to run 
schools privately, but in general they would not have supported the nation-wide closure of 
mission schools.
Students and Bantu Education
There was no organised or spontaneous student resistance to the introduction of Bantu 
Education. During this period students were not as politicised as they were to become in the 
1970s. Hyslop argues that in urban areas African youths tended to be largely a-political
81 Hyslop ‘Social...\ p. 227.
82 Ntantala, A Life’s, p. 162.
83 Huddleston, Naught for Your Comfort, p. 174.
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because of the predominance of an ‘individualistic, gangsterised84 street sub-culture.’ He 
suggests that African youths in urban areas lacked a sense of shared experience, divided as 
they were into those who received education (and looked to protect this opportunity) and 
those surviving on the streets.85 He contends that it was not until the 1970s when the 
majority of African youths were in school that they began to identify with each others’ 
struggles and oppose Bantu Education. Amongst those who attended school in the 1950s 
parental authority was more intact than it was in the 1970s, and this ‘tended to inhibit the 
emergence of self-organised school student movements.586 In addition, most school children 
were at the primary level, and were relatively unpoliticised.87
The nature of mission education also affected student politicisation. A teacher at Adams 
College remembers that an ‘overall religious education’ made students ‘submissive and very 
receptive.’88 Another teacher recalls that in the 1950s students ‘didn’t know what was 
happening around’ but that by the 1970s ‘they knew everything that was going on. ’89 As we 
have seen, mission authorities tried to prevent the radicalisation of students, through the 
regulation or prevention of political discussions, and the banning o f‘political’ publications. 
However, despite these restrictions some students, particularly those from secondary 
institutions, became politically conscious in this period. In November 1954 a ‘considerable 
body of students’ were arrested at Healdtown for attacking the headmaster’s home.90
84 Hyslop argues that an ‘anarchic spirit prevailed’ within tsotsi gangs. ‘Let Us...’, p. 251.
85 Hyslop, ‘Let Us...’, pp. 5-8 and Hyslop, ‘Social...’, pp. 282-313.
86 Hyslop, ‘Social...’, p. 251.
87 It should be remembered, however, that many primary school pupils were in their teens with a 
significant number between 15 and 20 years old.
88 She continued ‘everybody was involved in uplifting each other socially and spiritually...there 
were morals and values and priorities and things like that the youth of the day was interested in. ’ Nora 
Moerane, interview with author, Durban 19 June 1998. A pupil of Inanda remembers that in the 1950s 
‘students were not politically motivated,.,.the missionary influence which was predominantly religious, 
although educational as well, it did not imbue the sense of political approach to human situations. ’ Rev. B, 
K. Dludla, interview with author, Durban 16 June 1998.
89Mable Christofersen, interview with author, Durban 17 June 1998. Cliristofersen taught at Inanda 
from 1945-78.
90 CL MS 16595/5 Healdtown Annual Report, 1954.
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Writing a few days later the president of the Methodist Conference in South Africa wrote 
to its headmaster:
I am very sorry to hear o f the further trouble that has occurred at Healdtown.. .there 
is much resentment in the hearts o f  the students under the surface over our attitude 
to the Bantu Education Act.91
Like teachers, however, politically aware students were placed in a contradictory position 
by Bantu Education. Much as they may have opposed the ideology behind it, it did remove 
irksome missionary authority, and there was no credible alternative to it. Students in general 
made the decision to remain within the system as they still saw it as the best means of 
increasing their chances of gaining professional employment in adult life. As Jelico Njokweni 
at Healdtown noted “‘Instead of not learning we will take what is given to us”, that was the 
attitude of the students, but they were not satisfied, not satisfied at all.’92
Conclusion
The majority of Africans probably wanted a free, compulsory and non-racial education 
system in a fully democratic country. Consequently they wanted neither mission nor Bantu 
Education. Most Africans rejected Bantu Education wholeheartedly, yet by the end of the 
1950s teacher opposition had been subdued, Schools Boards were fully functioning and 
greatly increased numbers of pupils were attending Bantu Education schools. Clearly most 
Africans felt they had little real choice other than to acquiesce with the system, no matter 
how much they loathed it.93
Undoubtedly most politically aware Africans would have welcomed the overthrow of Bantu 
Education, but few believed that this could realistically be achieved. The defeat of Bantu 
Education would have taken massive coordinated action against the state in South Africa.
91 CL MS16598/8 Webb to Pitts, 22 Nov. 1954.
92 Jelico Njokweni, interview with author Healdtown 18 Jan. 2000.
93 Feit argues that too many Africans had a ‘vested interest in the working of the Government’s 
system.’ Feit, African Opposition, p. 175.
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It would have needed pupils, teachers, parents, and missionaries to come together in alliance 
and openly defy the apartheid government. Even if Africans had believed this was possible, 
certain conditions needed to have been met. African parents needed assurances that a 
credible alternative education system could be offered, teachers that their wages would be 
maintained and opportunities created for them and students that neither their education nor 
future prospects would suffer. Missionaries would not only have had to conquer the mutual 
mistrust that had developed between themselves and Africans; they would also have needed 
to find the vision and courage to join with Africans in opposition to the government. The 
ANC, or any other movement which challenged Bantu Education, did not have the 
resources to block Bantu Education, and the missionaries had neither the conviction nor the 
desire to act with them. Thus politically motivated Africans, especially teachers, were not 
convinced that it was possible to openly challenge the hegemony of the state in the field of 
education. For all CATA’s rhetoric, its leaders had realised by 1955 that it did not have the 
support of the majority of parents, teachers or missionaries, and advised its members to 
enter Bantu Education schools and teach Bantu Education. Thus, on the whole, politically 
aware Africans acquiesced in Bantu Education as there was no alternative. Parents sent their 
children to Bantu Education schools rather than let them drift on the streets, and teachers 
taught in Bantu Education schools rather than not teach at all.94
Educated parents and teachers as a whole seem to have been disappointed that the mission 
authorities had not engaged them more in the decision-making process. In addition, those 
associated with the larger mission schools mourned the financial constraints that prevented 
the churches from maintaining at least a few flagship schools as private institutions.95 There 
is no evidence to suggest that teachers or parents were in favour of the missions actually 
closing their schools down. They would probably have rejected such action for the same
94 R. van der Ross argus that despite the stress the NEUM and its affiliated groups gave to non­
collaboration in many areas (teaching, police, railway workers, postal workers etc.) ‘these departments in 
life were regarded by the people to be so vital to the promotion of their everyday living, that they, the people, 
would not have countenanced any interference with their lives in these matters. ’ R. van der Ross, The Rise 
and Fall of Apartheid: A Study of the Political Movements among the Coloured People of South Africa 
1880-1985. (Cape Town, 1986), (original emphasis) p. 241.
95 A teacher from Healdtown remembers ‘we were told about the decision of the Church, that they 
are not going to two the line and take their advice from us and make it a private school. ’ Jelico Njokweni, 
interview with author, Healdtown, 18 Jan. 2000.
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reasons that they rejected the ANC boycott. What is perhaps most striking about the 
evidence is the lack of African discussion on the missionary reactions to Bantu Education. 
By the 1950s many educated Africans had come to the conclusion that mission education 
was something of an anachronism and should be replaced by a state-controlled system. The 
removal of missionary influence was seen as inevitable and, while they may not have 
approved of Bantu Education, few were left lamenting the demise of missionary education. 
Those who did were associated with large missionary institutions, not with the dilapidated 
primary schools, which the missionaries themselves were pleased to be rid of.
For many Africans who were not politically aware, Bantu Education created the illusion of 
opportunity. The capacity of the state to expand educational provision, and the creation of 
school boards drew many Africans into the system. Some parents were able to send their 
children to school for the first time, whilst others found their power and influence in local 
communities augmented by serving on School Boards. For Africans who believed in 
education for education’s sake, and who struggled economically every day, Bantu 
Education, for all its limitations, appeared to provide improved prospects for their children. 
This is why it was successfully implemented - for it met the demand of many Africans for 
education. It is highly unlikely that these Africans would have supported any mass closure 
of missionary schools when they craved for educational provision. For the mass of Africans 
it did not matter if it was missionary or Bantu Education; they were grateful for any 
education.
If a person who has the money says this is the type of food I can offer you, either 
you accept it or you reject it and remain without anything to live by. Naturally you 
have to accept what is being offered because you have no other means. You have 
no choice and that was the situation...black people had no choice.95
96 Rev. Dludla, interview with author, Durban, 16 June 1998.
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II
Conclusion
Despite their rhetoric to the contrary, the majority of church and mission leaders in South 
Africa would have taught Bantu Education in their schools. The educational crisis that the 
missions faced was not induced by an ideological or moral refusal to teach Bantu Education, 
but was the result of the state’s refusal to grant them the subsidies required to keep their 
schools open.
The depression of the 1930s and the Second World War had precipitated a crisis for 
missionary endeavour throughout Africa. Both seriously damaged the churches’ ability to 
raise funds at a time when they found the demands of shattered European societies claimant 
on their resources. Consequently, less money was available for all aspects of missionary 
enterprise, seriously undermining the ability of churches throughout Africa to maintain, let 
alone expand, their existing activities. The war also created a recruitment crisis as human 
resources were thrown into the war effort, denying mission churches desperately needed 
personal.1 The effect s of these pressures were felt in South Africa in the 1950s manifesting 
themselves in staff shortages and, more significantly, in the churches’ willingness to give 
up their primary schools in an attempt to ease their financial woes.
Mission endeavour was also being undermined by the emergence of the state as the primary 
instrument of human welfare. The development of the ‘welfare state’ in Britain had shown 
how the state could divert massive resources into health and education, far exceeding what 
had previously been possible through church voluntarism. This change created what Andrew 
Porter has described as a ‘radical review of missionary work’ as churches realised they could 
not reverse the trend towards the assumption of social provision by the secular state.2
We have seen that it was not only external pressures that were undermining missionary
1 The Church of the Province estimated in 1955 that it would need another five years to ‘overcome 
its clergy shortage’ caused by the War. ‘Africa’, British Weekly. 17 Feb. 1955, p. 6.
2 A. Porter. ‘War, Colonialism and the British Empire: The Redefinition of Christian Missionary 
Policy 1938-52', ICS paper, 14 Jan. 1992, p. 9.
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undertakings. In the 1940s and 1950s internal pressure from Africans, who questioned the 
right of churches to control social services that they experienced, and rejected the churches’ 
paternalistic assumptions, challenged the very legitimacy of missionary endeavour.
In 1953 weak and hesitant mission churches, starved of finances and striving to maintain the 
support of Africans, faced Bantu Education. Generally, the churches in South Africa 
recognised the right, and indeed need, of the state to assume control o f ‘Native education’. 
In 1955 Goodhall acknowledged the expanding role of the state
this is ... the context in which the Bantu Education Act has to be seen. As 
a step in the educational process and in the shift between Government and 
private enterprise, many of its features belong to a familiar course.3
Recognising this change, however, did not mean the churches were willing to abdicate all 
responsibility for health and education which were, after all, prime areas of evangelisation. 
The mission churches in South Africa, informed by accepted practice beyond the Union, felt 
they had a right to run some private, state-funded schools imbued with a suitably Christian 
atmosphere, and aimed at furthering missionary endeavour. After all, the parents who chose 
to send their children to missionary schools had as much right to state resources as other 
parents.
The willingness to abandon their primary schools is evidence that the churches considered 
them a burden for which the state should assume responsibility. However, they were 
determined to maintain their large ‘flagship’ institutions, such as Lovedale and Adams, 
which had flourished through a great deal of missionary sacrifice, both in terms of money 
and effort. The churches hoped that even after the state’s full assumption of responsibility 
for ‘Native’ education these institutions would remain to ‘protect the identification of 
Christian service with high standards and provide examples which others would wish to 
emulate’.4
3 Goodhall, ‘Christian Action in Africa - Another Approach’, British Weekly. 9 June 1955, p. 7.
4 Porter, ‘War, Colonialism’ p. 11.
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If the implementation of Bantu Education had simply meant state control of primary schools 
and a new syllabus at all levels, effectively leaving ‘flagship5 institutions under church 
control, there would have been little comment from the churches.5 In effect, apart from the 
gradual withdrawal of subsidy, this is exactly what occurred in Catholic schools and at 
Inanda. Despite protestations at the nature of Bantu Education, if other churches had had 
the financial resources to do so, they would have followed the Catholic example and 
registered their schools as private institutions, teaching Bantu Education.6 It was the state’s 
withdrawal of subsidy that they resented, and which challenged them to either confront the 
government or acquiesce in its demands.
Had they wished to oppose Bantu Education and its criticisms of mission education 
effectively, the churches would have had to follow the actions of Reeves and Huddleston 
and actually close their schools down. However, for this to have happened a number of 
conditions would have to have been met. Firstly, it required a degree of church unity that 
was simply unattainable. Even within denominations, divergent actions were taken in 
response to Bantu Education, and ecumenical relations in South Africa were too limited to 
allow for coordinated action. Secondly, it would have meant political confrontation with the 
government which would have been at variance with majority white opinion, and would 
have associated the churches with radical African opinion. Given the creed of the Christian 
churches in South Africa such an act was unthinkable as two members of the British Council 
of Churches who visited South Africa in 1954 pointed out.7 Closing schools would also have 
needed the support of African teachers, parents and pupils who were generally not in favour 
of such action. Indeed, if teachers had been sufficiently militant and organised, they could 
have independently scuppered Bantu Education by refusing to teach it. The churches also
5 This is not to imply that the they would not have raised pedagogical objections to Bantu 
Education. Such criticism, however, would not have prevented them from maintaining their role in African 
education.
0 Missionaries may have believed that they could have subverted the ‘purpose’ of Bantu Education 
despite having to follow its syllabus,
7 NLS ACC7548 Report of BCC visit to South Africa 18 Nov. - 9 Dec. 1954, p. 2. The actions of 
the Catholic Church were deeply conservative gestures motivated entirely by a determination to maintain 
religious freedom, it had little to do with any wider interpretation of the freedoms that Africans so justly 
demanded.
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rejected school closure on the grounds that it would throw thousands of children onto the 
streets ‘where they would learn no good. In the schools at least they will be taught to read 
and write.’8 Lastly, the churches feared government reprisals, threatening the withdrawal 
of government subsidies for other services they provided such as hospitals and orphanages.9
The decision to lease schools was thus almost inevitable and, despite the churches’ 
inadequate attempts to engage African opinion, was ironically probably what the majority 
of Africans wanted. Most Africans certainly despised Bantu Education but did not have the 
luxury of choice; it was Bantu Education or nothing.10 However, was the decision to lease 
morally justifiable? Herron argued that ‘to condemn the purpose of the Act but leave a 
loophole by which the Act may achieve its purpose seems to be compromise at its most 
elastic.’11 The churches finely calculated the consequences of closing or leasing their 
schools, often in moral terms, but Bantu Education, like apartheid more generally, was 
undoubtedly amoral and a violation of Christian teaching. The closure of schools was the 
only option that did not compromise with Bantu Education and apartheid, as Huddleston 
and Reeves argued passionately. Nevertheless, in the end, even they were forced to retract 
in the face of African pleas for private schools, and attempted to establish schools which 
would have taught Bantu Education.
In 1941 the CPS A Church and Nation report called for the gradual removal of the colour- 
bar, rather than its immediate abolition. Adrian Hastings has observed that this position 
raises an important question: ‘does the church lose its moral authority if it tempers its public 
teaching to what is judged pragmatically possible within an evil situation?’12 This exact
8 NLS ACC7548 Matheson to Watt 22 Dec. 1954.
9 Clayton commented in 1955 ‘I don’t think that it would be practicable to carry our opposition to 
Government policy to the point of refusing any kind of cooperation. That would mean our work among non- 
Europeans would come to an end. ’ LPL Fisher V. 163 f79 Clayton address to SPG 26 April 1955.
10 Webb the President of Methodist Conference in South Africa remarked that although Africans 
‘hated’ Bantu Education like ‘poison, they still feel that a wreck is better than nothing at all.’ WC AC623 
BE A Webb to Blaxall 8 Nov. 1954.
11 Herron, ‘ Editorial’, British Weekly. 7 Oct. 1954, p. 6.
12 A. Hastings, A History of African Christianity 1950-75 (Cambridge, 1979), p. 23.
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question could be asked of the decision by the majority of churches in South Africa to lease 
their schools to the state. While it was morally admirable for Reeves and Huddleston to 
close schools, was it necessarily the right thing to do? Writing in 1976, Huddleston 
applauded the fact that at least one Anglican communion stood firm on principle against 
Bantu Education, but he recognised, in very different language from that which he used at 
the time, that it was ‘an appalling choice’ that had been made ‘reluctantly’.13 This is not to 
suggest that Reeves and Huddleston were wrong, but rather illustrates again what a complex 
and difficult position the churches were put in morally as well as educationally by the Bantu 
Education Act. As one senior African teacher remarked:
you know, thinking o f  Healdtown being closed would really have been so final, so 
we decided to take what w e were given instead o f the school being closed. Because 
we would be answerable to the world outside, because many people were so 
attached to this school...because better some education instead o f nothing.14
This thesis illustrates the difficulty that radicalised individuals and political pressure groups 
face when trying to translate a just policy into action amongst an oppressed people who 
have little means by which to determine their own destiny. Reeves’s and Huddleston’s 
closure of schools and the ANC boycott were legitimate responses to Bantu Education, 
which, if supported nationally, may have destabilised the apartheid regime. However, they 
failed essentially because of the deprivation and poverty which segregation and apartheid 
had engendered.
A 1955 ANC document concerning the boycott remarked ‘it is essential to realise that we 
must not forget that we are politicians and not sentimental individuals full of this non- 
political nonsense talk of the “poor children’” .15 This statement, which now seems 
insensitive and naive, demonstrates the chasm between the intellectual reaction to Bantu 
Education, and the practical concerns of the population. For all the principled talk of
13 T. Huddleston, ‘The Birth of a Struggle’, in I. Henderson (ed.), Man of Christian Action: Canon 
John Collins - the Man and His Work. (London, 1976), p. 50.
1,1 Jelico Njokweni, interview with author, Healdtown, 18 Jan. 2000.
15 ‘Suggested Boycott Programme, 1955' quoted in Feit, African, p. 163.
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boycott and closure, Africans teachers, parents and students were concerned with the 
immediate need to educate and be educated in the absence of any credible alternative to 
Bantu Education.
African acquiescence was thus partly due to the ‘success’ of apartheid. For Africans to 
support school boycotts and closures they had to believe that an alternative ordering of 
society would follow such a sacrifice, a conviction that the vast majority of Africans did not 
have in 1955. Given this, they were not prepared to risk a child’s chance of education and 
perhaps a better life, even if it meant Bantu Education.
Despite the failure of the churches to oppose Bantu Education, this thesis has also illustrated 
how different political and moral discourses can challenge dominant convictions, even if not 
immediately challenging established norms. Rival moral and political discourses emerged 
from within the churches through the actions of men such as Reeves and Huddleston. Such 
‘radicals’ engendered much debate in the churches16 but ultimately failed because they alone 
could not ensure the dissemination of their convictions into mainstream church thinking.
Their failure highlights the depth of the churches'complicity with apartheid and illustrates 
the difficulty in establishing a new ‘radical’ interpretation of the churches’ mission. In 
general, the churches essentially reflected the views of, and were restrained by, white South 
Africans both within (leaders and laity) and outside of their congregations. Their political 
and moral discourses were shaped by what was of paramount interest to the churches - the 
continuation of white supremacy in South Africa. Church leaders were not prepared to 
engage in meaningful and ‘revolutionary’ discussions with Africans, to actually address the 
fundamental inequalities in society. By not doing so, they were able to avoid both 
acknowledging the immediate and pressing legitimacy of African claims, and the need to 
actually undertake unprecedented action (which would, inevitably, undermine white 
supremacy) to alleviate African suffering. Only through the democratisation of their own 
institutions, via the Afficanisation of their leadership structures, would the churches have
16 Especially in the way in which they internationalised the issue of Bantu Education which brought 
pressure to bare on the churches from overseas.
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been able to align themselves with African opponents of Bantu Education and apartheid. As 
they were unwilling to do this, faced with Bantu Education and apartheid, the churches 
unimaginatively reaffirmed their belief in trusteeship, the very policy that Africans 
increasingly rejected.
In addition, this thesis illustrates the manifest contradictions of missionary practice in South 
Africa. The Comaroffs argue that for missionaries ‘schools were the most condensed loci 
oftheir efforts to change hearts and minds’ but were ‘sites of strident struggle’ and ‘portals 
of promise and places of dispossession.’17 In South Africa mission education was clearly a 
‘site of strident struggle’, between those educating and those being educated, and this thesis 
demonstrates the contradictions in the missionaries’ educational activities.
Missionaries gave a limited number of Africans insights into the wider world, both inside and 
outside of South Africa, and in so doing created an educated African elite which had the 
tools by which to evaluate the society within which it existed. This had the effect of 
radicalising many Africans who recognised the racism and injustices of the society within 
which they lived. This led to the creation of western type political parties and organisations 
such as the ANC, using the tools and skills learnt at mission schools to challenge and 
undermine white supremacy. As the majority of white missionaries were reluctant to 
champion wholesale societal reform they found themselves increasingly at odds with those 
whom they had educated. This growing conflict manifested itself dramatically in student 
disturbances and in a growing African intellectual unease with the nature and objective of 
mission education.
The missionaries’ efforts were thwarted by the segregationist nature of society in South 
Africa as their modernising project could never reach its natural conclusion, the full 
incorporation of the ‘modern citizen’ into a European model of civil society. This led 
missionaries to lament the demise o f ‘tribal sanctions’ (ironically the very ‘sanctions’ which 
they themselves had been so keen to erode during the previous century) and reaffirm their 
faith in trusteeship. This was an unimaginative response which did not, and could not, satiate
17 J. Comaroff & J. Comaroff, Of Revelation and Revolution, pp. 412-413.
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African demands, and it was left to Verwoerd and Eiselen to fashion ‘Bantu Education’, an 
educational system that they hoped would defuse African political aspirations.
However, as Clayton recognised, it was a system “doomed to fail” and rather than defuse 
African political aspirations it would become a rallying point for them: and, after twenty 
years of simmering discontent, a new generation of students, forced to endure the ever 
mutating Bantu Education system, rose up against it Soweto in 1976. The ensuing 
encounter between children and police, and the bloodshed which accompanied it, 
permanently shattered any illusion of the legitimacy or credibility of either Bantu Education 
or the State who imposed it.
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Appendix 1
G .IV S . 13299— 1948-0—300.
QUESTIONNAIRE ON NATIVE EDUCATION.
1. What do you consider should he the guiding principles and aims of Native education 1
2, Is it correct to regard the Nutive as a separate and independent race ?
0. What do you understand by the " racial characteristics ” of the Native ?
4. What arc the special qualities and aptitudes of the Native 1
5. In what way has the social heritage of the Native been determined by the characteristics referred 
to above ?
6. What do you consider the most- important changes at present taking place in the social conditions 
of the Native ?
7. In terms of your answers to questions 1-0, please give seriatim, your views on the manner in which 
these factors should determine the principles and objectives of Native education,
8. Referring to item 2 of the terms of reference, what do you understand by the “ future careers ” of 
the Native in South Africa 1
'!). (1) What do you-consider the chief defects of the present system of—
(a) primary schools;
(b) secondary schools :
(c) industrial schools;
(rf) teacher training colleges ; and 
(c) university training,
(2) What measures do you suggest for- effecting the necessary changes with special reference to the 
content and form of the syllabuses ?
(3) To what extent do these measures agree with the general principles you have recommended in 
answers to questions 1-7 above ?
10. What, in your opinion, should be the place and nature of religious education in the curricu.um ?
11. What, in your opinion, should be the place and nature of manual training in Native schools, especially 
with regard to— ■
(1) the use the Native, after leaving school, makes of his manual training ; and
(2) the transfer of skills acquired in school to the Native community 1
12. Do you regard the organization of the present—
(1) primary schools;
(2) secondary schools;
(3) industrial schools;
(4) teacher training colleges ;
(5) university training
as satisfactory, considered from the viewpoint of—
(a) selection and admission of pupils ;
(6) co-ordination of schools ;
(c) duration of complete school courses ;
(d) the role which these courses rtc called upon to play in the life of the Native ;
(e) school attendance ;
( / )  the school calendar ;
(</) examinations ;
(A) qualifications, race and sex of teachers ;
( i) methods ;
(j)  inspection ;
(k) boarding facilities.
13. Is the administration of the present—
(1) primary schools ;
(2) secondary schools ;
(3) industrial schools ;
(4) teacher training colleges ; and
(5) university training ;
satisfactory considered from the viewpoint of—
(a) the establishment of schools;
(A) the effective distribution of schools ;
(o) local control of schools :
(d) control of teachers (conditions of service and discipline);
(u) provision of school requisites ;
( / )  b u i l d i n g s ;
(r/) fees ;
(A) procedure for the payment of teachers.
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14. What is your opinion concerning the control of schools by the provinciu1 education departments, 
bearing in mind—■
(1) the desirability or otherwise of uniformity of practice, regulations and syllabusses;
(2) the geographic and ethnic distribution of the Native peoples;
(3) differences between the provinces in respect of pensions, leave privileges, school requisites, 
etc.
15. "What are your views as to the basis on which Native education should be financed, having regard to 
the Bhare which the Administration (Union and Provincial), the churches or missionary societies, and 
the Native himself should have therein 1
16. What are your views concerning the following points which may have been dealt with incidentally
under previous headings, but which seem to merit specific attention :—
(1) Adult education.
(2) The desirability of differentiating between the education given in different areas (Native 
reserves, rural areas and urban areas).
(3) The edncation and preparation of chiefs and leaders.
(4) Continuation study facilities for teachers, including libraries.
(5) The desirability of Government, community, tribal and church schools in regard to subsidies.
(6) Compulsory education in general or in specific areas.
(7) The training of Natives to occupy responsible positions in their own communities.
(8) The co-ordination of work of an educational nature carried out by State departments (e.g. 
Health, Native Affairs, Social Welfare, Justice).
(9) The education of leaders and the task of the university in this respect,
(10) The use of the mother tongue as medium of instruction.
(11) The future role of Native languages in education and in.the community.
(12) The possible gouping or amalgamation of Native languages.
(13) The place of the official languages in the Native school curriculum.
.(14) The relapse into illiteracy—its incidence and prevention.
17. Any other matters you wish to raise.
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A ppendix 2A; The Legislative Requirem ents of the Bantu Education A ct
The Bantu Education Act itself was not a long piece of legislation, containing little more 
than the mechanics of the transfer of control from the provinces to the NAD; the powers to 
be vested in the Minister; and the types of schools to be in existence under Bantu Education. 
Its purpose was £to provide for the transfer of the administration and control of Native 
education from the several provincial administrations to the Government of the Union, and 
for matters incidental thereto.51 It was divided into eighteen sections, the first five of which 
dealt with the transfer of educational responsibility from the provinces to the NAD. Sections 
six to eight dealt with the creation and funding of the various schools. Section six referred 
to ‘Bantu community schools’, the name given to any ‘Bantu school established or 
maintained by any Bantu authority, or any Native Council, tribe or community’2 and noted 
that they were to be subject to the authority of the Minister of Bantu Affairs, who could at 
any time suspend or withdraw their subsidies. Section seven was concerned with 
‘Government schools’ established by the NAD which were also subject to the Minister’s 
approval, while section eight covered ‘State-aided native schools’, which were schools 
provided by any group other than the Government or the Bantu Authorities, essentially 
mission schools. These would be granted financial support as long as they did not
retard, or render impracticable, or ... preclude, retard, or render impracticable, the 
establishment o f  a Bantu community school or a Government Bantu school for the 
area concerned.3
In their case also the Minister could ‘at his discretion, at any time suspend, reduce, or 
withdraw any grant made under this section or revoke his approval of any native school. ’4 
All ‘community’ and ‘State-aided’ schools had to be registered with the NAD; failure to 
comply led to a £50 fine or six months imprisonment. This section also provided that
1 Union of South Africa Parliament, Bantu Education Act, No. 47 1953, (henceforth BE A) p. 1.
The registration o f any such school shall be refused or cancelled if the Minister, 
acting on the advice and recommendation oftlie Native Affairs Commission.. .given 
after due enquiry o f the said Commission is o f the opinion that its establishment or 
continued existence is not in the interests o f the Bantu people or any section o f  such 
people or is likely to be detrimental to the physical, mental or moral welfare o f the 
pupils or students attending or likely to attend such schools.5
In May 1956, this section was amended to allow the Minister to determine the conditions 
for the registration of any school.’6 The amendment seriously concerned missionaries as it 
meant not only that schools could be closed for almost any reason, but that they could in 
fact be refused registration from the very start, at the whim of the Minister.
Sections ten and eleven of the 1953 Act formalised the transfer of teachers from provincial 
employ to that of the central state. The remaining sections dealt mostly with the running and 
administration of ‘Government Bantu Schools’ although section 15 (m) gave the Minister 
the power to prescribe the conditions under which grants-in-aid were to be made.7
It was only after Verwoerd’s (Minister of Native Affairs) statement to the Senate on the 7 
June 1954, that the policy to be adopted became clear, although changes in mission 
education did take place before this date. From January 1954 various circulars were issued 
by the NAD, the most notable of which stipulated that every teacher in training was to learn 
Afrikaans. To allow for this to take place all training colleges were instructed to drop 
‘without delay the teaching of geography and history’.8 Other changes included the 
establishment of a unified control mechanism in Pretoria and the appointment of F.J. de 
Villiers as Under-Secretary for Bantu Education. In addition, many administrative posts in 
the provincial Departments of Education were taken over by the N. A.D.
In his address Verwoerd outlined the situation that was to prevail in Bantu Education. He
5 BEA, p. 6.
6 Union of South Africa Parliament, Bantu Education Amendment Act, No. 36 1956. p. 1,
7 BEA, p. 12.
8 WCL ADI 158 SAIRR, GD2 Circular CM 31/1954 3 April 1954. Two other circulars removed 
the right of schools to receive equipment grants and forced school principals to introduce book fees.
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confirmed the eventual transfer of mission schools to ‘Bantu community schools’, but 
divided them into two classes. He differentiated between major missionary institutions, such 
as Lovedale, and the large number of primary schools in rural and urban areas which were 
under the supervision of mission societies. He predicted that ‘the transformation of an 
ordinary primary school into a community school will take place easily and naturally, and 
that the churches can raise no serious objection5. As soon as possible such schools would 
be handed over to local Bantu Boards under the supervision of the NAD. Recognising the 
investment that churches had made in large institutions, however he noted that ‘the transfer 
of educational institutions is a much more involved undertaking.5 This was because the 
churches would attempt to minimise their losses, and would also be losing ‘an organisation 
for controlling and expanding mission work.5
Nonetheless Verwoerd appealed to the mission schools to make the transfer as smooth as 
possible, claiming that ‘the Bantu5 would not be victims of change;
The State is taking over from the churches to prosecute the same work more 
efficiently. Assets which have been created by the Churches for the Bantu will be 
retained for the Bantu. Under these circumstances it ought not to be difficult to 
reach a fair agreement with the churches on the conditions of transfer.
He was also at pains to point out to the missions that religious instruction would continue 
in the schools, and that at set times they would be given access to pupils belonging to their 
denominations.
In spite of these assurances, missions were given the opportunity to apply for registration 
as state-aided institutions, although it was made clear that this would only be granted for 
deserving cases, and would be limited by available funds; any support granted would be 
limited to 75 per cent o f ‘the. salaries of the approved teaching staff.9
In addition, state-aided schools would lose their existing provincial grants for furniture, 
books and other requisites. The reduction of the subsidy to 75 per cent of approved teachers
9 Verwoerd. Bantu Education o p . 1 1 -1 2 .
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wages was designed to send a clear message to those running mission schools. It indicated 
the Department’s longer-term plans for the complete withdrawal of mission education, 
challenging mission bodies to debate the economic viability of their position. Nevertheless, 
Verwoerd was still vague concerning the time-scale for the final transfer of education, 
observing that ‘innovations will have to be made gradually ... in the meantime the machine 
will function very much as before.’10 The registration of schools as state-aided institutions 
would only be ‘a provisional arrangement’ and would be terminated ‘when the Department 
is convinced that the transfer of control to the Bantu community is desirable’.11
All teacher-training colleges were to be handed over to the government or closed as there 
was, at that stage, no provision for their registration as state-aided private schools. Churches 
were, however, given the opportunity to remain in charge of their hostels, an arrangement 
which could be discontinued if ‘it is apparent that full co-ordination of education in the 
classroom on the one hand and in the hostel on the other cannot be reached under such a 
system’.12 Verwoerd also indicated to the Senate that under Bantu Education double­
sessions would to be introduced in primary schools, whereas previously all pupils were in 
primary schools for four and a half hours per day; as soon as was practicable, primary 
schools were to accept children in two three-hour shifts. Verwoerd claimed that this would 
address the problem of low attendance, and go some way towards alleviating the problem 
of unschooled children roaming the streets, although it can be argued that, if anything, there 
would be more children on the streets, although possibly for shorter periods.13
Verwoerd’s speech indicated to those involved in mission education the outline of the 
transfer process, but it was not until 2 August 1954 that the grantees, superintendents and 
managers of state-aided schools received circulars from the NAD explaining in transfer in 
exact detail. The circular sent to state-aided schools gave those in control until the 31
10 Verwoerd. Bantu Education p. 8.
" ibid, P- 12.
12 ibid. p. 13,
13 ibid. pp. 15-6.
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December 1954 to choose between two options. Firstly, they could maintain control as 
unaided private institutions, or as state-aided institutions with a 75 per cent subsidy, or 
school managers could relinquish control of their schools by renting or selling them to the 
NAD. It stated that the NAD preferred schools to be relinquished and hired to the 
Department, which would be liable for maintenance; this way the churches could keep the 
buildings for use after school hours. Moreover it continued:
Since the funds available for the purchase or hiring o f Native schools will be 
derived at least in part from Native taxation it will be appreciated that the interests 
o f the Native taxpayer will have to be bom in mind.14
Thus, the somewhat bizarre situation was reached whereby mission bodies were requested 
to undervalue their properties for rent or purchase, so as not to drain limited resources 
allocated to Bantu education. As many mission schools15 had been established through equal 
financial contributions from Africans and mission organisations, in effect African 
communities were being asked to pay for the purchase or rent of properties that they had 
partly paid for in the first place.
The actual process of transfer or registration differed according to the scheduling of land 
under the Group Areas Act of 1950. On land scheduled as ‘native areas or urban locations’ 
school managers could apply for registration and if successful would receive a subsidy of 
75 per cent, from the 1 April 1955. However, if registration were refused the school’s 
subsidy would remain at its previous level (100 per cent) until such time as a transfer 
agreement could be reached. If no agreement for sale or rent could be agreed, the 
government reserved the right to withdraw its subsidy and look for alternative educational 
facilities. If, however, the church concerned wanted to hand its schools over to the ‘Bantu 
community’, it was to be paid a full subsidy until the ‘Bantu community’ was able to assume 
control. In this instance, the NAD reserved the right to request the mission or church body 
remain in control at a 100 per cent subsidy, until a suitable ‘Bantu community’ organisation 
could take over. In addition, the NAD reserved the right to withdraw any subsidy to any
14 Verwoerd. Bantu Education p. 1.
15 In particular small rural primary schools.
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school after two months notice, and, all agreements made were ‘subject to revision at the 
discretion of the Minister of Native Affairs. *16 In accordance with the recommendations of 
the Eiselen Commission school committees and boards were to be established, with church 
representation.17
In the case of schools on ‘European’ land the situation differed only slightly in that any 
registration granted at 75 per cent subsidy would be ‘provisional’,18 all other conditions 
were the same. Schools, on ‘European land’ designated as farm or factory schools were to 
remain under the control of the land or factory owner and were not to be transferred to ‘the 
Bantu community’. They were, however, to admit only the children of employees.
On 2 August 1954 a second circular was sent to all teacher-training institutions which made 
it absolutely clear that all training colleges would have to be transferred to the NAD. Those 
running the schools^given three choices: they could agree to the transfer of the entire 
institution to the department, by way of either rent or purchase; they could transfer only 
those buildings necessary for teaching, while retaining control of hostels (the preferred 
option); or they could close the institution and apply for registration as a private school with 
a 75 per cent subsidy. The Department wanted all training schools to be transferred by 1 
July 1955, training schools which did not reach an agreement by that date would have their 
subsidies completely withdrawn on 1 January 1956, ‘and alternative arrangements for the 
training of teachers would be sought.’19
Finally, the circular noted that if churches were to ‘donate’ their assets, ‘concessions’ would
16 WCL AB653, Circular 252/302(a), p. 3.
17 ibid, p. 4.
18 ibid, p. 3. This is a somewhat ambiguous position as the circular makes a clear distinction in its 
provisions for schools oil ‘African’ and ‘European’ land. However, the provisions do not differ at all apart 
from the word ‘provisional’ being placed in the text when dealing with ‘European’ land..
19 WCL AB1124 Diocese of Bloemfontein - Bantu Education, circular 252/302(b) Eiselen to 
Managers, Superintendents and grantees of training colleges, 2 Aug. 1954.
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be made.20 These included allowing the donating body to suggest names for the transferred 
institution, the placing of a memorial plaque on the site detailing the donation, and the right 
to nominate one or two members to the schools advisory committee. This committee was 
to be chaired by the local Inspector of Bantu Schools and was to contain two 
representatives of the local Tribal’ authority, one parent, two representatives of religious 
interests, two representatives of the Department and, if the missions agreed to run the 
hostels, the hostel manager. Such arrangements would, however, be adjusted once the 
control of training schools was transferred to regional Bantu authorities. In addition, the 
NAD indicated that it was not keen to rent or buy training schools in designated ‘European’ 
areas, and would only do so ‘if [they were] considered essential for teacher training.’21 As 
before, the circular was keen to emphasise the role that religion would play in the training 
schools, granting church bodies access for pastoral work.
By August of 1954 those in control of mission schools were finally aware of the 
government’s intentions regarding education. After a number of years of speculation the 
NAD’s designs on African education were clarified.
20 It is not clear what was meant by ‘donate'. It seems that the NAD was suggesting that for the 
greater benefit of Africans, churches should simply hand over their training schools for a nominal rent or 
purchase.
21 WCL AB1124 Circular 252/302 (b). p. 1.
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A ppendix 2B
UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA.
ft. n c :-! i v
c o n f e r s ..
P H c T O R I A
Provide for the transfer of the administration and control of native 
education from the several provincial administrations to the Govern­
ment of the Union, and for matters incidental thereto.
UNIE VAN SUID-AFRIKA.
Voorsiening te maak vir die oorplasing van die administrasie van en 
beheer oor natnrelle-ondenvys van die onderskeie provinsiale 
administrasies na die Unie-regering, en Yir daarmee in verband 
staande aangeleenthede.
No. 47, 1953.
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ACT
D efin itio n s.
Transfer o f  
co n tro l o f  n ative  
ed u ca tio n  from  
th e provin cia l 
ad m in istra tion s  
to th e U n io n  
G overn m en t.
A d m in istra tion .
To provide for the transfer of the administration and control 
of native education from (lie several provincial administra­
tions to the Government of the Union, and for matters 
incidental thereto.
(English text signed by the Governor-General.)
(Assented to 5th October, 1953.)
JDE IT ENA CTED by the Queen’s M ost Excellent Majesty,
the Senate and the House o f  Assembly of the Union of  
South Africa, as follow s:—
1. In this Act, unless the context Otherwise indicates—
(i) “Bantu” shall be synonymous with “native” ; (ii)
(ii) “Department” means the Department o f Native 
Affairs; (iii)
(iii) “ education" means education other than “higher 
education” within the meaning o f section seventeen 
o f the Financial Relations Consolidation and Amend­
ment Act, 1945 (Act No. 38 o f  1945); (viii)
(iv) “Minister” means the Minister o f N ative Affairs; (y )
(v) “native” means any person who is or is generally 
accepted as a member o f any aboriginal race or tribe 
o f  Africa; (vi)
(vi) “ native school” or “Bantu school” means any school, 
class, college, or institution for the education o f  Banru 
children or persons, or for the instruction and naming 
o f  Bantu persons who desire to become teachers or to 
improve theii qualifications as teachers; (vii)
(vii) “officer” means an officer on the fixed establishment o f  
the public service; (i)
(viii) “prescribed” means prescribed by regulation; (xi)
(ix) “regulation” means any regulation made under this 
A ct; (ix)
(x) “Secretary” means the Secretary for Native Affairs and 
includes any Under-Secretary o f the Department; (x)
(xi) “this Act” includes any regulation, (iv)
2. As from the date o f commencement o f this Act—
(а) the control o f  native education shall vest in the Govern­
ment o f  the Union subject to the provisions o f  this 
Act;
(б) there shall cease to be vested in the executive com ­
mittee o f  a province any powers, authorities and 
functions, and the provincial council o f a province 
shall cease to be competent to make ordinances, in 
relation to native education:
Provided that, subject to the provisions o f section eleven—
(i) a provincial administration shall continue to administer 
any pension, retirement or provident fund established 
or conducted by such administration in connection 
with native education;
(ii) a provincial council shall continue to be competent 
to make ordinances for the proper administration of 
any such fund,
3. (1) It shall be the function of the Department under the 
direction and control o f the Minister, to perform all the work 
necessary for or incidental to the general administration o f  
native education.
(2) The Minister may, subject to the laws governing the public 
service, from time to time appoint such officers and employees 
as he may deem necessary for the proper performance by the 
Department o f  its functions under this Act.
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4. Every officer w ho, on or after the first day o f  July, 1953, 
w as serving under a provincial administration mainly in con­
nection with native education, and who on the date o f  promul­
gation  o f  this A ct is still serving under a provincial administra­
tion, shall, as from  the date o f  com m encem ent o f  this Act, be 
transferred to the D epartm ent, unless any such officer, at the 
request or with the approval o f  the M inister, acting in consulta­
tion with the A dm inistrator o f  the province concerned, is 
transferred to another post in the public service or is in like 
m anner excluded from  the operation o f  this section.
5. (1) Every person, other than an officer or a teacher, w ho  
im m ediately prior to the date o f  com m encem ent o f  this A ct, 
w as em ployed  by a provincial adm inistration m ainly in con­
nection  with native education,' shall, as from that date, becom e  
an em ployee o f  the D epartm ent, unless .the M inister, acting in 
consu ltation  with the A dm inistrator o f  the province concerned, 
decides otherwise.
(2) T he continuous em ploym ent by a provincial administra­
tion  im m ediately prior to the com m encem ent o f  this A ct, o f  
any person w ho becom es an em ployee o f  the Departm ent in 
term s o f  sub-section  (1), shall, except as hereinafter provided, 
be deem ed to have been em ploym ent in the service o f  the 
D epartm ent.
(3) N otw ithstand ing any lim itation in respect o f  age or 
educational qualifications prescribed by or under the Public 
Service A ct, 1923 (A ct N o . 27 o f  1923), any person w ho becom es 
an em ployee o f  the D epartm ent in terms o f  sub-section (1), 
w ho is a South  A frican citizen and who has not attained the 
prescribed age o f  retirem ent, m ay, on the recom m endation o f  
the Public Service C om m ission , be appointed, on probation or 
otherw ise, to a post in the public service.
(4) A n y person appointed to the public service in terms o f  
sub-section  (3) shall be adjusted to the scale o f  salary applicable  
to the  p ost to w hich he is appointed at such notch on that scale 
as m ay be recom m ended by the Public Service. C om m ission: 
P rovided  that, except w ith his own consent or in accordance 
with the provisions o f  any law, the salary or the scale o f  salary 
at or in accordance with which any such person w as remunerated  
im m ediately  prior to. the com mencement, o f  this A ct, shall not 
b e  reduced.
(5) (a) A ny person w ho becom es an em ployee o f  the Depart­
m ent in terms o f  sub-section (1) and w ho, im m ediately  
prior to  the date o f  com m encem ent o f  this A ct, was 
subject to  a law  relating to pensions administered by 
a provincial adm inistration, shall retain his rights and 
obligations under any such pensions law  and shall 
continue to contribute to the pension, retirement, or 
provident fund to which he contributed prior to such 
date; and there shall be contributed to the said fund, 
out o f  m oneys appropriated by Parliam ent for the 
purpose, in  respect o f  every such person, an am ount 
equal to  the am ount which the provincial adm inis­
tration w ould  have contributed to that fund in respect 
o f  every such person if  he had remained in its service.
(b) T he provisions o f  section forty-seven  o f  the Pension  
Laws A m endm ent A ct, 1943 (A ct N o . 33 o f  1943), 
shall m u tatis m utandis apply to any person referred 
to in paragraph (a) or any dependant o f  any such 
person w ho becom es entitled to a pension under this 
sub-section.
6. (1) Subject to  the provisions o f  this A ct, the M inister may, 
on  such special conditions as he m ay stipulate and in accordance 
w ith such  general principles as he m ay determ ine in consultation  
w ith the M inister o f  Finance, ou t o f  m oneys appropriated or 
set aside by Parliam ent for native education—
(a) subsidize any Bantu school established or maintained
by any Bantu authority, or any native council, tribe 
or co m m unity (hereinafter called a Bantu com m unity  
school); or
(b) assist in the establishm ent or m aintenance o f  any such  
school.
(2) T he M inister m ay, in his discretion, at any time suspend, 
reduce, or withdraw any subsidy or assistance granted to any 
su ch  sch oo l under this section.
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7. (1) The M inister may, out o f  m oneys appropriated or 
set aside by Parliament for native education—
(a) establish and maintain Bantu schools which shall be 
known as Governm ent Bantu schools;
(Z>) establish and maintain any hostel, teachers’ quarters, 
school clinic, or any other accessory to a G overnm ent 
Bantu school.
(2) Every native school or accessory thereto which was 
established and maintained by a provincial adm inistration and 
w hich is in existence on the date o f  com m encem ent o f  this 
Act, shall, as From that date, be deemed to have been established  
in terms>of sub-section (1) as a G overnm ent Bantu School or 
as an accessory to a G overnm ent Bantu .School.
(3) The M inister may at any time, whenever he considers it 
expedient to  do so, close or disestablish any such G overnm ent 
Bantu school, hostel, teachers’ quarters, school clinic or other 
accessory to a G overnm ent Bantu school.
8. (1) Subject to the provisions o f  this Act, the M inister 
may, on such special conditions as he m ay stipulate and in 
accordance w ith such general principles as he m ay determine in 
consultation with the M inister o f  Finance, out o f  m oneys 
appropriated or-set aside by Parliament for native education, 
m ake grants-in-aid to any native school approved by him  for 
the purposes o f  this section: Provided that before approving 
any such school the M inister may consider—
(a) in respect o f  any native school situate in a scheduled
native area or a released area referred to in the 
N ative Trust and Land A ct, 1936 (A ct N o . 18 o f  1936), 
after consultation with the Bantu authority, or the 
native council, tribe, or com m unity concerned; or
(b) in respect o f  any native school situate outside a 
scheduled native area and a released area, with due 
regard to the interests o f  the Bantu people,
whether the establishm ent or existence o f  any such native 
school precludes, retards, or renders im practicable, or is likely 
to preclude, retard, or render im practicable, the establishm ent 
o f  a Bantu com m unity school or a G overnm ent Bantu school 
for the area concerned.-
(2) The M inister may, in his discretion, at any time suspend, 
reduce, or withdraw any grant made under this section or 
revoke his approval o f  any native school for the purposes o f  
this section: Provided that before so exercising his discretion 
the M inister m ay cause an inquiry to be held at which the person 
or com m ittee or other body in charge o f the said school shall 
be entitled to be heard.
9. (1) A s from  a date to be fixed by the M inister by notice  
in the G azette , no person shall establish, conduct, or maintain  
any Bantu or native school, other than a G overnm ent Bantu  
school, unless it is registered as prescribed.
(2) The registration o f  any such school shall be refused or 
cancelled i f  the M inister, acting on the advice and recom ­
m endation o f  the N ative Affairs Com m ission constituted under 
the N ative Affairs Act, 1920 (A ct N o. 23 o f  1920), given after 
due enquiry by the said Com m ission is o f  opinion that its 
establishm ent or continued existence is not in the interests o f  
the Bantu people or any section o f  such people or is likely to 
be detrimental to the physical, mental or m oral welfare o f  the 
pupils or students attending or likely to attend such school.
(3) Any person who, after the date fixed under sub-section
(1), admits any Bantu child or person to, or establishes, con­
ducts or m aintains, any Bantu or native school which is not 
registered in terms o f  this A ct, shall be guilty o f  an offence and 
liable on conviction  to a fine not exceeding fifty pounds, or, 
in default o f  payment, to im prisonment for a period not 
exceeding six m onths.
10. (1) The teaching establishm ent at any G overnm ent 
Bantu school shall be determined by the M inister on a basis to 
be laid down from time to time in consultation with the M inister 
o f  Finance and on the recom m endation o f  the Public Service 
C om m ission,
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(2) {a) The power o f  appointm ent, prom otion, transfer, or
discharge oT teachers in Government Bantu schools 
shall, subject to the provisions o f  this Act, vest in the 
M inister, w ho may delegate any or all o f  the said 
powers to the Secretary.
(b) In respect o f  any post designated by the M inister, he 
m ay delegate the power o f  appointm ent or discharge 
o f  any teacher to any officer o f  the Departm ent.
(3) Every person who im mediately prior to the date o f  com ­
m encem ent o f  this Act was em ployed by a provincial adm inis­
tration as a-teacher on the establishm ent o f  a native school 
referred to in sub-section (2) o f  section seven, shall, as from that 
date, be transferred to the service o f  the Departm ent.
(4) U nless and until the M inister’ prescribes otherwise, the 
conditions o f  service, including the em olum ents and leave 
privileges, o f  any teacher referred to in sub-section (3), shall 
continue in force a s f if  the said teacher had remained in the 
service o f  the provincial administration.
(5) U nless and until the M inister prescribes otherwise—
(а) the retirement or pension benefits o f  any teacher 
referred to in sub-section (3) shall continue in force 
as if  such teacher had remained in the service o f  the 
provincial administration by which he was em ployed  
im mediately prior to the com ing into operation o f  
this A ct and the provisions o f  section forty-seven  o f  
the Pension Laws Am endm ent A ct, 1943 (Act N o . 33 
o f  1943), shall m utatis mutandis apply to any such  
teacher or any dependant o f  any such teacher who  
becom es entitled to a pension under this paragraph;
(б) every such teacher shall continue to contribute to the 
pension, retirement, or provident fund which is ad­
m inistered by the provincial administration concerned  
and to which he contributed prior to the com m ence­
m ent o f  this A ct, as if  he had not been transferred to 
the service o f  the Departm ent, and there shall be 
contributed to the said fund, out o f  m oneys appro­
priated by Parliament for the purpose, in respect o f  
every such teacher, an am ount which the provincial 
adm inistration concerned w ould  have contributed to 
that fund in respect o f  every such teacher: Provided  
that, in the case o f  the pension fund established under 
Act N o . 43 o f  1887 (Cape), there m ay each year, be  
contributed out o f  m oneys similarly appropriated, 
towards pension benefits payable to retired native  
teachers, an am ount determined by the M inister in 
consultation with the M inister o f  Finance.
(6) Subject to the foregoing provisions o f  this section, the 
conditions o f  service, including the scales o f  salary, leave privi­
leges, and retirement or pension benefits, o f  teachers in G overn­
m ent Bantu schools, shall be prescribed by the M inister in 
consultation w ith the Minister o f  F inance and on the recom ­
m endation o f  the Public Service Com m ission.
(7) A ny disciplinary proceedings in respect o f m isconduct 
com m itted by any teacher referred to in sub-section (3) before 
the date o f  com m encem ent o f  this A ct, m ay be continued or 
instituted by the Departm ent as if  such m isconduct had been 
com m itted after the said date.
11. The M inister may, after consultation with the M inister 
o f  F inance and the Adm inistrator o f  the Province o f  N atal, by 
notice in the G azette, direct that subject to  such conditions as 
he m ay determ ine, the m oneys o f  the N atal non-European  
Teachers’ Provident Fund, constituted by Ordinance N o . 10 o f  
1930 (N atal), shall in respect o f  native teachers vest in and be 
administered m utatis mutandis by the C om m issioner o f  Pensions 
in accordance with the provisions o f  the said Ordinance or as 
prescribed and thereafter, as from  the date o f  the said notice, all 
contributions payable to the said Fund in terms o f  the said  
Ordinance or this A ct by or in respect o f  native teachers shall 
be paid to the Com missioner o f  Pensions, who shall be 
responsible for the payment out o f  the said m oneys and con­
tributions o f  all liabilities o f  the said Fund arising, or which have 
arisen, in terms o f  the said Ordinance or this A ct, in respect 
o f  native teachers.
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12. (1) The M inister may, with due regard to the principle 
o f  providing for active participation by the Bantu people in 
the control and m anagement o f  Governm ent Bantu schools, 
establish such regional, local, and dom estic councils, boards, 
or other bodies as he may deem  expedient, or may for this 
purpose entrust the control and management o f  any Governm ent 
Bantu school to any Bantu authority or native council established  
by or under any other law.
(2) The constitution, duties, powers, privileges, and functions 
o f  any such council, board, or body, or the duties, powers, 
privileges, and functions o f any Bantu authority or native council 
to w hom  the control and m anagem ent o f any Government 
Bantu school is entrusted, shall be as prescribed.
13. As from the date o f  com m encem ent o f  this Act—
(a) all the property, m ovable or im m ovable, which
im mediately prior to the said date was used or had 
been acquired by a provincial administration solely  
for the purposes o f  or in connection with native 
education, shall vest in the G overnm ent o f  the U nion , 
subject to any conditions or obligations upon or under 
which such property was held im mediately prior to the 
said date in so far as such conditions or obligations 
do not lapse by merger as a result o f  this vesting;
(b) all the liabilities lawfully incurred by a provincial 
administration for the purposes o f  or in connection  
with native education and existing im m ediately prior 
to the said date, including any liability to pay a bonus 
or allow ance to any retired teacher or em ployee or any 
dependant o f  any such teacher or em ployee in supple­
m entation o f  any pension payable to any such person, 
shall becom e the liabilities o f  the G overnm ent o f  the 
U nion , subject to the provisions o f this A ct and to the 
conditions under which those liabilities were incurred:
Provided that, save as is provided in section eleven , the pro­
visions o f  this section shall not be deemed to include any asset 
acquired or liability incurred in connection with any pension, 
retirement or provident fund administered by a provincial 
adm inistration.
14. T he M inister may expropriate any land required for the 
purposes o f  a Governm ent Bantu school or any accessory 
thereto, and the Expropriation o f  Lands and Arbitration  
Clauses Proclam ation, 1902 (Proclam ation N o . 5 o f  1902), o f  
the Transvaal, shall mutatis m utandis apply to any such expro­
priation in any part o f  the U nion .
15. (1) The M inister may from time to tim e m ake 
regulations—•
(a) prescribing, subject to the laws governing the public 
service, the powers and duties o f  the Secretary and 
any other officer or em ployee o f the Departm ent in 
connection with the adm inistration o f  native education;
(b) prescribing the conditions o f  appointm ent and service, 
including the rights, duties and privileges, o f  teachers 
in G overnm ent Bantu schools;
(c) prescribing a code o f discipline for teachers in G overn­
ment Bantu schools, the punishments which may be 
im posed for, and the procedure to be follow ed in 
connection with, any contravention o f  or failure to 
com ply with the provisions o f such code, and the 
circum stances in which the services o f any such teacher 
may be term inated;
(id) prescribing courses o f  training or instruction in 
G overnm ent Bantu schools and the fees, if  any, 
payable in respect o f  such courses or any exam ination  
held by or under the supervision or control o f  the 
Departm ent ;
(e) prescribing the medium o f  instruction in Government 
Bantu schools;
( / )  prescribing the conditions governing the establishm ent, 
control and m aintenance o f  any hostel, school clinic, 
or other accessory to a G overnm ent Bantu school;
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(.i?) relating lo the admission o f pupils or students to, the 
control, and treatment o f  pupils or students at, and 
the discharge of pupils or students from, any G overn­
ment Bantu school;
(/i) providing for the medical examination or teachers, 
pupils or students in Government Bantu schools, 
including the particulars to be contained in medical 
certificates;
(/) providing for the control o f  funds collected for any 
G overnm ent Bantu school;
(j) providing for religious instruction in Governm ent 
Bantu schools;
(k ) prescribing the circumstances in which the suspension 
or expulsion o f  any pupil or student from any 
G overnm ent Bantu school may take place or any other 
punishment may be administered or im posed;
(/) prescribing the conditions under which Bantu com ­
m unity schools may be subsidized or assisted under 
section six;
(ni) providing for the approval o f  State-aided native schools, 
under section eight, and prescribing the conditions 
under which grants-in-aid may be made;
(n) providing for the registration o f  Bantu community 
schools or other native schools;
(o) providing for the award o f  bursaries to Bantu pupils 
or students and prescribing the conditions under which 
such bursaries may be awarded;
(p ) providing for the establishm ent o f  an advisory board 
or advisory boards on Bantu education for the Union  
and prescribing the constitution, duties, powers, 
privileges and functions o f  such a board and the fees 
and allowances, i f  any, payable to any member o f  a 
board w ho is not in the full-tim e em ployment o f  the 
State;
{£, providing for the constitution, duties, powers, privi­
leges and functions o f  regional, local and domestic 
councils, boards or other bodies or the duties, powers, 
privileges and functions- o f any Bantu authority or 
native council to w hom  the control and m anagement 
o f  a G overnm ent Bantu school is entrusted and pre­
scribing the fees and allow ances, if  any, payable to any 
m embers thereof who are not in the full-tim e em ploy­
m ent o f  the State;
(U providing, subject to the approval o f  the Minister o f  
Finance, for the establishm ent and management o f  
a pension or provident fund or scheme for teachers 
in G overnm ent Bantu schools to be administered by 
the C om m issioner o f  Pensions and prescribing the 
contributions to be m ade to such fund or scheme out 
o f  m oneys appropriated by Parliament and by teachers;
(j) providing generally for any other matter relating to 
the establishm ent, m aintenance, m anagement and 
control o f  Governm ent Bantu schools or which the 
M inister may deem necessary or expedient to prescribe 
for achieving the purposes o f  this Act, the generality 
o f  the powers conferred by this paragraph not being 
limited by the provisions o f  the preceding paragraphs.
(2) Different regulations may be made in respect o f different 
teachers, groups, classes or races o f  teachers, or different schools 
or areas.
(3) The regulations may provide penalties for any contra­
vention thereof or failure to com ply therewith not exceeding a 
fine o f  fifty pounds or, in default o f  payment, imprisonment for 
a period not exceeding six m onths.
(4) U ntil the M inister makes regulations, the laws in force 
in the respective provinces im m ediately prior to the date o f  
com m encem ent o f  this Act, other than the law repealed by 
section seventeen , shall, in so far as they relate to native educa­
tion and are not inconsistent with the provisions o f  this Act, 
continue to apply m utatis mutandis in respect o f  native educa­
tion: Provided that in any such law, any reference to the
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A m e n d m e n t o f  
se c t io n  85 o f  
th e  S o u th  A fr ica  
A c t, 1909.
R e p e a l o f  A ct  
29  o f  1945.
S h o rt t it le  and  
d a te  o f
c o m m e n c e m e n t .
“ G overnor” or the “ A dm inistrator” shall be construed as a 
reference to the M inister, and any reference to the 
“ Superintendent-G eneral” , “ Superintendent” or “ D irector” as 
a reference to the Secretary, and any reference to the “ D epart­
m ent” as a reference to the Departm ent, and any reference to  
the “ C ontroller” as a reference to the Principal Accountant o f  
the D epartm ent.
(5) W henever the M inister makes regulations with regard 
to any o f  the matters referred to in sub-section (1), that part o f  
the laws referred to in sub-section (4) relating to any matter 
dealt with in the regulations, shall then cease to apply to native 
education.
16. Section eighty-five  o f the South Africa Act, 1909, is hereby 
am ended by the insertion in paragraph (iii) after the words 
“ higher education" o f  the words “and native education” .
17. The N ative Education Finance Act, 1945 (Act N o . 29 
o f  1945), is hereby repealed.
18. This A ct shall be called the Bantu Education A ct, 1953, 
and shall com e into operation on a date to be fixed by the 
G overnor-G eneral by proclam ation in the Gazette.
285
----------------- — ^ - ~ N  G A Z E T T E  E X T R A O R D I N A R Y ,  25 i n  J U N E , 1954 .
N o . 44 , 1954 .J
A R C II I V 1; c
B I S H O P S '  C O t T F R E N C O  
P R E T O R I AACT
T o amend the Bantu Education A ct, 1953.
{A frikaans tex t s i g t ^ d b ^ e  Governor-General)
{Goedgexeur op 18 Junie 1954.)
, ierrea to as the principal Act): Act 47 of 1953.
m en^oF" -12*. ^  Trh e  M i'lister m ay, w ith  du e regard to the 
Government o f  P rovid in g  fo r  active p a r t i c S o n  bv
Bantu the  B an tu  p e o p le  in th e  control S n  UOiPdllon  oy
schools o f  G ov ern m en t B antu  f  m anagem ent
and Bantu m u n ity sc h o o ls  v ° ° ls and B an tU corn-
community j  ,  h o o ts , estab lish  such regional local nr
school,. d o m e st ic  co u n c ils , boards or other bod ies as he
m a y  deem  exp ed ien t an d  entrust t to  e o m r o f  and  
a n a gem en t o l  any o n e  or m ore o f  such  sch oo ls to 
an y  su ch  co u n c il, board  o r  body for such  p eS o d  as 
h e  m ay from  tim e to tim e determ ine or he m ay £  
anv nnp^er en tru st th e  co n tro l and m anagem ent o f  
J J L ° ? .e or m o .re o f  su ch  schoo ls to  any Bantu  
a n y  0 t S ? a « ° a ‘IVe C° ™ Cil es ,ab lish ed  ^  or under
.1ri? p * rh e . c o n s d tution , d u ties, pow ers, privileees
and f!JDti510”S any such c o u r=cil, board o-- body
B aeu ? u tien’ iFOWerS’ privi!eSes and tnnctions o f  
i , £‘ ULfJU-a i y or native cou n cil to  w h -h  
th -  con tro l an a  m anagem en t o f  an v  G overnm er't
en tru sted  s h in  HEantU c o “ m unity sch o o l has b e e i  1 shnll b e  as p resen bed .
(3) The M inister m ay at any time, whenever hP
c o n sid er s it exp ed ien t to  d o  so , d isestablish  anv such
regional, local or domestic council, boa 5 o 7 o t o
b o d y  or w ithd raw  the co n tro l and m anagem en o f
sc h o o l f r o T a n v  n a n ‘,U SCt0u01 ? r B anlu oom m unityn o o t from  an y  B antu  au th ority  or native council ■
e n t r u s t  i n T  COn,rro1 a" d ™ n a g e n te m  has b e e lentrusted in terms o f  sub-section (1); Provided that
t h 5 ° S - eX-erC1Smg 1115 d iscretion  under this paragraph’ 
th e  M im ster  sh a ll ca u se  an  inquiry to  be h S f t
b e ^ n tit le d  “  b ° ^ ~ d
2 " (n) °by " th T fn s e u L n 1 e;nPnnCiPaI Aw ’S hereby am ended—  Amendment of 
after the w n r ^  paragraPh Cff) o f  sub-section  (I )  section 15 of 
w n S k  n G overn m en t Bantu sc h o o l” o f  the Act 47 of 1953- 
m  u i S- ° r a B antu  co m m u n ity  sc h o o l” • and
after6 the in^ Ta^ h (s)  o f  the said  sub-section
words nr P -> t G overnment Bantu schools” o f  the vords or Bantu com m unity schools” .
A ct 1954 Act Sh‘'lll be calkd the Bamu Education Amendment Short thle.
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UNION OF SOUTH A^ICA.
Department of Native Affairs, 
Flla No. 252/TO2. ' f ^antu Eduoati0",
Sir,
Private Bag 212, 
P R E T O R I A .
2nd August, 1954.
The Transfer of control of State-aided schools to 
Bantu Community organizations, except in 
the ease of toaeher training schools,.
1. In accordance with the policy speech, of the Minister
of Native Affairs, the Honourable Dr, IMP, Verwoerd, delivered 
before the Senate on the 7th of Junv, 1.954, this circular is 
addressed to all grantees, s uperint\ .ud-...nt c or managers of state- 
aided-schools in order to set out the policy of the Department 
and to seek the co-operation.of all‘churches and missionary bodies 
concerned. •-■■■■ .... .. .^
2. It should be emphasized'that the transfer of control
from the missions to Bantu communities is part of a wider scheme 
of social development, designed to assist in the progress of the 
Native-• people in the form of self-sufficient and responsible 
communities in all directions. - The purpose is not therefore the 
removal of religious influence from the life of the Bantu - an 
influence which the Department; realizes has been and will con­
tinue to be a most valuable contribution to Bantu development - 
but the enlistment of the energies of the Bantu in the develop­
ment of a healthy social and economic life of their own.
3- ’ It is the intention of-the Department to offer
reasonable compensation whore necessary to the churches or 
missionary bodies from whom school buildings are taken over.
In most cases sirre:. ifnahinchivinrthe!. ■,inte^ es;1iid)ifi'eit'her the 
churches or the communities that the buildings should be sold 
(e.g„ because 'the churches may want to retain control of build­
ings outside school hours for church services or other church 
activities) buildings will be hired rather than purchased. The 
negotiations will o.r necessity have to be on an individual basis, 
since in-a great-'many instances buildings have been erected-with 
funds'"ffom different sources, (the community, the church and the 
state)5 ■ Where rent is.to be .paid on buildings the Department 
will be responsible,^ for m^ I:[tunc:'np_er Since 'the funds available 
for the purchase or hiring oi Native schools will be derived 
at least in'part from Native taxation it will bo appreciated 
that the interests of the Native taxpayer will have to be borne 
in mind.
4. - Grantees, superintendents, or managers of all state-
aided schools 'a,re' requested, after due consultation with their 
own church authorities, to inform.the Secretary for Native Af­
fairs, Private Bag 212, Pretoria, as soon as possible (but in 
any caso'not later than 31st■ December, 1954) in the case of every 
‘state-aided school under their, cure., except teacher training and 
'-.farm, mine- or factory schools, w j  .ether -they wish -
ALL GRANTEES, SUPERINTENDENTS, O.R 
MANAGERS OP STATE-AIDED BANTU SCHOOLS.
(a) to /.
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(a)' to retain control of existing state-aided schools and 
hostels either as private unaided institutions, or as 
aided institutions with the subsidy for teachers1 
salaries fixed at seventy-five per cent, of both the 
.....salary" scale and cost of living allowance applicable 
. to each teacher employed with the approval of the De­
partment. (In-the case of hostels see paragraph 8); 
or
" (b) • to relinquish control of these schools and hostels to
. Bantu community organizations.
Negotiations in connection with transfer will be 
initiated as. soon as possible, where nec.essary.
5* Since the procedure will vary somewhat according to
the type -of school and its situation a more detailed setting out 
of the procedure is'given below.
6. - ■ . The- procedure of transfer will be as follows
(a) ' in.the case of primary and post-primary schools (including 
- ■ industrial schools) in Native areas or in urban loca- 
; ’ ’ tions:-
(i) if the controlling church or mission desires to 
. rbtain control with a subsidy for teachers1 salaries 
. -. .and all allowances as set out in 4(a) above, and tho 
. .. .Department; is able to comply with such a roquesi,
-. the' subsidy will bccomo effective as from the 1st 
, " April, 1955; .
(ii) if tho- Department is unable to comply with such a 
request the subsidy will continue to be paid on 
. ' the present basis until control of tho school is
assumed by a Bantu community organization or until 
the negotiations in connection with transfer have 
■' '. been ended by the Department. Where negotiations
in connection with financial or other matters
break down the Department reserves the right to 
withdraw subsidies and to provide alternative 
, educational facilities. Control of mission 
I schools will not be assumed before the necessary 
I community organization has been created. In any 
5 "case, control will not bo transferred before the
■' ; - 1st April, 1955 (see also (v) below), unless a re­
quest from the grantee, superintendent or manager 
of the school concerned is received and approved;
(iii) where a church or missionary body is agreoable to 
the transfer of control, the subsidy will continue 
to be paid on the present basis to the grantee, 
superintendent or manager of any such schno:! ..until 
control is assumed by a Bantu communr-cy organiza­
tion or negotiations concerning compensation 
have been ended by the Department;
(iv) Under certain conditions- the Department may re­
quest the grantee, superintendent or manager of 
a school to continue for a certain period his 
superintendency of a school, the transfer of which 
has either been agreed upon or concerning which 
for the time being no decision has been taken.
The subsidies calculated on tho present basis will 
continue to bo paid during such a period;
(v) i f .
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(v) if, after the 1st April, 1955, the Department
decides that it is desirable that the control of 
- a school which has remained uuider the superinten­
dency of a church or missionary body, either at 
the request of thaf. body or.'of tho Department, 
should be transferred to a Bantu community organi­
zation, notice of at least.two school quarters 
. will be given of the intention of the Depart­
ment so that teachers may.be informed and staffing 
arrangements made ‘without prejudice to the school 
or its teachers, Negotiations will then be opened 
to decide on what terms- the transfer may be ef­
fected; ■ -
(vi) arrangements arrived at under the provision of 6(a) 
(i) above will.be subject to revision at the 
discretion of the Minister of Native Affairs.
Notice of at least -.two full school 'quarters will 
be' given of any revision of sub'si'dy.
(b) in the case of farm, mine or factory schools situated on
land in European areas: t.; .. -;.o .•->'•
ihese,-'schools’ will in future limit -their enrolment, 
except with the permission.', of-the-Departmentto the. 
children of bona- fide Bantu.-employees, . or, in the case' 
of ‘ farm■schools children/of ^ approved residents in the 
vicinity’of, the- :sc;hp.bl.T.''~ ,lhe. Department;, will approach 
these h.Ohools infpriiiing’ them of their status and of-the 
changes which will 'be'necessary in order, to-conform - 
with the. new regulations. Control of these schools will- 
not be transferred to Bantu community organizations but'— — 
will be vested in the owner of the land or his authorised- 
representative who .may- be...a,.missionary , -. A circular; set- ., 
ting ouf-in.- full the; Department' s-;-policy -concerning-farm, • 
mine and . factory schools will "be issued-at an early /’date. ; 
Subsidies ''will continue on the samefbasis- as • hithertoi. ' i
(c) in the case"' of primary and post-primary .schools situated ‘ '
on land, in'European areas which are not recognised
as bOna- fide farm,' mine or factory schools;
Ihese schools are situated on Europe an-owhadvjland--'--- 
and are.-intended as general educational institutions ., ’•
for.Bantu- children, not-.merely,, to serve ‘the children -v , " 
of-rBantu employees of the owner of the land; - ,- :
(i) if a church or missionary organization, .desires’;,. , 
to retain control of this... type; -off schohiiuv'ith'.'a' 
fixed- subsidy equivalent to 75%. of, the'salaries 
. of. approved' teachers (hs'- set out ,'in 4(a) above);
■ '/ahd the ;Departme'nti-is able to’agree to the pro- . 
'"visional retentioii of control, by the present 
grantee, superintendent ■ or manager the new, '■ 
subsidy will become effective as from the 1st!
April, 1955;
(ii) where a church’ or missionary organization in­
dicates its willingness to hand over control • ■ 
of a school, the present rath of'subsidy will be 
maintained until the transfer of• control has 
been effected or negotiations have been ended 
by the Department; , '
.V .. .(iii) any/,,,,.'
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(iii)-. any arrangomenljs made by the Department in
- respect of this type, of school will be subject 
• j'• . to the provisions of .the' Group Areas Act (ho.
..u.4-1 of 1950)., as amended,- and ’also to the 
general policy.of the Department;
(iv) the provisions of 6(a)(iii), (iv) and (v) above 
, .will-also apply.* ■ • ' .,
7. Training Schools.
It is the policy’of tho Department that the. trainings of 
all teachers for state and stater-aided schools..-should-be"con-" 
ducted in Departinental1. sGhQ‘.ols..-'-;-Ne*gO'tibLtions with the ...bodies :- 
controlling.-statelaide'd teacher training-dnstiirtitions will be 
initiated immediately by the Department.. Owing to- the variety 
of conditions under which these, institutions have b.e bn financ ed ’ 
it wili be-jnecessary ‘to' consider each case,-on its merits. 1 The' 
control of hostels'-ser'ving teacher -training schools may'be re- 
tained. (See paragraph'.,8). . . . -■
8. Hostels. . ; •
The Department is willing that hostels. should remain, under 
mission control, and; Is, prepared to negotiate with the present . j. 
grantees, superintendents, or managers in- order-to achieve' ' " .: y
mutually satisfactory;terms in-the.'case of those hostels: whose 
continued .existence-'is:-‘considered essential. Such arrange- : 
ments will, ..however-,':be subject-to. revision Gy the : Department 
especially If . the/system is found to cause difficulty in the
control of schools:-:which'have, been transferred .to the Depart--
ment. . ...       ;
9« School Cbnimitr.ees. -.    1--'
In constituting- school'd otmittees care will-be taken that 
at least one Bantu member will,, be appointed to represent church 
interests. i ■ ’
10. School Boards'and Bantu' Authorities  ^■ • '
• Care will be taken by the Department- to see that, certain 
members, able and. willing-to•represent church interests are in­
cluded in these- bodies. . . ’ - . -.
11. Religious" Education.
The curricula of. all schools under the control of the. . 
Department including'^ those, under Bantu "community organizations , 
wili provide religious instruction. Churches recognised by 
the Department will be allowed to provide .special religious 
instruction for.the children.of their.'adherents at set times, 
provided such instruction is given in the 'mother tongue, f'
Where churches do not exercise this privilege the■Departmental 
syllabus will be taught by class teachers.:. The inspectorate ; 
will be instructed to see that religious instruction is 
thoroughly taught and that the time set aside for this purpose 
is not used for so-called examination subjects.
1. General/....
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12. General.
A separate circular has been drawn up setting out the 
basis on which negotiations for the transfer of control of • 
teacher training schools and hostels will be conducted. This 
circular will be sent out to the heads of training schools and 
other interested parties. Copies may be obtained from the 
Department.
13. In the foregoing paragraphs’emphasis has been placed 
mainly on the role which the Bantu Community must play in Bantu 
Education. The possibility that the European community, by 
virtue of its experience in the past, will be able to make an 
important contribution to Bantu education in the future is not 
being neglected. The possible use in an advisory capacity of • 
European experts, including church leaders, is being considered.
14. . Grantees, superintendents or managers of state-aided 
schools who may wish to raise questions in connection with 
any matters referred to in this circular are invited to send 
their queries as soon as possible (but in any case not later 
than 15th September, 1954) to the Secretary for Native Affairs, 
Private Bag 212, Pretoria, who will deal with such queries in
a further circular or by letter as soon as possible after the 
closing date.
Yours, faithfully,
(sgd) W.Y/.M. lEiselen.
SECRETARY EOR NATIVE AFFAIRS.
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UNION ON SOUTH AFRICA.
. FILE NO. 252/302.
DEPARTMENT OP NATIVE AFFAIRS, 
(DIVISION OF BANTU EDUCATION), 
PRIVATE BAG 212, 
P R E T O R I A .
2nd.- August, 1954*
Sir,
The transfer of control of teacher training 
schools to the State,
1. In terms of the recent declaration of policy by the 
Minister of Native Affairs, the Honourable Dr. H.F. Verwoerd, 
before the Senate on the fth of June, 1954, this circular is 
addressed to grantees, superintendents or managers of all state- 
aided teacher training schools for Bantu students.
2. It is the policy of ' the Department that the training
of all teachers for state or state-aided schools should be con­
ducted in Departmental. tUA.Ohor .trgii-n.ing-'-s.ehpels .only.
3. The choice of action which is open to grantees, 
superintendents-and managers of the present teacher training in­
stitutions who are desirous that their institutions should continue 
to serve the Bantu (leaving out of account'private non-subsidised 
schools) may be summarised as follows
(a) to agree to the transfer of control of an existing insti­
tution (school and hostels) and to negotiate an ecpuitable 
settlement, either by way of rental or purchase;
(b) to agree to the transfer of control of the school build­
ings necessary for a teacher training school on terms
to be negotiated while retaining hostels on a subsidised 
basis agreeable to both parties;
(c) to decide-to closo the existing teacher training school 
after an agreed period and to conduct instead a private 
primary or secondary school, or to apply for such a 
primary or secondary school on the basis of seve'nty-five 
per cent, of tho salary scale and cost of living allow­
ance applicable to teachers employed with Departmental 
approval.
4- In general tho Department does not desire to purchase
land and buildings outside scheduled Native areas, . but will be 
willing to hire land and buildings in European areas if con­
sidered essential for teacher training. 'Where the owners, how­
ever, "'desire to offer their properties in these areas for sale, 
the Department may be approached with such propositions. In 
the case-of mission-owned farms in or adjoining Native areas 
the Department is prepared to hire such areas thereof as may 
be necessary for the purpose of conducting a teacher training 
school or it may offer to buy the whole property if the owners 
are willing to sell. a
10 :
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5* Where Uno the Department hires buildings, hostels,
etc., tlio Department will undertake the maintenance of such 
properties, and the hire paid will be calculated to reimburse 
over a period of years actual.costs incurred by the owner of 
tho buildings in respect thereof„ Owing to the various con­
ditions under which buildings have been financed it will be 
necessary to negotiate a settlement of each case on its merits,
6. The present rates of subsidy for both teachers and • 
hostels will continue in force until at least two full school 
quarters aftertho. conclusion of negotiations, unless at the 
request of tho institution concerned other arrangements arc 
agreed to, ' It is the desire of the Department that control 
of training schools should be transferred not later than 1st 
July, 1955»
7. If no agreement can be reached in the case of any par­
ticular school by the Is^ June, 1955, subsidies will be withdrawn 
as from 1st January, 1959* and alternative arrangements for the 
training of students will be made.
8. In the bel;i ef that many churches and missionary insti­
tutions which have hitherto conducted teacher training schools 
■'dll retain their interest in Bantu education and will be anxious 
that the assets and facilities built up by them through the 
years should continue to bo available to the Bantu, the Depart­
ment is prepared to consider the following particular concessions 
to churches ana missionary institutions which make a substantial
donation of assets :- . . •
(a) all donations will be tyb’Sived in trust and if property
is not used as agreed upon it will revert to the donor;
(b) the institution or school will be given a name agreed 
upon by both parties in order to commemorate the 
generosity of tnc body or church concerned;
(c) a memorial plaque wil?. bo erected on the building 
setting cut the details of the donation;
(d,> the donors will be given the right to nominate one
or two 1/.embers of the advisory committee attached to 
Caen teacher training school (for functions see below); 
and
(e) where buildings arc placed at the disposal of the 
Department without charge tho responsibility for 
maintenance' will be assumed by the Department.
9*. The Department is prepared to consider suggestions
in connection with the matters raised in paragraph 8.
10. It is proposed to institute an advisory committee at.
each Departmental .teacher training school. The composition of 
the advisory committee may differ in details from place to 
place but will in general be subject to the following guiding 
principles
(a) since the advisory committee -will by definition be 
advisory and not executive, the chairman wall be an 
Inspector of Bantu Schools. (If at a later sbage;' ' 
the control of teacher training schools is entrusted 
to a regional or territorial authority the committee 
will necessarily bo reconstituted).
(b ) an/
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(b) an advisory committee may include
(i) two representatives of the territorial, regio nal
or tribal authority in whose area the school
falls, preference being given to the body with 
the'widest jurisdiction;
(ii) one representative of parents of students;
(iii) two representatives of religious interests;
(iv) two representatives of the Department;
(v) where hostels are conducted by a religious body 
formerly in control of the teacher training in­
stitution the head of the hostel will be a member 
of the committee. If the hostels are conducted 
by the Department no separate representation will 
be necessary;
(c) the Dative Commissioner will ex officio be a member of 
the committee;
(d) the principal or head teacher will attend meetings on 
invitation in an advisory capacity,
11. The functions of the advisory committee will be :-
(a) to advise the•Department and the principal on the follow 
ing matters
(i) the appointment of staff;
(il) the maintenance of discipline and good order 
among the students;
(iii) the selection and admission of students;
(iv) the representations of student bodies and of
parents;
(v) the maintenance of buildings and grounds;
(vi) the hostels;
(vii) public.relations; and
(viii) generally, all matters affecting the well­
being of the school.
The advisory committee will meet once a 'quarter
copies of minutes of meetings will be sent regularly to Head 
Office, Pretoria, and the office of the Regional Director,
12, The Department is desirous that-Christian influences
should be strongly felt in Departmental training schools and 
calls upon the churches to assist by
(a) retaining control of hostels whereever possible; and
(b) making arrangements at Departmental teacher training 
schools for pastoral work among adherents not only on 
Sundays but also during the week when at set times 
the adherents of each church will be available to its 
pastor fox' religious instruction.
It may be added that 'all teacher training curricula 
will contain biblical instruction and religious exercises of a 
non-sectarian nature.
13 . All/.. .
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13. All European teachers at present in employment in
aided, teacher training institutions will ho eligible to become 
Departmental teachers with conditions of service similar to 
those enjoyed by teachers employed in schools under the Depart­
ment of Education, Arts and Science. . Teachers who were in the 
employment of Provincial Education Departments and whose transfer 
to the employment of the Native Affairs Department was a neces­
sary consequence of the Bantu Education Act (No, 47 of 1953) will 
retain the advantages of their previous conditions of service. 
Teachers who were not direct employees of the Provincial Education 
Departments will have to satisfy the new conditions of service 
(e.g. as to qualifications and bilingualism) before they can be 
appointed permanently. Seasonable -time will be given to uni- 
lingual teachers to obtain the necessary qualifications while 
holding conditional appointments.
14. Until negotiations between the Department and the
managers of state-aided teacher training schools have been com­
pleted the salaries and allowances of all teachers at present 
paid by the Department will continue to be paid. As soon as 
negotiations have been completed the Department will advise all - 
teachers that as from a given date they will bo given two full 
school quarters in which to apply to become members of the De­
partmental teaching staff or to make such other arrangements as 
they may desire. The Department appreciates the good work done 
by loyal and interested teachers and is anxious to retain'their 
services where possible,
15* All Bantu teachers at present teaching in aided teacher
training schools will be eligible to become Departmental teachers 
under conditions of service now being framed. The procedure for 
the transfer of those teachers will be as set out above in 
paragraph 1 4 *
16. The Department desires to open negotiations for the
transfer of teacher training schools as soon as possible and 
commencing early in August 1954 Departmental officials will 
visit all teacher training institutions for that purpose. 
Negotiations will be greatly facilitated and expedited if 
grantees, superintendents or managers will communicate as soon 
as possible with the Secretary for Native Affairs, Private Bag 
212, Pretoria, informing him of any decisions they may have 
reached or asking for any further information they may require.
Yours faithfully,
SECRETARY EOR NATIVE AFFAIRS.
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A ppendix 3
12 Lokhani Chamber3 , 
2 S a v il le  S tr e e t ,
x  -M Diarban.
7 K ' 2oth  March ,195?.,
Dear Father,
It is quit* a conciderable length of time since Father heard from me 
and perhaps heard of me.
For as Ion* as the period during which I was quiet;! have not hoar, 
without a strong feeling that I should write Father and inform him about this 
and that which although unplsasing perhaps would he of interest to him,
I am no more at Umlaci,neither am I still in. the Teaching Profession,
Put Let sne say this "before I proceed,I hstv* thought if wiser for me tc write
a letter sc that I can put on paper Everything I want to say,"because a personal 
t a l k  has i t s  own advantages and disadvantages,I t  shall follow l a t e r  on.
On the 3th of November,1252 I submitted my resignation letter to our 
Granite,Father Mdhlafkla, of ter considering this line of action as from March, 1952,
I resigned from th-s Teaching Profession because I wanted, to 'os 3. Trade Unionist, 
and the^by Join the * mighty few* who have made it their duty to "bring ah out econo­
mic relief to the African in general and tc the African. Working class in parti- 
caLar.Ur.y I admit here that my action cannot b« divorced from political ideas.
This ’-fish was strenghtened when in the * Advance* 1 read a notice tc the 
effect that a Trade Union Movement Gcurse was to "be opened in Johannesburg as 
from the "beginning of January,1953,Towards the end of the year I applied for 
admissioh, and was accepted.
In the middle of January, 1953 I went to Johannesburg for training,But 
owing to the fact that the Sponsors of this course,who "belong to the Joint Planning 
Council, of the African National ongress end theSouth African Indial Congress, 
could^rafoase their octurerss "because of the pressure of wrk owin ~ to the two 
Bills that were then-biing pilot 3d through Psrliam*nt,the course could net be 
begun until the beginning of March,
It then happened that in February Chief intuli went to Bloemfontein 
to address a Meeting theaCof the African Nationl! 0engross.In Bloemfontein he 
met a Member of the National "executive,Mr Tlooms,who was also to address the 
meeting,Chief Lutuli then asked Mr Tlcome if he knew where I was because the 
Natal Executive of the A.N,C,only knew that I was in Johannesburg,but could not 
get a. line om me,On finding that Mr Tlccm- was in a position. to supply all infor- 
matio4 about metChief then asked Mr Tlccme. to contact me immediately an arrival 
in JoLumi-sburg ond ask me to come and take over the Office kkiinistration of 
Congress Affairs in Natal,He went cn to say if I was r^ luct.-'rt he should put the 
mattoi’ before the National Executive to persuade ms tc come back tc Natal.Although 
the matter did come before the. Nations! Executive,iikSrna&ly though,it was rot 
because I was unwilling but rather for ether reasons.
So I agr^id to cons back tc Natal,and did sc net :ithout r~grnts for 
I was to abandon my plansfor the time bsing.Hov/overfther» sons consolation 
because wc agr?-.*d that the Natal Executive would release me from their services 
after two months tc go bock for trainsing.So I  sha^l be here until the end of Apr-* 
that is if things are still normal in South Africa,but da ould the Government,shci 
they win this election,become aggressive and wild towards our Leaders;then Ithir 
it will he advisable for ms to remain hers ^nd just* dip the bucket where I son*, /
However,I prefer to leave this in the hsrds of fate.
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llowjl suppose 7«.ther is itching to cone tc grips wjbth the reason 
iky I resigned iron the Teaching Profesaion.let me proceed.
First and forancst let me point ,out that I have joined the company 
cf polititians because X uas a Teacher,! am still oorvineed that if I had not teen 
aTeacher X -vculd probably hr apathetic tcwords present political levelopments that 
iirectly o.if-'-ci the Africans.Or most certainly I would still h* in whatever occupa­
tion I was in,
I am a Teacher hr prof Qss ion, and no sir. probably a Polititiar by virtu 
and perhaps a humanit art an by endowment.And as tc the laid*” I do f i m h  heliv? that 
.man's i uiin limit-:d to right doing t'■■wards others and. an interest in their public 
v-lf arc* vit'k specific reference to the under dog-these who canhct help themselves, 
and in douth Africa.in the welfare- cf these who i*ni«d the right and even the privi­
lege of helping thamsslerA,and I shall always take a fifn stand by it.
P orhaps if Z " ss  not n Teacher for tbje past two years the cthertwo
potential talents would have remained nneirrlcited in me.’But as fate ot luck would 
have it I did “become a Teacher.And so having iksxi this grk'ilaga plus the two 
elssiftiits mixed in me,I began to appreciate the conditions under which, a Black school 
child lives.The inevitable happened.1 began to npprscinis the unspeakably dreadful 
condti6as to which the parents cf thsve children I taught veers and are subjected by 
the South African order of thing3,Thi* and orfty thii marksd the beginning of the
end of my profession as a Teacher.
Here was the beginning of something in my lifa.iiy feelings of 
sympathy went all cut at logger heads with my sense of reason.My sympathy for the 
ujeforttmato masses spurred nee into act ion. hy sense of reason reminded me of 'Safety 
First1 .kental gymnrsticr I began to e::pirience,Thera was no peace in me.Sut my sympa*- 
thy still cverpcvyr ad my sense of reason-hencs the hatching out of this -.’iii idea*
I knstj that sooner or Ic.tar I Vvonli bar- to uck3 a decision.And I made it .hoy X cl aim 
Father that vfvrn X unlc if it v?aa in the absence of all emotional inspiration.
By v ir tu e  o f my p r o fe ss io n  I was in  c lo se  con tact w ith school 
c h ild r en , and thses ch ild r en  srtrs fa ir ly  rep re se n ta tiv e  o f the l e s s  fortu n ate  ones 
th a t roomri a l l  over l i k e  sheep without a sheperd,and l ik e  some flew er s  undsr u n fa­
vourable c lim a tic  c o n d itio n s  tc  l i e  and rot before they came to  bloom ,dying a ua-rt 
unti*.»a.ly icu th  in  slum l i f e ,  areas vh er? squalor i s  & luxury -  abhorstbl* as i t  i s ,
Bc.l, Those children sp«*It polltics,Cun South African politira-the 
science- of how to go-r*rr. th“ ncn-Burop u-na in general and the Africans in parti and an- 
reflect something b-cically wrong in their spplic&tioa,?ha after-effects as X percir-vr 
tht*m an- at-.-- perci£vs them on cur ckr-iren are, signatures of a master hand of aw 
evil-ridden pdlititian.Th.vy rye. r.c rally indefensible; although white South \frrca wouli 
find ample political n-sfmoo against this apparent vccuaatiou,Bnt who cannot read 
through the deeds of man.,
Tka fa c t  is;G ur chilure.n are, sy s te m a tic a lly  reta rd ed , m entally a: I 
p h y s ic a lly .T h a ir  in te l l ig e n c e ,r e a s o n in g  powars and scmiaon sense low ered and made 
b lu n t by the absence o f  h ea lth y  curroutLniags at th e ir  homes. ItfHygient le sso n s  Teacher? 
always onghusiae the im portance o f that g a s , an ic.despansable g a s ,c a l le d  Oxygen, Yet 
at th e ir  homes the H ousing Board has provided another g a s , c a l le d  Carbon D io x id e , which 
the. Teacher has a lso  em phasised as deadly to th e ir  growth and g en era l health.And why 
t h i s  co n tr a d ic tio n  in  th eo ry  and actu a l p r a c t is e {
I hope I am net boring you Father with platitudes as you already 
know more about this than. I do .%•*.! I weald be very rropareo to learn more from you,
But 1 am g iv in g  tne su.sivsr to fr.e cues _,:i tWHY1 .u  ;^Vl f i v ropting  the c o n f l ic t s  w hi- 
I bad vihi;h ii. -C t « a d —  r»8iirji*,it!\.Tfc«r«:ore,pl„a„  reci c„ i ' ;
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The reason  i s  j th is  i s  fen® r e s u lt  o f the e x is t in g  order o f th in g s -
an o ld  order of th in g s  d a tin g  hack from the days the A frican was forced  in to  urban
l i f e .S u c c e s s iv e  governments and su ccess iv e  C ity  C ouncils,and  even the K .A .U .respo­
n s ib le  as they  are fo r  prov id in g  the d e tr ib a lis e d  A fricans w ith  h ouses,have A ll
proved to  he com peting fo r  a tXaxxxs* UTo-Housing-Scheme‘ fo r  N a t iv e s .I f  any houses
a t a l l ; t h e  procedure seems to  ho 1 As few houses and as s a n ll  as p o s s ib le 1.Or they  
t a le  refuge to a vary  sim ple method .They become conscious o f  th e ir  d i f f i c u l t i e s  in  
p ro v id in g  houses.Meanwhil® the housing p lans l i e  in  th e ir  sh e lv es  fo r  3y ye^ro, 
and we the s u ffe r in g  masses s leep  on th s  wat co ld  g locrs w ith  csraboardr- r-ni saclo­
c i  oth  abov? o-.ir h;iac.;> .is  th i?  not syst.-m s.tic procedure, schemes and p lan s engineered  
hr n eg le c ted  by our own South A frican Statesmen end prime M in isters  »
Then we the out-witt -id and hypnotised sleeping degs excsct genii 
fgom out* so-call cream/rfa expact our own future Macaulays,Syr cue end Skakaspfissres 
and Churchills .K*n with Miltonic and Lincoln!e firs them.But if I continue to 
expect theca from our dubious crssmjthen I liva in a fell1 3 ?orait3 g becauG- I 
know well what i t  afoot.
No Z,  Those school ch ild ren  sp e lt  economic in s t a b i l i t y , t h e  d ire c t  
r e s u lt  o f cur South A fr ican  p o l i t i c s ,  , I
And so;more o ften  than n o t ,I  and -my fe llo w  teach ers  were co n fro n te l 
w ith  sta rv in g  c h ild r e n  ’'hom we were supposed to  te a c h .I  had inter^Iew ad cer ta in  1
ch ild r e n  at random, m d  came across cases where ch ild ren  to ld  me th at they had |
m issed  th a ir  p rev iou s day1$ supper and that the subsequent b reak fast c o n s is ted  o f  j
on© s l i c e  o f  bread ?nd three o ra n g es ,I t  might be argued th a t t h is  sort cf th in g  does |
not happen d r ily  or w ith  every chil&.BAt should i t  happen at allJT he sad part c f  i t  
1$ th a t th is  i s  but one o f innumerable such ca ses  .Worse th in gs than th is  happen,but 
I-am on ly  d ea lin g  h ere  w ith  co n d itio n s  which v ers  in  ny immediate c i r c le  as a Teacher, 
I cou ld  t e l l  you mors Ja ih er  about th is  economic probelm-a B u ll  dozer * owned 1 by  
% o f  th e  e n tir e  A fr ica n  P op u la tion ,
1 had a c h ild  in  my c la s s  who absented h e r s e l f  from sch oo l fo r  th irti-r :  
days.And I *.;?:? b o i l in g  about th is  because o f t&e then approaching exardnations.She  
turned up on the fo u r teen th  d ry ;but i t  was on ly  to  break my h ea rt.S h e  was q u ite  
f e a r le s s  to t a l l  me th a t her n o th er-a  Widow (perhaps because m a ln u tr ition  le ssen ed  
th e n a tu ra l r e s is ta n c e  of her husband aga in st d isea ses  }had no mcney fo r  the 
daughterfe tr a in fa r e .T h e  very fa c t  th a t she attended c c h o o l^ t  JJmlasi and not in  one
o f  th e  Durban sch o o ls  where she atsyed  shows th e r e su lt  of^Education f a c i l i t i e s  fo r  
N ativ e  i i i  11." sr . Tear-bedewed I turned away from her im agining the horrors o f th is  
economic s tr a n g u la t io n . I t  could do noth ing e ls e  but rapture my h eart .What r e a l ly  
hurt me was that th a t case was but one o f  innumerable such cas«3,A t l a s t  I could  
not stand i t  sry lo n g e r .I  cou ld  not lon ger r.asai r sn e ia  in d if f e r e n t  to such p a ss io n -  
s t ir r in g  in c id en t s.'who would not be movodi
To me such th in gs were and are a ch a llen ge to  th ese  who are aware o f  
them,They c a l l  fo r  immediate action.A nd perhaps th is  was em otioarl anger,but I d id  
s in c e r e ly  b e lie v e  th a t  i f  one was not going to act or hejhp in  some other way,then  
one had no r ig h t to  g iv e  us illu m in a tin g  speeches on how to  so lv e  our S o c ia l and 
Economic problem s,As fo r  m y se lfjto  be a mere sym pathiser would be tortu re  myself.Thr / 
were th e  c o n f l ic t s  which I was no longer prepared tfc a llow  to  take p la ce  in d e f in i t e  7 
I lon ged  to be among th o se  who tr ie d  to improve the s i t  n a tio n . And l ik e  an in sp ire  
m ission ary  I d ecided  to  *go forw ard-1
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V  >VI  decided  to 'bid good "bye to  th e  3^ nd^^«'^-fba^/)^ia«nts of th e  Tea** 
ch in g  P r o fsa s io n .I  decided  to  go and r e c e iv t  my share of  /eur^ering fo r  th e  su fferifc_  
w ith  the »u ff s r in g , I was angry, ,but X was convinced and c onvfcnced that
i t  was and i s  r ig h teo u s anger s in ce  i t  has in  i t  g r ie f  not on^tecdnnt o f what i s  
happening to me hut because on account of what i s  happening to others.M ay I p o in t  
out that I s h a ll  not make im p o s s ib i l i t ie s  p o s s ib le , !  have .joined the company of thos 
who are con sc iou s o f  the fa c t  that they s h a ll  not do or ach ieve anything except that 
which i 3 humanly pocaible.V /hat I know i s  that we are not d ea lin g  w ith  su p er-n atu ra l 
op p ressors,
Ho o,Those school ch ild ren  sp e lt  Moral degradation .
I t  i s  not urban l i f e  which ru in s these c h ild r e n .N o .lt  i s  c o n d itio n s  
which ob ta in  in  th ese  places,Vfhat South A fr ica  does i s  to  cry over m ilk which i t  
has helped to sp ill,W hat our so -c a lle d  1 guardians*do i s  to  condemn s e e d lin g s  knowing 
f u l l  w e ll th a t thay come from seed lin g s which were only f i t  to  end up in  the fcv/1  
izun.They condemn f r u i t s  as u n f it  for  human consumption but they  re fu se  to examine 
the ground from which the f r u i t s  are drawn.And when they  cry about *N ative C rim inals 
we have on ly  one con clu sion  to  make;* They ace caught in  th e  t o i l s  c f  th e ir  own 
s e l f i s h n e s s 1 .Sm all wonder th in g s  are what th ey  a te ,
A fter  studying our problems thoroughly in  th e ir  true p e r sp e c tiv e  I I  
l i t e r a l l y  c r ie d  fo r  the broken m orality  o f  the innocent children.w ho w ithout pare­
n ta l  choice i r e  l e f t  to th a ir  own raw resou rces fo r  tw elve hours everyday ,to  peddle  
th e ir  own canoes by t r i a l  and error m ethod,Is th is  not equ ivalent to l e t t i n g  a 
student p i lo t  to  teach  him self^The cannon of the m atter i s  that the innocent c h ild  
i s  l e f t  a d e fa n c e le ss  v ic tim  o f a l l  m isch ie f in c l in a t io n s  pravelen t among a l l  
ch iId rsn .B u t, a la s  I These tak s root in  an A frican  c h ild  fo r  h is  mother i s  away l£h rs  
.every day to  nurse the. hand th a t destroys her and her innocsnt ch ild ,A nd th e c h ild  
brought up in  a s o c ie ty  o f w rong-dosrsjh is l i t t l e  p laym ates,regards w rong-doing as 
an accepted moral standard o f  liv in g ,C r im in a l ten d en cies in t e n s ify  th em selves as tbs  
c h ild  grows up,Anything but honest l i v in g  i s  h is  am bition.To him regu lar s t r e e t - f i -  
> g h te r a ,s e l f - s ty le d  Cowboys and tough k a ife -u se r a  are heroes to be worshipped by 
everyb od y .lt might be argued that i t  i s  n a tu ra l for  a l l  m h ilirsu  to be so.G rant th rf  
But even wh-ni our A frican ch ild r en  hava reached manhood th e ir  s u b it ic n 3  do n et  
r e f l e c t  any s i c i r l i s e d  aims and purposes,
,fh$. t ln c $ n t iv o #v/hat chances and what guar ant ess hr*. our ■_-hilii-.n: 3 0 * 
to grow up lttv?-abi':ing c i t iz e n s  vh^n the l i c e  are so h e a v ily  loaded a g a in st them \ 
Then cm as the mest h eart-b rack in g  thingjjroEi these c h ild r en  vw. 
crpect our fu ture T eachers,I/orsa than ik ic  ;',u* expect fu tu re Mothers and f a th e r s .
And worst s t i l l ; w e  expect fu tu re  p r i e s t 5 , Let us not ignore e ith er  th at s o f t  p e r s i s t s  
cry o f '*Vfhy do we net have A frican  3 ish op srt ?In shortjJfrom the grtrwairg g en era tion  
ws ezpect e l l  thfs enviable q u a l i t ie s  that are e x c e lle n t  in  man. And 3 0  i f  our p eop le  
v/ho,more o fte n  than n o t ,a r e  m orally  sound,produce Teachers who are drunkards and 
moral w ea k lin g s ,to  me i t  i s  on ly  an already a n tic ip a te d  outcome, s t r i c t l y  governed by 
a sequence o f  events strewn a l l  over the victim * 3 ch ildhood *>4iich took p la ce  without 
the p aren t1s knowledge and or in s p it e  of the p aren t.
S h a ll we n o t , in  a hundred years to  c o m e ,to ta lly  degenerate as ra ce  i f  
we submit to  the p resen t order o f th in g s j l t  i s  a lready tak in g  p lace ,an d  more t r a g ic  
th in gs than t h i s 3 hang im m inently by th in  threads over o&r heads,T his i s  but one 
th e many ga th er in g  clouds which are on the verge of iiriix th e ir  daw p o in t and rec 
. 0  relfla.se th $ ir  ‘^ owupour 0 1  ’* Dies sings ** oestowed upon us by our w hite * saviours*  
Vlho tfcf.t th ey  are her* to s ta y ,th a t th ey  Ij, th is  and tha+ ^  ori<>r V
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am eliorp.t© c o n i i t io n s  which prevail- among A fricans and ina.^ --cy c?.n© to  South. A ir ic  
in  order to p la n t c u ltu r e  in  th e  land o f the barbarous n a t iv e s .
T ru e.In  thiffc p a s t  th is  te n s  was dona,tu t now i t  i s  being undone,And in  tb  
n o t-d is ta n t - fu tu r e  th e  work of  the undocrs sh a ll hav-e “been com pleted. And the futures 
s h a l l  be lu ck y  to  f in d  an A frican  c h ild  w ith  an I n te ll ig e n c e  Q uotient o f  a 1 0 0 .In , 
f a c t  th ere id  ample evidence o f retarded  mental growth in  our school ch ild ren ,
And so I vns nc longer prepared to watch jfiiis d estru ctio n  anc. do n o th in g  
about it ,B e c a u se  I was con sciou s o f i t  I f a i t  an overpowering sense o f g u i l t  o f evpi 
ding  the i s  rue .T here were and there are many more who f e o l  l ik e  I do.But one th in g  
I f a i l e d  to do was to  l i v e  w ith  a ’ d iv id ed  se lf*  ,1  was moved and spurred in to  action' 
The r e s u lt  was th a t even when I was s t i l l  in  the Teaching P ro fe ss io n  I was sc a c t iv e  
support*!' of C on gress,I  signed  on a3 a Volunteer on th s  6 th  A p r il ,1952 although I 
knew that I was p la y in g  w ith  f ir e .B u t  then 1 was a F in a n c ia l Supporter in  the Canpai 
gn-henca I sa id  in  the b eg in n in g  017 a c tio n s  cannot be d ivorced from p o l i t i c a l  id e a s .  
A fter  a l l  i t  i s  not a commendable th in g  tc  l i v e  b7  reason  and in t e l l ig e n c e  i f  th ese  
are to be ap p lied  o n ly  where th ey  are com fortably s u it  a b le . 3 a to end th e c o n f l ic t  th  
was in  mo I d ecid ed  to  res ig n ,a n d  when I did so I was g r e a t ly  re lea v ed  o f the lo n g  
d read fu l <sxpirier.ee o f having to make a f in a l  d e c is io n .
I do n o t th ink  what 1  did was a wonderful th in g .In  fa c t  I would he qu it 
'd isappoin ted  w ith  m yself i f  I cou ld  come to regard i t  as w o n a sr fu l.lt  cou ld  be done 
by anyone in  my p o s i t io n .
I did  t h is  w ith  the f u l l  ap p recia tion  o f  th e  ser io u sn ess  of th* step  I 
was ta k in g ,I t  i s  a step  which cannot be d ivorced ffo n  hardships and even d isap po in t­
m en ts .I t  was a w ild  step  to  t a k e .I t  ,wgs a desperate en terp r ise ,B u t in  the in te r e s t s  
o f  this©  s£  who co u ld  not h e lp  them selves i t  had to  be done,
From th e  fo reg o in g  i f  might he assumed th a t I th in k  I w i l l  fr ee  the 
p eop le  from th e ir  oppression,]?© ,th a t would b© l ik e  l i v in g  under an i l l u s i o n , !  on ly  
came to  jo in  and th ereb y  a s s i s t  those whom H istory  has d estin ed  to  r ig h t  the wrongs 
o f  the p ast th ree  c * a tu r i« 5 |J  wss novel to be there as they  fdught and f e l l .
Having tr ia d  to  exp la in  what dangers I saw which th reaten ed  our p e o p le ,  
whether p o te n t ia l,im a g in a r y  or r e a l I s h a ll  now proceed to exp la in  why I ignored  
th e  fa c t  that I am an orphan and th a t I am shouldering q u ite  a lo t  o f  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty ,  
and tnafc I cou ld  put r ig h t  our own fam ily  on a sound f in a n c ia l  fo o t in g  b efore I could  
•van th in k  o f  h e lp in g  oth er people-£- 
. . .  W ell her© i s  the reason . From th® da# I wafc ab le to read and lea m  with
understanding any good book I f e l l  in  lo v e  w ith  H isto r y .
I dug out the bones o f the great men o f the p a s t .I  l i t e r a l l y  exhumed 
th e bodies c f  th e  in te l le c tu a l ,  g ia n ts  o f  the Greek and SlizadJithan p e r io d s ,I  read 
o f al le g * d ly  am bitious men l i k e  J u liu s  Caesar,and 0 1  am bitious men l ik e  C assius who 
graced the Eoman periodjam d o f  S ocrates o f  th# Gr*#k p e r io d .1  read about f ig u r e s  -iio  
fe a tu r e  o u tsta n d in g ly  in  the h is to r y  o f  America,men l i k e  Abraham-Lincoln.I p lurged  
ihjwh® realm o f  P e e tr y .le a r n e d  o f sages and g e n ii l ik e  G ilb er t K eith C hesterton and 
M ilto n ,I  uiiaarthfcc men l ik e  Samuel Taylor C olerigde whonspent most o f th e ir  l iv e s  
im agining the m osy h o r r ib le  things- about ’Ancient Mariners e t c . I  read about appare­
n t ly  mad men l i k e  th e  ’B rothers W right1 to  wanted to  f l y  l i k e  b ird s by f ly in g  machine
and d id  s o .I  read  about other g sea t in ven tors and sh holars o f  th* Eenaissanca P er io
Inventors whose l i v e s  p ro sp ered ,b u sin ess  f lo u r ish e d  but who f in a l ly  d ied  very  poor 
and n e g le c te d .I  a lso  read about Thomas Alva S d ison jth e  ’ mad y o u n gster 1 who spent 
s o l i t a r y  hours l i s t e n i n g  tc  the hum o f  the f a l l in g  w aters ,an  apparently  u s e le s s  
pastim e,And y e t ho crea ted  and fushipnad the age in  to ic h  -v/a l i v e  - th e  age o f  speed 
and e l e c t r i c i t y ,
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I turned over the new pages o f our h is to r y  which i s  dominated, - ^ p t a t e s -  
men.I read o f th e 1 Man o f  the Moment’ do were flu n g  :in to  power "by tr e n d s , emc® on s anc 
o p p o r tu n itie s  th a t e x is te d  at th e ir  tim e3,and a lso  o f  ’Men o f the F uture1 Vh^eiriovfed  
vd th  p a th e tic  q u a l i t i e s  th a t created  the next age,men l i k e  the Carpenter’ s Son,Gur 
lo r d  and a lso  ?aujyvmo3e one and on ly  one id eo lo g y  was ‘‘Love th in e  neighbour/enem y0 .
And i t  i s  a tr a g ic  commentary that our Statesmen and F o l i t i t i a n s  have com p lete ly  |
ign ored  th e ir  id e o lo g ie s .  1
I read o f  exp lorers who looked at the angry seas not as the boundaries 
o f  th e  worV but^sur bounds:! es o f th e ir  own eounti±es o n ly ,to  imagined th ere  were large  
t r a c t s  o f  land soiaswhere fa r  and ’beyond th ese  roaring  ssas.Thereupon .th e y  s a i le d  
a cro ss  the se a s ,n o t  knowing what they  vo a id  d isco v er ,n o t knowing vhat hardsh ips they  
would su ffe r  and not even carih g  to know dout th e se .T h e ir  minds hatched out w ild  ideas.
/ took  to the seas aW  ju s t  fo llo w ed  th s ir  n o s e s .I  am not fo r g e t t in g  the f i r s t  hatch  of^
in s p ir e d  id is s io n a t ie s  l i k e  Owen,Gardiner and L iv in g sto n e ,
One th in g  which struck  me in  th ese  men, e s p e c ia l ly  the In v e n to r s ,was th e ir  
w ealth  o f  ’’Wild and Crude Id eas1 .They explored the unknown avenues in  l i f e  and did  
so "by e x p lo it in g  t h e ir  w ild  ideas,T o-day  our H isto ry  i s  incom plete w ithout them.They 
were not am bitious.T hey ju s t  y ie ld e d  to  th e ir  crude m inds.
A ll th e se  men ex erc ised  th e ir  i r r e s i s t i b l e  in f lu e n c e  on me.Their w ild  
id e a s  and d e fia n t a c t io n s  in sp ir e d  me.I bowed down to th e ir  y o k es .I  su b n itte q .
And than cams my turn &3 th e ir  p u p il to do as th ey  d id .I  was p e r fe c t ly  
aware of the part I was p la y in g  in  my la t e  p a r e n ts ’ fa m ily ,b u t I ju st decided  to  defy  
such stum bling b lo ck s* I  knew I was a Teacher, thought o f  the n ot-so ’-bad-cheque I was 
getting,rem em bered th a t vhat was expected o f  me was to g et aonrxiifex married,knew X 
was expected  to  improve th e l i t t l e  E sta te  which out b eloved  FAther l e f t  u s ,I  f e l t  
s tr o n g ly  about the in esca p a b le  duty entangled ground th® noble Teaching P r o fe s s io n .
Yet I f v l t  th a t i f  I would not re s ig n  ju st bacaus* 1 was a Taacher <oi 
boo&usa I was con sc io u s of th e Teachers’ d u ty ,th a t would be to  imply that Education  
has an end in  i t s e l f , a n d  th a t i t s  end i  s the Teach er P ro fess io n ,a n d  th at Teaching i s  
the end and bo a l l  o f Education.W hereas H istory  would r e fu te  th is*
As to  th* o th er  stumbling b lock s which a lso  con trib u ted  a somewhat xseBtrai 
n in g  in f lu e n c e  on my d e c is io n  j i t  i s  a fa c t  that not a l l ,  i f  any, s u c c e s s fu l and |ebss 
prosperous A frican  men were Teachers p r io r  to th e ir  m a te r ia l is t ic  p ro sp er ity ,H es id ea ,
I have no stron g  wish to  become rich  jus#  now or in  th* near fu tu r e .T h is  makes fo r  
p se x x is sd  in s in c e r e  le a d e rsh ip ,a n d  although not a l l  rich, lea d ers  were and are in s in c e r  
in  l ib e r a td r y  s tr u g g le s  t h is  sort o f th in g  I pm r s fe r in g  to i s  not wi thput i t s  own 
p a r r a l l e l |  c a s e s .And as our lib e r a to r y  stru gg le  id  fo r  the p o o rjl am persuaded that  
the r i s in g  masses must f in d  in  th e ir  ranks men and women who^  clhhough fa r  from b ein g  
r ic h  m a ter ia lly ^ a rs  r ic h  in  id eas
About m arriage I have th is  to sa y .I  f e e l  s tro n g ly  the need o f g e tt ij ig  
married.And t h is  i s  one f e e l in g  which X ’gave t o t a l ly  f a i l e d  to  ignore or flefy .Sut  
s in c e  I en visage for m yself a  l i f e  l ik e  that of the G ypsies or to r e fe r  to  our pwn 
contemporary educated and c i v i l i s e d  Gypsy ; l ik s  that o f the Rev. M ichael Scott,vrwho i s  
prepared td> l i v e  a noraadic l i f e  for the sake o f the underio g s ,I  do not know i f  i t  
would be f a ir  to  my w ife  to  nut her in  such a p o s it io n  as to l i v e  an almost d eserted  
l i f e .
However, s in c e  the gripping id ea  of m nrriag5 i s  a c tu a lly  s tra n g lin g  my 
mind I sfeall come and d is c u s s  th i3  q u estion  with Father to  g e t h is  ad v ie 1® s .  I c\m bold  - 
enough to do so because o f  the fa th e r ly  in v ita t io n  which Father extended to me in  
h is  l e t t e r  he wrote kwccxxxx: 2 years and 1 day ago?a l e t t e r avh ich  Father wrote on the 
23rd January,1951.
301
V i
' M?" preparedness to  r e s ig n  w oulj not have 'been f u l ly  uncovered i f  I d id
v-not :.iatnt ion  another great man whose message in c ited ?  and inpirecL u*#He i s  our Arch- 
'{Hishop o f  0 op a town, Path er Clayton.He was d e liv e r in g  an address at Michaelhoou.se on 
■:the 3rd November ,1 9 5 2 ,H e'd ec la red ,1*Safety  F ir s t  as a Rule i s  »o ttan u ,and fo r  my 
/ p a rt I was prepared to  "believe him^aL though he was r e fe r in g  th is  to another great 
' men,Mr S n e llj th e  then  P r in c ip a l who was le a v in g  fo r  Bhodesia ter a sch oo l on
B im ilar l in e s  l ik e  Michaelhou.se* s .
Perhaps to you Father tyhat I have sa id  might appear to he l i k e  a stor: 
t o ld  by an i c i o t  j_lu.11 Ox sound and ±urviSj.gm j.ym g nothing,H ut a f te r  g iv in g  th ese  
d e ta ile d  reasons fo r  re s ig n a tio n  I humbly free  Father to pass judgment on my action*  
Hence I was not very  keen to meet Father before I w rite  th is  l e t t e r ,
I do n o t know ju s t  how Father w i l l  f e e l . l t  i s  not my h a b it to  judge at 
fa c e  va lu e and th e r e fo r e  X our m eeting (nay I c a l l  i t  a co ll& ssion ) y esterd a y  
provided  me w ith no p o in te r  as to Father*® decided view* as aga in st th e  happy mood 
perhaps irapodod on th e  spur o f  the moment c a lc u la te d  to  make me f e e l  com fortab le .
L a stly  may X adm it,I might have wronged you Father by my short comings 
1 might have d isap p o in ted  you Father by f a i l in g  to l i v e  up to e x p e c ta t io n s ,I  might 
have su rp rised  you Father by r e v e a lin g  the absence o f thoee n o t-so - ig n o r a b le -q u a li­
t i e s  * h icb  were so m an ifest in  my la t e  beloved  Father .But I ask th at a l l  these,m y  
u g ly  reminders,may not only be fo r g o tte n  but a lso  fo rg iv en  although I am out to  
behave l i k e  th e  F ro d ig a l Son,
As I typ e out the l a s t  sen tences o f  th is  l e t t e r  ,a  p e t i t io n  and p i t a  
fo r  understanding in  actu a l f a c t , I  f e e l  the weight o f unw iilifcgaass to meet you 
d im in ish  and s in k  to  n oth ingness l ik e  a re lea v ed  H eurotic whose s p e l l  has j jn s t  
been e x p e lled  from w ith in  him. And from now onwardstI make-bold to  s a y ,I  s h a ll  not 
*^keep se c r e t  any c f  my fu tu re pl^ns^from you,any o f  my Father* s and Mother* s fr ie n d s , 
'# h y re la tiv e s  and w e ll-w ish ers ,A etb er^ b feg y  would cause you a year*s nightm are or th ey  
would r e a d ily  command your f u l l  approval,
I rem ain,
Yourx Son,
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